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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE SOUND OF SILENCE: IDEOLOGY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND RACIAL 
INEQUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY CURAÇAO 
By 
Angela E. Roe 
Florida International University, 2016  
Miami, Florida  
Professor Jean Muteba Rahier, Major Professor 
This dissertation addresses racism in contemporary Curaçao—a former Dutch 
colony in the Caribbean that remains a component of the Kingdom of The Netherlands.  
The dissertation theorizes racism as a partially hidden constituent of the island’s ideology 
of national identity, which throughout its history has emulated hybridity before being 
influenced, more recently, by multiculturalism. The research’s main objective is to 
uncover the ways race and racism have been entangled with Curaçao’s hegemonic 
ideology of national identity, a reality too often omitted and always under-theorized in 
Dutch and Dutch Caribbean scholarship.  
Using historical, ethnographic, statistic, and discourse analysis data, the 
dissertation reveals how profound the operations of race have been on Curaçaoan society, 
and on all Curaçaoans on the island and in the diaspora. It discusses the historical 
formation of ideologies of race and national identity in Curaçao, to contribute to the 
explanation of the current state of race relations on the island. It exposes the silencing 
impacts that the hegemonic ideology of national identity has had on individual 
Curaçaoans’ understanding of self through the reflexive presentation of an 
 ix 
intergenerational family history. The dissertation ends with ethnographic analytic 
descriptions of five neighborhoods differently located in Curaçao’s racial/spatial order, 
which reveal the mechanizations of multiculturalism and the prevalence of racism.  
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Introduction 
Trouble in Paradise: An Introduction to the Study of Race and Nation in Curaçao 
 
Your silence will not protect you. 
 – Audrey Lorde 
 
Introduction 
This research started in the year 2000, when I traveled from my country of birth, the 
Netherlands, to my mother’s small Caribbean island. It was my first visit to Curaçao 
without my parents (see map 1).  
Map 1. The island of Curaçao 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao 
Driving with my cousin through the worn, hot streets of Willemstad, on my way to my 
aunt’s house, I was excited. Finally I was “home again,” in a world that I had always 
carried inside while growing up in the Netherlands, but that had never been my own. I 
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was 24, in the midst of my M.A. program in cultural anthropology in Amsterdam, and 
Lord!, was I ready for a long summer of partying and lounging on tropical beaches 
trimmed with azure blue waters. Little did I know. That evening, I had just finished 
unpacking, my aunt told me the one rule of her household. She said: “You can do 
anything you like, just don’t come home with a black man.” 
 The world stopped in its tracks. Never in my life had I expected to hear such a 
racist comment from one of my own relatives. But there it was. I was very confused: after 
all, my own mother was black. I wondered if maybe my aunt was making a joke. Unsure 
about how to interpret her words I had almost forgotten about it, when a few nights later I 
went on a date with a very dark skinned young man. I had met him in a bar with my 
cousin, and we had talked the evening away.  
I did not yet have a driver’s license, so he picked me up at home. My aunt, who 
had been curious—not to say suspicious—about my date, asked him in for lemonade. She 
invited him to sit down on one of the chairs on the porch, and positioned herself on the 
armrest of another chair, so she was higher up than he was. Up to that moment she had 
been her warm and cheerful self, so I was fully unsuspecting of what came next. While 
my new friend took a sip from his glass my aunt cocked her head back and started her 
interrogation. “What neighborhood are you from? What car do you drive? What school 
did you go to? What is your job?” On and on she went. Her tone was demanding, and 
demeaning. I watched in horror how my date sank into the porch chair, a bit deeper with 
every question she hurled at him. My brown skinned aunty, the sister of my brown 
skinned mother, asked all those questions in order to determine what kind of “black” 
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person this young man was: rich or poor, proper or “disputable.” She had been dead 
serious after all, about me not bringing home a black man.  
 He respectfully and honestly answered all her questions. After a few never ending 
minutes she released us. I could tell that she was not at all pleased with my choice: this 
young man was not from an upscale neighborhood, he did not have a high education, he 
repaired air conditioners, and his dented, old Toyota station wagon did not qualify as a 
respectable car. All of that had not troubled me one bit during our lively conversation, a 
few nights back. But what did trouble me was my aunt’s interrogation. I was livid. And in 
shock, unsure about how to retort to my aunt, and what to say to my new friend. The date 
did not go very well. We went to the movies, we spoke about what happened, but still, 
after that date he never called me again or pick up his phone. I did not blame him. But my 
aunt, all summer long I contemplated what to say to her about her behavior. I was too 
shocked and angry to share my thoughts with her. But in that angry silence that night 
festered inside of me. It hurt. It festered even more when she tried to shame me through 
gossiping to other people about why I was so interested in black men. The word came 
back to me that she was telling people that I like “them” for their penises, which in 
Curaçaoan lore are of equal mythical proportions as elsewhere in the world.  
Up to then, I had adored my aunty. But this summer ended that. Her instruction 
had first of all revealed racist principles that to all likelihood not only shaped her 
perception, but that had also affected my Caribbean family at large, which is spread out 
over Surinam, Curaçao, Aruba, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, it made me realize that these racist tenets were to all likelihood common to 
how Curaçaoans thought, lived and breathed: they were an indication of a much larger 
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problem. And thirdly, this ugly scene on the porch confronted me with my own ignorance 
of race and racism. Until then I had grown up in predominantly white middle-class 
surroundings, where I—a light skinned mixed-race woman—was perceived as an exotic 
“Other,” just like my darker-skinned mother was. But I did not realize that this 
“exotification” and “otherization” were in fact manifestations of racism. I had never 
considered how race and racism adversely affected the lives of my mother and myself. 
Why did I not know about these things, and why had I never asked?  
That summer became the start of this study, a plunge down the rabbit hole of 
Curaçao’s pigmentocracy. I never challenged my aunt openly about what she had said 
and why, that night on the porch. I knew her well enough to know that she would deny 
anything that could ever be held against her. But I could not let this rest. Instead, my 
outrage towards her, and my annoyance at my own profound ignorance regarding race 
and racism developed into an academic inquiry. After obtaining my MA degree in the 
Netherlands it eventually led me to pursue a Ph.D. in Miami, and then brought me back 
to Curaçao, where I started a lengthy field study, wrote this dissertation, and wrote, 
directed, and co-produced the documentary film Sombra di Koló (“The Shadow of Color” 
2014) on race relations, which has traveled around the world. Sixteen years lie between 
that dreaded evening in June and the day of completing this work. But I got my answer, 
to my question if this racial exclusion was my aunt’s outdated belief, or if this was in fact 
normal to Curaçao, and why I had been so unknowing of the way race shaped our lives, 
including our choice of who we came home with.  
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Curaçao: a Racial Paradise? 
This dissertation addresses racism in contemporary Curaçao as a partially hidden 
constituent of the island’s ideology of national1 identity, which emulates cultural, ethnic 
and racial diversity, and which in recent decades has adopted multiculturalism. At first 
glance, anti-black racism does not appear to be much of an issue in contemporary 
Curaçao, a small island in the Dutch Caribbean (see map 2) with a population of 
approximately 150.000 people who over the centuries have become ethnically and 
racially diverse, while remaining predominantly of African descent (Allen 2009a; Hartog 
1961b; Römer 1979).  
Map 2. Curaçao in the Caribbean Basin 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao, adapted by me 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Until 2010, Curaçao was governed as one of five island territories of the former Netherlands Antilles. On 
October 10th 2010 Curaçao and St. Martin became constituent countries within the Dutch Kingdom, 
together with Aruba and the Netherlands. The other islands, Saba, Statia and Bonaire are oversees 
municipalities of the Netherlands. Consequently, Curaçao is not a sovereign nation state, but I argue that it 
certainly is a nation. Though influenced by Dutch national discourse and ideology, the island has its own 
specific history and national culture, which has always differed significantly from the Netherlands. Its 
population uses an ideology of common descent, the Yu’i Kòrsou identity that connects them to the soil of 
this island. Curaçao has its own currency, language, flag, and anthem. 
 
 6 
Curaçaoans praise the Yu’i Kòrsou or “Child of Curaçao” ideology of national 
identity. This ideology suggests that all Curaçaoans are perceived as equal, regardless of 
their ethnic or racial profile. It replaced the racial inequality and segregation of black and 
white that characterized the island’s colonial era, and celebrates cultural, ethnic and racial 
diversity and promulgates unity. Today Curaçao prides itself for its diverse society, and 
tourism capitalizes on it. Any visitor to the island will be immersed in “diversity”: in 
ethnic groups, in the multitude of languages, musical styles, cuisines and religions that 
have become part and parcel of the island culture or cultures, and in the abundant collage 
of phenotypes one encounters in the streets.  
The culturally, ethnically and racially diverse make-up of Curaçaoan society dates 
back to colonial times. Curaçao is small in size, but it occupied a prominent role in the 
Dutch Empire (see map 3), which was not as large as the British, French and Spanish 
empires, but still held a significant position in the colonial world.  
The Dutch started their imperial enterprise in Asia at the beginning of the 17th 
century. Because of its strong naval force soon thereafter they successfully extended their 
pursuits to the Western hemisphere. In spite of the relatively small amounts of territories 
in their possession, during the 17th century the Dutch were a key player in the global 
market (Wolf 1982) and the transatlantic slave trade (Oostindie 2000:18). 
In 1635 the Dutch confiscated Curaçao, a small, dry island off the coast of 
Venezuela. It served as a slave market from which slaves were shipped to other parts of 
the Americas, and as a popular trading hub of the Dutch West India Company. Both legal 
and contraband trade brought people from all over the world to its shores (Rupert 2012). 
The major population segments, however, where those of the white Dutch colonials and 
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Portuguese Jews, and the enslaved Africans. Ideology of racial inequality—foundational 
to colonialism and slavery—determined their interaction. 
  
Map 3. The Dutch Empire in the 17th, 18th and 19th Century  
 
Source: Wikimaps 
The dark green areas refer to the 17 and 18th century territories of the Dutch West India Company, light 
green to those of the Dutch East India Company, and yellow to the territories occupied during the 19th 
century. 
 
The construction of the prestigious Royal Dutch Shell oil refinery in 1915 marked 
the beginning of the island’s industrialization. Large numbers of immigrants from the 
Caribbean, Europe, Asia and the Middle East moved to the island, eager to profit from 
the economic boost (Dalhuizen et al 1997; Oostindie 2000; Römer 1979, 1998). Between 
1915 and 1965 Curaçao’s population more than quadrupled, growing from 33,000 people 
to 136,289 (Römer 1981:45). Today, Curaçao has become home to 160 different 
nationalities (Ministry of Social Development, Labor & Welfare 2014:3).  
During the industrial era colonialism’s racially exclusionist ideology, which had 
explicitly separated black and white, was replaced with one that promulgated a first sense 
of a national unity in racial diversity. The old colonial elites had to ensure that the black 
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masses would not overthrow them, but instead formed a willing proletariat. In the face of 
this rapid population growth the first rendition of the “Child of Curaçao” or Yu’i Kòrsou 
ideology of national identity sought to evoke a sense of unity among the old black and 
white population segments, based on the metaphor of black and white alike being born to 
the island’s soil (Römer 1979). This ideology served to protect white dominance, both 
from the black masses and from the new Dutch colonials that were sent to the island to 
run the increasingly complicated administration.    
The refinery brought prosperity to many. Curaçao’s black working class, 
however, remained stuck at the bottom of the economic ladder. In between 1948 and 
1964 the refinery downsized drastically, firing 75% of its employees (Verton 1977:61). 
Economic recess hit hard, and impacted especially the black working class. On a sunny 
Friday in May of 1969, a union-led strike of Wescar laborers—a company that worked 
for Shell—attracted thousands of laborers from various companies (Römer 1979:162). 
They gathered at the gates of the refinery to protest against their abominably low wages 
and the many lay-offs. The strikers eventually decided to head towards town. Along the 
way more and more people joined. Decades if not centuries of pent up anger over racial 
inequality, poverty and lack of social upward mobility began to boil over. People looted 
stores and burned cars. The police intervened. When one of the leaders of the revolt, Papa 
Godett, was shot, the already tumultuous protest turned into a violent uproar in which 
people not only looted but burned down stores in the inner city center (Römer, 1979:163). 
The Dutch military put an end to the chaos.  
The city burned for days, and the government fell. New elections were held, after 
which it was replaced by an administration that allegedly was more representative of 
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Curaçao’s black masses. As for example Gert Oostindie’s collection of stories about the 
revolt (Curaçao 30 Mei, 1999a) indicates, many people argued that “race did not initiate 
the revolt.” But people from all sides, from different racial and class backgrounds, all say 
that the revolt started over poverty, and the continued marginalization of black people 
(Committee May 30 1970; Oostindie 1999a; 1999b; Römer 1974, 1979). Thus, even 
though the revolt had not been planned, and was never deliberately and explicitly geared 
at resolving racial inequality, it would become a turning point in Curaçao’s black 
empowerment, and the start of Curaçao’s multiculturalism. 
In the decades after the revolt, opportunities for education, employment, and 
social, cultural and political engagement increased considerably for Afrocuraçaoans 
(Allen, 2007; Oostindie, 1999a; 2000; Römer, 1979). As a consequence Afrocuraçaoans 
have pervaded the middle and upper classes, which has brought many to reason away the 
claim that racial inequality survives in contemporary Curaçao, even though in today’s 
colorist society blackness continues to be associated with inferiority and lower social 
standing.  
Immediately after the revolt the interim government—still dominated by the old 
elites—initiated significant social reform. Three black men were appointed to the highest 
governing positions of the island: Curaçao got its first black governor, lieutenant 
governor and prime minister (Reinders 1993). From the 1970s the prohibition on racism 
and all other forms of discrimination, already part of the constitution, became part of the 
criminal code. Furthermore, several international treaties were ratified in which Curaçao 
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agreed to combat discrimination in all forms2. A new version of the Yu’i Kòrsou 
ideology of national identity was adopted that propagated increased intercultural equality, 
the celebration of diversity and an increased visibility and appreciation of Afrocuraçaoan 
culture and Curaçao’s creole language. Diversity has become a key component of the 
Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national identity, and “multiculturalism” a buzzword in 
Curaçaoan policies, reports, tourism and everyday vernacular. This is reflected in the 
2001 governmental cultural policy plan, which provides the following definition of the 
Yu’i Kòrsou, one that is still in official use today (Allen 2012b:1): 
A yu-di-Kòrsou is someone who lives in Curaçao or abroad, and who fits the 
following criteria. He/she speaks and understands Papiamentu. He/she is willing 
to work to advance Curaçao. He/she can declare to the world that he is a yu-di-
Kòrsou and accepts his/her culture and history without any shame. He/she accepts 
and adheres to Curaçao’s multicultural situation, and accepts cultural diversity. 
He/she does not consider cultural elements of his/her ethnic group to be Curaçao’s 
culture, but he/she considers them as part of Curaçao’s culture. He/she accepts 
that Afrocuraçaoan elements dominate the majority part of Curaçaoan culture 
(Rosalia 2001:10) 3.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See appendix II for an overview of Curaçao’s anti-discrimination legislation. 
 
3 This definition shows the two components that over time have become part of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology, 
as scholars like Rose Mary Allen (2006), Aart Broek (1994) and René Römer (1974) illustrate. In the first 
half of the 20th century the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology indicated that the Yu’i Kòrsou were the white, black and 
mixed populations of the colonial era vis-à-vis the large influx of immigrants. Eventually it became more 
inclusive and also included the large immigrant population. In the 1980s, when emancipation and the civil 
rights movements of that time instilled in people a stronger appreciation of blackness, Afrocuraçaoan 
culture and folklore, as well as the Papiamentu language became the core of this national identity. Hence, 
the real Yu’i Kòrsou was black (Allen 2006; Broek 1994; and Römer 1974). In this more recent version we 
see that one no longer has to be born on the island or have a parent who is to be a Yu’i Kòrsou. In my field 
research I have found that the most important qualifications are speaking Papiamentu, being well versed in 
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The cultural policy plan defines “multiculturalism” as “different cultures that are 
co-existing in interaction” (Rosalia 2001:12)4. This definition reflects the way in which 
the word is commonly used in Curaçao’s society, presupposing equal appreciation and 
respect for the island’s various cultural groups. White supremacy, which is part and 
parcel of multiculturalism, remains largely unaddressed by academia, the government and 
in the mainstream media. It has been predominantly because of the work of local NGO’s, 
artists, scholars, political activists and cultural workers that the development and 
appreciation of Afrocuraçaoan culture has increased, and the position of Afrocuraçaoans 
in society at large has strengthened.  
Still, in spite of their important work and the pro-black reforms that have been 
taking place, the persisting racial inequality has remained a sensitive subject in everyday 
conversations. People do not discuss race much—if at all. It does not easily arise in 
intimate settings, or in public or governmental discourse. The existing legal instruments 
are severely underused. In conversations with both the Ombudsman and the President of 
the Court of Justice I learned that people rarely file official complaints when they have 
been discriminated against, and that such complaints virtually do not amount to court 
cases or prosecution5. During my data gathering process it repeatedly became apparent 
that many Curaçaoans are insufficiently informed about their rights and the legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the island culture, history and folklore, and loving the island and making a valuable contribution to its 
advancement. I also found that all these versions of the definition remain active, and that being 
Afrocuraçaoan is an important element. 
 
4 “Diferente kultura huntu den relashon” literally translates as “different cultures together in relation.” 
 
5 The Ombudsman who served until 2015 informed me in a conversation that in the past decade no 
complaints were filed on the basis of racial discrimination, and in an email the President of the Court 
informed me unofficially that on very rare occasion lawyers have presented cases on the grounds of racism, 
but this does not easily lead to actual criminal charges being pressed, or to prosecution. 
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instruments available to them: some are even unaware that racism is in fact illegal. The 
anti-discrimination legislation that has existed for over four decades has yet to be 
translated into nation-wide awareness of these instruments, as well as in organizations 
and institutions that facilitate and encourage their access and use. These findings are 
corroborated by those in the Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of 
African Descent, which visited Curaçao in between June 24th and 28th 2014 with the aim 
to assess the current situation of people of African descent. The report states that: 
[t]he Working Group was concerned that racial discrimination is considered a 
“taboo” subject and identified a lack of understanding within the society about its 
manifestations. As a result, cases of racial discrimination against people of 
African descent in Curaçao are not being reported to the authorities (UN 2015:4). 
This is lack of reporting is aggravated by the fact that “there is no national human rights 
institution or an equality body” (UN 2015:6,7). The Working Group also commented on 
the underrepresentation of Afrocuraçaoan judges (UN 2015:15) in Curaçao’s Court of 
Justice6.  
What’s more, when the topic of racial inequality does arise, it stands out to me 
that people fervently adhere to the island’s “inclusive” Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national 
identity, to reason away the racial part of the inequality. The common perception is that 
discrimination and especially anti-black racism belongs to a colonial past. In this day and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “The Working Group also learned that there were limited possibilities to learn the Dutch legal system and 
it was highly inaccessible to ordinary Curaçaoans. The University of Curaçao has a law faculty where 
Curaçaoan law (very similar to Dutch law) can be studied. Though after studying law, one still has to 
obtain additional training in the Netherlands before being able to open a law practice. As a consequence, 
there are very few native Curaçaoan judges in the court system in Curaçao. The Working Group’s request 
to meet the Ombudsman for further clarity in this matter was not successful” (UN 2015:15). 	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age all are equal, and ethnicity, race and phenotype no longer matter. One’s misfortunes 
are therefore not caused by the systemic racial inequality that results from a long history 
of race-based exploitation, but by one’s own abject behavior or lack of perseverance. 
This, as we will see in subsequent sections, is a tenet of “colorblind” or “raceless” racism 
(Bonilla-Silva 2010).  
In arguing that “all are equal,” this ideology of national identity places the 
intricate mechanizations of persisting white supremacy out of sight. White privilege 
remains normal and natural. People are acutely aware of the prevalence of racial 
inequality, especially with regards to people of African descent, but they often do not see 
or suspect that there is a broad, institutionalized dimension to racial inequality (see 
Goldberg 2002). This structural base, upon which I will elaborate in the following 
subsections and chapters, like the bottom of an iceberg, remains largely “hidden” from 
the masses, whether they identify as white, black or any other racial category. We may 
know that the iceberg has a bottom, but we do not know how big it is, and what shape it 
has. Consequently, people may know that racism and oppressive and marginalizing 
measures exist, but they do not know how extensive they are, and how—exactly—they 
operate.  
But masses and elites—whose precise members are not easily identified and 
which are thus not easily delineated—are ultimately socialized into the same norm and 
value system (Goldberg 1993; Koeningsberg 2009; Smith 2010 and Applebaum et al 
2003). The elites thus perpetuate this system in part without having a clear awareness of 
the full extent of its mechanizations. Nonetheless, I use the word “hidden” to signal the 
deliberate intent on the part of the elites in not making the perpetuation of structural 
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oppression visible, and preserving their privileges. It also signals the reluctance, of black 
and white people alike, to explicitly address racism. Like with an iceberg, one has to 
remind oneself that there is an underwater part, for to the unsuspecting eye they appear to 
float on the surface; the bottom is unseen. In similar fashion, the impacts of race and 
racism can also be reasoned away and denied to the extend that we indeed believe that it 
no longer exists, which is what colorblind and raceless ideologies seek to do.   
With regards to scholarly works on Curaçao, numerous Curaçaoan and Dutch 
scholars such as Rose Mary Allen (2007), Alejandro Paula (1967), René Rosalia (1997) 
and Gert Oostindie (2000)—to name only a few—have explicitly addressed that this 
inequality has its roots in colonial times. Yet, their scholarship has not yet amounted to 
the development of theoretically substantiated, in-depth studies on race, racism, racial 
inequality and multiculturalism in Curaçao, or to policies by the Curaçaoan government 
directed at racism’s dissolve. 
As is the case across the African Diaspora, in Curaçao too, much has changed in 
the relations between the black and white population segments. But racism and racial 
inequality have far from disappeared. In their contemporary form they are largely 
unaddressed, to the point that to many it appears as if racism indeed no longer exists.  
 
Research Objective and Contribution 
The main objective of this dissertation is to critically analyze and theorize Curaçao’s 
contemporary racism as a partly hidden constituent of its ideology of national identity of 
the Yu’i Kòrsou. Curaçao’s 1969 revolt, which corresponded with the era of the civil 
rights movements in the U.S., challenged the existing status quo of Curaçao’s race 
 15 
relations. But race and racial inequality have remained topics that are too often omitted, 
especially in political debate and policy making. This omission is furthermore clearly 
reflected in the academic literature on Curaçao, which is predominantly generated in 
Curaçao and in the Netherlands. Scholars address a wide range of topics that pertain to 
Curaçao’s white and black populations. However, the explicit and comprehensive study 
of race, race relations, racialism, racial inequality, racism and multiculturalism is largely 
absent from this body of work.7 Many studies have referred to Curaçao’s issues of racial 
inequality (see for example Allen 1996, 2006, 2007; Hoetink 1958; van Hulst 1997; 
Oostindie 2000; Paula 1967; Römer 1979, 1998, 2003), and various studies have 
explicitly focused on the national Yu’i Kòrsou narrative (Allen 2009a; Broek 1994; 
Römer 1979). Yet I have not come across studies that operationalize race, or explicitly 
theorize and analyze the ramifications of racial differences in Curaçao and their 
connection to hegemonic formations and structural inequalities. Also, the reinforcement 
of hegemonic ideologies under neo-liberalism and multiculturalism are not themes that 
are easily addressed in a theoretically substantiated manner, if at all. Racial inequality is 
commonly framed in the context of statements about cultural and ethnic differences and 
social change.  
This research seeks to fill this injurious gap in the scholarship, by pioneering a 
theoretical and empirical exploration of contemporary race relations on the island, and 
the role that hegemonic ideology plays in these. I expect that my approach will generate 
ample new insights regarding the historical interrelatedness of race and nation in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Harry Hoetink (1958), Alejandro Paula (1967) and René Römer (1979) do explicitly write in racial terms. 
But it is noteworthy that more recent publications tend to avoid the notion of race, and especially racism.  
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Curaçao. With this original research on Curaçao, which wants to bring into focus current 
racial inequalities and how these are supported by hegemonic ideology, I want to open up 
a space wherein constructive solutions can be debated and adopted. In doing so, I hope to 
contribute to the disciplines of anthropology and sociology, and to a number of multi- 
and inter-disciplinary fields of inquiry: race and racism studies, creolization studies, 
multicultural studies, and Caribbean and African Diaspora studies. My research results 
should be of use to a broad range of policy-makers and educators in, but not limited to, 
Curaçao, and to individual Curaçaoans and others seeking extended awareness regarding 
racism and black empowerment. 
Naturally, this doctoral study is far from panoptic and conclusive. I focus 
predominantly on hegemonic ideology and how that persists in people’s awareness, and 
less on how the masses react to this, or on the precise contributions and contestations that 
the Afrocuraçaoan population makes to dominant culture and ideology. The examination 
of the intricate ways in which the Afrocuraçaoan population responds to racism in overt 
and hidden ways certainly is the follow up project. Because I have split these two foci up 
the current study appears somewhat one-sided. Although black agency, resistance and 
empowerment surface continuously throughout this dissertation, these themes do not 
constitute the theoretical and analytical core of this dissertation. Nonetheless, this study is 
still embedded in praxis theory (Berger and Luckmann 1972; Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 
1978; Giddens 1984, 1995; Gramsci 1971). I very much acknowledge the complexity of 
power relations: the nation’s masses are never passive recipients of ruling class culture 
and ideology, but always active agents or actors that create the system that is also passed 
on to them.  
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What’s more, through my current focus on ideology I attempt to reveal how 
persistent racial inequality is, and how it is deeply woven into the fabric of society. 
Therefore, at times my analyses may sound as if this system is fixed, as if the elites are 
quintessentially far more powerful than the masses they seek to dominate, and as if the 
future holds naught but ever-lasting doom and damnation for the oppressed. But nothing 
is further from the truth. The past has shown us that dominance is never permanent, and 
that the subjugated never simply subject. Hegemony is dependent on its silences and its 
“invisibility:” on people perceiving their oppression as normal and natural to the point 
that they do not challenge it. Therefore, seeking to unveil at least some of hegemony’s 
mechanizations—as I do in this thesis—is my deliberate act of counter-hegemonic 
activism. 
 
Theorizing Race and Nation 
Curaçao is a “pseudo-nation,” since the island has never reached sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, as a territory that is 4,240 nautical miles8 removed from its superordinate 
nation-state, the Netherlands, Curaçao has its own specific history, culture, population 
composition, legislation, government, and even language, which all mark it as very 
different from the Netherlands. I argue that Curaçao functions much the same as a 
“regular” nation would. In fact, it shares very little national binding with the Netherlands 
other than remaining a territory “belonging” to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which 
means that it is bound to its Charter. Since Curaçao functions much like autonomous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/distances.html?n=722 
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nations do, I consider it particularly relevant to use the conceptualizations of ideologies 
of national identity studies.  
 
Defining Race and Racism 
Even though biological and natural scientists reject the validity of “race” as a sound 
biological concept to categorize humans, for social scientists “race” is a social construct 
that functions in society (in many societies) as if it had the biological credentials it 
doesn’t have (Armelagos and Goodman 1998; Omi and Winant 1998; Cornell and 
Hartmann 2007). Yet, to view race solely as a social construct obscures its 
mechanizations. Stuart Hall (1992) warns that in spite of its mythical foundations race 
still appears to stem from the domain of the natural and the biological. This naturalness 
makes race appear static and essential, and renders its changeability and historicity 
relatively invisible, which—as Cornell and Hartman argue (2007)—allows it “to play 
such a powerful role in legitimizing and rationalizing social hierarchies and inequalities” 
(Cornell and Hartman 2007:39). Bonilla-Silva (2010) argues that in spite of its 
constructedness, race entails a social reality that “produces real effects on the actors 
racialized as ‘black’ or ‘white’” (2010:9). This, he argues, makes it appear as if it were a 
constant and unchanging entity.  
Race is thus necessarily contextual and is always one of the axes along which 
national power is exercised (Goldberg 2002). Bonilla-Silva writes about “racial structure” 
and “racial ideology.” The concept “racial structure” refers to “the totality of the social 
relations and practices” that protect and perpetuate the privileges of the dominant group 
(Bonilla-Silva 2010:9). The “racially based frameworks used by actors to explain and 
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justify (dominant race) or challenge (subordinate race or races) the racial status quo,” on 
the other hand, comprise a society’s “racial ideology” (Bonilla-Silva 2010:9, see also 
Omi and Winant 1998). After all, ideology is one of the main instruments within the play 
of power because it allows the dominant group to generate a primary perspective that 
legitimizes, safeguards and perpetuates its superiority  (Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 1978; 
Giddens 1984, 1995; Gramsci 1971). The racial ideology defines the different racial 
groups within a population, it hierarchizes them according to its norms, and it legitimizes 
and indoctrinates this hierarchy as well as the racial structure through which this 
hierarchy is institutionalized and thus operated (Memmi 2000). This brings us to the core 
of racism.  
As is the case with race, there is a wide range of definitions of racism. I work with 
two definitions in particular. The first one states that: “Racism is a negative attitude 
towards persons in virtue of their race” (Arthur 2007:14). It emphasizes the fact that 
racism does not so much specify actions but rather generates attitudes that stem from the 
inherent negative norms defined in the racial ideology (Arthur 2007). These attitudes 
vary from hostility to indifference to reluctance even, and can be explicit or hidden, 
conscious or unconscious (Arthur 2007). The second definition I find particularly 
worthwhile was crafted by Albert Memmi (2000):  
Racism is a generalizing definition and valuation of differences, whether real or 
imaginary, to the advantage of the one defining and deploying them [accusateur], 
and to the detriment of the one subjected to that act of definition [victim], whose 
purpose is to justify (social or physical) hostility and assault [aggression] (Memmi 
2000:100).  
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This definition highlights the power dimension of racism, which, in an indispensible 
functionalist sense, allows for an understanding of the motivation behind the act. 
 
Hegemony 
Inspired by the works of Antonio Gramsci (1971), W.E.B. Du Bois (1903), Sidney Mintz 
(1985), Eric Williams (1994/1944), Leslie Carr (1997), David Goldberg (1993; 2002), I 
use a perspective that builds on contemporary Marxist theories to examine the 
interrelation between race and nation. This study specifically focuses on ideology as a 
tool used by the ruling class to organize the nation and exert dominance. Nationalism, a 
specific kind of hegemonic ideology, has the ability to imagine and instill a sense of 
belonging in people, a sense of roots, of shared identity, history, culture and territory. It 
instills a sense of solidarity that binds individuals to the “nation” (Cornell and Hartmann 
2007; Smith 1993). Hegemony thus engenders allegiance and loyalty through 
indoctrination of the masses.  
Gramsci (1971), who coined the notion of hegemony, stated that the nation 
always educates the masses into who belongs to the in-group, and who does not (see also 
Hall, 1999; Foucault, 1977). It does so in a way that makes dominant norms and values 
appear as natural, self-evident, self-imposed, and self-created thoughts of individuals. 
This is what makes it eventually harder to contest this ideology and its naturalized 
hierarchies (Goldberg, 1993). And that is precisely what hegemony revolves around. 
Where there is hegemony, there is a significant level of consent from the subjugated 
masses: they espouse the perspective of the ruling and governing power to the extent that 
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this perspective becomes normalized and naturalized. Even though people are aware of 
oppression or injustice, they do not contest it.  
To Gramsci (1971) the ruling elites are always plural, and comprised of various 
groups and social classes with shifting alliances. Gramsci calls this the “historic bloc” 
(Gramsci 1971:771): sections from different class layers that seek allegiances to bring a 
shared ideology to the level of hegemonic dogmas. In Gramsci’s understanding neither 
elites nor working classes are homogenous, Hall argues; they are quintessentially divided 
by “conflicting interests, historically segmented and fragmented in this actual course of 
historical formation” (Hall 1986:14). Unity within a class segment has to be forged, and 
must never be assumed. Dominant discourses are always in close dialogue with the 
masses that they speak to. Therefore, the various media used to broadcast dominant 
ideology are therefore not a one-way channel from elite to masses, but rather a space in 
which rivaling social forces battle and negotiate for power. Hegemony is powerful 
because it is internalized, naturalized and operates virtually unseen, but it is never static. 
No one is ever powerless, and the dialogue between hegemony and counter-hegemony is 
unending and always in flux. 
  
Race and Nation 
Goldberg (1993, 2002) argues that race came into existence with modernity, and with the 
voyages of discovery and the subsequent era of imperial expansion and colonialism that 
started in the fifteenth century. These led to the rise of industrialism, capitalism, and the 
birth of the nation-state, always premised on, and organized along the lines of race 
(Goldberg 1993, 2002; Said 1993; Williams 1944; Wolf 1994). Devising myths that 
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proclaimed that indigenous peoples did not work the land and thus held no ownership 
over it, which made them “inferior peoples” if human at all, allowed Europeans to 
establish their rule and to begin exploitation and dominance. The soil was “readily” 
available, as was “capital.” And for the endless labor force, Europeans resorted to 
slavery, first putting the indigenous populations to work, but quickly replacing them with 
Africans (Williams 1944; Wolf 1994). Thus, Eric William wrote:  
Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery 
(1944/1994:7); Racial differences made it easier to justify and rationalize Negro 
slavery, to exact the mechanical obedience of a plough-ox or a cart-horse, to 
demand that resignation and that complete moral and intellectual submission 
which alone makes slave labor possible (1944/1994:19).  
Following Williams’ Marxist approach I view race as a most powerful ideological 
construct devised specifically by white colonial elites to implement and instill oppression, 
for the sake of economic gain, and to secure all dimensions of power related to it. Racial 
ideology is part of the ideology of national identity, which it defines, explains, legitimizes 
and perpetuates. Consequently, ideologies of racial superiority became a fundamental 
part of the colonial—and postcolonial—world (Walters 2003:15). Comprised of a set of 
ideologies, attitudes and relations, racism became a vital tool for the exercise of power in 
European expansionism: one that is forever changing and highly context specific, always 
adapting to and interacting with other dimensions of power, even though always 
characterized by white supremacy and black abjection (Goldberg 1993; Memmi 2000).  
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Race and the National “Imagined Community” 
Benedict Anderson (1983) claims that nations only exist by the grace of the imagination. 
Nation building revolves around story telling, and around telling the same story to all 
who can “hear” or read. When the printing press was invented in the 15th century, ideas 
could be fixed into words on paper, and in a standardized way be distributed to 
populations living in large territories. These standardized messages had the power to 
instill into individuals an awareness of a communion with a larger group of people who 
they had never met and would never meet. Among the working classes they raised a 
loyalty to an elite that gloriously and intrepidly safeguarded this collective. Anderson’s 
use of the word “imagined” does not refer to the meaning “invented;” he argues that the 
community “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1983:6).  
Hobsbawm (1983) elaborates on that, connecting Anderson’s imagined 
communities to what he refers to as “invented traditions.” The deliberate construction of 
history and tradition, Hobsbawm argues, is a key tool in the construction of the nation. 
Under the pretext of being firmly rooted in a distant past such stories or national myths 
legitimize the claims groups make regarding inclusion in and exclusion from the nation 
(Hobsbawm 1983, Andermann 2009). This deliberately constructed history and tradition 
serves to strengthen national cohesion, but also explains why not all people living in a 
national territory are invited to participate and take equal part in this comradeship. 
 There are ample ways in which the nation is imagined. Anderson argues that in 
the image that is spread across the nation there are both myths and facts (See also 
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Gramsci, 1971; Hobsbawm, 1983; Trouillot, 1995; and Poria and Ashworth 2009). Under 
the pretext of having the nation firmly rooted in a distant past, national myths naturalize 
the claims groups make about inclusion in and exclusion from the nation. Continuously 
broadcasted through symbols and standardized carriers such as flags, seals, heroes, 
rituals, currencies, monuments, warfare, education, folklore, canonized arts, and 
consumption industries, national narratives instruct multitudes of people participating in 
the nation, be they insiders or outsiders. 
 
Racial Homogeneity and Diversity in the Imagination of the Nation 
Anderson (1983) argued that the nation is quintessentially homogeneous and that racial 
heterogeneity and inequality are anomalies that should be seen as separate from, and 
threatening to, the nation. He argued that racial heterogeneity and racism undermine 
nations’ imagined communities, which are always premised on cohesion through 
homogeneity (Anderson 1983). Will Kymlicka (1995), however, considers racial 
heterogeneity as part of the contemporary nation-state, but as something that is resolved 
through what he calls “liberal multiculturalism.” This he understands as the shift from 
assimilationist to “sincerely” inclusive politics towards minority groups. In Kymlicka’s 
view, liberalization amounts to a decentralization of state power and to the increasing 
efficacy of democracy in resolving inequalities. In his perception, liberalism can dissolve 
racial inequality. 
Goldberg disagrees. In his view, liberalism played a key role in preserving racial 
inequality, and making it an integral and largely unseen part of the nation. He argues that: 
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Liberalism plays a foundational part in this process of normalizing naturalizing 
racial dynamics and racist exclusions. As modernity’s defensive doctrine of self 
and society, of morality and politics, liberalism serves to legitimate ideologically 
and to rationalize politico-economically prevailing sets of racialized conditions 
and racist exclusions. It is thus key in establishing racialized reasoning and its 
racist implications as central to modernity’s moral and social political sense 
(Goldberg 1993:1). 
Liberalism was comprised of a discourse of liberty and equality, while at the same time it 
rationalized and legitimized racial inequality and exploitation. Goldberg argues that the 
ideologies that sprang from liberalism and modernity became embedded into the national 
myths from which the budding nation states were manufactured, and as the oppressed and 
exploited populations resisted their exploitation and marginalization, these ideologies 
became all the more sophisticated, established, indoctrinated and naturalized. For, as 
Goldberg argues, “[t]he modern state, it might be said, founds itself not just on 
exclusions, those absences that render invisible, but on the internalization of exclusions” 
(Goldberg 1993:9). 
In contrast to Anderson, scholars such as Goldberg (1993, 2002), Koeningsberg 
(2009), Smith (2010), and Applebaum et al (2003) argue that nations are highly dynamic, 
complex, yet coherent entities that emerged from the endeavors of colonial exploitation 
and the advent of modernity. In a Marxist view the material base or economic make-up of 
society determines the superstructure, or society’s ideological foundation. The 
superstructure in turn supports and facilitates the needs of the material base (Marx 1859). 
This perspective suggests that any ideology about race most and foremost supports and 
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adjusts to the forever changing economic circumstances. Therefore, Carr argues, as does 
Goldberg, that racism has always been part of the nation.  
After all, the colonial project was premised on the exploitation of non-white 
peoples by white peoples. This exploitation and expansion could only occur successfully 
when these non-white peoples were labeled as both vitally different and inferior to white 
people. In the early days of the colony race was not yet that common as a notion (Carr 
1997), yet the difference between the colonized and the colonizer was phrased as the 
difference between culturally inferior and culturally superior people; as subjugated versus 
dominant. In the 18th and 19th century this distinction became phrased in racial terms. It 
became part and parcel of the founding myths of the young colonizing European nations. 
In these myths, this difference between colonizer and colonized was formulated in such a 
way that it communicated white superiority. Furthermore, it presented a glorified 
narration of the nation’s history that justified exploration, expansion and exploitation. For 
as an ideology, racism defines, explains, legitimizes and perpetuates dominance, and 
informs those partaking in the nation of the “natural” order of things. Through these race-
based national myths, nations thus became organized into elites, working class masses, 
and slaves (Goldberg 1993, 2002; Tilly 1994): an order that is challenged continuously, 
but that still persists. For ideology is highly malleable and easily adaptable, and can be 
shaped to fit the needs of the dominant and to—at least temporarily—defuse the 
contestations of the subjugated9. Racism, too, has always adapted to the needs of the 
elites, and the ways in which the subjugated masses make their claims to equality and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 This also applies when the balance of power flips and new regimes overthrow old ones, as history has 
proven many a time. 	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retribution. So as history passes we witness how the explicitly racist ideologies of 
Curaçao’s colonial days changed into the “color-blind” or “raceless” renditions that shape 
our contemporary societies.  
 
The Ideology of National Identity: From Racial Hybridity to Multiculturalism 
Nations are unavoidably premised on racial inequality and on a politics of race-based 
inclusion and exclusion. Numerous scholars such as Applebaum et al (2003), Goldberg 
(1993, 2003), Koeningsberg (2009), and Smith (2010) address processes that have taken 
place worldwide and across large spans of time, to contend that both those who constitute 
the elites and the racial majority in a nation, and those who are racially otherized and 
made invisible or otherwise marginalized, are constructed and legitimized through 
discourses of purity and racially based ideologies of national identity (Goldberg 1993, 
Koeningsberg 2009, Smith 2010 and Applebaum et al 2003). According to this line of 
theorizing, national myths of population homogeneity serve to create order and unity to 
cover over the “disorder” that heterogeneity and subsequent inequality eventually entails. 
These ideological narratives edify this imagined homogeneity as a lived and natural 
reality, obscuring the ways racial diversity and inequalities structure the nation to 
safeguard the privileges of the elites.  
In “white” nations, such as those of 19th and early 20th century Europe, discourses 
of national homogeneity were perhaps rather easy to craft and impose. However, in the 
much more racially mixed nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, anthropologist 
Jean Muteba Rahier (2003) argues, ideologies of national identity have emulated 
mestizaje, mulataje, and créolité, and presented specific mixed race identities as the 
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prototypical national identity. During the period Rahier called “monocultural mestizaje,” 
which extends from the early 20th century to the late 1980s (Rahier 2012:1-14), most 
countries in the region emulated such ideologies of national identity.  Intellectuals of the 
region writing at the service of the building of these ideologies even foresaw that the 
mestizo race, the “fifth race,” would end up being superior to the then dominant “Anglo-
Saxon race” (see Martínez-Echazabal 1998; Rahier 2003; and the works of Mexican 
philosopher José Vasconcelos 1925, and Brazilian sociologist and anthropologist Gilberto 
Freyre 1933). Hybridity was no longer considered a biological aberration, or a polluting, 
degenerative influence, as colonial ideology had declared. Instead, through miscegenation 
the negative traits and inferiority that had been ascribed to non-white peoples waned 
through mixing with the “superior” white race.  
Contemporary scholars have revealed these ideologies of national identity that 
emulate race mixing as ultimately revolving around the ideal of white supremacy since 
non-whites were supposed to whiten: indeed, these ideologies didn’t prescribed whites to 
mix with non-whites, but instead they showed the way to non-whites to whiten 
themselves culturally and racially (Hale 1996; Hintzen 2002; Martínez-Echazabal 1998; 
Price and Price 1997; Rahier 2003; Sheriff 2001; Skidmore 2002; Stepan 1991). During 
the period of monocultural mestizaje these hegemonic ideologies provided a particular 
narration of the nation in which citizens were nothing but all mestizos...  Those who did 
not phenotypically conform to the prototypical national identity were at the same time 
otherized, invisibilized, and marked as not fully belonging to the nation.  
In Caribbean ideologies of national identity the notion of “creoleness” and 
“creolité” served a similar purpose of unification. The notion of “creole,” in use since the 
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16th century, has a broad range of context-specific meanings that refer to the syncretism 
or cultural mixing that is commonly attributed to “New World societies” (Stewart 
2007:2-3, see also Palmié 2006). This mixing of cultures comprised dramatic loss, 
violence, degradation and inequality (Hall 2003:35), as well “resilience and creativity” 
(Stewart 2007:4).  
In the early 20th century new ruling elites deliberately devised ideologies of 
creoleness (or créolité in Francophone contexts) in order to facilitate their nation building 
endeavors. Creoleness became a trope that signaled hybridity as the essence of the nation. 
It served to erase the stark colonial boundaries between white and black, and to generate 
a national identity that served as an in-between space between “the civilized” and “the 
savage” (Hintzen 2002; Palmié 2006). Creolization—the processes of exchange, mixing, 
reformulation and invention—transformed the cultures and bodies of the heterogeneous 
populations that shared the (former) colonial space “in a regime of identific solidarity” 
(Hintzen 2002:92)10. The propagation of such unity obscured racial inequality, 
perpetuated exploitation and white privilege (Condé 1999; Hintzen 2002; Price and Price 
1997).  
Yet, creolization affected both parties, Hintzen argues: “When applied to 
Europeans, creolisation implies the taint of savagery. When applied to Africans it implies 
a brush with civilization” (Hintzen 2002:94). Thus, ideologies of creolization demarcated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “Creolization” has a broad and varied use. It refers to the early 20th century ideologies of national 
identity devised to create unification in heterogeneous societies, especially in the Caribbean and parts of the 
Americas (Bernabé et al. 1989/1993; Glissant 1995; Hannerz 1987). In more recent times it has been 
adopted by the social sciences as part of theories of cultural mixing, transculturation, and globalization, 
often still referring to, but no longer limited to, the Caribbean (Hall 2003; Khan 2001; Mintz 1998; Stephen 
2007). 
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clear lines between Europe and the New World. The true white European falls outside of 
creole space, while the white Caribbean elite falls outside of white European space and 
can occupy only the top ranks of nationalist creole space. This legitimized European 
superiority while still making white elites in the colonies part of the fraternal unity that 
this creole space proposes (Hintzen 2002). 
 From the 1970s these discourses of alleged unity and equality would come under 
fire (Rahier 2012). Social movements across the region led by progressive white-
mestizos, indigenous people, and Afrodescendants began rejecting mestizaje and 
creoleness as ideologies of national identity (Hale 1996; Rahier 2012; Skidmore 2002). 
They were becoming aware of what Goldberg calls “the tension between racial conditions 
and their denial, racist states and their resistance, and about the ways homogeneity has 
been taken axiologically to trump the perceived threat of heterogeneous states of being” 
(Goldberg 2002:6). Worldwide resistance of subaltern populations emerged everywhere 
in the Global South, while in the U.S. the civil rights era unfolded. Goldberg argues that 
nations and states deflected this resistance with the creation of new ideologies and 
discourses of national identity that embraced multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism 
instead of reifying mestizaje (Goldberg 2002:5, see also Greene 2007; Hale 2002, 2005; 
Rahier 2012), through what Shane Greene calls “state-supported politics of recognition” 
(2007:329). As a novel ideology of national identity multiculturalism refers to nations 
and states officially recognizing the cultural, ethnic, and racial diversity of their 
populations through constitutional reform, geared at acknowledging and protecting the 
rights of these different groups—often indigenous and Afrodescendant populations 
(Brondo 2010; Greene 2007; Hale 2002, 2006; Htun 2004; Rahier 2012; van Cott 2000). 
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Here, it is important to note that while the turn towards multiculturalism 
unfolded—differently in different national contexts—in the 1970s in the Global North 
(mostly the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe), the multicultural turn in Latin America 
and the Caribbean generally took place much later, as it expanded in the 1990s (see 
Rahier 2012). However, in the former Caribbean colonies that were not yet independent 
the multicultural turn was severely impacted by the trajectories chosen by their former 
colonizing nations (Reiter 2013). Greene urges to keep the particularities of the historical, 
cultural and political contexts in which multiculturalisms develop in different nations 
well in sight. He argues that “multiculturalism is not one phenomenon but many” 
(2007:336).  
Multiculturalism is characterized most and foremost by an explicit shift in 
ideology of national identity, expressed in the adoption of new constitutions or major 
constitutional reforms and of laws premised on “inter-cultural equality” (Hale 2002:490).  
What could be called “multicultural legal instruments” (Rahier: personal communication) 
were devised to protect citizens of all and any backgrounds from discrimination, giving 
them a series of “new” rights including but not limited to the constitutional right to 
bilingual education and to collective ownership of ancestral lands for indigenous 
communities (see Brondo 2010; Hale 2002, 2005; Hooker 2005; Greene 2007; Rahier 
2012).  
The multicultural turn potentially provided tools for marginalized populations to 
better fight to improve their socio-economic and political positioning within the nation in 
ways previously unavailable to them. But as it has been argued by a great number of 
scholars, the multicultural turn didn’t really alter the socioeconomic and political order of 
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things in existence before its advent, it simply provided the national elites with a new 
narration of the nation that does not attempt to erase its diversity and that—most of all—
permits the continuation of societal arrangements. A multitude of well-researched Latin 
American case studies show that the practice of multiculturalism has been coming along 
with a wide range of obstructions—sometimes disguised as celebrations of diversity—
which impede or undermine the application of the new law or constitution (see Brondo 
2010; Hale 2002; Greene 2007; Rahier 2012). Hale argues that: 
The great efficacy of neoliberal multiculturalism resides in powerful actors’ 
ability to restructure the arena of political contention, driving a wedge between 
cultural rights and the assertion of the control over resources necessary for those 
rights to be realized. This is not a divide between (endorsed) individual rights and 
(prohibited) collective ones but rather a retooled dichotomy between base and 
superstructure: a Marxist vision returning to social movements as a nightmare. 
(Hale 2005:13) 
Goldberg, who writes about the Global North (2002), presents useful insight in 
the racialized nature of multiculturalism. In his address of the intersection between race 
and nation he particularly critiques “racelessness” or “colorblindness” as components of 
multiculturalism that undercuts the propagated “letter of the law.” Such discourse renders 
race and racial inequality relatively invisible. The consequence is a “relative silencing of 
public analysis or serious discussions of everyday racisms,” (Goldberg 2002:217), which 
makes difficult to address in arenas of public debate, academic analysis, politics and 
policymaking. This relative invisibilization of race and racial inequality also places out of 
sight the causal relation between past oppression and exploitation and contemporary 
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racial marginalization. Instead a positive, whitewashed history is formulated, which 
presents “the indomitable superiority of whites – in prestige, achievements, education, 
wealth, and power – not as a natural phenomenon but as historical outcome” (Goldberg 
2002:212). In the color-blind discourse racial inequality is explained as being the fault of 
the victim. In larger society race no longer matters, the narrative goes: all have equal 
opportunities. People who are disadvantaged owe their misfortune solely to themselves 
and their life choices (Goldberg 2002:217). Through the alleged inclusiveness and 
equality propagated by multiculturalism the actual address of white supremacy is 
deflected (Goldberg 2002; Greene 2007; Hale 2002, 2005; Rahier 2012). 
  In this dissertation, I hypothesize that Curaçao’s Yu’i Kòrsou or “child of 
Curaçao” ideology is one of these ideologies of national identity that has reified 
hybridity, creolization, and especially multiculturalism. Following what Goldberg has 
taught us about the State, I posit that instead of being obsolete, as many claim it is, racism 
is a partially hidden constituent of Curaçao’s ideology of national identity. Though 
cherished by the population, this ideology, like a Trojan horse, is a silent bearer of white 
supremacy, and protects racial inequality at the detriment of Curaçao’s Afrocuraçaoan 
population. This study seeks to deconstruct the multiple layers of Curaçao’s national 
narrative(s). It intends to demonstrate the concrete existence of Curaçao’s racial 
hierarchy, how it is protected and perpetuated by the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology, and how it 
has come to structurally impregnate the whole of Curaçaoan society. The ultimate 
objective of this study is perhaps to attempt to understand how hegemony actually works, 
through the examination of how Curaçao’s hegemonic ideology of national identity 
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inserts itself into the minds of Curaçaoans, whispering to them what to see and what not 
to see, while producing and requesting a great many silencing. 
 
Overview of Chapters 
To address my research objectives I have developed three large case studies, which each 
use various methods of triangulations. Each case study is presented in a separate chapter. 
The first chapter presents a historical examination of how Curaçao’s ideology of national 
identity developed over the course of nearly four centuries. Using mostly secondary 
sources, I observe the racialized structure of society as it developed out of colonization, 
which in Curaçao was characterized by slavery, extensive international trade, and a 
small-scale plantation economy, and how this racist foundation persisted as 20th century 
ideologies of creolization and later on multiculturalism arose. After a discussion of the 
colonial era, the chapter explores the rise and development of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology 
of national identity, the messages regarding national belonging and citizenship that it 
promulgates today, and the multiple silences it entails, which are exercised in among 
others the whitewashing of colonial exploitation, the deflection of Afrocuraçaoan 
resistance, and the relative invisibilization of persisting racial inequality.  
Chapter 2 explores my self-ethnographic transnational family history. It focuses 
on my mother, my grandmother, and myself: all women of color, who live or have lived 
in Surinam, Curaçao and the Netherlands. Following Gilroy’s notion of the “changing 
same” (1995), this chapter captures how the essence of white supremacy, embedded in 
Dutch ideology of national identity, shaped us across these different eras and different 
territories in the Dutch Empire. In doing so the main focus of the chapter is to make 
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visible how hegemonic internalization of racism—and colorism as a particular dimension 
of it—operates. Silence and its multiple dimensions of oppression and resistance is the 
central lens of my theoretical scaffold. In addition, Ann Stoler’s conceptualization of 
intimacy as a micro-dimension of imperial power (2002) further frames this self-
ethnography. Chapter 2 thus brings into sight the way racist ideologies of national 
identity influence the deepest parts of our lives and psyches, and the different positions 
we take on the battlefield between indoctrination and resistance, as victims and agents. 
This chapter also reveals my positionality as a partial insider and partial outsider of the 
community in focus in my research project. 
In the third chapter, I turn my attention back to Curaçao, and share the results of 
my ethnographic field study in five very different neighborhoods or barios11. Through a 
presentation of my research results I attempt to answer a number of questions: what is the 
specific work done by Curaçao’s Yu’i Kòrsou multicultural ideology of national identity 
on Curaçao’s inhabitants? How do Curaçaoans perceive and experience racial inequality? 
And in what ways does racism as part of multiculturalism operate in ways that people are 
not always aware of?  I interviewed a total of twenty-nine respondents, and contrast and 
complement their narratives with participant observation, informal conversations, and 
statistical data. In this chapter I continue to use silence as a theoretical lens in order to 
expose hegemony, and the way in which “raceless” racism (Goldberg 2002, see also 
Bonilla-Silva 2010) —a key element of multiculturalism—serves to perpetuate white 
supremacy while at the same time keeping it largely out of sight.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bario, spelled with one r, is the Papiamentu word for neighborhood or residential area. I use it throughout 
this thesis. 
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This study deals with ideology. This has determined the methodologies used. 
David Jacobson (1991) establishes a distinction between two main levels of reality 
considered by anthropological research: the modes of thoughts and the modes of action 
(1991:9, see also Firth 1975). The modes of action address what people actually do. To 
support claims about modes of actions, a researcher must use exclusively data that consist 
in observed actions through participant observation. Ideology, on the other hand, pertains 
to the modes of thought, which are about what people actually think, how they perceive 
their world and their positions in it. The privileged data used as evidence to support 
claims about modes of thought are linguistic data obtained through verbal statements in 
interviews, conversations and written texts (Jacobson 1991:12). Jacobson is adamant in 
asserting that methodologically claims about modes of actions may not be supported by 
linguistic data (there is always a gap between what people do and what they say they do). 
Vice versa it is not satisfactory that claims about modes of thought be supported by 
observed actions. This dissertation zeroes in on hegemonic ideology; as such it addresses 
modes of thoughts. Consequently, linguistic or verbal data constitutes the vast majority of 
the data discussed in this dissertation. Only on limited occasions do I make reference to 
actual observed actions. 
 
Vocabulary and Translations 
Curaçao is a colorist society, where people recognize a wide range of different skin 
colors and phenotypes. These are listed in great detail in appendix I. I will however not 
refer much to these emic categories as they are very specific, and have very diffuse 
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boundaries. But the vocabulary that I do use throughout this dissertation deserves some 
elaboration.  
“Afrodescendant” refers to all people of African descent12. I use the notions of 
“people of color” and “black” interchangeably. They refer to lighter and darker skinned 
Afrodescendants alike. In Curaçao, the notions of hende di koló (“people of color” in 
Papiamentu) and hende pretu (“black people” in Papiamentu) do however not refer to 
people with a white or nearly-white phenotype that in the U.S. could pass for white even 
though they have black ancestry. In this dissertation, the notions “people of color” and 
“black” thus have a Curaçaoan meaning, for in practice the marginalizations that people 
of color experience in Curaçao’s colorist context do not easily affect very light skinned 
people of color. Hende di koló is more inclusive of lighter skinned people than hende 
pretu, which specifically refers to Afrodescendants with a darker phenotype. 
The word “Afrocuraçaoan” is used to refer to people of color with a Curaçaoan 
heritage. But since Curaçao’s population is ethnically very diverse with significant 
Afrocaribbean and Afrolatino communities, the word “Afrodescendant” is more 
appropriate in some contexts. These notions largely correspond to the respective emic 
notions of Afrodesendiente (“Afrodescendant” in Papiamentu) and Afrokurasoleño 
(“Afrocuraçaoan” in Papiamentu).  
After lengthy debate I have decided to use the problematic and outdated word 
“mulatto” to refer to Afrocuraçaoans of mixed race descent, because until the mid-20th 
century they formed a separate class and racial sub-segment in Curaçaoan society. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This does not refer to white people born on the African continent. 
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term is much used in the literature about Curaçao. Its use has however disappeared with 
time when miscegenation became much more generalized and legal differences between 
Afrocuraçaoans and mulattos dissipated. Today it is no longer commonly used. 
Throughout the paper I use it where relevant. 
In this dissertation the word “white” refers to people from European but also 
Middle Eastern ancestry.  
 All translations in this dissertation are mine. 
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Chapter I 
A Historical Exploration of the Interplay Between Racial Ideology and National Identity 
Formation in Curaçao 
 
“The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility;  
the ultimate challenge, the exposition of its roots.”  
― Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995) 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation’s hypothesis is that racism is a partially hidden constituent of Curaçao’s 
ideology of national identity, which today is founded on multiculturalism. In this chapter 
I examine both the historical development of the island’s racial ideology and current 
status quo, and the emergence of the ideology of national identity that is in effect today, 
in this autonomous but not-independent Caribbean territory of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The focus of the chapter is twofold. It seeks to identify a number of 
important gatekeeping mechanisms, which I see as the processes by which persons or 
groups control access to resources such as information, goods, services and networks 
(Lee 2004). These mechanisms protect the privileges of the white elites from claims of 
the non-white masses that also seek upward social mobility, and restrict the 
Afrocuraçaoan population in their access to these privileges. The chapter tracks these 
mechanisms over the course of time, with the objective of enlightening the contemporary 
realities lived by Afrocuraçaoans today, which are in focus in this dissertation. 
Furthermore, it analyzes the impact of multiculturalism—an ideology adopted in the 
second half of the 20th century—on the perpetuation of white supremacy through the 
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deflection of Afrocuraçaoan claims on a reformulation of the power balance (Hale 2002, 
2005; Goldberg 2002; Greene 2007). 
 I divide Curaçao’s history up in three main time periods: 1) the colonial era, 
which spans nearly three centuries, from 1634 to 1915; 2) the industrial era, which started 
in 1915 with the building of the Shell oil refinery and involves rapid and large-scale 
demographic, economic and social changes; and 3) the post-industrial era, which starts 
with the famous laborer’s revolt of May 30th 1969, and again ushers in an era of 
significant social change. When discussing these three periods I specifically focus on the 
racial ideology of white supremacy in tandem with the development of the Yu’i Kòrsou 
ideology of national identity as it developed and impregnated people and things. 
Whenever I can, I attempt to uncover the mechanisms through which these ideologies 
were infused in the social fabric through various means of indoctrination.  
Today the Yu’i Kòrsou identity is a popular national identity, whose “unifying” 
message is consumed by the Curaçaoan population at large in a rather uncritical manner. 
In the sixteen years that I have visited and lived on the island, and in various field 
research projects that I have conducted during this time, I repeatedly found that people 
genuinely take pride in being a Yu’i Kòrsou. They use it to debate one’s level of insider- 
and outsiderness, to express patriotic feelings towards nos dushi Kòrsou13, and to praise 
the island’s “multicultural” society in which this ideology of national identity is 
embedded. Dominant and non-mainstream renditions of Curaçaoan history all center on 
the ethnic diversity of the colonial population14. Over the course of time numerous other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Our sweet Curaçao.” It is a notion that is often used to express one’s love for the island. 
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ethnic groups have merged into the already diverse island population (Allen 2006, 2007; 
Dalhuizen et al 1997; Hoetink 1958; Römer 1978, 1998; Rupert 2012; Oostindie 2000). 
In this every day vernacular use of the notion multiculturalism denotes the co-existence 
of different cultures on the basis of equality. In these renditions multiculturalism as a 
celebration of equally valued and respected cultures appears to be perceived as a natural 
and logical progression in the move away from colonialism. I argue that the current 
definition of who is a Yu’i Kòrsou must be understood in the frame of this national 
ideology of diversity. As we saw in the introduction, the working definition of the Yu’i 
Kòrsou in use by the government today (Allen 2012b:1) is: 
A yu-di-Kòrsou is someone who lives in Curaçao or abroad, and who fits the 
following criteria. He/she speaks and understands Papiamentu. He/she is willing 
to work to advance Curaçao. He/she can declare to the world that he is a yu-di-
Kòrsou and accepts his/her culture and history without any shame. He/she accepts 
and adheres to Curaçao’s multicultural situation, and accepts cultural diversity. 
He/she does not consider cultural elements of his/her ethnic group to be Curaçao’s 
culture, but he/she considers them as part of Curaçao’s culture. He/she accepts 
that Afrocuraçaoan elements dominate the majority part of Curaçaoan culture 
(Rosalia 2001:10) 15.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Given the omission of the notion of “race” in Dutch Caribbean and Dutch academia, “ethnicity” is the 
operative notion.  
 
15 This definition shows the two components that over time have become part of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology, 
as scholars like Rose Mary Allen (2006), Aart Broek (1994) and René Römer (1974) illustrate. In the first 
half of the 20th century the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology indicated that the Yu’i Kòrsou were the white, black and 
mixed populations of the colonial era vis-à-vis the large influx of immigrants. Eventually it became more 
inclusive and also included the large immigrant population. In the 1980s, when emancipation and the civil 
rights movements of that time instilled in people a stronger appreciation of blackness, Afrocuraçaoan 
culture and folklore, as well as the Papiamentu language became the core of this national identity. Hence, 
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Citizenship or legal immigration status is not part of this contemporary definition. 
Instead it solely centers on ideology, which propagates quintessential heterogeneity and 
alleged inclusiveness. In the chapter I will examine earlier versions of this ideology, and 
further analyze and unpack the contemporary version, as well as its larger frame: 
multiculturalism.  
The debate whether the Yu’i Kòrsou identity might obscure and, in doing so, 
facilitate the reproduction of racial inequality, is not part of colloquial dialogue or general 
academic concern. This chapter illustrates however, just as it has been the case for most 
countries in the region with their respective ideologies of national identity, that 
throughout history the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology has been at the service of the elites who 
devised or elaborated it and who directly benefit from the reproduction of the status quo 
it allows. 
 This chapter is mostly grounded on the consultation of secondary sources. At the 
exception of the work by Rose Mary Allen, René Rosalia and Richenel Ansano, most of 
the scholarly texts on Curaçao’s history are based on archival documents of various 
kinds, as well as on the recorded voices of the participating national and colonial elites 
that fill the Dutch colonial archives. This has compounded a difficulty for those, like 
myself, who are indeed interested in Afrocuraçaoan voices. Official or hegemonic 
representations of the nation, always generated by the elites who also always control the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the real Yu’i Kòrsou was black (Allen 2006; Broek 1994; and Römer 1974). In this more recent version we 
see that one no longer has to be born on the island or have a parent who is to be a Yu’i Kòrsou. In my field 
research I have found that the most important qualifications are speaking Papiamentu, being well versed in 
the island culture, history and folklore, and loving the island and making a valuable contribution to its 
advancement. I also found that all these versions of the definition remain active, and that being 
Afrocuraçaoan is an important element. 
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state, are at the service of the reproduction of a particular socio-economic and political 
order. These representations of the nation-state and of what is true national citizenship 
attempt to mask the always intrinsically heterogeneous nature of national populations.  
Jens Andermann (2007), Christine Buzinde and Carla Santos (2008), and 
Alexandra Cummings (2004) address the politics of hegemonic representations in 
contexts of tourism and (national) museums, which provide some of the many stages on 
which imaginations of the nation are deployed and performed. They note that such 
enticing hegemonic representations were particularly important as colonial regimes began 
to wane, and the brutal regimes that ran the plantation economies changed: the elites 
needed new ways to ensure their positions of power (Buzinde and Santos 2008; see also 
Poria and Ashworth 2009).  
There is an extensive scholarship on the making of ideologies of national identity 
and the ample silences they entail, in European and non-European settings alike. As 
Trouillot (1995), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) and Rahier (2003) argued, the 
celebration of official history comes with its erasing, forgetting, and invention of what 
actually happened (see also Aronsson and Elgenius 2011; Timothy and Boyd 2006). 
Whitewashing of history (Butler 2001) can be achieved via various methods such as 
symbolic annihilation, trivialization of events, deflection (see also Brooms 2011; 
Eichsted and Small 2002), eliminating descriptors and omitting controversial historical 
accounts (Brooms 2011; Buzinde and Santos 2008; Hall 1999; Timothy and Boyd 2006), 
and accentuating the socio-economic prowess of the white upper class (Buzinde and 
Santos 2008; 2009). These narrative techniques enable the hegemonic narrator to make 
the atrocities of colonialism seem less brutal—if they are referred to at all. They draw 
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white social actors constructed as heroes to the forefront while demonizing black social 
actors as villains, if at all mentioned. When painful historical sites, such as plantations 
and haciendas, are rewired as what Buzinde and Santos call “mnemonic devices” (2008: 
469), the past is represented as an entirely positive, unproblematic, source of pride that 
led to the imagination of the nation as harmonious and unified, with racial inequality and 
racial oppression out of narrative sight. 
The consultation of the existing scholarly literature on race and nation-making in 
Curaçao makes evident the conspicuous absence of serious work on the importance of 
race in the socio-economic and political structure of the island. Like elsewhere in the 
African Diaspora, the former Dutch colony of Curaçao has a lengthy history of 
colonialism and slavery, which resulted in a contemporary society where phenotype has 
of old played an important role in determining social status (Allan 2006, 2009; Hoetink 
1958; Oostindie 2000; Paula 1967; Römer 1979). Akin to many other former colonies in 
the Americas, under colonial rule light skin and other European physical features were 
commonly associated with beauty and higher social status. In contrast, blackness has 
been associated with ugliness and marred to slave status and inferiority. This old race-
based value system certainly appears to have remained in effect today. 
In Curaçao’s contemporary society phenotype has remained a determinant of 
social status. The “color hierarchy” that Dutch sociologist Harry Hoetink writes about in 
The Pattern of the Old Curaçaoan Society: A Sociological Study16 (1958) is still in effect. 
It is a colorist system (Banks 2000; Burton et al. 2010; Harris 2008; Hunter 2007), or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The original title is in Dutch: Het Patroon van de Oude Curaçaose Samenleving: Een Sociologische 
Studie. 
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what Trinidadian sociologist Anthon Allahar refers to as a “pigmentocracy” (Allahar 
2001), in which somatic features are ranked on a detailed hierarchical scale always 
characterized with dark-skinned blacks at the bottom and whites at the top. The 
persistence of this hierarchy is among others visible in everyday use of language. In 
Papiamentu, Curaçao’s creole language, expressions like e ta pretu mahos, which 
conflates the words “black” (pretu) and “ugly” (mahos) as to say “(s)he is black and 
therefore ugly17,” and mal kabei meaning “bad or kinky (black) hair,” are common. 
Furthermore, Papiamentu has a broad lexicon to mark nuances in skin tones and hair 
types, which serves to identify one’s place on the color hierarchy (see appendix I for a 
detailed description). The island’s racial structure also arises in a broad range of jokes, 
expressions and proverbs. No hasi kos di bo koló is an old expression usually addressed 
to someone who is dark skinned. It translates as “don’t do things of your color,” which 
suggests that inappropriate behavior accentuates one’s blackness, and as a consequence 
diminishes social standing. It thus serves to shame the person into subscribing to white 
norms of respectability, and into denouncing blackness. Pasombra mi ta pretu, “because I 
am black”, has become a catchphrase for any kind of disadvantageous situation a person 
finds him or herself in. It is used in gest, for example when drawing straws and pulling 
the short one, or when a bag of chips is passed around and the last person doesn’t get any 
because the chips have run out. And it is used in serious ways, to address possible racist 
behavior, or a situation in which someone might have been marginalized on the basis of 
their race, such as when not getting a particular job. Curaçao is a society in which race 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The expression indicates that the person’s color makes him or her ugly. This pertains to dark skinned 
people, not lighter brown people (koló bruin), see appendix I. 
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and color are always part and parcel of social interactions, even if people do not easily 
talk about how race and color affect their every day lives, and even if the systemic and 
institutional dimensions of racial inequality remain mostly unaddressed in government 
policy, pop culture, education, the mainstream media, and academics. 
Curaçao’s color hierarchy is also reflected in the representations of the national 
population in the mainstream media. Even though black people have long been 
represented, the vast majority of mainstream images about the island show white and 
lighter skinned black people. In a series of 100 billboards that I photographed along the 
main roads across the island in 2014 only three contained a dark skinned black person, 
depicted in advertisements for low skilled jobs and a pawnshop. This preference of 
lighter skinned black people over darker skinned ones subscribes to ideals of whitening 
as presented in ideologies of national identity that reify mestizaje and mulataje (Hale 
1996; Hintzen 2002; Martínez-Echazabal 1998; Price and Price 1997; Rahier 2003; 
Sheriff 2001; Skidmore 2002; Stepan 1991). 
The racial divides can also be seen in the racial/spatial order of the island, or the 
somatic make-up of the island’s socio-economic classes: “in Curaçaoan society, class 
distinctions have for long coincided with racial differences (Allen 2006:19). Various 
scholars agree that socio-economic classes by and large conflate with races (see also 
Allen 2009a:3, Römer 1981:22). A drive across the small island reveals the concrete 
existence of a color line. The lower classes are predominantly black, the middle classes 
are mixed, with a lot of lighter skinned black people, but also large groups of darker 
skinned and white people, and the upper classes are predominantly white. This is a 
feature that is far from uncommon in the societies of the region.  
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But as said, especially in Dutch and Dutch-Caribbean scholarship, concern over 
racial inequality and racism in Curaçao has yet to lead to serious inquiry. Richenel 
Ansano argues that “African consciousness in Curaçao has been systemically overlooked 
and downplayed except through the work of very few researchers, including Rose May 
Allen and Rene Rosalia” (2015:2), and I may add, himself. While across the Caribbean 
an abundance of writings on race has arisen, Curaçao falls far behind in an explicit and 
theoretically substantiated address of race and racial inequality. Many authors, such as 
Rose Mary Allen (1996, 2006, 2007, 2009), Richenel Ansano (2011, 2012, 2014, 2015), 
Aart Broek (1994), Leo Dalhuizen et al (1997), Charles Do Rego and Lionel Janga 
(2009), Frank Martinus (1997, 2003), René Römer (1979, 1998), René Rosalia (1997), 
Wim Rutgers (2012), Gert Oostindie (1997/2000, 1999a, 1999b), and Peter Verton 
(1977), to name only a few, address related topics such as colonial history, exploitation, 
slavery, national identity, ethnicity, and the inequality between the different population 
segments. Though these authors comfortably refer to Curaçao’s racial nomenclature 
where whites, blacks and mulattos are named, their works do not provide much 
theoretical substantiation of the core importance of race, or on the systemic nature of 
racism.  
The only publication that directly addresses skin color in Curaçao is Show Your 
Colors: Idealization and Denial of One’s Own Skin Color18, by Valdemar Marcha, Paul 
Verweel and Jacqueline Werkman (2012). It presents a collection of interviews on how 
Curaçaoans of different ages and class layers experience skin color and thus race. The 
interviews, which are presented in their entirety and read as small stories, do give 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	  original	  title	  is	  in	  Dutch:	  Kleur Bekennen: Idealisering en Ontkenning van de Eigen Huidskleur.	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information on how Curaçaoans experience race, and on the persistence of racial 
marginalization and white supremacy. They however also entail unproblematized 
expressions of colorblindness, black-to-white discrimination, and multiculturalism. 
Although the study aspires to conduct ethnographic research (Marcha et al. 2012:19), it 
does not present an operationalization of the variable race, an explanation of the 
methodology used, an elaboration on the way in which the respondents were recruited, or 
a theoretical framework through which to analyze the gathered data. This makes the 
reliance of the data presented questionable. Furthermore, there is no critical discussion or 
analysis of the myriad of experiences that arise in the interviews. To my opinion the 
publication is therefore best seen as a journalistic read than as an academic contribution.  
 An older generation of scholars addressing Curaçao, including Cornelis Goslinga 
(1956), Johannes Hartog (1967a, 1967b), Harry Hoetink (1958, 1961, 1967, 1973), 
Alejandro Paula (1967) and also René Römer (1979, 1981, 1998) wrote about race and 
racial inequality mostly in a descriptive rather than in a critical or theoretical manner. An 
exception to this are certainly Hoetink’s The Split Society in the Caribbean19 (1962) and 
Slavery and Race Relations in the Americas (1973), in which he addresses various 
theories and dimensions of race, racism, mixed race identity and nation building20.  
This academic silence is not a coincidence: it fits within a nationwide tendency to 
avoid talking about race and racism in the Netherlands, which affects everyday life 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
19 The original title is De Gespleten Samenleving in het Caribisch Gebied. 
 
20 These two works focus mostly on the Caribbean region at large, which makes them less relevant for my 
particular research. Also, Hoetink’s theories on race and nation building are a product of his time, and often 
contrast with my theoretical positioning. Therefore in this dissertation they will not be discussed as 
elaborately as some of his other work.  
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academia and national politics. In fact, in the Netherlands the national census also omits 
the category of “race,” which undoubtedly sets the tone for the way the censuses are 
conducted in its overseas constituents. Currently, this prevents Dutch and Curaçaoan 
governments from collecting data per racial and ethnic group, which are of crucial 
importance in bringing to light patterns of racial inequality and race-based exclusion of 
Afrodescendants (UN 2015:10). Instead, the data are gathered by country of birth, which 
provides no information on people’s racial identity.  
A few scholars, such as Paul Bijl (2012), Philomena Essed (1987, 1990, 1991), 
Ramón Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants (2006), John Helsloot (2012), Guno Jones (2012), 
Melissa Weiner (2014) and Gloria Wekker (2016) have made important contributions to 
the study of race and racism in the Netherlands, and to the critique of contemporary 
academia in the Netherlands for its lack of engagement with race and racism.  
Weiner in particular contends that scholars who do engage in such research have 
at times experienced ostracism, “forcing many to continue their work in universities 
outside of the country” (2014:732). 
Combined with the national denial of race and racism, the lack of independent 
granting agencies in The Netherlands inhibiting most scholars from acquiring 
funding to study racism, and faculty and graduate students of color in Dutch 
universities has hindered critical scholarship addressing this subject for nearly two 
decades (Weiner 2014:731). 
This has indeed been my experience. After I graduated in the Netherlands I spent four 
years looking for a Ph.D. admission, so I could research race in Curaçao. I found none. 
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When I decided to try my luck in the United States, I immediately got accepted into a 
graduate program.  
The result is that the interrelatedness of Dutch colonial exploitation and persisting 
racial inequality in the Netherlands and its former Caribbean territories is not easily 
addressed in Dutch and Dutch Caribbean academia (Bijl 2012; Helsloot 2012; Jones 
2012; Weiner 2014).  
This Dutch status quo is relevant for Curaçao for two reasons. Suman Seth argues 
that “Western scientific knowledge has been co-constituted with colonialism” 
(2009:374), which of course also was the case for Dutch social science production. In the 
18th and 19th century it was by and large Dutch scholars who determined the 
sociocultural, political, geographical, and biological “truths” of the colonized territories 
and populations.  
In the 20th century many more people from Curaçao and other decolonizing 
territories in the Dutch Caribbean got the opportunity to study in the metropole. Not all 
Curaçaoan scholars studied in the Netherlands. Some studied in the United States, others 
in the Caribbean or in Latin America. But as Caribbean citizens of the Netherlands, 
obtaining an education there was affordable and easily accessible. More and more 
formerly colonized or “subaltern” people, as Gayatri Spivak calls them (2010), obtained 
education and degrees, and joined the ranks of Dutch scholars. These scholars have been 
developing their visible and critical voices that challenge mainstream Dutch knowledge 
production. Thus, while many Curaçaoan scholars have made abundant, most valuable, 
and sophisticated contributions to the knowledge produced on Curaçao, they thus do so in 
fields of inquiry that have always been, and continue to be dominated by white scholars, 
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and that has a long tradition of turning a blind eye on he importance of race and the 
necessity to study local forms of racism. 
In this chapter I rely heavily on secondary sources of information, many of which 
were written by Curaçaoan and Dutch scholars. A great deal of them—especially those 
researching the colonial and pre-industrial eras—also use written primary and secondary 
sources as their main data, such as travel accounts, mission logbooks, colonial 
correspondence, and scholarly books and articles, rather than on oral histories and 
participant observation. These written sources mainly preserved and present the white 
male voices of colonial administrators, missionaries, merchants and such. In more recent 
times, scholars—many of whom are of Afrocuraçaoan descent—have made great efforts 
to collect original data among Curaçao’s Afrodescendant population, and to make both 
male and female Afrocuraçaoan voices much more heard. The collection of poems and 
scholarly articles, Mundu Yama Sinta Mira21: Womanhood in Curaçao (Ansano et al 
1992), is only one of the increasing numbers of contributions that sheds light on gender 
and womanhood in Curaçao of past and present from an Afrocuraçaoan perspective. But 
especially with regards to the colonial era the majority of the available data is heavily 
raced and gendered: the white male narrative dominates. Since this chapter serves as a 
contextualization of this study, and was not intentioned to present original research on the 
colonial era, it unfortunately perpetuates at least some of this racial and gendered 
narrative.     
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mundu yama sinta mira is a proverb that translates as “the name of the world is sit and see” (Clemencia 
1992:ix). 
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The Colonial Era (1634 – 1915) 
Curaçao was first annexed by Spain in 1499, and turned to Dutch hands in 1634 during 
the Eighty Years War: a lengthy religious war, fought predominantly on Dutch soil 
(Oostindie 2002:18). Even though this small, dry island did not seem like much of a loss 
to the Spaniards, there was much at stake. The war took its toll on the Dutch economy, 
which brought the Dutch to explore new lands from which to combat Spain and to put 
significant dents in its stronghold. By the turn of the 16th century Spain had already 
initiated the colonial rat race in the Americas. Large quantities of silver and gold, 
extracted from its new colonies, fuelled its wars. These new riches resulted in territorial 
expansion oversees as well as in Europe, and until the early 18th century the Spanish 
Kingdom extended well into the Netherlands. In 1621 the Dutch founded the Dutch West 
India Company to wage economic warfare against the Spaniards and the Portuguese, 
whose territorial expansion oversees was also increasing, and to thwart the Southern 
European attempts to dominate Europe (Oostindie 2000:18; see also Rupert 2012). 
Warfare, but also raiding Spanish and Portuguese colonies and trade routes in the 
Americas and the African West Coast, enabled not only the Dutch but also their French 
and British counterparts to rupture the flow of silver that financed Spain’s iron grip on 
Europe (Oostindie 2000; Rupert 2012).  
The Eighty Years War broke Spain’s colonial monopoly in the West, and the 
British, French, and the Dutch followed suit, conquering many islands and starting their 
own West Indian colonies. Sidney Mintz argues (1985) that the North European colonists 
were less interested in the search for precious metals than the Spaniards and the 
Portuguese were (Mintz 1985:35-36; see also: Oostindie 2000:21). They were more 
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interested in “marketable commodities” such as cacao, tobacco, cotton, coffee, and of 
course, sugar (Mintz 1985:36). Sugar in particular became the prize crop of the 
Caribbean, partly due to the efforts of Dutch entrepreneurs (Oostindie 2000:19; Mintz 
1985:35). The British started the first sugar plantations in Barbados in 1627 (Mintz 
1985:37). The Dutch modeled their Guyanese colony—Surinam—after this new 
plantation model, which quickly became highly lucrative due to opportune investments in 
technology and slave capital (Oostindie, 2000:19). Yet, Curaçao and the other small 
islands that the Dutch conquered from the Spaniards were not quite cut out for the same 
destiny. 
Curaçao, together with Aruba and Bonaire, is one of the Leeward Islands, situated 
close to the Venezuelan coast. Here the climate is too dry for profitable plantations: the 
island’s agricultural and livestock endeavors could not produce sufficient quantities 
needed for export. Instead, the plantations that were created on Curaçao were small and 
geared at providing for the food consumption of the local population, which made it 
somewhat less costly to maintain the colony (Hoetink 1958:16. See also: Oostindie 
2000). But the Dutch saw other possibilities for these arid islands. They had pursued 
Curaçao in particular for its numerous large natural harbors, its saltpans, and its 
proximity to the Spanish colonies. Whereas to the Spaniards these small islands had 
initially been considered rather “useless”22 (Martinus 2003; Oostindie 2000), to the Dutch 
Curaçao in particular was mostly of strategic value (Hoetink 1958:11; Do Rego and 
Janga 2009).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The Spaniards actually named the islands Islas inutiles: “useless islands” (Oostindie, 2000:22, see also 
Eckkrammer, 2003). 
  
 54 
Part of its strategic position was related to commerce. Because of its natural 
harbors Curaçao quickly developed into a trading post. From the late 17th century on it 
became the center of general and contraband trade with the region, and the beating heart 
of the infamous Dutch slave trade (Hoetink 1958:7; Klooster 1994:283; Oostindie 
2000:55; Rutgers 2012), which supplied the Spanish and the Dutch colonies in other parts 
of the Americas. Rupert writes:  
Lacking the basic resources to sustain agricultural production, Curaçao’s 
merchants sought markets throughout the Caribbean and the Americas that would 
provide them with agricultural commodities they would sell in the wider Atlantic 
system (2012:165).  
They became so successful at this that, much to the dismay of the other European powers 
that operated in the region, the goods that the richer colonies produced were traded 
through the open ports of Curaçao (Rupert 2012:121).  
Officially governed by the Dutch West India Company, but ran mostly by 
individual entrepreneurs (Rutgers 2012), the bustling harbor city of Willemstad 
developed around the big St Anna Bay. It attracted merchants and entrepreneurs from the 
far corners of the world. The big harbor facilitated abundant trade with the Venezuelan 
coast, New Granada, Hispaniola, Panama, Puerto Rico, and Cuba (Klooster 1994:283), 
while the island’s numerous smaller bays made dropping off an illicit load or two most 
easy (Hoetink 1958:1823). The island also generated revenue by serving as a depot for 
weapons and provisions for the Seven Years War between France and England, and for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Here Hoetink is referring to Cola Debrot: Bevolkingsgroepen op Curaçao, in: Cultureel Indie, 7e jrg p. 
131-144, 1945. 
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the American Revolutionary War (Hoetink 1958:7,8). These glory days, however, did not 
last. When Caribbean mercantilism ended by the end of the 18th century, followed by the 
decolonization of the Spanish empire in the Americas and by the end of the slave trade in 
the 19th century, Curaçao lost its merit to the Dutch (Hoetink 1958:8). The colony slowly 
but surely demanded newer and larger investments in order to turn it from a burden into a 
self-sustaining part of what had by then become the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  
While Curaçao’s trade networks spanned most of the Americas, the trade between 
the island and the Netherlands had always been modest (Rupert 2012:121). Economically 
speaking the economic successes of the Dutch islands and even of plantation colony 
Surinam were of little relevance for the Netherlands (Oostindie 2000:22; see also Hoetink 
1958:26-27). In fact, the Dutch had to invest greatly to keep their colonies running. They 
did make such investments in Surinam, which was a plantation colony, even though it 
yielded insufficient revenue. However, the colonial motherland sent considerably less 
funds to Curaçao and the other Dutch islands (Oostindie 2000:30-31). Consequently, the 
Dutch Republic did not support or protect its possessions in the Antilles much (Oostindie 
2000:30; Hoetink 1958), nor was it very involved with the administration of the growing 
population. When focusing on Curaçao in particular, we see that the consequence of this 
noninvolvement was that the island became rather self-sufficient early on. The Dutch 
elites that ruled the island became more focused on the Latin American mainland in their 
culture, language and trade relations than on the Netherlands (Oostindie 2000:36).  
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Curaçao’s Segmented Population  
The racial groups that constituted Curaçao’s populations in the early days of the Dutch 
colony were the Caiquetío, the indigenous inhabitants of the region and the island itself, 
the white Europeans, and the enslaved Africans: a common composition in many a part 
of the Americas. Over the course of the centuries people from all over the world would 
join, seeking out opportunities in the island, which had become an important trading hub. 
Curaçao became a very multi-ethnic and multi-racial island early on (Hoetink 1958; 
Oostindie 2000; Rupert 2012). But in spite of the spatial intimacy and miscegenation 
between blacks and whites, Hoetink argues that since its very days of origin as a Dutch 
colony Curaçao’s society had been a severely segmented society (Hoetink 1958, 1961). 
 In spite of repeated instructions from the colonial motherland to Christianize all 
non-Dutch inhabitants of the colony, Curaçao’s Dutch elites were reluctant to encourage 
the acculturation of the enslaved population and non-Dutch immigrants into their religion 
and cultural practices, norms and values (Hoetink 1958:109,110). In fact, the Dutch 
colonials would eventually use religion and even language to exclude non-Dutch people 
from their ranks (Hoetink 1958; Oostindie 2000). Frank Martinus wrote that in the forts 
on the African coast the Catholic Church demanded that enslaved people be baptized 
before they could be transported. Initially the Church even demanded that there was a 
priest on board of every slave ship (Martinus 1997:127, quotes Carreira 1983a:282-
283)24. But once in Curaçao the Protestants did not bother with the Christianization of 
their “property.” On the contrary, Oostindie quotes a compelling diary entry of early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Cabo Verde. Formaçāo e extinçāo de uma sociedade escravocrata (1460-1878). Praia: Instituto 
Caboverdeano de Livro). 
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eighteenth century Reverend Bosch, who elaborates on the motivation behind 
segregation:  
When I had spent several years in Curaçao, I however saw the true reason, why 
the protestants have saved their churches here only for people of a white color, a 
reason that signified more than the abovementioned suitability of the Roman 
Catholic Church for dumb folk. This was, namely, in a colonial politics, to bring 
people with a black and brown color in disdain. The larger one makes the distance 
between whites and blacks, and the more one humiliated the latter, the more 
steadfast and longer, one thought, the colonial system would stand; for did fear 
for the whites not keep the Negroes at a respectable distance, was there among the 
latter not respect for the moral majority and higher worth of the former, then live 
and possessions, peace and safety were in danger” (My translation. Bosch 
1829:226. In: Oostindie 2000:62).   
When the Dutch took over the island they deported the small amount of remaining 
Spanish residents to Venezuela (Hartog 1961a). The majority of the Caiquetío population 
that had originally populated the island followed the Spaniards; only a few dozen 
Caiquetío remained behind. Johannes Hartog (1961a) writes that the Dutch did not 
intermingle with these native inhabitants the way the Spaniards had. They did not engage 
in the concubinary relations that the Spaniards had maintained, nor did they baptize the 
Caiquetío, as the Spaniards had done, or introduce them to their European ways (Hartog 
1961a:207-208; Paula 1967).  
The Dutch Protestant population itself separated into two classes: the elites, and 
the middle- and working class citizens. The “higher” Protestants, as Hoetink calls them 
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(1958:44), were the well-educated officers and employees of the colonial government, 
sent to Curaçao to implement the administration. Through their assigned functions they 
became the island’s elite (Hoetink 1958, 1961; Paula 1967). The “lower” Protestants 
were the sailors, soldiers, and laborers and such who filled the economic niches of 
artisans and small merchants (Hoetink 1958:44; see also Paula 1967). These two groups 
also remained economically, socially, and spatially separated. Through this divide the 
higher Protestants aimed to safeguard their newly acquired elite status (Hoetink 1958:45; 
Paula 1967), which they had not enjoyed in the home country. However, in religion, 
education and language the divide between higher and lower Protestants was far less 
strong: both groups attended the same churches and schools, and spoke Dutch. But 
intermarriage between these two economic segments did not occur much, if at all, nor 
could the lower Protestants obtain the jobs of the elite of administrators (Hoetink 
1958:47). 
In 1656 a large number of Sephardic Jews arrived on the island. They originated 
from Spain, where they had been expulsed by the Inquisition. After having resided in 
Portugal, Amsterdam and Brazil for a great many years they were eventually welcomed 
in the Dutch colonies, where they quickly proved to be very successful “merchants, but 
also insurers, ship owners and seafarers” (Hoetink 1958:37). Not only did the 
“Portuguese” Jews, as they became known, merge predominantly with the higher societal 
echelons, their financial successes in fact proved of great economic value to the colony 
(Hoetink 1958:37). Yet, again there would be no significant intermingling between the 
Jews and the Protestants. Their relations were predominantly formal and limited to 
business and trade (Dalhuizen et al 1997; Hoetink 1958; Paula 1967; Oostindie 2000).  
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 The fact that the Jews were not allowed to occupy official administrative positions 
reserved for the Protestants fortified the Jewish-Protestant separation (Hoetink 1958:39). 
Also, through their successes in trade in particular, the Jewish elites soon posed 
somewhat of a threat to Dutch economic, social and political dominance—yet another 
reason why the two groups remained separate (Hoetink 1958, 1961; Paula 1967; 
Oostindie 2000). Map 4 illustrates that the Dutch and the Jews developed separate 
residential areas, which further limited social interaction (Hoetink 1958; Paula 1967). 
The Protestants settled in Punda and Otrobanda, the Jews in Pietermaai and Scharloo. 
Also in religion and in marriage there was virtually no intermingling. Neither the 
Portuguese Jews nor the Dutch Protestants were interested in letting the other group enter 
their religion, or marry into their families (Hoetink 1958:41; see also Oostindie 2000). 
 
Map 4: The City of Willemstad in 1863 
 
Source: Detail of Map of the Island Curaçao, Hulst van Keulen, G. (1836), adapted by me. 
 
Even linguistically these two segments remained rather separate. As a Dutch 
colony the official language of the island was Dutch. Jewish men often did speak Dutch 
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for trading purposes, but their maternal languages were Portuguese and Spanish (Rupert, 
2012:136; see also Fouse 2002, Hoetink 1958). The Dutch were less proficient in these 
languages, but linguist Gary Fouse argues that the Dutch often did speak Spanish and 
other European languages for trading purposes (Fouse 2002:66), especially since Dutch 
was not a viable trade language in the region. Still, language and especially religion can 
be seen as means of ethnic gatekeeping between these two groups.  
Because of the forced migration of Africans, which lasted over two centuries, 
Afrodescendants came to form Curaçao’s largest population segment. Ample 
miscegenation between the black and white populations resulted in a growing mulatto 
population that, like in many other colonies in the Americas, would over time develop 
into a separate class segment (Hoetink 1958; Römer 1979). Initially, the Dutch West 
India Company set up relatively large government plantations (Rupert 2012:135), which, 
because of the island’s dry climate, were still quite small compared to plantations in other 
parts of the Caribbean.  
Of 376 owners in 1735, only 38 owned more than10 slaves. The largest slave-
owner at the time had 120 slaves. And in 1863, the year of abolition, when six to 
seven thousand slaves were emancipated, the great majority of owners still owned 
fewer than five slaves. The “average” slave-owner held a few slaves as coachmen, 
house-servants, or gardeners. Only on the so-called plantations (especially in the 
western part of the island) were there slave-holdings of more than 50 slaves, and 
only rarely more than 100 (Hoetink 1983:3). 
However, in the early 18th century the Dutch West India Company already sold its 
plantations to independent merchants (Rupert 2012:135): they were not lucrative. 
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Hoetink writes that most plantation owners generated their income via ample commercial 
activities: “If any of these owners had had to depend exclusively on their plantations for 
their income they would have been bankrupt in a few years” (Hoetink 1983:3). The 
plantations were thus more a status symbol than a genuine source of income, he argues 
(1983:3).  
Because of the small scale of Curaçao’s plantations, black and white people 
cohabitated in far closer proximity than on the big plantations that characterized most of 
the Americas. This absence of a large-scale plantation economy also meant that the 
Afrocuraçaoan population did not predominantly do the agricultural-related work, as was 
so common at the large plantations in the region. Afrodescendants—both slaves and 
freedmen—often worked in and around the harbor as construction workers, artisans, 
sailors, traders, musicians, and military personnel, among others (Allen 2007; Klooster 
1994). In these settings they often worked side by side with the poor white population. Or 
they would be dockworkers, ferrymen, fishermen, or have their own property in town 
from where they operated a small business (Rupert 2012:145). Due to the mercantilist 
nature of the colony and the small scale of the plantations, in the 18th century the 
Afrocuraçaoan population became rather self-reliant (Allen 2007; Klooster 1994; Rupert 
2012), and.  
It deserves mention that the segment of freedmen kept expanding as manumission 
became common in Curaçao (Allan 2007; Hoetink 1987; Klooster 1994; Rupert 2012). 
Klooster, referencing Hoetink (1958/1987:75) writes that in 1817 32.2% of the island 
population was comprised of free non-whites, while in 1833 this percentage had already 
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increased to 43.5%, bringing the population of free people of color to outgrow the slave 
population as the largest segment of the island population (Klooster 1994:288).  
Slaves and freedmen were in constant interaction with both lower and upper class 
whites (Oostindie 2000:33; Rupert 2012). On the small plantations, which sometimes 
only housed a handful of slaves, but also in the city, white and black people lived in close 
proximity (Hoetink 1958). We already saw that since the Curaçaoan plantations hardly 
provided enough work for the slaves they often worked as seamen, carpenters, gardeners, 
household servants and fishermen, and as craftsmen, construction workers and laborers in 
the harbor (Klooster 1994; Rupert 2012). The old colonial architecture reflects this spatial 
intimacy between blacks and whites. In the courtyards of the many old mansions and 
plantation houses that have been preserved across the island we see the former slave 
quarters, often no more than a few steps away from the main house. And in Otrobanda, 
the old inner city center, the large mansions, and the houses that once belonged to the 
colonial middle class, the working class, and slaves and freedmen all stand shoulder-to-
shoulder, lined up along an intricate maze of alleyways and hidden passages.  
Inter-racial sexual arrangements were a key component of this intimacy between 
black and white. According to Hoetink, Protestant and Jewish boys as young as 15 or 16 
were expected and encouraged to have their first sexual relations with women of color 
(Hoetink 1958:56). It was a norm rather than an exception for white men to have sexual 
relations and live in concubinage with one or more women of color (Hoetink 1958:119, 
120). Hoetink even states that this kind of relationship was “institutionalized” 
(1958:119). In this segregated, small-scale society there was a great shortage of available 
marriage partners for white men. Therefore people often married within the family, as to 
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preserve the family capital (Hoetink 1958:119). The often long lasting relationships these 
men had with women of color could be seen as a “supplement, a substitute perhaps of the 
official marriage” (Hoetink 1958:119). For women of color such relationships provided 
material gain and social privileges, among which a higher social status for their mixed-
race children (Allen 2007:90). Formal marriage between a lower class Protestant man and 
a light-skinned Afrocuraçaoan women happened on occasion (Hoetink 1958:49). But 
more so, concubinage, which Hoetink also describes solely as a white man and black 
woman endeavor, was a given.  
It deserves mention that in the literature that I consulted I have only found 
minimal references regarding the sexual violence that is such an important part of 
colonialism. Hoetink’s seminal work, which heavily informs this dissertation and many 
other scholarly works, unfortunately presents a romanticized and one-sided narrative on 
interracial relations. His work is founded mainly on secondary literature and archival 
sources such as travel logs, correspondence and reports written by missionaries and 
colonial administrators, rather than oral history and ethnography. These sources convey 
the voices of white middle class and elite males of the colonial and pre-industrial era: the 
voices of women—especially of Afrocuraçaoan but also of European and South 
American descent—are not part of them.  
Although Hoetink does address the relationships between mulatto children and 
their white colonial fathers, many of whom belonged to the class of slave owners, I have 
not been able to find any mention of sexual exploitation of Afrocuraçaoan women. 
Hoetink speaks in positive terms of the sexual prowess of the young white males 
(1958:56,57), and of the apparently consensual nature of interracial sexual relations. This 
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may reflect the way his sources chose to describe such interactions: they may not have 
made much mention of rape or violence to begin with. But whether they did or did not 
address sexual violence, Hoetink’s narrative is notably constructed in the absence of 
voices of women—and also men—of color that were forcedly part of these detrimental 
interactions.  
Rose Mary Allen, who is another main source in this chapter, does use an 
abundance of oral histories of Afrocuraçaoan men and women. Especially in in Di Ki 
Manera: A Social History of Afro-Curaçaoans, 1863-1917 (2007), she conducted 
interviews with Afrocuraçaoans of a very high age. They recounted stories and songs 
from their parents and grandparents, which paints an important picture of what life was 
like during and after slavery. In her work the voices of women of color are abundantly 
present, but she also does not present an in-depth discussion of intimate relations between 
Afrocuraçaoan women and white men, nor does the topic of sexual violence surface.  
In a brief article about Curaçaoan women in slave society, Nolda Kenepa-Römer 
writes: “The […] status distinction among the slaves, the skin color, developed because 
the female slave was also subjected to sexual exploitation” (1992:24). She then continues 
with a discussion of the distinction between house- and field slaves. While she at least 
mentions the forceful and violent dimension that is also very much part of interracial 
contact, she presents it as a given, and does not problematize it further.  
Even though there must be more sources that make more mention of this 
dimension of sexual exploitation, the lack thereof in the sources that I used is significant. 
It appears to signal a silencing of this horrid but integral part of the colonial past. On the 
side of the white elite such a silence could indicate the whitewashing of destructive white 
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actions, as well as a naturalization of white oppression. If people find it normal and self-
evident that (female) Afrocuraçaoan slaves were raped, it suggests that white dominance 
is also normal and self-evident. On the part of Afrodescendant people that are first-, 
second-, or multiple generation survivors of such violence, silencing could indicate a 
deliberate forgetting, to help assuage internalized oppression and shame (Sheriff 
2001:83). But as Sheriff (2001) and Scott (1992) argue, such silences should also be seen 
as powerful forms of resistance; as ways to shield the trauma that these transgressions 
caused until there has been sufficient healing, and to deflect a perpetuation of potentially 
damaging narratives and stereotypes of black female bodies as vulnerable. 
With regards to the children that were begotten in intimate interracial contacts, 
Hoetink argues that it was socially accepted for Jewish men in particular to acknowledge 
their biracial offspring, and to favor them in over other Afrodescendant children. They 
would for example manumit them, provide them with education, a good job, or even 
some land (Paula 1967:30); things that were not easily available to enslaved people and, 
manumission aside, to freedmen. Also, it was not uncommon for these children to take on 
their fathers’ family name. Protestant men also extended such favors to their 
Afrodescendant children, with the exception of their family name. The child could only 
allude to its white lineage through changing its fathers’ name a bit (Hoetink 1958:120).  
Hoetink is less explicit about the ways in which bi-racial children remained 
structurally disadvantaged compared to their white siblings. Interracial relations were so 
common that miscegenation appeared to be part of the “natural order of things,” he 
argues. He paints a romantic picture of black and white children living in the same yard, 
growing up together as playmates and friends, both groups knowing their place in the 
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balance of power, something that Gilberto Freyre too writes about with regards to 
Brazilian society (Freyre 1933). “One met their negro relative in every street of Punda” 
(Hoetink 1958:121)25. But history across the African Diaspora illustrates that these 
children often also served as cheap additions to a plantation owner’s slaves. In Hoetink’s 
work their voices also do not surface much—if at all. In this representation of 
miscegenation the oppressive and violent dimensions of interracial relations remain out 
of sight. 
It is important to observe the gatekeeping mechanisms at play in these intimate 
yet unequal relations. Ann Laura Stoler specifically addresses this “realm of the intimate” 
as yet another mechanism through which colonial dominance was exerted (2002). The 
official and implicit rules, sanctions and prohibitions regarding who could bed and wed 
who and under what circumstances, how colonial parents were to interact with their 
mixed-race children and how nurse maids were to interact with white colonial children, 
informed both the white colonials and the enslaved and otherwise subjugated population. 
They were a continuous implementation and affirmation of colonial power and white 
supremacy (Stoler 2002). Women of color that had relationships or interactions with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This romantization of interracial intimacy is a common theme throughout the African Diaspora, and often 
spotlighted in Curaçaoan national imagination, like in the popular novels My Sister the Negress by Cola 
Debrot (1935/1955), and Slave and Master written by Carel de Haseth (1988/2008). Both books rank 
highly in Curaçao’s literary canon. However, in popular culture the topic of sexual violence directed at 
women of color also appears to be minimally present. Much more research is needed to determine if this 
indeed the case, see appendix X. In de Haseth’s book a white man and a slave who grew up together as 
friends both fight over the same woman of color, with whom they are both deeply in love. In Debrot’s book 
a white elite Curaçaoan man returns to the island after studying abroad and falls in love with the black girl 
that tends to his father’s house. She turns out to be his sister. Both stories strongly feature romanticized, 
quintessentially unequal amorous relations between black women and white men, from the male 
perspective. Pierre Lauffer’s famous poem about the slave Buchi Fil and his wife Mosa Nena (1964) 
describes how the overseer tries to break Buchi Fil’s strength by selling Mosa Nena. This is a powerfully 
violent act in which rape may be implied, but in Lauffer’s poem it is not explicitly mentioned. An in-depth 
analysis of the imagination and representation of interracial relations in the Curaçaoan arts in past and 
present, and how these contest or perpetuate hegemony, would be most valuable. 
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white men—consensual or not—could reap benefits from them, but even when such 
relations were amorous and permanent, Afrodescendant women could never enter white 
European space as a white man’s legitimate partner (Stoler 2002:39; see also Kenepa-
Römer 1992). For the non-white, mixed-race children they had with these white men the 
same gatekeeping mechanisms applied. There was a good possibility that they received 
privileges from their fathers and from society at large, but never to the extent that they 
became part of the white elite26 (Kenepa-Römer 1992:22,23).  
Therefore miscegenation must not be romanticized: during the colonial era in 
particular it always contained the threat of violence and the exploitation of black bodies 
(Stoler 2002). White males could rape women of color or demand sexual favors27. And 
the children that resulted from such relations were likely to have had more privileges 
compared to their darker skinned peers, but their white peers would by default outrank 
them. Racial labeling is of key importance in this gatekeeping process:  
The colonial politics of exclusion was contingent on constructing categories. 
Colonial control was predicated on identifying who was “white,” who was 
“native28,” and which children could become citizens rather than subjects, on 
which were legitimate progeny and which were not (Stoler 2002:43).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In chapter 2 I will use Stoler’s work to present a much more in-depth analysis of how white supremacist 
ideology was exerted through the various intimate interactions between black and white people in Curaçao. 
 
27 White men would also sexually violate and exploit black men—a heavily silenced dimension of colonial 
oppression in general, and certainly in the literature on Curaçao’s colonial era. But naturally this would not 
amount to miscegenation. Hoetink does not elaborate on this, or on intimate relations between black men 
and white women, but like elsewhere in the colonial realm, these were not condoned and heavily 
sanctioned. This too is a marginal topic in the existing literature on Curaçao.  
28 Stoler writes here about Indonesia, also a part of the Dutch Empire. In Curaçao’s case “non-white” or 
“Afrodescendant” should replace “native”. 
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Inter-Racial Intimacy and Creolization 
The previous section indicates that, even though the Protestants—and also the Jews—
were averse to outsiders acculturating into their cultures, there was ample racial and also 
cultural mixing between black and white segments of Curaçao’s population. Linda 
Rupert’s Creolization and Contraband (2012) illustrates the highly complex processes of 
creolization that took place during the early days of the colony, when people of different 
ethnic backgrounds and classes interacted abundantly in cultural and economic arenas.  
The notion of “creolization” has multiple uses. As discussed in the introduction, it 
refers to the early 20th century ideologies of national identity devised to create 
unification in heterogeneous societies, especially in the Caribbean and parts of the 
Americas (Bernabé et al. 1989/1993; Glissant 1995; Hannerz 1987). In more recent times 
creolization has become a favored concept by the social sciences to theorize and analyze 
processes of cultural mixing, transculturation, and globalization, often still referring to, 
but no longer limited to, the Caribbean (Hall 2003; Khan 2001; Mintz 1998; Stephen 
2007). This is also how Rupert, as well as Hoetink, Römer and Martinus employ the 
notion in a Curaçaoan context: as “processes of sociocultural exchange and adaptation 
that occurred among all the diverse peoples of the early modern world who were thrust 
together with the rise of European overseas empires” (2012:6).  
Hoetink (1958), followed by Römer (1979, 1981) and Martinus (1997), specified 
three main trends of cultural exchange that led to the mixing, reformulation, and 
invention of different cultural elements: processes that have been referred to with 
expressions such as “africanization,” “dutchification,” and “latinization.” These can be 
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seen as often converging, specific trends in the creolization processes29 that took place on 
the island30.  
In this Dutch colony, the Dutch culture, norms, values, language, and modes of 
operandi were the norm, and associated with the superior status that the Protestant elite 
enjoyed (Hoetink 1958:51). This created a cultural framework in which other parts of 
society develop. Dutchification refers to the influence from the dominant cultural norms 
and practices from the Protestant Dutch colonizers on the Jewish and especially the 
Afrodescendant populations (Hoetink 1958:84). Especially after emancipation Dutch-
ness would become a much sought after norm for people of color, adopting elements of 
Dutch culture and religion was a way to secure social mobility.  
Hoetink wrote about the herengedragspatroon or “master behavioral pattern,” 
which is an ideal typical pattern belonging to the elites and the “slave behavioral pattern” 
(Hoetink 1958:125). These two ideal typical31 behavioral patterns mainly instructed 
whites and blacks the correct display of respect, obedience, prowess and dominance. The 
general gist of the master behavioral pattern was that one was to be fierce, proud, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Hoetink initially appears to have perceived creolization to be the synonym of Africanization (Hoetink 
1958:49). Römer understands creolization as an almost natural and self-evident amalgamation of these 
three processes, which according to him resulted in a unified island identity. Allen, however, critiques 
Römer in particular for being oblivious to the racial and socio-economic inequality and subsequent tensions 
between the groups involved in this amalgamation. She claims he did not take into account the “social-
political dimension” that is part and parcel of creolization (Allen 2006:23).  
 
30 It deserves mention that particularly the writing of Hoetink and Römer arises during a time when 
ideology of national identity shifts towards a focus on creolization. Both were influential scholars in 
Curaçao. Hoetink’s work on the different ethnic and racial groups in post-colonial Curaçao’s and their 
interrelatedness was unprecedented and has to this day remained a seminal work. Römer was the first 
scholar to analyze Curaçao’s post-colonial era. Their analyses and knowledge making fuelled the 
imagination of the intellectual elites involved in the imagination of the nation and with that the national 
narrative from the 1960s on. No longer were the black and white population segments depicted as castes: 
their profound interrelatedness became a new trope in Curaçao’s national imagination. 
 
31 Hoetink understood that there were many nuances and variations in people’s individual behaviors. 
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respected, superior to blacks, dominant, and ambitious; the slave behavioral pattern 
required a performance of being submissive, obedient, and patient towards whites 
(Hoetink 1958:125). However, the lighter skinned free population also adopted the 
master behavioral pattern, thus intentionally pursuing dutchification. Imitating the 
colonial elites and their behaviors of superiority was a way to signal one’s deliberate 
moving away from slave status (Allen 2006, Klooster 1994). It went hand in hand with a 
deliberate distancing from African descendent culture, mores, practices, which were seen 
as inferior (Hoetink 1958:89). The Catholic Church, which was gaining influence over 
the non-white community after emancipation and avidly denounced all African 
influences, added more momentum to the dutchification process (Hoetink 1958:84, see 
also Allen 2006, Römer 1981).  
The other process Hoetink describes is latinification. The culture of Curaçao’s 
Protestant elites, he claims, bore a closer resemblance to that of the Catholic elites of the 
South European nations and especially their Latin American colonies. It was 
characterized by an unusually strong patriarchal character, a “virginity complex,” which 
pertained to the women of the Dutch elites, a very present “virility complex,” which 
concerned the men, and much more celebration and festivity than was common in the 
Calvinistic oriented Netherlands of the 16th and 17th centuries. Girls and women were 
duly chaperoned and confined to the home while black servants run all the errands 
(Hoetink 1958:52-54). Men, on the contrary, were from their early teenage years on 
encouraged to be sexually active and promiscuous (Hoetink 1958:55,56). As previously 
discussed, fathering children out of wedlock was common and encouraged. Historical 
sources also indicate that Curaçao’s culture was characterized by ample celebration and 
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social interaction, always with an abundance of music and dance, which both had West 
European, Latin American, and African elements (Hoetink 1958:59-60). In the 
Netherlands these trends were far less present: the culture was characterized by frugality, 
piousness, abstemiousness and a much more subdued sexual morale. Paralleling his 
findings to the works of Gilberto Freyre (1933) and Eric Willems (1954), Hoetink 
attributes the differences between Dutch Protestant culture in Curaçao and Dutch 
Protestant culture in the Netherlands to the Latin influences. For a large part these 
influences arose from frequent trading contacts with the mainland (Rupert 2012), and 
from interactions with the Portuguese Jews on Curaçao32.  
For lower class Protestants, more so than for the elites, there was another 
latinization influence: marriage to “mestizo” women from mainland, who brought their 
culture (Hoetink 1958:48). Hoetink however claims that while the lower Protestants knew 
that latinization was unavoidable, they did not appreciate it, as it was perceived as 
diluting their Dutchness and the superior social status that was associated with that: in the 
Dutch oriented colonial culture their Dutchness automatically gave them a superior 
position over non-whites (Hoetink 1958:84). 
For the mulatto group on the other hand, latinization was yet another way to 
distance oneself from the Afrocuraçaoan cultural domain and its ascribed inferiority 
(Hoetink 1958:89), as well as from Curaçao’s rigid colorist system. This group was 
financially equal or superior to the lower Protestants, but in the social hierarchy they 
were always perceived as inferior to whites. Often lighter skinned people, and especially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The Protestant aristocracy, as Hoetink calls is, did not actively seek to imitate cultural norms, values and 
behaviors of the Jewish group. Until the end of the 19th century the Dutch elites looked down on the Jews, 
and thought them “unequal” and “inferior” (Hoetink 1958:51). 
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those that were fairly affluent, tried not to marry darker skinned black people as to 
prevent “social downturn,” Hoetink argues. Instead they too sought mestizo or white 
marriage partners from South American mainland (Hoetink 1958:83). “By confessing to 
South American culture and morals, they as it were sought to detach from the local 
hierarchy, and to experience their being of color as less disgraceful” (Hoetink 1958:83).  
But Curaçaoan linguist Frank Martinus argues that latinization already took place 
in the 16th and 17th century Portuguese-run slave forts on the West African coast, from 
where they were bought among others by Dutch slave traders (Martinus 1996:126). In 
collaboration with the Catholic Church the Portuguese slave laws of the time stated that 
African captives had to be baptized, for which the Church collected a tax (Martinus 
1997:127). So before arriving in Curaçao, slaves were deliberately socialized into the 
Portuguese-based pidgin language used in the forts, and in the religion33. They even 
learned a trade such as masonry, carpentry, distillery or blacksmithing, which would 
increase their value (Martinus 1997:126). Latinization of the Afrocuraçaoan population 
also occurred through the ample missionary work of the Catholic priests who reached 
Curaçao from the South American mainland in the 18th and early 19th century, before 
Dutch Catholics came to the island (Klooster 1994:292). 
The third trend, africanization, pertains to the cultural influences of 
Afrodescendants on the various white groups of the island. Because of the small size of 
the plantations there was ample personal and intimate contact between enslaved people 
and their owners (Hoetink 1958:123). This facilitated the continued and two-way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Martinus states that captives could stay in these forts for months if not years, for lack of transportation 
(Martinus 1997:126-129). 
 
 73 
exchange of cultural elements between enslaved black children and the white children of 
the slave master growing up together on the same compound; in interracial sexual 
relations, which as said were often permanent, personal, and affectionate (Hoetink 
1958:120); in the relations between fathers and their mixed-race children who were 
commonly raised by their black mothers rather than in the house of their father, and 
between white and non-white siblings (Hoetink 1958:121-125). Lower Protestants 
working as artisans, civil servants and shopkeepers in the city frequently interacted with 
the black population, both free and enslaved (Hoetink 1958:148): they were clients, 
employees, colleagues, neighbors and acquaintances.   
The yayas or wet-nurses are often mentioned as a key element in the specific 
transmission of Afrocuraçaoan language and social practices, beliefs, and values to the 
Jewish and Protestant families they worked for (Hoetink 1958:124; Römer 1981:71; see 
also Stoler 2002:133). Interestingly, Stoler, in writing about colonial Indonesia and 
colonialism at large, describes the apprehension that elites had towards the servants. They 
were perceived as a source of “contamination” and “corruption” of a child’s European 
mindset and identity (Stoler 2002:136). Hoetink does identify the elites’ apprehension 
towards the yaya’s “africanizing” influence, but both Hoetink and Römer depict her in a 
rather romanticized way as a positive symbol of creolization (Hoetink 1958:152; Römer 
1995). She was the person who transferred Afrocuraçaoan culture as well as the 
Papiamentu language to “her” white children, through the milk in her breasts and the 
songs she sang them to dry their tears. Römer also depicts her as a figure of authority, as 
someone who was able to direct her white bosses (Römer 1995). In his descriptions, the 
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yaya does not appear as a threatening influence, one that erodes the boundaries between 
black and white.  
Also in Martinus’ work both the concubine and the yaya or nursemaid were 
considered important vectors for the transmission of Papiamentu and Afrocuraçaoan 
culture to young white Curaçaoans (Martinus 1997). Elite white Curaçaoans that were 
raised with the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology (see below) commonly talk with great nostalgia 
about their yaya as “their black mother.” To many she was the woman who loved them 
even more than their white birth mothers, and who nurtured them into adulthood.  
Martinus’ perception is however dangerously one-sided: the accounts of the 
women that worked these jobs are not included. Returning to Stoler’s Carnal Knowledge 
and Imperial Power we see that, much like white elite Curaçaoan memories, the accounts 
of the Dutch colonials in Indonesia “are filled with tender anecdotes and demonstrations 
of affection, loyalty, and mutual recognition” (Stoler 2002:173). But as Stoler relays, the 
stories of the female domestic servants are structurally untold—they are silenced 
accounts of hegemonic tresspassings. This silence, she argues, is deeply embedded in a 
“gendered local script for colonial service: the tale of the sexually exploited and morally 
debased female domestic” (Stoler 2002:180). Dutch perception of the domestic servants 
could easily shift from a nurturing presence to a sexually disruptive threat to the marital 
bed (Stoler 2002:180). The fear over this stigma, which could end their livelihood, 
concealed the abuse that servants endured from their Dutch employers (Stoler 
2002:180,181). As was the case with the sexual violence directed at Afrocuraçaoan 
women, in Stoler’s memory work she too finds that this violence is stored, and navigated, 
in silence. This silence is oppressive: it preserves the dominant position of the white 
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colonials. But, I argue, it can simultaneously be seen as a deliberate act of self-protection 
(see Sheriff 2000), as a way to navigate and diminish the impact of violence directed at 
non-white women. Speaking up would severely damage the woman’s reputation, and to 
all likelihood result in the end of her employment. Her silence may not end the abuse, and 
therefore has a dimension of complicity; nonetheless it is also an expression of subaltern 
agency. 
 In Curaçaoan academic literature, sociologist Ieteke Witteveen is one of the few 
critical voices that questions this white colonial memory work of the yaya as a “one-
sided, romanticized image of an older woman who effaces herself” (Witteveen 2006:33). 
She does raise the critique that there was absolutely no equality between this black 
woman and the white people she worked for, or between the amicable slave and his white 
childhood friend (Witteveen 2006). But as Stoler emphasized, colonial power penetrated 
all dimensions of the relationship between colonizer and colonized, and in this case 
between slave owner and his children’s wet nurse. 
Still, in these unequal and often abusive interrelations, africanization left a visible 
imprint on Curaçao’s culture in lore, music, dance and other art forms, and in beliefs in 
the supernatural and healing practices (Hoetink 1958:144-147, Römer 1981, 1998). The 
island’s lore is among others characterized by a strong presence of Ananzi or Kompa 
Nanzi34, the trickster spider that has his origins in Ghana, West Africa (Römer 1981:73, 
see also Allen 2012). In Curaçao too Kompa Nanzi, who is loved by black and white 
alike, always schemes his way out of difficult situations, while ridiculing his superiors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Kompa is short for Kompader, the Papiamento word for “friend” or “companion.” 
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The dominant musical and dance styles on the island also have strong African influences 
(Hoetink 1958:140; Römer 1981, 1998; Rosalia 1997), be it in the syncopated rhythms 
and instrumentation of the Curaçaoan waltz, which clearly diverges from its European 
predecessor, or the complex polyrhythmic tambú and its West African instrumentation, 
and the feet stomping and hip gyrating couple’s dance. Also there is an abundance of 
songs, rhymes and proverbs that are deeply rooted in the Afrocuraçaoan experiences of 
racial inequality and slavery.  
Language was another a very important space of creolization. Linguists Eva 
Eckkrammer writes: “Given the fact that the two most prestigious social groups lack a 
common language, the emerging Creole language—based on an Afro-Portuguese Pidgin 
(or Creole, cf.2.2) spoken by the black population and fully established around 1700—is 
quickly adopted” (2007:75). In the 18th century Papiamentu developed into “the chief 
medium of every day communication” (Eckkrammer 2003:99-100). It was spoken by 
blacks and whites, and people of all other racial and ethnic backgrounds (See also Fouse 
2002:66). 
There are various theories about the origins of Papiamentu, which is an Iberian-
based instead of Dutch-based creole language. The polygenesis theory claims that the 
language developed in the Caribbean, in the contact between the Caiquetío population 
and the Spaniards (Martinus 1997). The monogenesis theory, on the other hand, suggests 
that “all creole languages derive from a West African Pidgin Portuguese that was spoken 
in and around Portuguese forts and trading settlements along the West African coast from 
the 15th to the 18th century” (Fouse 2002:89). The latter theory suggests that an early 
version of Papiamentu was developed to facilitate the slave trade. Martinus argues that 
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the language, mainly composed of Portuguese and West-African elements, was used to 
facilitate easier communication amongst the European and African slave traders, but also 
to indoctrinate or “ladinize”35 the captivated Africans into European culture (Martinus 
1997:126). This ladinization36, Martinus argues, was grounded on the baptizing of the 
captives, which was mandated by the Catholic Church. For every baptized captive the 
Church collected baptism tax (Martinus 1997:127). Furthermore, while awaiting 
transportation in the European forts on the West African coasts, something that could 
take months, slaves were taught all sorts of skills, such as carpentry, masonry, and 
blacksmithing, in order to raise their worth (Martinus 1997:126). Since the captives often 
had different native languages and could not communicate with one another easily, they 
used that early version of Papiamentu. This Afro-Portuguese Pidgin was also the 
language the traders used on the ships and in Curaçao (Martinus 1997). Martinus argues 
that in Curaçao, then, this West African Portuguese Pidgin was partially relexified; a part 
of the lexicon was replaced with Dutch and Spanish words, without changing the 
grammatical structure of the Afro-Portuguese Pidgin (Martinus 1997:8).  
The Papiamentu that developed on the island was thus shared by the racially 
stratified population. But Papiamentu also had a gatekeeping function. The Dutch attitude 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Martinus uses the word “ladinize” and “ladinization” rather than latinization, like Hoetink. Martinus uses 
Portuguese sources, which use a slightly different spelling of the word. 
  
36 Martinus borrows the notion of “ladinization” from Carreira (1969:118-119, in Martinus 1997:126. As 
Companhias Pombalinas de Navegaçao, Comércio e Tráfico de Escravos entre a Costa Africana e o 
Nordeste Brasileiro. Porto: Imprensa Portuguesa). Here too it referred to cultural influence by the Southern 
European colonizers, and in particular to the indoctrination of African captives into the religious traditions 
and the language of the Portuguese slave traders and missionaries. Hoetink also speaks of “latinization,” to 
refer to the influence of Southern European people, those speaking Latin based languages - in the case of 
Curaçao the Portuguese Jews - on the Dutch as well as the Afrodescendant people in Curaçao (Hoetink 
1958: 45). 
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of excluding the Portuguese Jews from Dutch language and religion also pertained to the 
Afrodescendant population (Fouse 2007:68). Even though Rupert argues that especially 
in the city Afrocuraçaoans often had a basic understanding of the European languages 
(2012:137), until the 20th century only white children would be officially educated in 
European languages (Fouse 2007), which were considered symbols of refinement and 
white superiority. Since Papiamentu was spoken by the Dutch, the Portuguese and the 
Afrocuraçaoan population, there was no need to instruct Afrocuraçaoans in Dutch or 
Portuguese. Even though many Afrocuraçaoans did learn these European languages, 
officially they remained closed off to the black population. Papiamentu thus bridged the 
racial divide while also maintaining it.  
 
Race-Based Marginalization and Exclusion 
Notwithstanding hybridization, miscegenation and creolization, during the colonial era 
the Afrodescendant population, slave or freed, remained segregated at the bottom of 
social hierarchy. Racist ideology, as I argued previously, works to justify this hierarchy. 
Racism should be seen as a “structure of knowledge and representations” that aims to 
naturalize the socio-economic and political order. It is maintained, among others, through 
gatekeeping mechanisms (Lee 2004), which serve to shield privileges of the white elite 
from claims of the non-white masses. 
As was the case elsewhere in the Caribbean, Curaçaoan slaves had very limited 
rights: they were perceived as property, not citizens. There were laws that protected them, 
but these were rarely reinforced (Paula 1967; see also Allen 2007; Klooster 1994). In 
Curaçao, slaves were perhaps somewhat freer in their comings and goings than in large-
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scale plantation settings. They were often contracted out, and some had their own houses 
in separate locations from their owners, or a small side business or a garden of their own 
where they grew food (Allen 2007:85-86; see also Rupert 2012). But in the end the 
enslaved population was economically dependent on the slave owners for their 
livelihood, housing arrangements and general spatial mobility, especially since the dry 
climate of the island made it difficult to obtain much revenue from agricultural activities. 
Phenotypically, legally, and economically enslaved Afrocuraçaoans remained a separate 
societal category, as was common throughout the colonial world at the time. 
For the mulatto population things were somewhat different than for the darker 
skinned population. Mulattoes were sometimes manumitted, and their white fathers might 
give them educations, jobs and even property. This was common throughout the colonial 
realm. Curaçaoan sociologist Alejandro Paula, who writes specifically about these black 
and white relations during the colonial era (1967), argues that it was in part through this 
parental acknowledgement, but predominantly because of the lighter skin tone that 
mulattoes were perceived as different from blacks (Paula 1967:30-31, see also Allen 
2007:73-74). Even though these privileges were by no means given to all mixed race 
children, their lighter phenotype entailed increased privileges in society at large. Over 
time the mulatto group did develop into a new socio-economic class, positioned in 
between the dark skinned enslaved and free population, and the white elites (Paula 
1967:30-31). Allen writes about the slavery era (1635-1863):  
With the increase in the number of colored people, one’s skin became the 
deciding factor for social mobility. Legal discrimination was introduced. Hair 
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texture and the degree of one’s skin pigmentation became important markers of 
identity (Allen 2007:73).  
Allen and Paula describe an elaborate ranking system that existed within the black 
population at large, and that was both fed by, and perpetuated through, the privileges 
white people attributed to those of lighter skin. These ranks, Allen argues, had started 
with those being born on the island being considered superior to people who had newly 
arrived from Africa (Allen 2007:73); something that was common in the Americas at the 
time. Lighter skin tone added further to this social stratification.  
“It was in particular among the group of mixed racial descent, hence the group of 
“mulattoes” or “coloreds,” that an elaborate hierarchy existed regarding the 
amount of the negroid part in everyone’s descent” (Hoetink 1958: 81). 
 Eventually this separation of mulattos from blacks would become sanctioned by 
colonial law (Paula 1967:31; see also Stoler 2002), which reinforced the color 
hierarchy37. The colonial government also began to distinguish between the two groups 
on the basis of somatic appearance when making “administrative and military 
classifications” (Paula 1967:31), yet another a gatekeeping practice:  
Such classification would serve as one more distinctive factor between the Whites 
and the Negroes. The establishment of a clear distance between the Negroes and 
the Mulattoes could only favor the “respect and due reverence” of the Negro for 
his white master (Paula 1967:31).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  The literature used does not make explicit, however, on what precise basis this distinction between 
mulatto and darker skinned black was established, whether this based on phenotype—and if so, by what 
criteria was phenotype “measured”—or on other criteria. 	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During the slavery era the mulatto group eagerly accepted this superiority and exerted 
racist behaviors towards their darker skinned counterparts: white supremacy had a deep 
seat in peoples’ consciousness. This group posed a threat to the white elites in a way that 
the darker skinned Curaçaoans did not. Stoler describes a similar tension in colonial 
Indonesia. Miscegenation confounded the once clear and physically visible markers of 
Europeanness, which entailed the risk of non-white people gaining access to this 
carefully protected European space, and to the privilege and power that came with it. 
“Conceived as a source of subversion, it was seen as a threat to white prestige, and 
embodiment of European degeneration and moral decay” (Stoler 2002:80). Stoler uses 
the notion of “interior frontiers,” which was coined by German philosopher Johan 
Gottlieb Fichte. Rather then expecting the enemy of the nation at exterior frontiers, it 
suggests that through miscegenation white ranks would be penetrated from the inside out 
(Stoler 2002:80). 
In Curaçao, mulatto people certainly had more access to European culture—“the 
source of civilization”—then their dark skinned counterparts. On occasion, the mulatto 
population was able to become Protestant, something that was impossible for the darker 
skinned population. We already saw briefly that Afrocuraçaoans were not welcomed into 
European culture. European culture, language and religion were the landmark of any kind 
of social status (Hoetink 1958; Oostindie 2000). Dutch slave owners believed that it was 
dangerous to educate slaves and to allow them to congregate, which is why the 
Protestants not only did not instigate missionary activities, but initially also refused 
Spanish Missionaries to baptize and educate slaves. Consequently, slaves were not 
baptized until the end of the eighteenth century (Allen 2007; Hoetink 1958; Klooster 
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1994; Paula 1967). Naturally, the Afrodescendant population developed their own 
spiritual and religious practices, which to a large extent centered on the drumming 
tradition of the tambú. The work of Rose Mary Allen (2007), and especially René Rosalia 
(1997) illustrates how Afrocuraçaoan religion and spirituality was fiercely oppressed by 
the plantation owners, the Catholic Church, and the State, and the many ways in which 
Afrocuraçaoans challenged and resisted this white dominance. 
The colonial government did allow some mulattos to be baptized as Protestants, 
but reluctantly so. The Protestant Dutch had a great disdain for the Catholics, Hoetink 
writes (1958:109,110). This is why, should any religion be administered to people of 
African descent, the work befell to the zealous Catholic missionaries. In the early days of 
the colony the colonial government however greatly restricted Catholic priests, who were 
by and large of Spanish origin (Klooster 1994: 291-292. See also: Allen 2007:93), and 
therefore seen as untrustworthy. Klooster argues that the Dutch West India Company was 
in fact barely aware of these Catholic activities (1994:291). It would take until 1824 
before the Catholic presence significantly increased in scale. In the 19th and 20th century 
large numbers of Dutch Catholic clergy came to the island, where they would play a key 
role in the indoctrination of Afrocuraçaoans into the norms of white supremacy. 
 
Catholic Civilizing Mission (1824-1915) 
This Catholic presence expanded at a time when the freed blacks had outnumbered 
enslaved people (Klooster 1994:288, see also Broek 2006), and had begun to pose a 
considerable threat to colonial dominance. Hoetink argues that the mulatto and freedmen 
population mimicked the behaviors of the white elites. Because of this “master behavioral 
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pattern” (Hoetink 1958:125), as he calls it, blacks denounced the role of subjection and 
obedience that was expected of them, and instead acted with superiority, ambition, and 
pride. Through this behavior they challenged white supremacy. Consequently, Klooster 
writes that this large free black population caused great worry among the white elites 
over their struggle to govern this “proud and rowdy lot,” in addition to their deep fear for 
slave revolts (1994:290).  
Because of the various ways in which Afrocuraçaoans could earn money, which 
was unlikely prospect for field slaves on larger plantations in the region, it was fairly easy 
for Curaçaoan slaves to attain manumission, more so than in other colonies (Rupert 
2012:145). Enslaved people often manumitted themselves: by the 1840s freedmen 
already outnumbered slaves (Allen 2007:66; see also Klooster 1994). Allen argues that 
especially slaves that had artisan skills were able to make money to manumit themselves 
or their loved ones (2007:89; see also Klooster 1994). Slave owners, the Jewish ones in 
particular, also manumitted slaves for various reasons. Sometimes they freed people for 
humanitarian reasons, especially the slaves that they favored, such as their 
Afrodescendant children (Allen 2007:89-90; Hoetink 1958:111). But slave owners also 
manumitted slaves that were sick and old and thus no longer profitable, or when they 
themselves faced financial struggles and could not afford to feed extra mouths. Allen 
writes: 
The masters were not forced by law to support their manumitted slaves, as was 
the case in the British Caribbean. Thus manumission did not necessarily imply 
opportunity and benefit for everyone (Allen 2007:90).  
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Goslinga (1956), Hoetink (1961, 1973), Paula (1967), Römer (1979) all claim that 
consequently, the freedman’s status held no particular privilege or opportunity.  
Still, those who had special skills could do well for themselves. Many freedmen moved to 
Willemstad, (1994:286), where they found employment in the city and around the harbor. 
The small and dry plantations, unfit to yield significant profits, did not offer much work 
for the large Afrocuraçaoan population.  
At the beginning of the 19th century the Dutch colonial government allowed the 
Dutch Catholic Church to start an elaborate mission program in Curaçao, specifically 
directed at the Afrocuraçaoan population. Curaçao’s elites were afraid of violent 
uprisings, and as Dutch sociologist and literary scholar Aart Broek contends, they 
collaborated with the Catholic Church to avert this threat for the safeguard of the 
colony’s wellbeing (Broek 2006:12). Under the guise of humanitarian care, the Church 
would become one of the island’s new institutions working for the reproduction of the 
racial status quo, and indoctrinating the island population even further into the ideology 
of white supremacy (Allen 1992, 2007, 2014). Dutch Catholic missionaries transformed 
many aspects of the island’s landscape: they built churches, established villages, and set 
up education and health care (Allen 2007; Broek 2006; Hoetink 1958). It was not only 
colonial law that legitimized the racist ideology that had been firmly established over the 
course of the previous two centuries; now God Himself would inculcate and validate the 
message (see Hall 2002).  
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During the preceding two hundred years a segmented society had developed, with 
a population that was subdivided into four main categories38 according to race/ethnicity: 
the white Dutch Protestants, the white Portuguese Jews, the mulattos, and the darker 
skinned Afrocuraçaoans. As discussed, in many ways these categories remained separate, 
surrounded by clear boundaries that were premised on race, and exerted through 
demography, religion, language and labor. Thus, by the early 19th century Curaçao this 
racist structure, which centered on what Hoetink calls a “somatic norm image” (Hoetink 
1958), was securely in place and supported by a legal structure that separated whites from 
blacks, and that gave to mulattos—freed and enslaved—certain privileges that were not 
available to blacks.  
In the official colonial acts too, there was a clear distinction between whites and 
blacks: the former were citizens, whose rights and privileges were well looked after. The 
latter were not (Paula 1967:28). In the colonial act of 1741 slaves were not allowed to 
congregate, not even for weddings or funerals, at the risk of severe punishment. The 
colonial act of 1820 forbade slave marriage (Paula 1967:34). The mulatto population, 
however, was less restricted by such sanctions. As previously discussed, at the turn of the 
19th century the colonial government started to classify mulatto’s and darker skinned 
Afrocuraçaoans differently (Paula 1967:31), and the privileges that mulattos received 
increased. This further reinforced the color hierarchy. 
Spanish priests from the South American mainland had been operating on the 
island in very modest numbers since the mid 17th century, in spite of resistance from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 During the colonial era people from other ethnic backgrounds had moved to the island and carved out a 
place for themselves in Curaçao’s society (Hoetink 1958; Rupert 2012), but their numbers remained small 
compared to these main segments.  
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Curaçao’s colonial government. The enslaved and free black and mulatto people, who 
had not been initiated into the Protestant or Jewish faith and who were discouraged to 
practice their own religion, had however shown great interest in the Catholic faith that 
did welcome them (Klooster 1994:291). Initially the Dutch West India Company had not 
paid much attention to this development (Klooster 1994:291), but when by the mid 18th 
century virtually the whole Afrocuraçaoan population was Catholic the colonial 
administration slowly began to perceive the large Catholic congregations of 
Afrocuraçaoans as a threat, while at the same time recognizing the religion’s potential to 
exercise control over this group (Klooster 1994:291, 292).  
The early priests from the mainland laid the groundwork for the Dutch Catholic 
missionaries who arrived in the island in the 1820s, led by Mgr. Niewindt. Niewindt’s 
personal objective was to “civilize” the Afrocuraçaoan population (Allen 2007:94), and 
to instill in these “poor black souls” the virtues of “white culture”—the epitome of 
civilization—while depicting the African continent as inherently devoid of any 
sophistication and refinement (Allen 2007:94). The Dutch missionaries labored 
industriously to build schools, hospitals, churches, parishes and villages (Allen 2007; 
Broek 2006; Hoetink 1958). In only four decades the Catholic Church arose to great 
power: 
Even though the colonial government dealt with issues that were related to 
citizenship in its attempt of eradicating what it deemed as ‘improper’ behavior by 
the former enslaved, it was less present in engineering collective identities and 
belonging among the former enslaved than was the Church. At the time of 
emancipation, the Roman Catholic Church was the primary institution exercising 
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authority and control over the lives of African descendent Curaçaoans (Allen 
2014:47). 
Initially keeping Afrocuraçaoans outside of “European civilization” had been a 
major part of the gatekeeping efforts of the white Protestant and Jewish elites (see Lee 
2004). Now this European civilization was used to further indoctrinate the Afrocuraçaoan 
population. “The civilization work of Niewindt was aimed at shaping the slave, so he 
would accept submissiveness to his master as his moral duty” (Allen 1992:19): it was 
thus a “deliberate strategy” (Allen 1992:19). White European religion was put at the 
service of the imposition and naturalization of the racist social order. The goal was to 
generate a healthy, manageable, docile and well-organized population39.  
Consequently, the Church waged war on anything African (Allen 1992:22, 
Rosalia 1997), the tambú in particular (Rosalia 1997). To this day people see this 
tradition as a way through which to connect to their ancestors and even to the African 
motherland. Playing the drum is considered a way of praying, a way to find strength and 
solace (Rosalia 1997). But as of old the tambú songs have also been a way to critique 
society, be it a bothersome neighbor, an unruly wife, a rigid pastor, or the repressive 
actions of the slave owners or shons40 (Rosalia 1997). Consequently, the tambú was 
fiercely repressed, especially when the power of the Church expanded. Rosalia describes 
avidly how the shons, the police and the missionaries would dispel such gatherings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The colonial government had initially not been convinced of the usefulness of Catholicism as a means of 
control. But when the State witnessed the success Niewindt had with his civilization mission it initiated a 
much more intense collaboration (Allen 2007:94).  
 
40 “Shon” translates as sir or mister. It is a term of respect that signifies a person with a high social status. 
The notion is often used to refer to the white elites and their superior economic status, especially vis-à-vis 
slaves. However, shon is also used to refer to a respected black person, such as an elder or someone with a 
specific kind of wisdom, regardless of whether this person has a high economic status or not. 
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whenever they could, punishing the tambú players and dancers if they could catch them, 
and destroying their instruments. In spite of ample resistance41, physical violence, and 
legal and religious sanctions became the three pillars that instilled fear in Afrocuraçaoan 
people for practicing their tradition (Rosalia 1997)42.  
Both Allen (2007) and Rosalia (1997) illustrate that in spite of this reign of terror 
the Afrocuraçaoan population resisted this oppression of Afrocuraçaoan culture and 
beliefs. As a result tambú, seú, and many other Afrocuraçaoan beliefs, practices and 
cultural expressions survived colonial oppression and still exist today. In fact, for 
centuries they have fuelled Curaçao’s black counter-hegemonic identities (Allen 2007; 
Rosalia 1997), which amounted to several slave revolts, among which the famous slave 
revolt of 1795, and the violent revolt of 1969, but also the post 1969-revolt developments 
of black empowerment and “antilleanization.” Still, the Church was fairly successful in 
its oppression of Afrocuraçaoan culture: many people feared the lei di pastor or “law of 
the priest” (Allen 2007:170, Rosalia 1997:202), and the wrath of God that would be 
unleashed upon them if they got involved in ‘heathen’ practices. Catholicism offered a 
way to gain some access to “white culture,” and with that to some upward social mobility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Rosalia’s dissertation (1997) for copious descriptions. 
  
42 The sanctions on performing the tambú were harsh. The shons could punish the players physically, 
through beatings and whippings, or through a cut in their rations. After 1863, when slavery was abolished, 
many former slaves rented small bits of land from the shons through the paga-tera or share cropping 
system. This kept people trapped in a strong dependency on the landowners (Allen 2007). When resisting 
the ban on the tambú people risked loosing their right to these lands and to become homeless and jobless 
(Rosalia 1997). The police arrested people for playing, singing and dancing tambú, and destroyed the 
drums. But the punishments by the priests were equally feared. The missionaries initiated violent raids to 
dismiss the gatherings and destroy the instruments, and preached that the tambú was the devil’s work. They 
threatened the practitioners with excommunication and no longer being allowed to confess and receiving 
the sacraments. There was even a corner outside of the cemetery’s walls where the ‘damned’ people would 
be buried (Rosalia 1997:206).  
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(Allen 2007, 2014; Hoetink 1958:84), which gave it significant appeal to many 
Afrocuraçaoans.  
 
Emancipation  
After abolition, oppression of Afrocuraçaoan culture and beliefs intensified. In the Dutch 
colonies, Curaçao included, slavery ended officially on July 1st 1863. Like elsewhere in 
the colonial world, Afrocuraçaoans exited slavery to enter a status of ‘second-rate’ 
citizens. In theory they now lived under the same laws as all other citizens, and were 
entitled to the same rights (Allen 2014; Römer 1978; Paula 1967). But similar to other 
colonized territories, in practice this meant that formerly enslaved people were perceived 
as a threat to the economic status quo of the colony and the safety of the white population 
(Allen 2014; Paula 1967), especially since by the second half of the 19th century the 
Afrocuraçaoan population constituted approximately 80% of the population (Allen 
2007:66) and thus far outnumbered the white population. The elites feared resistance. As 
a consequence Afrocuraçaoan rights to citizenship became specified in a series of new 
laws, which served to restrain their behaviors and specify their obligations to safeguard 
the well being of the nation (Allen 2014:3). And in order to enhance feelings of national 
belonging and patriotism among the Afrocuraçaoan group, the Catholic Church 
intensified its so-called “civilizing mission” of the black masses (Allen 2014:9-11).  
Economically speaking abolition brought the Afrocuraçaoan population very little 
relief and socio-economic reform (Allen 2007, 2014). The already challenged plantation 
system crumbled due to continued droughts: the economy was worse than ever (Allen, 
2007; Römer 1979). Afrocuraçaoans now received some basic education in the Catholic 
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schools, but the old elites continued to protect their economic and societal positions and 
continued to restrict black people in their access to education, jobs, political power, and 
wealth (Allen 2007, 2014). These restrictions also applied to mulattos, though in 
somewhat lesser degrees. In the late 19th century whites occupied the upper and middle 
classes; mulattos managed to move upwards, seeping into the middle classes; yet the 
formerly enslaved—the largest population segment—remained at the bottom of the social 
ladder43 (Allen 2007, 2014; Römer 1978). 
In the Catholic schools and churches, which were initially solely attended by 
black and mulatto children, the civilization mission perpetuated. Until 1935 the language 
of instruction was Papiamentu (Narain 1995:23, see also Broek 1994; Fouse 2002)44. 
Generally speaking, the white elite of the island, various missionaries included, was 
opposed to using a “slave language” for this civilizing process: they considered it too 
crude to impart any level of sophistication (Broek 2006:21). If “civilization” of the black 
masses was necessary, it had better be achieved by using a “refined” European language, 
people argued initially. And for the sake of the assimilation of the black masses into the 
Dutch Kingdom, it was thought best to use the Dutch language (Broek 2006:22). 
However, a group of late 19th century local upper- and middle class writers supported the 
Church in its favoring of Papiamentu (Broek 2006:22,23). This was the language that 
Afrocuraçaoans knew best and communicate in comfortably. Instead, this group of white 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Afrocuraçaoans were not recompensed for the abuse and exploitation they and their ancestors had 
suffered. Their former owners, however, did receive “financial ‘compensation’ for the loss of their 
‘property’ (Allen 2014:4). 
 
44 Through the publication of educational and religious materials the language stabilized considerably; in 
1874 a first Papiamentu grammar was created, followed by a dictionary a year later (Fouse 2002). 
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and mulatto writers started writing literature and poetry in Papiamentu, and in doing so 
they argued that Papiamentu was perfectly fit for expressing anything and everything. 
Also, it captured better the essence of the Curaçaoan multiracial population at large and 
its many experiences than did Dutch (Broek 1994, 2006:23).  
 The island’s first newspaper in Papiamentu, Civilisadó45, played an important role 
in this acceptance of Papiamentu. Launched in 1871, this newspaper was directed at the 
Afrocuraçaoans, and aimed to perpetuate the spread of “civilization” according to the 
norms of the Catholic Church (Broek 2006:13-15). However, the Afrocuraçaoan 
population, which was still largely illiterate, and the mulatto population, which according 
to Broek rather distanced itself from Afrocuraçaoan culture, did not display the expected 
interest: the newspaper did not last long (Broek:13-15). Even though it had been 
unsuccessful at indoctrinating the population of color in the civilization narrative of the 
Church, it still made an important contribution to the appreciation of Papiamentu by all 
layers of society. Civilisadó had established Papiamentu as a “civilizing” language, but 
also as a language that allowed for “civilized expression” (Broek 2006:15). In the first 
decades of the 20th century Papiamentu developed into one of the major markers of 
Curaçao’s culture, one that would soon be picked up by the elites and used in their search 
for a national identity separate from the colonial motherland: the Netherlands. More 
newspapers in Papiamentu and various kinds of Papiamentu literary expressions saw the 
light of day, extending both the notion of who were considered civilized and by what 
measures, as this sense of a budding Curaçaoan national uniqueness and awareness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Civilisadó translates as “he who has been civilized.” 	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(Broek 2006; Eckkrammer 2003). Here we see the power of the printing press as 
underscored by Benedict Anderson (1983/1991). 
Around the turn of the century the notion of the Yu’i Kòrsou began to emerge on 
occasion in publications of the Catholic Church, such as an article published in the 
newspaper La Cruz in 1900, dedicated to the “20th anniversary of the daughter of William 
III, Queen Wilhelmina” (Allen 2014:12). Allen analyzes numerous original documents 
for the promulgation of such sentiments, such as publications in the Papiamentu 
newspapers La Cruz and La Union, which were initiated by the Catholic Church in 
respectively 1900 and 1922, and were directed at the Afrocuraçaoan population (Broek 
1992:121,122). In these texts she notices the frequent use of the word yu or “child” to 
denote the formerly enslaved (Allen 2014:9). In some of these texts the notion of child 
explicitly refers to their status as lesser beings, compared to whites. This, Allen argues, 
concurs with the prevailing race-based ideologies of that era in Curaçao and across the 
region, which in spite of their newly acquired citizenship perceived blacks as inferior to 
the white population (Allen 2014:11, see also Paula 1989).  
Allen’s rather succinct article appears to be the only inquiry into the use of the 
Yu’i Kòrsou notion during this time period. I find it therefore difficult to conclude that 
the notion of the Yu’i Kòrsou or Child of Curaçao was indeed devised by the Catholic 
Church as a narrative or doctrine directly and exclusively aimed at the Afrocuraçaoan 
population. However, the evidence that Allen presents suggests that the frequent notion 
of the word “Yu” in Church propaganda did have a strong and specific reference to black 
people’s inferior status. This could indeed indicate that this early use of the notion of the 
Yu’i Kòrsou was geared at instilling a sense of national belonging among 
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Afrocuraçaoans, though be it as lesser humans and not as equal citizens. If a first 
rendition of a Yu’i Kòrsou narrative indeed developed during this time, and was 
widespread enough to be perceived as an ideology, it was one that propagated explicit 
racial inequality: as Allen argues, blacks were represented as inferior and childlike 
compared to whites.  
This overview of the first 280 years of the colony illustrates the development of 
the island’s overt hegemonic racial ideology of white supremacy, and its implementation 
through language, religion, law, education, work, citizenship status, and demography. 
During this era miscegenation had become a norm that had many implications. The white 
population reinforced colonial dominance and white supremacy through intimate, 
unequal, interracial relations (see Stoler 2002). This dominance was further reinforced 
through the colorist system or color hierarchy that developed along with miscegenation, 
and that ranked white over black. For people of color miscegenation was an important 
way to pursue and achieve social upward mobility. Still, miscegenation must not be 
romanticized: it always also contained the threat of violence and the exploitation of black 
bodies (Stoler 2002).  
 In spite of ample cultural and racial mixing, the racial segments remained 
separated. Protestants and Jews stuck to their own communities, and race-based 
gatekeeping mechanisms by and large kept Afrocuraçaoans—mulattos included—from 
integrating into these white population segments, and especially from successfully 
claiming white privileges. 
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The Shell Era (1915-1969): Industrialization  
In 1915 the Royal Dutch Shell built an oil refinery on the island. In only two or three 
decades the refinery’s presence changed Curaçao “from an agrarian-commercial into a 
modern, capitalist and industrialized society” (Broek 1992:120). Its economic impact was 
enormous. Curaçao’s colonial government eagerly supported the refinery, meeting its 
needs through “facilities, legislation, protective measures, and a significant say in 
government policy-making” (Broek 1992:120). Not before long, the refinery became a 
key player in Curaçao’s society. It instigated the building of various residential areas for 
the workers it attracted, and to this day it is a key sponsor of many social initiatives on 
the island (such as the arts, sports, education, and health care). One of the consequences 
of the installation of the refinery was Curaçao’s government expansion, thanks to the 
revenues the refinery provided. This is when the government funded education and health 
care for Afrocuraçaoans developed. The Catholic Church, which had been until then 
providing health are and social services, saw its zone of influence dwindle (Broek 
1992:120). 
Large numbers of foreign laborers were drawn to the island to work in the oil 
industry and related industries (Dalhuizen et al 1997:82,83; Oostindie 2000; Römer 
1979). For nearly three centuries, Afrocuraçaoans, now constituting the working class, 
had been agriculturalists. Römer contends that they did not feel inclined to work for the 
refinery; they rather migrated to Cuba to find an agricultural job (1979:102, see also 
Allen 2009b). Between 1915 and 1965, Curaçao’s population more than quadrupled, 
growing from 33.000 people to 136.289 (Römer 1981:45). Fifteen years after the 
construction of the refinery, immigrants from the Netherlands, Asia, the Middle East and 
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the Caribbean already constituted 28 percent of the island’s population, hence adding to 
Curaçao’s diverse society, causing profound socio-economic changes (Römer 1978:111). 
The refinery thus generated a massive influx of high- and low skilled immigrants that 
either came to work directly in the oil industry, in the administrative sector, or that sought 
to participate in the growing economy at large46. This led to rapid population growth and 
demographic expansion, and the government struggled to modernize the provision of 
water, electricity, telephone, healthcare, infrastructure and education (Römer 1979:126, 
142). The composition of the population changed drastically, which impacted the 
understanding of national identity. Many who had inhabited the island for the previous 
two-and-a-half centuries felt apprehension about this huge population influx. 
 
The Politicization of the Yu’i Kòrsou Identity 
This period of industrialization in Curaçao’s history led to a growing xenophobic 
sentiment among the “older” Curaçaoan population. Hoetink claims that it was in these 
‘roaring’ 1920s that the notion of the Yu’i Kòrsou arose again, and became part of every 
day vernacular. This time, it denoted the old Curaçaoan population, as to distinguish it 
from the newcomers (Hoetink 1962:195).  
After the old Protestant elite had ruled the colony for almost 300 years, a large 
group of highly skilled Dutch immigrants took their place at the apex of Curaçao’s socio-
economic hierarchy. The old Protestant elite had not been educated enough to keep up 
with the new demands put on Curaçao’s industrializing and rapidly expanding society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Libyans, Syrians, Arabs and Indians in particular moved to the island to merge into the trade sector, 
importing products from Asia. They were serious competition for the existing traders, who imported pricier 
products from Europe and the US (Römer 1979:129). 
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(Römer 1979:142), and could not fulfill the refurbished positions of engineers, civil and 
public servants, and government officials (Römer 1979:145). Replaced by new Dutch 
colonials, the old Protestant elites slowly and grudgingly dissolved into the middle 
classes, contemplating ways to reclaim their dominion (Römer 1979:142).  
The mulatto segment had continued to climb up to the middle class, and was 
now—together with Protestants, Jews, and new Dutch representatives of Shell—
represented in the Colonial Council47 (Römer 1979:145), which constituted the 
government. The Protestant working classes had also upgraded, among other ways by 
contracting marriages with the impoverished Protestant elites. Much to their dismay, 
these elites now shared the middle class ranks with two groups that it had distinguished 
itself from so feverishly during the colonial era.  
The dark skinned Afrocuraçaoan population, however, had not been able to move 
upward much, and was remained largely stuck in the working class (Römer 1979). They 
had to compete with the large group of immigrant laborers from other Caribbean and 
Latin American countries. These were often better educated and thus better suited for the 
lower ranking jobs at the refinery (Römer 1979:131), and therefore, initially profited 
more from the prosperity brought by Shell than the Afrocuraçaoan laborers. 
The groups of immigrants differed from the Curaçaoan population in nationality, 
ethnicity, language and religion. The refinery housed the newcomers, organized by 
language, nationality, and socioeconomic class. For example, the immigrant laborers in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The Colonial Council advised the Governor: he technically had the power to rule the islands 
singlehandedly (Römer 1979:154). Still, the Council, which after 1936 would be replaced by a parliament, 
governed in all of the Dutch Antilles: Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Statia and St Martin. The 
government of the Dutch Antilles was located in Curaçao, which gave Curaçao a leg up over the other 
islands, and a stronger say in island affairs.  
 
 97 
camps, some of which later developed into neighborhoods or barios; executives and other 
high-ranking Dutch immigrants were accommodated in the fancy neighborhoods 
Julianadorp and Emmastad, named after two Dutch queens. This segregation of the 
newcomers followed the logic of the apartheid-like societal arrangements that developed 
during colonial times, when the Protestants and Jews developed their own 
neighborhoods. It contributed an even larger arrangement of “small enclaves,” as Römer 
calls them, which initially remained culturally and spatially separate from the “local” 
Curaçaoan population (1979:113).  
As said, the considerable threats that the large influx of immigrants posed on the 
economic positions of large parts of the Curaçaoan population fuelled a sentiment of 
nationalistic xenophobia. The social and spatial distance between the local population and 
the immigrants further enhanced this. Among the Protestant elites in particular, the 
feeling of being inferior to the “freshly arrived” Dutch elites instigated a new political 
awareness. On one hand, this sense of inferiority augmented the nationalistic feelings of 
Curaçaoans who wanted to distinguish themselves as the “true Curaçaoans” in opposition 
to the newcomers, who assumed nonetheless positions of power on the island (Hoetink 
1962:195,196, see also Allen 2009a, Römer 1979). On the other hand it intensified the 
desire for autonomy and separation from the Dutch motherland that was brewing on the 
island under the leadership of Dr. Moises da Costa Gomes or “Doktoor”  (Römer 
1981:152, see also Allen 2009a, Broek 2006; Hoetink 1961; Oostindie 2000). WWII 
further compounded to this. For more than a decade contacts with the Netherlands were 
drastically reduced. Governmentally Curaçao fended for itself, and culturally the 
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population became much more oriented towards North and South America (Römer 
1979:151).  
The first elections—which pertained to the six islands that comprised the Dutch 
Antilles as a whole, not just for Curaçao—were held in 1937, with the participation of 
Curaçao’s first two viable parties: the Roman Catholic Party, led by the Church, and the 
Curaçaoan Political Union, led by members of the elite (Römer 1979:152). The Roman 
Catholic Party was the winner. What is important to note is that for these first elections 
the right to vote was restricted to men over 25 years of age with sufficient income and 
education (Paula 1989). It excluded women, and the vast majority of the black 
population, which predominantly belonged to the working classes: a new gatekeeping 
mechanism developed, again directed at the Afrodescendant population (Afrocuraçaoans 
and black immigrants). The white population perceived the black working class as too 
undeveloped to concern itself with and positively contribute to state matters. Giving the 
black masses suffrage would be dangerous to Dutch rule (Paula 1989:15). Consequently, 
only 2,5% of Curaçao’s population voted (Römer 1979:153, see also Paula 1989; Verton 
1977).  
As the war drew to and end two new political parties formed, which departed 
from strong anti-Dutch sentiments. In 1944 the Democratic Party or DP was established. 
It was mainly led by the old Protestant and Jewish elites, with a few mulattos in the 
higher ranks. The main focus of the DP was to reclaim the privileges of the white elites 
and the mulatto middle class vis-à-vis the newcomers (Allen 2009a; Broek 1994; Hoetink 
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1962; Römer 1979). In 1948 “Doktoor” Da Costa Gomes,48  a well-educated, light 
skinned Afrocuraçaoan, founded the National People’s Party (Nationale Volkspartij or 
NVP), which emerged out of the Catholic Party. Da Costa Gomes had played a central 
role in the Catholic Party, and now led the NVP.  
In the DP, which until the 1969 revolt would remain the leading party, 
Protestants, Jews and mulattos fought side by side to achieve autonomy and diminish 
Dutch colonial dominance (Paula 1989), and to contest the power of the new Dutch 
immigrants, whom they called Makambas (Allen 2009a). They sought support from the 
black lower classes—the largest population segment on the island—that were deeply 
dismayed over the lack of improvement of their social position after emancipation 
(Römer 1979: 156, see also Oostindie 1999a, 1999b). It thus fought for the restoration 
and perpetuation of the old race and class based structure of white, mulatto and black, 
something that diametrically opposed the unity that the party allegedly advocated.  
The NVP had similar interests, be it that they were less focused on the interests of 
the white Protestant elites, and more on interests of the Catholic Church. Though slightly 
different in orientation, the NVP also fought for autonomy, and for the preservation of the 
middle- and upper class interests, it too had a light skinned top, and a large black 
following. Nonetheless, the DP and the NVP were avid opponents, and fought each other 
tooth and claw (Hoetink 1962). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Moises Da Costa Gomez was a mulatto from a well off family. Originally he was a lawyer, and a 
member of the Catholic Party. But dissatisfied with the party’s program he initiated the National People’s 
party (NVP). In 1951 he became the first prime minister of Curaçao, and negotiated autonomy and general 
suffrage.  
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The notion of the Yu’i Kòrsou had already begun to surface in the 1920s, Hoetink 
argues, and as said referred to the black and white population segments of the old, 
colonial island society (Hoetink 1962:195). In the 1940s the DP in particular, but also the 
NVP, began to politicize the idea of an alleged unity as a way to gather sufficient backing 
from the black masses to achieve its goals: to protect the rights and the needs of the “old” 
Curaçaoan population—black and white alike—from the newcomers (Hoetink 1962:196; 
Römer 1979:155-156). Especially through propaganda, published in for example the 
DP’s party paper “Democraat”, the Yu’i Kòrsou notion became a narrative that was 
disseminated nation wide (Römer 1979:155).  
Propelled by the political propaganda of the DP, this was the first time in the 
history of the island that such a unity in diversity was imagined and proclaimed (Hoetink 
1962; Römer 1979). Even though, as we will see, actual protection of the interests and 
improvement of the livelihood of the Afrocuraçaoan population would be limited, during 
the industrial era there is an increased acknowledgement of this group as a legitimate part 
of the nation. This shows for example in the acceptance of general suffrage in 1948 
(Paula 1989:27), which was predated by suffrage for women in 1944 (Paula 1989:17). 
Following what happened in a great many national contexts in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the notion of the Yu’i Kòrsou came to celebrate ethnic and racial diversity 
as the core symbol of Curaçao’s national identity. Over time this developed into an 
ideology that enhanced national unity and strengthened patriotism towards Curaçao, as 
opposed to an allegiance to the colonial motherland the Netherlands. After all, the DP and 
NVP fought for Curaçao becoming autonomous from the Netherlands. This development 
was characterized by an increased appreciation of the creolized island culture as opposed 
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to the Dutch culture (Hoetink 1962; Römer 1979), and by a “desire to achieve a 
homogenous society, with preservation of the status quo of the segments, to put it 
paradoxically” (Hoetink 1962:196). Curaçao’s national identity formation thus turned 
towards an ideology of creolization, similar to other such ideologies that during that time 
arose across the region (Allen 2009a; Condé 1999; Hall 2003; Hintzen 2002; Palmié 
2006; Price and Price 1997; Stewart 2007). 
This novel nationalist perspective presupposed a social unity and a culture shared 
by all, and downplayed the socioeconomic and cultural inequalities that continued to 
characterize Curaçao’s society (Broek 1994; Römer 1979; see also Condé 1999; Hall 
2003; Hintzen 2002; Palmié 2006; Price and Price 1997; Stewart 2007). Curaçao’s 
ideology of national identity linked directly to the soil of the island. This imagery of the 
island’s inhabitants being born from the soil, and not from flesh and blood individuals, 
suggests that the island births people of all color, which are all equal. A deeper 
interpretation of this could be that if black and white are “brethren and sistren” born from 
the same symbolical womb—that of Mama Kòrsou—then one’s ancestry does not matter. 
Explicit references to actual racially mixed lineages, which exist in great abundance and 
which are key to the island’s colorist system, become obsolete, and the deeply embedded, 
structural nature of racial inequality becomes relatively invisible—characteristics of 
ideologies of creolization (Condé 1999; Hintzen 2002; Price and Price 1997). This 
metaphor might even suggest that blacks and whites could be one without racial 
intermixing. I however argue that because racial inequality and white privilege are made 
invisibile in the metaphor, they can perpetuate freely. In the subsequent paragraphs we 
will see how the Yu’i Kòrsou became a trope that—at least temporarily—placed 
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Curaçao’s colonial racial divides out of sight, and imagined a homogeneous space to 
overlay a heterogeneous reality (Hintzen 2002).  
 
Creolization, Antillianization, Folklorization and the Invisibilization of Race 
In the development of a new ideology of national identity language continued to play a 
gatekeeping role. This time, it was deployed to single the newcomers out and mark them 
as foreign vis-à-vis the old island population. Since the Shell had such an impact on 
society, and new Dutch immigrants did not speak Papiamentu, the status of the Dutch 
language and culture upgraded (Broek 1994, 2006; Römer 1962; Verton 1977). The new 
Dutch administration deemed Papiamentu a “slave language” that should be banned, 
especially in education (Broek 1994, Fouse 2002). However, politicians, and also the 
intellectual elites, opposed the increased imposition of Dutch cultural norms and values 
(Broek 2006: 132,138; see also Broek 1994; Fouse 2002, Römer 1962). They argued that 
Curaçao had its own unique cultural style and developmental trajectory. It could not be 
subjected to Dutch standards and rules, nor should the new Dutch administrators be the 
ones to decide what is right for the island (Broek 1994). Various authors such as Verton 
(1977) refer to this focus on a Curaçaoan uniqueness as the first manifestations of 
“Antillianization.” 
Curaçaoan writers strove for a way to modernize that would fit the island, as 
opposed to simply following what had been prescribed by the Netherlands (Broek 
2006:132,133). Papiamentu played a key role in the symbolic inscription of Curaçao’s 
uniqueness. Various important poems were published in Papiamentu, such as Joseph 
Sickman Corsen’s Atardi (1905), which means “In the afternoon” (Broek 1994). It is still 
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avidly sung today as a “second” national anthem. This development of Papiamentu as a 
respectable national language and of a Papiamentu literature produced by the white elites 
and consumed by broad audiences thus supported the development of Curaçao’s budding 
national imagination (Broek 1994, 2006; Eckkrammer 2003). This entailed an important 
shift in racial imagination. Even though Papiamentu had been spoken by black and white 
alike for centuries, it was still considered an inferior language that was associated with 
the negatively valued black segments of the island’s population. However, in this novel 
“nationalizing” use of Papiamentu, Curaçao was projected a fundamentally creole nation, 
grounded on a national myth of as racial hybridity. 
 The Catholic Church added greatly to this creolization trend. The Church—which 
I argue must be seen as a component of the old colonial elite—feared that it would loose 
its influence on the black population due to rapid modernization brought about by the 
arrival of the Shell refinery (Broek 1992, 1994). Modernization threatened social stability 
and instigated “moral decay,” as the Catholic Church put it: the only salvation was the 
pursuit of proper Catholic doctrine (Broek 1992:124, 1994, 2006; Fouse 2002). In order 
to safeguard both its position of power as people’s sense of stability, the Church began to 
protect and preserve some of the Afrocuraçaoan cultural expressions and practices, in 
spite of the fact that these were plentiful and full of counter-hegemonic and race-aware 
content (Allen 2007). Papiamentu was part of this preservation process: it still was the 
language the Church used to reach the black masses, and to perpetuate its civilizing 
mission. 
 In particular the Priest Paul Brenneker (a white Dutchman) and various other 
famous clergymen recorded Curaçaoan festivities and folkloric practices, beliefs, songs, 
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dances, stories and so on. It must be noted that not all priests were equally on board with 
the civilization mission, some, like Brenneker and also Amando Römer (a light skinned 
Curaçaoan), were genuinely interested in empowering the black population and preserved 
Afrocuraçaoan culture. Even though the Church was still very much involved in its 
mission to “advance” these “poor black souls” (Broek 1994:20; 2006), its actions allowed 
for the preservation of Afrocuraçaoan traditions such as the harvest festival Seú and 
Ananzi stories. Curaçaoan writers and cultural activists such as Pierre Lauffer (a light 
skinned Curaçaoan), and Ellis Juliana (an darker skinned Afrocuraçaoan), also worked 
diligently on this preservation of the old Afrocuraçaoan culture.  
 Because Brenneker, Juliana and Lauffer were prolific writers that published quite 
some of their materials, they became much more visible than the broad group of 
Afrocuraçaoans whose stories, poems and traditions they recorded. Consequently it 
appears often as if it was mainly because of the work of intellectuals like Brenneker, 
Juliana and Lauffer, many of whom were from the elite or middle class, that 
Afrocuraçaoan traditions and folklore were made into markers of Curaçaoan culture, for 
blacks and whites alike. This is not surprising since, as we saw, “Antillianization” was at 
least in part devised by the Church and the political elites in order to advance their 
inexplicit goals of preserving white supremacy. But Rosalia (1997) and Allen (2007) both 
illustrate profusely how the Afrocuraçaoan population was always actively producing, 
perpetuating and preserving their culture, and contesting its ongoing devaluation and 
oppression from the white population. 
 But folklorization is commonly an elite endeavor. The concept of “folklore” is 
commonly traced back to 1787 Germany and to the development of European 
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Romanticism (Bauman 1992). In response to the many societal changes that followed 
industrialization and urbanization the artistic, literary and intellectual elites in 18th 
century Europe began to idealize life before “modernization” (Bauman 1992), which 
became characterized by the idolization of the grand cultures of ancient times, of exotic 
peoples, and of rural life. In Curaçao too, the time when this folklorization emerged was 
one of great and rapid changes that combined with a longing for the old days. In 18th 
century Europe, in the rather grimy living conditions of the newly developing cities 
people revered the assumed simplicity and purity of country life, as well as the 
knowledge, traditions, manners, beliefs and lore of country folk, which thus became 
labeled as “folklore” (Bauman 1992). National elites have ideologically exploited rural or 
non-modern cultural practices, which they have associated with national primordial time 
in narratives that circulate across society and that inform written texts, the material 
environment, cultural performances and so on (Bauman 1992). 
 Creating folklore entails a careful arrangement of practices, lore and knowledge. 
Some of these “cultural elements” represent the nation better than others, depending on 
how they portray the relations between the nation’s elites and masses. Thus, the 
“folklorization” of such cultural elements—the extent to which they will represent the 
nation—is a political process in which a national ideology is constructed and represented. 
This ideology informs who are the nation’s elites and who are the masses, how do they 
live, how have they always lived, and what their relations are with one another. Folklore, 
as an important part of nation building, freezes populations in imagined times of way 
back, to establish as a national hierarchy and to determine the superiority of one group 
over another. It thus serves to legitimize and perpetuate national hegemony.  
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 In the case of Curaçao, Broek argues, Afrocuraçaoan lore and practices that 
became labeled as folklore were stripped from “too much Africanness” (Broek 1994:23), 
and especially of the elements of resistance and empowerment. It took for example 
decades before the tambú, which to this day can be seen as the old seat of Afrocuraçaoan 
resistance and counter-hegemony, became a true part of this folklore (Rosalia 1997). 
Since the early 19th century the Church had been tambú’s nemesis, yet today a folklorized 
version of the tambú is part and parcel of national folkloric performances. The same goes 
for the seú, the harvest celebration that originally made offerings of gratitude to African 
gods. Nowadays renditions of these counter-hegemonic traditions are played in Church as 
part of the Catholic repertoire, speaking to a segment of Afrocuraçaoans that previously 
may not have attended mass.  
 Again we see the purpose behind this folklorization: keeping a grip on the 
populace by incorporating its cultural practices, though in an appropriated and 
whitewashed form. This folklorization and appropriation has been resisted against by 
segments of the Afrocuraçaoan population (Interview Ansano, April 6th 2016), and the 
tambú, seú, and other Afrocuraçaoan cultural practices continue to be practiced and 
performed in their original and in explicitly subversive forms, like they always have. But 
in my observation, the performances that take place outside of the arena of folklore, 
tourism, and national festivities, and those of the tambú in particular, are often still 
surrounded by the negative stigma of black inferiority and indecency49. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In 2011 I conducted field research regarding the tambú in its various contemporary settings. This section 
is partially based on these findings. 
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Post-Industrial Curaçao (1969 – now) 
During the Shell era Curaçaoan society changed rapidly (Paula 1967; Oostindie 1999a, 
1999b; Römer 1979, 1998). While the budding Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of the Shell era 
romanticized unity and national cohesion among the old black and white population 
segments, the large black working class—Curaçaoan and immigrant alike—struggled 
with the effects of the steep economic decline that set in as the oil price lowered on the 
world market. In between 1948 and 1964 Shell fired 75% of its employees (Verton 
1977:61), and unemployment rose to 20% of the island’s labor force (Croese 1999:91). 
The government, which was mainly focused on elite and middle class interests, was not 
creating enough economic alternatives for the black working class (Committee 30 May 
1970:82), nor did it invest in social services to support the increasing number of 
unemployed people (Verton 1977:63, see also (Croese 1999:91 and Schrils 2003:123). 
The marginalization of the black lower class, which had characterized the colonial era, 
still continued. There were ample tensions, laborer strikes, and conflicts between laborers 
and employers. On May 30th 1969 all this unrest came to a fiery upsurge. What started off 
as a union-led strike regarding low wages and ongoing lay-offs, became a violent revolt. 
Centuries of pent up emotions over colonial oppression, economic marginalization and 
racial inequality erupted. On that Friday, the city burned, ravaged by thousands of angry 
laborers. That day marked the start of a new era, in which the imagination of national 
identity would be redefined. 
 The revolt was the start of ample social reform. It is often marked as a pivotal 
moment in Afrocuraçaoan empowerment (Dalhuizen et al 1997). In the decades leading 
up to the revolt Afrocuraçaoans had become keenly aware of the discrepancy in the Yu’i 
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Kòrsou ideology and accompanying discourse that promulgated unity in diversity, and 
their lived reality of race-based marginalization. As I will illustrate in the following 
section, the new rendition of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology, which arose in the 70s, openly 
proclaimed Afrocuraçaoan culture as the core of the nation. In a series of national 
“markers” such as the flag and the new anthem the heterogeneity of Curaçao’s 
population—this time including the expanding immigrant population—was embraced and 
celebrated, on the basis of the equal value of all the different cultural, ethnic and racial 
groups. 
However, various scholars and critical voices from the civil society have 
questioned the depth of this reform (Broek 2006; Oostindie 1999b: Schrils 1997; Verton 
1977). As of yet, a thorough analysis of how “pro-black,” and more importantly, how 
impactful this empowerment movement really was and who were its key players, is 
lacking. Using primary sources such as reports, newspaper articles and advertisements, 
and interviews, as well as secondary sources, I try to gain some insight in how these 
processes developed.  
In this section, I first examine why and to what extend the government shifted 
towards this much more explicit recognition of Afrocuraçaoan culture. In order to gauge 
the depth of this alleged pro-black reform I shed some light on the key players who first 
initiated the reform, their allegiance to the white elites and the black masses, and the 
reform that was indeed initiated during this time. Additionally, I discuss some of the 
ways in which this new rendition of Curaçao’s ideology of national identity is framed and 
expressed, both by governmental measures and by civil society, for example through 
legal reform, a new anthem, the creation of a national flag, the establishment of national 
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celebrations, cultural expressions, and continued folklorization50. I analyze this pro-black 
revolt within the theoretical frame of multiculturalism. 
 
Multiculturalism and Racelessness 
During the civil rights era the ideology of multiculturalism arose in response to 
emancipatory claims made by subaltern populations around the world. Even though this 
resistance and state responses to it developed differently in every nation, they share some 
important commonalities. In many nations new national identity ideologies developed, 
premised now on the appreciation the heterogeneity of their populations. These “state-
supported politics of recognition” (Greene 2007:329) allowed governments to deflect 
subaltern resistance of white dominance (Hale 2002, 2005; Goldberg 2002; Rahier 2012). 
The explicit shift in ideology of national identity is expressed in inclusive cultural policy 
and constitutional reform, through adoption of laws premised on intercultural equality 
(Hale 2002:490), including but not limited to anti-discrimination legislation, bilingual 
education, and in the case of especially the indigenous populations the Americas reform 
in policies regarding collective property rights and land titles, and protection of 
indigenous heritage (see Brondo 2010; Hale 2002, 2005; Hooker 2005; Greene 2007; 
Rahier 2012). 
The broad literature on multiculturalism in Latin America makes visible that 
multicultural reform creates an ideology of diversity and inclusion, but simultaneously 
omits and deflects actual empowerment and improvement. Alleged inclusion is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 It will be evident that in this thesis I can present only a most succinct discussion. This analysis deserves 
ample additional research (see appendix X). 
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operationalized through tools that allow subaltern populations to contest their 
marginalization and increase their social upward mobility. But since such reform 
ultimately leads to a redistribution of resources and a rebalancing of power, it opposes the 
interests of national elites, which results in a range of—often not very visible— 
obstructions that impede or undermine actual reform and perpetuate marginalization (see 
Brondo 2010; Hale 2002, Greene 2007; Rahier 2012).  
Goldberg (2002), writing about the Global North, highlights the role that the 
relative invisibilization of race is a necessary dimension of multiculturalism. 
“Racelessness” and “colorblindness,” he argues, are common component of 
multiculturalism that further undercut reform. By denying racial inequality through 
arguing that it has become obsolete, it becomes harder to address it in the arenas of public 
debate, academic analysis, politics and policymaking. Furthermore, this relative 
invisibilization of race obfuscates the causal relation between past oppression and 
exploitation and contemporary marginalization. National historiography presents a 
whitewashed version of the colonial past, which features “the indomitable superiority of 
whites—in prestige, achievements, education, wealth, and power—not as a natural 
phenomenon but as historical outcome” (Goldberg 2002:212). Also, raceless or color-
blind discourse explains racial inequality as being the victim’s fault. Allegedly, since 
multicultural reform has secured equal opportunities for all, people that are disadvantaged 
owe their misfortune solely to themselves and their unfortunate life choices (Goldberg 
2002:217). Thus, the inclusiveness and equality propagated by multicultural ideology 
deflects the actual address of white supremacy (Goldberg 2002; Greene 2007; Hale 2002, 
2005; Rahier 2012). 
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Political Reform and its Key Players 
The morning of May 30, 1969, when the union leaders, Amador Nita, Anthony Godett, 
Stanley Brown, and Ewald Ong-A-Kwie51 started the strike, they had not envisioned that 
it would lead to a political upturn of the island. But a few days after the revolt the 
Curaçaoan government stepped down, and the governor resigned. An interim 
government, comprised of the old elite-focused parties that had constituted the 
government, took over. After the revolt that Nita, Godett and Brown established the 
political party Frente Obrero y Liberashon 30 di Mei (FOL)52, Curaçao’s first labor party 
(Oostindie 1999b, Reinders 1993). The FOL, which had not been part of the interim 
government, however had no clear ideology or program (Anderson and Dynes 1975:119), 
but in the election of December 1969 the party had earned enough votes to enter the 
coalition, still dominated by the parties that had ruled the island until then–the DP and the 
NVP in particular.  
In the months between May 30th and the elections of December the interim 
government, pressured by the Dutch government, initiated the Committee 30 May 
(Oostindie 1999b:13). This was a group of young reformist intellectual professionals of 
different racial and class backgrounds, who had been charged to analyze the cause of the 
revolt, and to advice on how to proceed with remedies to the situation. It was a 
progressive group that sought social change, but it was not representative of the black 
masses, nor did it necessarily have a strong allegiance to it. The report concluded that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Three of the four leaders of the labor strike were of immigrant families: Anthony “Papa” Godett was of 
Bonerian and Statian origin, Stanley Brown’s father was from the British West Indies, and Ewald Ong-A-
Kwie came from Surinam. 
 
52 Laborer’s Front and Liberation May 30th, or the Liberation Front. 
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uprising had indeed been an unexpected outcome of a strike, rather than a premeditated 
and well-organized event. It furthermore acknowledged the extensive marginalization of 
the black masses, as well as their profound underrepresentation in the government 
(Committee 30 May 1970:83). The Committee also strongly advised the interim 
government to initiate significant socio-economic, cultural and political reform. The 
black population needed to be much more actively represented in the administration, 
among others through taking participation in the highest administrative positions, and 
through broad-based social reform focused on increased acceptance of Afrocuraçaoan 
culture. Furthermore, the report strongly advised in favor of placing Afrocuraçaoans in 
the highest positions in government, much like already was the case in the British 
Caribbean (Committee 30 May 1977:172). However, it also issued a significant warning:  
Nevertheless, it is precisely there that at present a radical "Black Power " 
movement is submerging that finds the “black faces” in high places insufficient, 
as long as the economic positions of power in society are still “white.” 
Consequently the “black faces” are called the “Uncle Toms” of the “white power 
structure. This perception also appears to be represented in Curaçao and among 
youth in the Netherlands. For Curaçao we consider the objective included therein 
not realizable and therefore politically dangerous for the country (Committee 30 
May 1970: 172, translation is mine). 
The report identified the demand for a more pervasive economic reform made by 
civil rights movements in the British Caribbean, which contested the protection of the 
dominant position of the white elites, and suggests that the reform that was being made 
omitting in-depth, pro-black empowerment. By referring to these critical voices as 
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“radical” the report dismantles such claims in the Curaçaoan context, and warns against 
reform of the white dominated economic base of society.  
Journalist Mario Kleinmoedig explains that the immediate focus shared by the 
interim-government and the Committee was to restore peace on the island, through 
presenting a new national ideology of inclusion. The revolt had made the black 
population, comprised of Afrocuraçaoans and a large number of immigrants, much more 
aware of the power of their numbers. Fearing an intensification of subaltern claims on 
resources and the reformulation of the balance of power, the interim-government and the 
Committee advised to immediately assuage the black population. The old government 
and governor stepping down and calling for new elections was the first stride, which 
symbolized the goodwill of the white elites. The interim government appointing two 
black men to become governor (Ben Leito) and lieutenant governor (Otto Kibbelaar)—
the highest positions in the Curaçaoan administration—as the Committee had advised, 
was a second. The new prime minister would be selected in December. He would also be 
a black man. 
Never before in Curaçao’s history had black men occupied these prime 
administrative positions. At first sight, their appointment seemed like a victory for the 
black population, a signal that their race-based marginalization was coming to an end. 
However, a closer examination of the nature of their allegiance will complicate that. 
Critical voices argued that they were all token blacks53. These men had come from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 In an interview with Oostindie regarding the revolt’s aftermath Ewald Ong-A-Kwie, the Surinamese 
union leader of the strike that led to the revolt says: “The governor we got then, Leito, was in his heart a 
white man, a makamba pretu53. Everywhere token blacks were put in place, with the idea that things would 
be fine then.” (Interview in Oostindie 1999a:92). Interviews with Mario Kleinmoedig  (Interview March 17 
2016) and with anthropologist Richenel Ansano (Interview April 6th 2016) argue that many people, and 
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working class backgrounds, so to their communities they were seen as un di nos, “one of 
us”  (Interview Ansano April 6th 2016). They became symbols for success and black 
empowerment, which indeed they were. But at the same time, they were conservative, 
pro-Dutch and pro-elite in their orientation, rather than in favor of pro-black 
emancipatory reform. This is a clear illustration of Gramsci’s claim that we must never 
perceive elites—or any class segment—as homogenous. Allegiances always also develop 
across class segments, and not just within them (Gramsci 1971). 
The new prime minister was Ernesto Petronia, a dark skinned, high-ranking 
Afrocuraçaoan businessman who lived in Aruba (Anderson and Dynes 1975:100). The 
Partido di Pueblo Arubano or the Aruban Patriotic Party (PPA) headed the coalition for 
the government of the Netherlands Antilles54. The PPA had its followers in Aruba’s black 
working class, which like Curaçao was also made up of a lot of black immigrants. But it 
was not progressively pro-black or pro-reform: its focus was on Aruba’s autonomy 
(Reinders 1993; Verton 1975). What’s more, the PPA was a long-standing ally of the 
conservatively oriented DP. The two parties had formed the coalition of the government 
of the Netherlands Antilles since 1954 (Alofs 1999:164; Verton 1997:77): they had been 
like-minded enough to successfully govern the islands for 15 years. After the new 
elections these parties were again in charge of the major pro-black reform that was 
expected to take place in the Netherlands Antilles. The FOL had only a minority of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particularly those that studied abroad and had immersed themselves in civil rights literature and actions, 
shared this perception. This is the group that the report of the Committee May 30 refers to as dangerous and 
radical. 
 
54 Interestingly, the light skinned ‘mestizo’ F. Tromp was officially listed as the head of the party (Reinders 
1993), and should have become prime minister. 
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seats, both in the government of the Netherlands Antilles and in the Island Council of 
Curaçao. In Curaçao the old elite-led parties DP and NVP remained in control (Reinders 
1993).  
Interestingly, in contemporary popular discourse, replicated on websites and 
Facebook, the FOL is often referred to as “Curaçao’s first black government.” In fact, in 
popular accounts of the post revolt era, pro-black reform or “antilleanization” is often 
directly attributed to or conflated with the FOL (see also Dalhuizen et al 1997). But in 
reality, stuck between the DP, the PPA and the NVP the FOL did not have the political 
space to implement such reform, nor did it have a sufficiently unified vision (Dalhuizen 
et al 1997; Oostindie 1999a, 1999b; Verton 1977; Reinders 1993).  
The newly instated Government of the Netherlands Antilles was mostly focused 
on the increased autonomy for the Dutch Antilles (Reinders 1993:84; see also Verton 
1975). It was mainly due to the influence of the unions that the government introduced 
some of the much-needed social reform for the black population, such as a new law 
regarding minimum wage (Interview Ansano April 6th 2016, see also Reinders 1993:85), 
which protected in particular the rights of the black masses. A clear policy of pro-black 
reform was however not part of the new government’s program.  
The same held true for the administration of Curaçao’s Island Council. The DP 
and NVP, which dominated the coalition, were not focused on strong social reform. The 
DP’s main concern was still to restore the privileges of the old elites (Dalhuizen et al. 
1997; Römer 1979). The NVP was the political machine of the Catholic Church, which 
had been a major instrument of hegemonizing white supremacy. Da Costa Gomez, or 
‘Doktoor,’ organized events among black farmers and laborers at Isla to talk about “our 
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black culture, our black people.” Part of it was genuine, but part of it was propaganda, 
argues anthropologist Louis Philip Römer (Interview March 26th 2016). The NVP played 
an important role in the founding of credit unions and labor unions and in improving the 
infrastructure between Bandabou and the city, but it also remained invested in the elites. 
It was a popular party, with a large Afrocuraçaoan following, but it did not pursue true 
social reform (Interview Louis Philip Römer March 26th 2016).  
And the FOL’s interests formed a stark contrast with the ‘old guard.’ Nita’s 
ideological stance was strongly black and anti-colonial, and demanding of equal rights, 
equal facilities and equal pay for all citizens. He critiqued white power, privilege and 
opulence, especially of the new Dutch elites, and ongoing racism and the exploitation of 
the black masses (Nita 1952, 1954, 1958). Godett’s focus was less on racial equality and 
more on improving the fate of the laborers and on relieving the dire poverty and 
exploitation they struggled with. Brown, however, wanted a social-democratic turn 
including a new constitution and independence, where power should be transferred from 
the elites to the black working classes, racism would be erased and black pride increased. 
The constant friction between these three men impeded actual policy making.  
Then, less than a month after the government started to operate Nita–the only 
FOL minister in the government–suddenly died at age 47. The official death report said 
he died of natural causes, but the party members claim it was poisoning (Anderson and 
Dynes 1975:102). Brown left the FOL soon after. In an interview he states that he 
pursued true reform but to his opinion the FOL was not the means to that end (Brown in 
Oostindie 1999a:21). Less than a year after the FOL’s first flight had taken off the island 
council collapsed due too much conflict between the parties, and the government fell 
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again (Reinders 1993:89). The political field was quickly taken over by the old parties, 
though with new fronts. In 1971 the DP, NVP, PPA and the AVP55 formed the coalition 
for the Netherlands Antilles (Reinders 1993:93). In the new elections the FOL had gotten 
a small amount of votes, but was explicitly kept out of the coalition by DP foreman 
Ronchi Isa (Reinders 1993:102).  
Still, Anderson and Dynes argue that “[a]s a new political force the May 
Movement disrupted established political arrangements and led to the formation of new 
political organizations and power alignments” (1975:96). The impact of the revolt 
resounded throughout society, and even if the government was not actively involved with 
Afrocuraçaoan empowerment, pro-black reform was pursued and achieved on various 
levels, inspired and led by numerous groups and institutions.  
 In spite of the continued stronghold of the white and light skinned elites a new 
political party arose that would successfully implement black reform. In 1971 the 
Movemiento Antia Nobo (Movement New Antilles) or MAN, led by Don Martina, 
sprung from the ranks of the FOL. Martina was a dark skinned Curaçaoan from 
Bandabou, the rural part of the island. He had studied abroad and had returned a highly 
educated professional. It took a few years for the MAN to gain enough popularity, but in 
1979 Martina became prime minister. This was the first time a black party obtained a true 
majority in the government. Martina actively advocated what he referred to as 
“antilleanization56,” even though he never created a clearly outlined party ideology, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Arubaanse Volks Partij or Aruban People’s Party. 
 
56 As of yet the notion antilleanization has not yet been operationalized, nor has the precise development of 
antilleanization and black emancipation, and its key players been analyzed or historiographed. It lies 
outside of the reach of this dissertation to fully tackle such a big task, but I do argue that this is an 
 118 
specified what precisely antilleanization entails. Still, Martina had a stronger ideological 
stance than Nita and Godett. The political agenda and ideology of national identity began 
to specifically center on the redefinition of the identity of the Afrocuraçaoan population 
(Allen 2009a:7), and on government directed pro-black socio-economic reform. MAN, 
often in coalition with the FOL and the NVP of the 1980s, was the most influential party 
behind Curaçao’s black empowerment and antilleanization, argue Ansano, Kleinmoedig 
and Römer (Interview Ansano April 6th 2016; interview Kleinmoedig March 17 2016; 
interview Römer March 26th 2016).  
In the beginning of the century the term “antilleanization” was used in 
decolonization discourse, to signify the increasing local focus in national discourse, 
reacting against Dutch colonialism and Dutch identity. But the notion is confusing 
because the root of the word, “Antillean,” refers to the conglomerate of Dutch islands as 
contrasting to the colonial motherland. Yet, in the post-revolt setting it is not an Antillean 
identity that is pursued but a Curaçaoan one, and in the practice antilleanization refers 
specifically to the highlighting of Afrocuraçaoan identity. Richenel Ansano, an active 
advocate of black empowerment contends that in the 1970s and 80s antilleanization 
specifically entailed “mental decolonization, doing critical race work, and diminishing 
poverty through increased access to social upward mobility” (Interview Ansano April 6th 
2016). In popular discourse all reform that pertained to the black population was labeled 
antilleanization, while in fact a lot of it had no direct reference to it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
important hiatus in Afrocuraçaoan historiography, one that obfuscates both the true black emancipation that 
did take place, as well as the mechanizations of white supremacy that thwart it. 
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After Martina, other politicians such as Maria Liberia-Pieters (the first female–
and black–prime minister) carried on parts of his message. In the 1990s the political 
climate became more conservative due to the economic and social crisis the island was 
struggling with. In popular discourse, such as for example presented in Dalhuizen et al. 
(1997:142-143) this crisis is often directly attributed to the alleged mismanagement of 
these black governments, without taking into account the many other factors that 
contributed to it. In this narrative black victory is again followed by failure. In the 
following decades political leaders and parties alternated between white and black, 
conservative and progressive again. In 2012, the new party Pueblo Soberano, which 
literally translates as “Sovereign People or Nation” won a majority of the votes. Its 
leader, Hermin Wiels, a dark skinned man from a working class background, was the 
most recent politician to pursue pro-black reform. However, contrary to his pro-black 
predecessors he actively sought in-depth reform, directed among others at relocation of 
resources and reformulating the economic power balance, an explicit contestation of 
white supremacy. His popular daily radio-show was an important platform for the 
dissemination of this awareness to the black masses. On May 5, 2013 he was 
assassinated, a day before releasing important documents that unveiled high-end 
corruption. The murder is still unresolved. 
 What becomes apparent in this discussion of the political field is that the 
government indeed adopted a new national ideology that proposed to recognize 
Afrocuraçaoan culture and population as an equal part of the nation, rather than as a 
figurehead that the old white elites used in order to distinguish Curaçao from the colonial 
motherland, as had been the case with the previous version of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology. 
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However, it appears that the majority of the key players that dominated the political field 
in the 47 years since the revolt were more allegiant to the white elites and their agendas, 
than to black empowerment. Politicians like Don Martina, Maria Liberia-Pieters, Hermin 
Wiels, and also René Rosalia, are the exception. Consequently, the recognition of 
Afrocuraçaoans seems not to be deliberately geared to pro-black reform, but more likely 
to deflecting further black contestation of white supremacy, while appeasing the black 
masses. This strongly indicates that the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology is a multiculturalism 
(Goldberg 2002; Greene 2007; Hale 2002, 2005; Rahier 2012). 
 
Legal Reform 
Nonetheless, as we will see in the subsequent sections the 1960s, 70s and 80s were 
characterized by important legal reform—another key component of multiculturalism 
(Brondo 2010; Hale 2002; Rahier 2012)—, which honored the new ideology that 
celebrated Curaçao’s cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. The judicial changes was 
largely driven by the Netherlands, which had started to define a multicultural policy in 
the 1970s in response to its increasing immigrant population. By the end of the 1970s the 
Dutch government focused on the official recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity, 
intercultural equality, and equal rights for minorities (Sleegers 2007:15). As a 
consequence the Netherlands initiated the signing of a number of international treaties 
regarding human rights and anti-discrimination. International treaties, however, are 
signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which between 1955 and 1986 was comprised 
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of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. The different constituents decide when 
ratification will be in effect in their specific territory57.  
In December of 1971 the prohibition of discrimination (including racial 
discrimination) became part of the Criminal Code of the Netherlands Antilles58. In 1972 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands signed International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 59, which was ratified by the Netherlands 
Antilles at the same time. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms had already been ratified by the Netherlands Antilles in 1955, 
when the territories became autonomous. In 1979 the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (IVBPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IVESCR), both of which were 
immediately ratified by the Netherlands Antilles. The Convention against Discrimination 
in Education had already been signed by the Kingdom in 1966, but was ratified by the 
Netherlands Antilles until 1986, when the islands had made the necessary reform.  
However, in Curaçao these juridical tools have remained largely unused by civil 
society, the judicial force and the government. During my data gathering process I 
repeatedly noticed a deep unawareness of Curaçao’s anti-discrimination legislation: some 
people are even unaware that racism is in fact illegal. The Ombudsman in office until 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 While all constituents of the Kingdom were free to decide when they would ratify the treaties, they were 
all responsible for compliance with these treaties. 
 
58 Discrimination had already been prohibited by article 3 in the constitution of the Netherlands Antilles, 
which became operational in 1955, when the islands became autonomous. This legal reform was likely 
pressured by the Netherlands, as this anti-discrimination law was signed on December 25th 1971, and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands signed the CERD treaty on January 9th 1972. In order to be able to sign the 
treaty all constituents of the Kingdom will have had to have anti-discrimination legislation in order. 
 
59 See appendix II for an overview of Curaçao’s anti-discrimination legislation. 
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2015 informed me that during the past decade they had not received cases regarding 
racial discrimination. In an unofficial communication the current President of the Court 
of Justice informed me that on rare occasions lawyers have presented cases on the 
grounds of racism. However, as of yet, such complaints virtually have not amounted to 
court cases, and thus to criminal persecution of racism. A recent report of the UN 
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent corroborated these findings 
(UN 2015). 
But also, conversations with the people working for the government and the court 
indicated that for decades the annual report that is demanded by the CERD on Curaçao’s 
progress in anti-discrimination has been limited to a single paragraph in the report sent by 
the Kingdom. Time and time again administrators told me “The government is simply not 
interested in addressing racism.” Even though Curaçao’s anti-discrimination legislation 
has existed for over four decades, the population still does not have a good awareness of 
these legal instruments, and organizations and institutions that facilitate their use have yet 
to be developed (see also UN 2015). This is another unfortunate characteristic of 
multiculturalism: legislation designed to protect and empower subaltern population 
segments does not necessary translate into reform (Brondo 2010; Goldberg  2002; Greene 
2007; Hale 2002, 2005; Rahier 2012). 
 
Social Reform 
In the social field, the 1970s and 1980s were also characterized by ample pro-black 
developments. One of the most important effects of this reform was the shattering of the 
centuries-long marginalization of black people on the job market. Due to the influence of 
 123 
the union’s income levels and social benefits increased. After the revolt the labor unions 
rapidly gained power and even militancy (Anderson and Dynes 1975:111, 117). The 
political and commercial community had felt the threat of violence, and the unions had a 
very large reach. A far wider range of jobs opened up than had ever been available before 
(Dalhuizen et al 1997:142). Many were chosen for their qualities, and many others were 
chosen because it favored the image of the company as being inclusive and 
“multicultural.” Even though the unions were more focused on socio-economic class than 
on racial disparity, they were a key element in the contestation of the marginalization of 
the predominantly Afrocuraçaoan working class, and in the increase of their social 
upward mobility. 
Another major set of pro-black agents was the previously mentioned diverse 
group of Curaçaoan intellectuals that had been educated abroad, and that started to return 
to the island in the early 1960s. They brought back black left-wing ideas regarding social 
reform and decolonization. The turbulent 1960s had opened up the discussion on slavery, 
colonialism and racism (Allen 2009a:7; Oostindie 1999b:19), all of which added vital 
substance to the black empowerment movement. Many of these young intellectuals 
started their own initiatives to increase the recognition of Afrocuraçaoan culture and 
social standing.  
The appreciation of Afrocuraçaoan culture and identity, and the strengthening of 
black people’s socio-economical situation, had been a principal factor in the start of the 
revolt itself, and remained key to Curaçao’s post-revolt reforms. Before the MAN 
appeared on the political stage this pro-black empowerment had already been carried by 
an increasing range of movements, individuals, foundations and institutions (Allen 
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1996:5). Dalhuizen et al speak of a cultural “renaissance” of traditional Afrocuraçaoan 
artistic expressions (1997:142; see also Oostindie 1999b:28). In the arts, music, literature 
and theater the focus on black culture and black empowerment soared, and Papiamentu’s 
popularity increased significantly60. People even considered making it the language of 
education, instead of Dutch (Dalhuizen et al 1997:123,142). Caribbean history was 
included in the educational curriculums, instead of just Dutch history (Oostindie 
1999b:28). Also the “black is beautiful” movement that started in the US in the 1960s 
also took hold of Curaçao, resulting in a significant increase in the appreciation of dark 
skin and features (Dalhuizen et al 1997:142).  
Popular culture was avidly preserved and expanded by the intellectual elites and 
by practitioners of these various traditions. Many believed that preserving and 
disseminating local culture was key to enabling the black masses to heal from the 
ongoing traumas of slavery (Ansano, interview April 6th 2016). In the 1980s this was 
incited and facilitated by the political route of the MAN. Consequently, there was huge 
attention for all sorts of old and new Afrocuraçaoan traditions, such as the tumba, seú and 
tambú (Dalhuizen et al 1997:142). During the first part of the 20th century, when a 
national ideology of creolization prevailed, there had already been a wave of 
folklorization, instigated by the old white and light skinned elites. This time 
Afrocuraçaoan and pro-black agents pursuing genuine black empowerment directed this 
development. Supported by the government Afrocuraçaoan culture was placed at the core 
of Curaçao’s national culture and folklore.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Unfortunately there is no comprehensive overview of this important work done by pro-black agents, and 
the artistic products they made. This has yet to be researched and thoroughly documented. See appendix X. 	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The appreciation of Curaçao’s creole language also continued to rise. This 
became among others apparent in the shift towards bilingual education, another important 
feature of multicultural reform (van Cott 2000). In 1935, Dutch, the only official 
language of the island at that time, had become the exclusive language of instruction in 
Curaçao (Narain 1995:23). However, for the vast majority of the population, and 
particularly the lower class Afrocuraçaoan families, who were marginally exposed to 
Dutch, Dutch was a second language61. For this already marginalized group the shift 
towards Dutch increased their arrearage in their overall social upward mobility, starting 
in the early years (Narain 1995). In 1986 the Convention against Discrimination in 
Education was accepted in Curaçao. In 1987 Papiamentu became a course taught in all 
elementary schools (Narain 1995:24). Even though officially Papiamentu is taught as a 
second language, in the majority of both elementary and secondary schools it is used as 
the language of instruction, often in combination with Dutch schoolbooks.  
Part of the acknowledgement of Afrocuraçaoan culture was the 1984 
officialization of the Commemoration of Tula (Allen 1996), the leader of Curaçao’s big 
slave revolt of 1795. This was a highlight of the black empowerment movement. The 
colonial elites had often portrayed Tula as an insurgent and a criminal (Allen 1996:6). 
This negative representation had been supported and spread by the Church, and 
consumed by the masses (Allen 2007:75). But since the 1960s a group of people that 
sought to improve the oppressed state of Afrocuraçaoans decided to commemorate Tula 
as a hero, and to “get [him] a dignified place in the history of Curaçao” (Allen 1996:7). In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The first language is the mother tongue, and the language used in the individual’s primary social 
environment (such as the home). A second language is a language that is learned outside of the primary 
social environment, and can be the language spoken in society at large (Narain 1995:7,8). 
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1984 the government, at that time led by the NVP, made the commemoration official. 
However, the commemoration never became a big, nationwide happening, like the Dia di 
Bandera, or “Flag Day,” which was also created by the government, and inaugurated in 
1984, with the acceptance of Curaçao’s first flag (Dalhuizen et al 1997:142).  
Dia di Bandera is a more “inclusive” national celebration. It was deliberately 
geared to unite all the nation’s citizens62. At the 5-year celebration of Dia di Bandera a 
government add in the national paper “the Amigoe” highlighted the symbolism of 
unification that was incorporated into the flag’s design. The Curaçaoan flag has two stars, 
which both have five points. These five points, the article says, refer to the five continents 
from which Curaçao’s people have come (Amigoe July 1 1989:2). Here we see an 
example of a national symbol through which the national ideology of cultural, ethnic and 
racial diversity was expressed. In the island’s new anthem this emphasis on unity in 
diversity and the new definition of the Yu’i Kòrsou became were also made explicit. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Dia di Bandera is a big celebration that takes place on various sites on the island, many of which are in 
predominantly black neighborhoods and the countryside. It takes place on July 2nd, conform the date of the 
first meeting of Curaçao’s Island Council, and thus the first day of Curaçao’s autonomy, on July 2nd 1951. 
Brion Square, which is the main square in the center of Otrobanda, has over the past years been one of the 
main locations for this celebration. Here all national festivities take place. The celebration is full of 
Afrocuraçaoan folkloristic performances, music, dance groups, and speeches. In stark contrast Tula’s 
commemoration mainly takes place around his statue62, which was erected on the water’s edge next to the 
water and electricity factory. Situated behind a strip of mangrove, the location is fully out of sight of every-
day traffic. This is a “place of memory,” as Ansano calls it (Interview April 6th 2016). It is the actual site 
where Tula was quartered and fed to the sharks. The downside of the location is that the commemoration 
takes place in a very secluded area. There is no walkway or bridge that connects the location to the city 
center, which would be in close walking distance. No one visits it unless with a clear purpose. Until 
recently only people that seek a place to make out with a secret lover park their cars there. Nowadays it has 
been closed off to prevent such nighttime activity. Currently Tula is not commemorated in the city, but 
soon a new cruise ship terminal will be opened that will be called the Tula Pier. Tula’s commemoration 
involves speeches, artistic and spiritual performances, and is organized and attended by people with a clear 
black emancipatory stance. There are several commemorative events around Tula, including “Ruta di 
Tula,” or “Tula’s Route.” With a bus tour people can follow the route that Tula traveled during his revolt. 
There are performances at the different stops. The tour sells out quickly as there is only limited room. 
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Analyzing newspaper articles of The Amigoe from after the revolt, I noticed that 
the notion of the Yu’i Kòrsou arose repeatedly. Mostly it referred to people of all sorts of 
backgrounds, including the broad range of Curaçao’s numerous generations of 
immigrants. Even though the bulk of post revolt reform was directed at the 
Afrocuraçaoan population, in the reproduction of the new version of the Yu’i Kòrsou 
ideology the full cultural, ethnic and racial diversity of the island appears to be 
embraced63. Especially in the comment section, on several occasions disagreement arose 
regarding who is a true Yu’i Kòrsou. This has been a debate that to this day persists in 
society at large. Immigrants were not true Yu’i Kòrsou, various contributors to the 
Amigoe’s comment section argued: only black Curaçaoans were. This discussion flared 
up particularly in the months right before and after the creation of Curaçao’s new anthem, 
which was officialized in 1979. The anthem should be directed at the real Yu’i Kòrsou, 
the Afrocuraçaoan population. The pro-black focus of the 1970s had indeed placed the 
Afrocuraçaoan at the center of the nation, and of the Yu’i Kòrsou identity. But the 
government adds in the paper, as well as the flag and the anthem, dismantle this and 
emphasize unity and equality instead. State-supported recognition of Afrocuraçaoans is 
thus flanked by their invisibilization, which dilutes and deflects too strong a subaltern 
claim to power. In the anthem, displayed below (Amigoe July 20th 1978:2, underscores 
are mine), we see the words “unite,” “united,” and “union” appear three times, and 
cumulate into the Yu’i Kòrsou.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Much more data is needed to fully support this claim. However, this lies outside of the scope of this study 
(see appendix X).  
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Lanta nos bos ban kanta 
grandesa di Kòrsou; 
Kòrsou, isla chikitu, 
baranka den laman! 
 
Kòrsou, nos ta stima bo 
ariba tur nashon. 
Bo gloria nos ta kanta 
di henter nos kurason. 
 
Nos pueblo tin su lucha, 
ma semper nos tin fe 
di logra den tur tempu 
viktoria ku trabou! 
 
Ban duna di nos parti 
p'e isla prosperá. 
Laga nos uni forsa 
p'asina triumfá. 
 
Nos patria nos ta demonstrá 
onor i lealdat, 
meskos na e bandera 
union di nos nashon. 
 
Nos bida lo ta poko 
pa duna nos pais, 
luchando uní pa libertat, 
amor i komprenshon. 
 
I ora nos ta leu fo'i kas 
nos tur ta rekordá 
Kòrsou, su solo i playanan, 
orguyo di nos tur. 
 
Laga nos gloria Kreador 
tur tempu i sin fin, 
k'El a hasi nos digno 
di ta yu di Kòrsou! 
 
Let's raise our voice and sing 
the grandeur of Curaçao; 
Curaçao, small island, 
a boulder in the sea! 
 
Curaçao, we love you 
above all nations. 
Your glory we sing 
with all our hearts. 
 
Our people have their struggle 
but we always have our faith 
to accomplish always 
victory through labour! 
 
Let us do our part 
for the island's prosperity. 
Let us unite forces 
so we can triumph. 
 
(To) Our fatherland we demonstrate 
honour and loyalty, 
as to the flag 
the union of our nation. 
 
Our lives would be little 
to give for our country, 
fighting united for liberty, 
love and understanding. 
 
And when we are far from home 
we all recall 
Curaçao, its sun and beaches 
the pride of us all. 
 
Let us praise our Creator 
always and forever, 
for He has made us worthy 
to be a child of Curaçao! 
In the anthem, and in the government ads the cultural, ethnic and racial diversity of the 
population is assumed, but remains unspecified. This could be seen as a kind of 
racelessness or colorblindness—yet another characteristic of multiculturalism (Goldberg 
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2002). In the definition of the Yu’i Kòrsou that is given in the 2001 governmental 
cultural policy plan, which is still in official use (Allen 2012b:1), the two meanings have 
been conflated: 
A yu-di-Kòrsou is someone who lives in Curaçao or abroad, and who fits the 
following criteria. He/she speaks and understands Papiamentu. He/she is willing 
to work to advance Curaçao. He/she can declare to the world that he is a yu-di-
Kòrsou and accepts his/her culture and history without any shame. He/she accepts 
and adheres to Curaçao’s multicultural situation, and accepts cultural diversity. 
He/she does not consider cultural elements of his/her ethnic group to be Curaçao’s 
culture, but he/she considers them as part of Curaçao’s culture. He/she accepts 
that Afrocuraçaoan elements dominate the majority part of Curaçaoan culture 
(Rosalia 2001:10).  
From the way the meanings of the Yu’i Kòrsou identity develop during the post-
revolt era, it becomes evident that Curaçao’s multicultural ideology was directed at 
incorporating the Afrocuraçaoan people and culture into the representation of the nation, 
more than the immigrants, most of whom have remained largely invisible in this national 
ideology. Shane Greene (2007) and Juliet Hooker (2005) argue that this is yet another 
part of multiculturalism: some groups are recognized by the state, made visible in the 
national narrative, while others are not. The immigrant presence in the ideology, though 
unspecified, does serve a purpose, I argue. The claim that Curaçao’s population is formed 
by 160 different ethnic groups helps to avoid calling Curaçao a black nation, in spite of 
the fact that the Afrocuraçaoan population constitutes approximately 80% of the national 
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population. The narrative of a highly heterogeneous nation prevents the Afrodescendant 
population from claiming too prominent a position on the national stage.  
 
Hegemony, Whitewashed History and Racelessness 
How has this ideology of unity in diversity been reproduced in national markers such as 
statues, museums, and the monumentalization of colonial European-based architecture? 
Examining such official and unofficial reproductions of the nation reveals the white 
supremacy that as Goldberg (2002) warns, underlies this allegedly inclusive ideology of 
multiculturalism.  
In 2014, I researched all statues on the island. Drawing heavily on a study done 
by art historian Jennifer Smidt (1996) on these statues and when and why they were 
erected I was able to conclude that the vast majority of Curaçao’s fifty-five statues was 
placed in the 60s, 70s and 80s. Only eleven of them (20%) depict black people or 
important black events, and only four of these statues are well visible. The statue of Tula, 
which is Curaçao’s biggest statue of a black person, is well hidden from public view. 
Thirty-two statues portray prominent white people or commemorative events of white 
society (58%), and thirteen are of important Latin Americans such as Marcel Piar, Simon 
Bolivar, and Pablo Duarte64. The message that Curaçao’s statues convey is that the 
achievements of white65 and light skinned people are far more worth commemorating and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 They were gifts from the government of Venezuela and of the Dominican Republic (Smidt 1996). 
 
65 This includes very light skinned people that are considered white by Curaçaoan standards. See appendix I 
for further elaboration on racial categories. 
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celebrating than those of black Curaçaoans. There is no statue that represents Curaçao’s 
immigrants or that reflects Curaçao’s “multicultural” society. 
In 2015, I conducted a study on Curaçao’s nineteen museums, with the aim to 
ascertain when and why they were initiated, and what messages their collections 
communicate with regards to race and nation building66. The vast majority of the 
museums opened in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. Five museums 
focus on Curaçaoan society in general, nine museums present the heritages of the 
European elites, one museum centers on slavery, and four museums specifically address 
Afrocuraçaoan heritage. Again, immigrants are barely mentioned in these museums’ 
permanent exhibitions, nor are they featured much, if at all, in temporary ones. The main 
focus of Curaçao’s museums thus lies on European and African contributions and their 
prolific blends, with a clear emphasis on the representation of white elite achievements.  
The white centered museums (Brooms 2011) make minimal mention of slavery. 
Their collection present a glorified white past full of cunning merchants and dapper 
seafarers. With regards to slavery the role of the white elites is obfuscated: they are 
depicted as benevolent slave traders and owners or innocent bystanders. In these 
museums there is no representation of black agency in Curaçao. The Afrocuraçaoan 
museums mostly show life of the post-emancipation and pre-industrial era: slavery is 
scarcely addressed. Here too there is very limited mention of the extent and intensity of 
slavery on Curaçao67, of Afrocuraçaoan agency and cultural contributions during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See appendix IV for an overview of the museums. 
 
67 The Kura Hulanda Museum in Otrobanda prides itself on its extensive exhibition on slavery, yet it does 
not explicitly address slavery in Curaçao.  
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colonization and the industrial and post-industrial eras. Curaçao’s black past and present 
are severely watered down. Interviews with the curators reveal that this censure is the 
result of pressure from the boards of these museums, and of the Dutch funds that finance 
the museums. The collective message that the island’s museums teaches us is that 
Afrocuraçaoan culture may be at the core of the ideology of national identity, but only in 
a watered down, non-critical, non-revolutionary manner that does not harm the integrity 
of the white “founders” of the island.  
The same whitewashing of Curaçao’s extensive history of colonial exploitation 
and oppression occurs in the policies regarding the island’s colonial European-based 
architecture. Since 1997 Willemstad’s inner city is part of the UNESCO list of World 
Heritage. Needless to say, this is the pride and joy of the island. Approximately 80 
restored monumentalized edifices adorn Willemstad’s old city core, to say nothing about 
the many other monuments such as haciendas, mansions and churches elsewhere on the 
island. In 1954, at the cusp of the autonomy of the Netherland’s Antilles, the Monument 
Preservation Foundation68, was inaugurated. It oversees the preservation and 
monumentalization of the Dutch- or European-based architecture of the white colonial 
population69. In contrast, pre-industrial and even the pre-emancipation Afrocuraçaoan 
architecture is not perceived as monumental, and therefore not protected or preserved. 
The “Kunuku house” is the most common type of Afrocuraçaoan architecture, but there 
are various other building styles. There are dozens of these old Afrocuraçaoan houses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Stichting Monumentenzorg Curaçao. 
 
69 Not all of these houses were inhabited by white people. Some of the small houses were inhabited by the 
free black population; others were former slave quarters, often as part of a large mansion. But the building 
styles of these small, monumentalized houses are European based. 
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left, if not hundreds. Many have been restored (often without protecting the original 
materials and structures) by their contemporary owners, many others are dilapidated or 
have been demolished. The message that flows from this stark discrepancy in heritage 
preservation is grim: while allegedly all parts of Curaçaoan culture are equal, only 
colonial European-based architecture is worth preserving, monumentalizing, and 
showcasing in the tourist field.  
Goldberg furthermore warns for the relative invisibilization of race and racial 
inequality that accompanies multicultural ideology. At the start of this chapter I, argued 
how race in absent in Curaçao’s policymaking, academia, politics, and public debate. 
Instead, the unproblematized use of multiculturalism is widespread: it has become a 
buzzword in policy reports and tourism. As a consequence racial inequality persists and is 
because of the alleged racelessness and inclusiveness of Curaçao’s national ideology 
uncontested. The gatekeeping mechanisms that were developed during the colonial era 
are still in place. This I will discuss in more detail chapter 3.  
 
United Nations Decade of People from African Descent 
A final topic that deserves mention in this chapter is a recent development in the 
governmental arena. In 2014 the Directorate of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of 
General Affairs (DFR) initiated a working group to attend to the United Nations (UN) 
resolution 68/237, which proclaimed the International Decade of People of African 
Descent (UNDPAD), from 2015 to 2024. In this resolution, the UN requests all its 
Member States to take action in order to diminish racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and other forms of marginalization, exclusion and intolerance towards people 
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of African descent, and to “promote respect, protection and fulfillment of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms by people of African descent, as recognized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UN 2014:5). The working group, which is 
comprised of representatives from GO’s and NGO’s70, and of which I was also a part, 
was given the task to propose to the government a plan for the fulfillment of the 
UNDPAD in Curaçao. 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands at large responded to the call to action by 
inviting a working group of UN experts to visit the Netherlands and Curaçao, in order to 
make an assessment of the current situation of Afrodescendant. In the Report of the 
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its sixteenth session: Mission 
to the Netherlands (2015) the Working Group presents its findings and recommendations 
to most of which pertain to the Netherlands, and some of which are specifically directed 
at Curaçao. As previously mentioned, the findings of the report provide strong support 
for several of the findings and claims in my research. 
Firstly, the Working Group expressed the concern “that racial discrimination is 
considered a “taboo” subject and identified a lack of understanding within the society 
about its manifestations” (UN 2015:4). It argued, as do I, that in spite of there being 
various legal instruments available to contest racial discrimination, people are largely 
unaware of them (UN 2015:13). Furthermore, Curaçao does not have a national human 
rights institution (UN 2015:6,7) that informs the population and the government, and that 
facilitates in the use of these instruments. Consequently, cases of racial discrimination are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The working group is multidisciplinary, and racially diverse with an Afrodescendant majority. It is 
mostly comprised of women; men are underrepresented.	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severely underreported (UN 2015:13). The report also draws attention to the small 
numbers of Afrodescendant lawyers and judges in Curaçao’s court system (UN 2015:15), 
and encourages the government to find ways to increase their numbers.  
It furthermore points to the lack of census data on race as an impeding factor in 
bringing to light the effects of racial discrimination (UN 2015:10), and to cut backs in 
funding from the Netherlands that might have been directed at combating discrimination 
(UN 2015:15). The Working Group expresses concern about the educational system, in 
which children are not able to receive “education at all levels in Papiamento” (UN 
2015:21)71, and identifies the “historic underrepresentation of people of African descent 
[…] as institutional figures in Curaçao” (UN 2015:15), “few programmes and 
employment opportunities available specifically for youths of African descent” (UN 
2015:21), and “insufficient measures to address gender-based violence” (UN 2015:21).  
Partly in response to this UN report, the Curaçaoan working group drafted the Bill 
for the Curaçaoan Fulfillment of the United Nations Decade for People of African 
Descent72 (2015). It makes a number of recommendations to the Curaçaoan government 
regarding the improvement of the situation of Afrodescendants in Curaçao. The full list 
of recommendations is presented in Appendix XI. 
The recommendations regarding actual reform pertain to the increase of 
information on human rights and the available legal instruments, and to facilitate their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The list of concerns and recommendation that I summarize here is not exhaustive, for the full report see 
the Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its sixteenth session. Mission 
to the Netherlands. 20 July 2015. A/HRC/30/56/Add.1. 
 
72 The original title is Nota voor Curaçaose invulling van United Nations Decade for People of African 
Descent. 
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use, as to increase the reporting of cases of racial discrimination. The bill proposes the 
initiation of a Human Rights Institute by the Ombudsman, an anti-discrimination agency, 
and a governmental website regarding the UNDPAD and human rights (Directorate of 
Foreign Affairs 2015:2). It also recommends that the mainstream rendition of Curaçao’s 
history in educational curriculums, which presents a Eurocentric perspective, is adjusted 
to the experiences of Afrodescendants, and that there will be a “dissemination of 
information regarding discrimination, respect, equality and (self)acceptance” (Directorate 
of Foreign Affairs 2015:2). It also proposes to improve immigration policies to the 
betterment of Afrodescendant migrants, and to increase the awareness of human rights, 
racial discrimination, and the UNDPAD among the ministries73 (Directorate of Foreign 
Affairs 2015:2,3).  
Early 2016, the bill was accepted by the Council of Ministers, which is a major 
achievement, and a clearly constructive development. So far the UNDPAD has been 
instrumental in a first breaking of a long institutional silence concerning race and racial 
discrimination in Curaçao. What is less positive is that we are well into the second year 
of the decade, and there has not been a public, nation wide launch of the decade, nor is 
there much attention for the decade in the mainstream media. The upcoming elections of 
October 2016 will have to give a foretaste of whether the government will indeed 
“dedicate itself to improve the societal, social and economic position of people of African 
descent” (Directorate of Foreign Relations 2015:2). Will the address of racial inequality 
be on the agenda’s of the political parties? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  For the full bill see appendix XI.	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This remains an important question: how much of this reform will be taken on by 
the government, and how much will remain the responsibility of NGO’s and civil society, 
as has been characteristic of the past decades. And how much funding will the 
government make available for the numerous projects that will have to be constructed? 
This has been a constant theme in the meetings of the working group. NGO’s proposed 
numerous projects, but some of the government officials in the working group indicated 
that—at least for now—there is no government funding available. “We cannot simply 
give everyone money, it also has to be the responsibility of the NGO’s and of civil 
society to make these changes,” was an often heard reply. But there funding possibilities 
on the island are very limited, so unless the government ads significant resources that 
NGO’s can draw from, the needed reform will not be easily attained. This has been a key 
characteristic of multiculturalism: governments advocate and initiate change but due to 
various obstructing mechanisms actual reform is minimal (Brondo 2010; Hale 2002, 
2005; Hooker 2005; Goldberg 2002; Greene 2007; Rahier 2012). 
Currently, the bill proposes that the Foundation National Archaeological - 
Anthropological Memory Management (NAAM)—an NGO—will coordinate the 
International Decade for People of African Descent (UNDPAD). NAAM has for decades 
been a key organization in the preservation of tangible and intangible national heritage, 
both black and white. It plays a central role in community outreach, and hosts many 
celebrations of Afrocuraçaoan culture and traditions. This makes it by far one of the best-
suited Curaçaoan organizations to coordinate the UNDPAD. However, in spite of its 
important role to Curaçao, and of its continuous output of valuable knowledge and its on-
going community engagement, NAAM has been structurally underfunded and 
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understaffed. This makes it challenging for the foundation to take on this elaborate task, 
and in fact threatens its current activities and objectives. Currently, governmental funding 
of the UNDPAD has yet to become available. This consistent lack of funding creates a 
deep vulnerability that we must monitor keenly, so the desired reform does not again 
peter out because of the mechanizations of multiculturalism. 
 
Conclusion 
In this historical chapter, I sought to make visible how the ideology of white supremacy 
became deeply embedded in Curaçaoan society, and perpetuated as a partially hidden 
constituent of the creolization and multicultural renditions of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of 
national identity. I have demonstrated that in 20th and 21st century Curaçao racism did not 
become obsolete, as many claim—far from it.  
The first part of the chapter showed how during the colonial era an ideology of 
explicit white supremacy developed. Through the system of slavery, race became the 
variable that distinguished Afrodescendants from Europeans, and that legitimized their 
exploitation and oppression. This was reinforced by a number of gatekeeping 
mechanisms, which also became embedded in race, such as religion, language, 
demography, and division of labor, which restricted the Afrocuraçaoan in their social 
upward mobility. These exclusionary measures pertained to the enslaved population, but 
also to freedmen and mulattos. However, over time the mulatto population gained more 
privileges compared to the darker skinned population, which resulted, like elsewhere in 
the African Diaspora, in mulattos forming a separate socioeconomic class that was 
positioned in between black and white. A color hierarchy developed on the island, which 
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has to this day has remained a deeply internalized, continuous expression of white 
supremacy.  
After abolition initially this explicit version of racist ideology remained. In the 
first part of the 20th century, during the era of industrialization, it became hidden under 
the first version of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology. In the face of rapid industrialization and 
large-scale immigration, the island’s elites adopted an ideology of creolization, which 
appeared to be inclusive towards Afrocuraçaoans. However, as was the case elsewhere in 
the Caribbean, creolization served to unite a population that for centuries had been 
deliberately and violently segregated, with the aim to perpetuate the dominant position of 
the ruling elites and to further their goals. In Curaçao, the colonial elites lost their 
financial preeminence to the new Dutch immigrants, sent to run the island’s rapidly 
modernizing and expanding society. This enhanced resentments among the old elites, 
who pursued political dominance and autonomy from the Netherlands. To this end, the 
elites needed the support of the black masses, which comprised the vast majority of the 
island population. The Yu’i Kòrsou ideology, though not explicitly advocating 
miscegenation, imagined the Curaçao as a mixed, heterogeneous nation, in which the old 
black and white population segments now formed a unified whole. In this imagination, 
Afrocuraçaoan culture became a figurehead of Curaçao’s cultural uniqueness vis-à-vis 
the colonial motherland. But also, the attention for and appreciation of Papiamentu and 
folklorized forms of Afrocuraçaoan culture invited the black masses to be allegiant to the 
elites that had once so fiercely subjugated them.  
However, this unity and equality that the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology proposed did not 
improve the marginalized socioeconomic position of the Afrodescendant population, 
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which during the industrial era remained greatly impoverished, and had very limited 
possibilities for social upward mobility. White supremacy persisted. The violent labor 
revolt of 1969 demanded a more serious address of the dire straits that the 
Afrodescendant population was in. It was a wake up call for the old elites. They were still 
a numerical minority, and continued black dissatisfaction could result in the demise of 
their dominance.  
After the revolt an allegedly more inclusive version of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology 
of national identity developed. This new version was specifically directed at including the 
Afrocuraçaoan population on an equalitarian basis, but now it also included the 
increasing numbers of the first-, second-, and third generation immigrants, which had 
merged into the nation. In representations of the nation of the 1970s and ‘80s the vast 
majority of the many dozens of different ethnic groups that lived on the island remained 
largely invisible, or better said, unspecified: the focus was on Afrocuraçaoan culture and 
heritage, which was again seen as the core of the nation. However, I argue that the 
presence of these many immigrant groups is crucial to the imagination of the nation: it 
avoids Curaçao being labeled a “black” nation, and deflects Afrocuraçaoan claims to 
increased power. In the new rendition of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology Curaçao is imagined 
instead as a heterogeneous or “multicultural”74 nation, in which all inhabitants are unified 
and equal, regardless of their ethnic or racial origin.  
But this new version of the ideology of national identity was embedded in 
multiculturalism. The new government that was elected after the revolt adopted a politics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In this use multicultural refers to the island being culturally, ethnically and racially diverse, not to the 
oppressive dimensions of this ideological system as discussed throughout this dissertation. 
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of strengthened recognition and inclusion of Afrocuraçaoan culture. This initiated ample 
pro-black reform, much of which was pursued and carried out by key agents and 
organizations from civil society. This greatly improved the possibilities for social upward 
mobility for people of African descent. Legal reform regarding labor rights, anti-
discrimination legislation and bilingual education were to safeguard intercultural 
equality. The 1969 revolt and its aftermath caused a major break through in the severe 
racial oppression and marginalization that for so long had characterized the lives of the 
majority of the Afrodescendant population. People of color undeniable gained many more 
ways to move upward socially, and permeated the middle and upper classes. This was a 
major gain of the multicultural turn.  
However, as is common in multiculturalism, from the start actual black 
empowerment and reform were obstructed and even omitted in various ways, especially 
with regards to a reformulation of the economic power balance and a relocation of elite-
owned resources to the populace. The political arena became ruled by whites and 
blacks—although I argue that people’s allegiance is more important than their phenotype 
or racial identity. The economic power however remained predominantly in the hands of 
the old—and new—white elites. Many of the race-based gatekeeping mechanisms that 
were previously discussed were partially, but not fully, dismantled. They are deeply 
institutionalized, and by many they are perceived as the natural order of things, and thus 
relatively invisible. As a consequence, today the impact of racial inequality remains 
significant, and is clearly observed in the racial/spatial ordering of the island: the working 
classes are predominantly black, the middle classes are mixed, and the elites have 
remained predominantly white. 
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In this chapter I argue that ideology is an essential factor in the perpetuation of the 
racial status quo. Because of this alleged equality that is promulgated in the ideology’s 
narrative, and because of the ample pro-black reform that has been instigated after the 
revolt, the ideology implies that racism no longer exists. This denial or invisibilization of 
racial inequality, especially on the part of the elites and the state, however makes the 
actual perpetuation of racism much harder to measure and address. Race, racism, racial 
marginalization and discrimination to this day remain largely outside of the focus of 
academia, policy making, and administration. This relative invisibility of especially 
institutionalized racism is another key tenet of multicultural ideology. 
The chapter also illustrates how contemporary narrations of the colonial past often 
glorify white achievement (Goldberg 2002), while repeatedly downplaying or obscuring 
black achievement and narratives. The statues, museums, and the monumentalization of 
colonial European-based architecture by and large convey the island’s persisting 
hegemonic racial ideology of white supremacy. In many such narrations the atrocities of 
colonialism are omitted, denied, trivialized and whitewashed, and the legacy of the Dutch 
Protestants and the Portuguese Jews is carefully preserved and admired. These 
hegemonic recitations are marginally contested, and often repeated: the majority of the 
population—white and black alike—proudly celebrates them as an important part of 
Curaçao’s “multicultural” or ethnically heterogeneous society. While there is also a 
noticeable celebration of Afrocuraçaoan heritage in some of the museums and especially 
in Curaçao’s folklore, the colonial wrongdoings often remain unchallenged, and even 
unmentioned. White supremacy—the bottom of the iceberg—continues to dictate the 
racial status quo, cloaked by an ideology of unity and equality in diversity—its top.   
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Chapter II 
The Intimate Dimensions of Hegemony: A Reflexive Presentation of an Intergenerational 
Family History 
 
 
Until the lion learns to write, every story will glorify the hunter 
—African Proverb 
 
Introduction 
This study seeks to deconstruct the multiple layers of Curaçao’s ideology of national 
identity, and how they are deeply entwined with race and racism. Part of this inquiry is 
concerned with the ways Curaçao’s hegemonic ideology of national identity pervades the 
minds of Curaçaoans, and how this is mechanized into national representations that 
produce different forms of silencing, but also evoke resistance. In this chapter, I explore 
how these ideologies shaped my mother’s, grandmother’s, and my own understandings 
and performances of self. 
The chapter locates our personal narratives within the broader geographical 
context of the Dutch Empire. I give special attention to the territories of Curaçao, 
Surinam and the Netherlands, which have all three provided a home at one point or other 
to my family and me. Furthermore, following Stoler and Rahier, this second chapter 
zooms in on the micro-dimensions of intimacy as the everyday life mechanizations of 
hegemony. The trans-generational and transatlantic stories of my mother, my 
grandmother and myself illustrate how in our perceptions of self, and in our experiences, 
expectations and choices we perpetuated and thwarted ideological fragments of race and 
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nation, which we brought with us across oceans, territories, and generations, impacting in 
that way our everyday lives.  
 Ann Laura Stoler argues in Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power (2002) that 
intimacy is colonialism’s handmaiden. When reflecting about colonial power, people 
often think exclusively about the economic and political dimensions of colonialism, its 
rules and regulations about trade and economic profit, its division of labor, and the issues 
of freedom, servitude, ownership, and citizenship. However, Stoler contends that the 
most intimate levels of the colonials’ lives, and particularly their interactions with those 
who were colonized, were also a source of great preoccupation for colonial authorities in 
general. It is in the spoken and unspoken rules about who could bed and wed whom, who 
served who and how, and who raised who and how, that the dimensions of race and 
power were solidified in everyday practice. She illustrates how ideas about race and 
miscegenation, gender, sexuality, intimacy, power, identity and belonging are pliable, 
political constructs that were adaptable enough to keep both colonizers and colonized in 
line (Stoler 2002). In the end, colonial rules and regulations, and the sanctions and 
prohibitions they entailed, established the seat of imperial power and dominance (Stoler 
2002). 
In “The Microphysics of Colonial Power: Violence, Intimacy, and Sexuality in 
Belgian Colonial Literature” (2010), Jean Rahier makes a similar argument. Sex, race and 
power intersect, Rahier states, because  “affective sentiments, emotions, joys and pains 
[…] marked the lives of both colonizers and colonized” (Rahier 2010:41). These 
constitute “the micro-dimensions of the practice of colonial power in the interactions 
between colonizers and colonized” (Rahier 2010:42). Following Michel Foucault’s 
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theorizing that power is always in circulation and in flux (Foucault 1978), Rahier argues 
that in order to comprehend the way power operates one must zoom in on the processes 
of interpersonal interactions, on the realm of the intimate, as much as on the larger social, 
economic, and political dimensions of the colonial order (Rahier 2010:42). He writes: 
Power is not only repressive, it is also productive. It takes us over and gives rise 
to pleasure, to particular kinds of emotions and relationships, as well as to forms 
of knowledge and discourses (Rahier 2010:42). 
In this chapter I focus on the micro-dimensions of intimacy in the everyday life 
mechanizations of hegemony. I specifically explore (1) what hegemonic messages were 
transmitted to my grandmother, my mother and myself; (2) how these instructed us to 
respect the rules of the Dutch Empire, both in the Caribbean colonies we live(d) in as in 
the Netherlands, even as these imperial structures changed significantly over the course 
of our lifetimes; and (3) how we have incorporated/embraced or resisted these rules. Even 
though the findings that I present in this family narrative are specific to the contexts of 
our family and our personal lives, they do reveal larger patters that also pertain to others 
inhabiting the same imperial space, and present a vivid example of the complex ways in 
which hegemony operates.  
First there is my café-au-lait or coffee and cream colored grandmother who left 
Surinam for Curaçao in the 1940s with her brown-skinned baby, in search of financial 
opportunities during Curaçao’s oil boom. Then, there is the story of my black mother, 
who left Curaçao in an attempt to leave behind her own shame for her “African” features 
for the anonymity of the Netherlands. And lastly there is me, the light skinned daughter 
raised to pass-for-white, who moves back to the Caribbean to resolve her identity crises. 
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In the process, I consequently discovered my family's silenced history of enduring 
internalized anti-black racism. Our stories, woven out of multiple strands of silence, 
connect Surinam and Curaçao to their colonizing nation: the Netherlands. They envelop 
multiple generations of people negotiating their colonial heritage and the politics of skin-
color in a so-called “postcolonial world.” 
The stories I am presenting here are not fully self-ethnographic since the 
information about each one of the three life histories came from the person in focus, as 
well as from other individuals who played an important role in what I call a “reflexive 
presentation of an intergenerational family history.”  I collected these three life histories 
over the course of several years, during which I had many conversations with my mother, 
father, grandmother and my mother’s siblings and cousins.  
For my grandmother’s story, I departed from my mother’s stories, and from the 
few stories my grandmother shared with me in informal conversations before she passed 
away. Conversations with other relatives served to add depth and nuance to my 
grandmother’s main storyline. I obtained the information about my mother’s 
grandparents from my mother and her siblings and cousins. A family tree that my aunt 
had once lent me was very useful, because it helped me to find the great grandmothers 
and –fathers that came before, who I was able to trace back to two plantations in 
Surinam. This history, of our family’s roots in slavery, had not been known to my 
generation, or to that of my mother. 
The second case study tells my mother’s story.  I recorded in-depth conversations 
and interviews with her over the course of seven years.  I also include the information I 
gathered over the course of my lifetime living and interacting with her. I have always 
 147 
been a witness of her life, the listener to her life stories, the comforter of her woes, and 
the receiver of her cares, her love, and her overt and silent teachings. Together with her 
and my father we have written her story.  
Writing my own self-ethnography took me seven years, during which I have had 
constant conversations with both my parents, who read my numerous drafts, and provided 
me with ample material for reflection. I also spoke abundantly with my closest friends, 
my relatives, my partner, and my professors. Their feedback gave me again plentiful 
opportunities to reflect upon and refine my accounts and analyses of self. 
 
Silence, Hegemony, Censure, And Resistance 
One of the first things my mother said in our first interview on the importance of race in 
her life was: “Silence is where I hid, because I was never supposed to be born.” As her 
painful story about her childhood unfolded, silence turned out to be its guiding motif. So 
before we hear her story, let us take a brief look at silence’s personal and intimate 
dimensions within colonial and postcolonial discourses of white supremacy.  
 Pierre Bourdieu, writing about the sociology of power in his pivotal work Outline 
of A Theory of Practice (1977), describes the various ways in which ruling classes create 
and implement hegemony. Not only do they control the means of production, he argues, 
they also dominate the way the ideology of national identity is shaped. That ideology not 
only defines what the prototypical national identity is, it also indicates how the nation 
ought to function, what must be kept silent, and what should be considered normal, 
sensitive, unimportant or absurd (Gramsci 1971). Bourdieu argues: “The most successful 
ideological effects are those which have no need of words, but ask no more than a 
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complicitous silence” (Bourdieu 1977:188). These “social silences,” which according to 
Bourdieu can be both “deliberately or involuntarily complicitous” (Bourdieu 1977:188), 
may result from explicit strategies of the ruling class.  
Silence is thus a favored tool of hegemony. In Silencing the Past: Power and the 
Production of History (1995) Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot elaborated 
on discourse formation. Trouillot argued that history never revolves around the objective 
telling of facts but rather it entails a highly politicized play of power wherein silence is 
wielded like a blade. Not until we uncover the silences of the non-elites, creating a 
myriad of overlapping stories, can we grasp the true, complex nature of any given 
societal occurrence. But such “un-coveries” are discouraged by hegemony; silence serves 
to censor, to suppress or delete communicative material that is considered damaging to 
hegemonic rule by labeling it as offensive, unpleasant, harmful or sensitive (Gramsci 
1971). This type of hegemonic silencing can be imposed through coercion, or on the 
contrary it can be voluntarily ascribed to by the masses—hegemony’s “double-edged 
sword” (Gramsci 1971).  
But as hegemony imposes and evokes censorship, there are also ways in which 
this hegemonic rule is resisted. Silence can be a powerful means of protection from and 
resistance to hegemony’s effects, as James Scott illustrates in Domination and the Art of 
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1992). Scott argues that the hidden transcript is the 
offstage critique of and coping with the public transcript or the official discourse 
projected by the elites. The hidden transcript here refers to the “infrapolitics” or “low-
profile forms of resistance” (Scott 1992:19) of the oppressed, and is expressed in a 
multitude of ways, varying from gossip, stealing, anonymous attacks, silences and acting 
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dumb to stalling, muttering, metaphors, blasphemy, and cultural expressions such as 
dress, songs, and folktales.  
Scott argues that in the hidden transcript the limits of oppression are constantly 
tested, which happens to the “performances” both sides give in the public transcript. 
These performances are delivered for strategic reasons: the oppressor cannot openly 
falter, and the oppressed cannot openly resist without risking serious repercussions (Scott 
1992). In the play of power both sides need to perform their correct role. For the 
oppressed this role involves the “credible performance of humility and deference” (Scott, 
1992:10), while the oppressor is to present a “credible performance of haughtiness and 
mastery” (Scott 1992:10). Once the oppressed sees that the oppressor’s performance 
falters and that his/her power is not as absolute as claimed, open resistance may follow. 
This can happen, among other things, through a public declaration of the hidden 
transcript, through some form of insubordination that passes without sufficiently 
restorative actions on behalf of the dominants’ power. Should the oppressed be too overt 
in their hidden resistance, oppression and coercion may follow, making their plight worse 
than it initially was. Therefore, Scott claims that such more or less silent hidden 
transcripts need safe sites in which they can develop and live, out of earshot and sight of 
the oppressor. Hidden transcript cannot just be seen as a way to vent, as to take a deep 
breath and chug on. Hidden transcripts may or may not be acted upon, Scott argues, but 
they always are sites of resistance, and thus always contain a threat to the oppressors’ 
dominance. They are the source from which open revolt flows, when it does (Scott 1992). 
Anthropological linguist Robin Sheriff’s ethnography Dreaming Equality: Color, 
Race and Racism in Urban Brazil (2001) yields ample examples of both the subjugation 
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and the resistance silence involves in a racialized context. Like Scott, Sheriff argues that 
silence should not automatically be understood as acceptance of dominant discourse 
(Sheriff 2001:118). Her study reveals that racism, racial prejudice and race-based 
discrimination are rarely discussed by the inhabitants of the shantytown or favela she 
studied. Her respondents explain that it makes them feel sad, angry, frustrated, hopeless, 
and powerless, so they rather ignore such experiences instead of having to relive painful 
situations. They are afraid that they will loose control if they fuel these emotions and 
express them openly, which would be dangerous since there is always the threat of 
punishment and retaliation by those who are accused of racist acts. These narratives of 
racism clearly reveal the imbalance of power that is inherent to racism, as well as 
people’s continuous awareness of this imbalance and the injustice it involves. 
Furthermore, people may think that it was the victim’s fault if they experienced racism, 
which makes it all the more painful. They should have known better and behaved more 
“appropriately” (Sheriff 2001:124). To talk openly and complain about racism would 
mean to acknowledge its power and thus “involve a kind of personal and collective 
surrender” (Sheriff 2001:75). Complicitous silence offers a way to cope with these 
predicaments. 
And again, like Scott, Sheriff claims that through silence oppression is allowed to 
perpetuate freely, but that it does more than that. She argues: “The silence my informants 
practice is simultaneously a public form of accommodation and a private (and at the same 
time communal) form of resistance” (Sheriff 2001:83). Euphemism, deception, avoidance 
and denial are necessary means to soften the internalized oppression, the shame, and the 
wounds that one cannot adequately protect oneself from. But they are also ways to 
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camouflage these negative impacts, making them invisible to the perpetrator, as well as to 
disobey. Silence is a multifaceted and multifunctional “space” that oppresses, but also 
protects and creates a “safe site” (Scott 1992) in which resistance grows. 
Sheriff’s findings fit the mold that sociologist Erving Goffman (1967) and also 
linguist Deborah Tannen (1985) paint about silence in its more general use. Tannen 
argues that “the meaning of silence in interaction, like other features of discourse, can be 
understood to grow out of the two overriding goals of human communication: to be 
connected to other people and to be separate from them” (Tannen 1985:97). Goffman 
(1967) respectively refers to these as presentational rituals and avoidance rituals. 
Presentational rituals allow individuals to be accepted by and in agreement with the 
social group. This kind of silence enhances the social connection that Tannen refers to. 
From the group’s perspective this silence can both serve to comply with hegemony, as 
Bourdieu’s “complicitous silence” does, and to collectively challenge and resist it. 
Avoidance rituals then refer to remaining silent out of disapproval or defiance, or as a 
means to attack or deflect. Here, the individual distances himself or herself from the 
collective. Similarly, such silence may signal that the individual disconnects from the 
group out of shame, hurt, or discouragement (Tannen 1985). In this case too, this 
interpersonal type of silence cuts across hegemonic and counter-hegemonic contexts, 
depending on the stance of the social group vis-à-vis hegemony. These types of silence 
should thus, as Tannen argues, “be measured against what is expected in that context” 
(1985:98).  
And lastly, silence is a well-known part of individual traumatic response (Caruth 
1996; Eyerman, 2001, 2013). Dissociation or avoidance behavior is a common response 
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to emotional shock sustained during a very distressing physical or emotional event. In 
addition to numbness, a condition where the capacity to feel pain is temporarily 
suspended, amnesia and repression are defenses of the mind against such a violent 
intrusion. The victim simply forgets or denies that anything has occurred (Caruth 1996; 
Eyerman 2013:42). Trauma generates yet another form of silence: “involuntary 
forgetting,” or the inability to recollect certain parts of one’s memory (Caruth 1996:4).  
But trauma also exists on a cultural or societal level, when a group or social 
segment is collectively affected by a crisis (Alexander et al. 2004; Connerton 1989; 
Eyerman 2001, 2013). The trauma that is experienced on the individual and collective 
level—a significant alteration or even loss of identity—becomes framed and expressed in 
a collectively shared narrative. Such a shared narrative can then constitute a new identity 
for its members, which as Jeffrey Alexander’s theoretical model for collective trauma 
(2004) suggests, may either be empowering or detrimental to the collective at hand. In the 
case study that I address such collective trauma would refer to the injurious effects of 
slavery and other forms of racist exploitation and injustice, sustained by earlier 
generations or by contemporary exposure to racist encounters.75 For many postcolonial 
societies this trauma narrative is a subaltern discourse, which by default develops and 
exists in close dialogue with larger (national) hegemonic discourses. It can hence be 
expected that the tools that elites use to maintain its hegemonic discourse will impose 
censoring silences onto these narratives, as well as on groups at large, marginalizing them 
and rendering them relatively invisible (Alexander 2004; see also Stutzman 1981). But as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ron Eyerman (2001; 2013) specifically writes about collective trauma and identity formation in relation 
to slavery and African-American identity. 
 153 
Sheriff’s accounts on cultural censorship (2000; 2001) highlight, we may also expect that 
members of subaltern groups will self-impose such silences, whether to shield themselves 
from violent repercussions flowing from oppression while nurturing some form of 
resistance, or to adhere to hegemonic discourse in search of its benefits.  
Even though this theorizing is far from conclusive, it quickly becomes evident 
that much can be said about silence. Silence is not an empty space, and it is never quiet. It 
is instead full of power struggles, conflicting allegiances and meanings, opposed codes of 
behavior, norms, values, hopes, dreams, rituals, fears and pains. Like any bit of cultural 
discourse, silences are passed on from one person to another, consciously or 
unconsciously, as part of people’s socialization into society’s dominant discourses, as 
well as counterhegemonic discourses of resistance and protection, and society’s specific 
traumas. This makes silence fundamental to understand social reality. As Bourdieu 
(1977:188-189), Sheriff (2001:127) and Trouillot (1995) argue, silence is in dire need of 
systematic research.  
 
Case Study 1: My Grandmother Sophie and Our Forgotten Ancestors 
My grandmother Sophie (see photo 1) was born in 1919 in Paramaribo, Surinam. She was 
a free-spirited girl, smart as a whip, and brimming with a creativity that only barely died 
when she did, at the age of 92, smoking a cigarette and sipping her morning coffee at her 
sowing table. Her slender hands preferred the piano over typewriters and ledgers, her feet 
rather danced than carry her to run errands or hold still behind a desk. She wanted to sing, 
act, be on stage. But in the 1930s such things were not suitable for proper, light skinned 
middle class girls. Her parents wanted her to become a decent and sensible woman. Her 
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father was a professional tailor. He ran a good business, sowing amongst others the 
uniforms of Paramaribo’s police officers. With a family of six children he had the means 
to allow his daughters some education, but nothing extravagant. They were lucky to even 
receive secondary education: many young women didn’t in those days. So Sophie studied 
bookkeeping. She learned how to count her blessings, but the fiery passion for arts and 
creativity she carried inside remained a burden for her all throughout her life. 
     
Photo 1. Sophie at age 17 in Paramaribo, in 1938 
 
Mundane life did not fit her. Once she told me that what she had really wanted was to be 
part of the theater, to be on stage, be a dancer. She was so angry with her father that he 
would not let her. But she did sneak away once, when this big theater company came to 
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town, and participated in a play. She giggled in her typical way and said to me: “Ai 
baja76, I just did it, and I had such fun! My parents never even knew…” But they would 
soon become acquainted with the fruit from that experience, for my grandmother returned 
home, pregnant with my mother. 
 
Rudolf – Sophie’s Father 
Sophie’s father, Rudolf Vervuurt, was a fourth generation descendant of a Dutchman who 
had come to Surinam in 1795. Some of his relatives had been colonial officials, some had 
managed plantations, and others were tradesmen and craftsmen, like him. My mother 
remembers her grandfather as a tall, white man with piercing blue eyes, who dressed in 
the typical white colonial outfits that the Europeans wore. Other relatives also remember 
him like that: a white man of German descent. But he never looked German to me. On 
the old black and white photographs my tall, thin great grandfather’s skin seemed to have 
a light brown hue, and the long slender face underneath his thick, sleek white hair did not 
look like the European faces that I knew at all.  
As my mother once again told me of his whiteness, I decided to pick up the 
Vervuurt family genealogy printout that my aunt lent to me almost ten years ago. There I 
traced Rudolf’s grandparents and great grandparents back to the first Vervuurt, who left 
the harbor of 17th century Delfzijl, situated in the Northernmost part of the Netherlands, 
and set sail for Surinam with his pregnant wife.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 “Ai baja” means “Oh God” or “Good heavens” in Sranan Tongo, the Creole language of Surinam. 
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In contrast to Curaçao, where plantation economy was marginal, Surinam had 
been a settler and a plantation colony. Along the edges of the 480 km long Surinam River 
the tropical rainforest was turned into large sugar, coffee, cacao and cotton plantations. 
The narrow strips of land stretched inland, into the thick jungle that was the home of the 
indigenous population, and the refuge of maroons. Given that it was a settler colony in 
which the Dutch had intended to start a permanent community (Helman 1977:239), it was 
not surprising that a good deal of these early settlers traveled to Surinam with their 
families. The stencils revealed that the first Vervuurt and his wife had made it to the 
“New World,” and over the decades their children and grandchildren married what 
appear to be other Dutch people, or at least people carrying Dutch names. There is 
however no trace of a German ancestor. So far that part of the family narrative was not 
holding up. But I was more interested in Rudolf’s alleged whiteness, which did not look 
all that white to me, so I looked eagerly for the page in the genealogy with the names and 
places of birth of Rudolf’s father and mother. If he was partly Dutch, what were the other 
parts of his ancestry? But the page was missing. In all of the genealogy it was the only 
page that was missing. Was this a coincidence, I wondered, or had someone deliberately 
removed it? I decided to track down Rudolf’s parents via online archives77 instead, and 
soon enough I caught their proverbial scent. I was not prepared for what I would find.  
Before long the digitized Surinamese ledgers revealed to me that Rudolf’s mother 
had been called Julia Emelina Zechiël. Further inquiry brought me to the manumission 
archives, listing the slaves that had been freed before slavery ended. There I found that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 I used Geneanet, the Dutch National Archive (Nationaal Archief), Ancestry.com, MyHeritage.com, and 
the Foundation for Surinamese Genealogy (Stiching voor Surinaamse Genealogie). 
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Julia had been born a slave on the large sugar plantation De Drie Gebroeders (The Three 
Brothers) in upper Surinam. She had been a house slave there, the ledger informed me. 
Her mother, Bruinetta Dorothea Zechiël, had worked in the fields. At the time of 
manumission, in 1863, Julia was 16 years old. The fact that Julia was a house slave may 
have meant that she was a child of the man who owned the plantation, or that she was his 
“housekeeper-concubine” (Helman 1977:245). In both cases it is likely that she was of 
lighter skin.  
Like in Curaçao, intimate relations between white men and women of color were 
common in Surinam. Yet, while in Curaçao such relations were encouraged (Hoetink 
1958), in Surinam the colonial government strictly forbade white men to have sexual 
relations with their slaves. If found out about, the men would be fined small amounts of 
money or sugar. For white women and enslaved men maintaining intimate relations, the 
punishments would be far worst. But due to the large surplus of white men compared to 
white women these colonial rules were often bent and broken. It was common for white 
men to live in concubinage with slave women, who would be employed as housekeepers, 
something that the colonial government condoned. The mixed-race children that would 
result from these relations, who in Surinam became called “Creole,” often held a 
privileged position, and might even be freed (Helman 1997). Thus, like in Curaçao in 
Surinam a mixed-race segment developed early on in colonial times, which became a 
separate population segment existing in between white Europeans and African slaves. 
They commonly adopted white norms, practices and culture, as argued by Surinamese 
writer Albert Helman (1977:245).  
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In these explicit and implicit rules about interracial relations in Surinam one can 
observe the same contradiction that Stoler finds in 20th century Indonesia: there is an 
explicit rule that established white endogamy as the ideal, meaning that whiteness is not 
only superior to non-white, but also that white men’s allegiance should remain with the 
white Dutch colonial forces and the goals of dominance and economic gain they pursued. 
The flip side of this explicit decree is “the unspoken norm” (Stoler 2002:1), which in fact 
supports the message of the explicit decree as it dictates that women of color are perfectly 
fine to perform the household tasks and to provide sexual, physical and emotional 
sustenance (Stoler 2002:1)78. Women of color could never become the legitimate partner 
that represents European membership and access to privileges, property and prosperity 
(Stoler 2002:39). Thus, argues Stoler: “it was in the disarray of unwanted, sought after, 
and troubled intimacies of domestic space that colonial relations were refurbished and 
their distinctions made” (Stoler 2002:6).  
Not only was Rudolph not of German but of Dutch origin, far more importantly, 
he was of African descent! Of all the tales I ever heard about my family this was not one 
of them. I remember my mother identifying as part Indonesian, Javanese, and Indigenous 
Surinamese, all of whom constitute large population segments in Surinam. But never did 
I hear anyone in my family acknowledge any Afrodescendance. Why did I not know this 
part of our history? Recasting Rudolph as white and European placed him and his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Stoler writes: That prohibitions against interracial marriage were commonly late rather than early 
colonial inventions (in such diverse contexts as Mexico, Cuba, India, Indonesia, and the U.S. South) 
suggests that it was not interracial sexual contact that was seen as dangerous but its public legitimation in 
marriage. Similary, it was not the progeny of such unions who were problematic but the possibility that 
they might be recognized as heirs to European inheritance” (Stoler 2002:39). 
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descendants in the realm of European membership and the privileges that came with it. 
Labeling him a man of color, on the other hand, would have denied him all that. 
As soon as I had clicked open the page with their names in the online 
manumission register it felt as if the air in the room changed, as if my two lost ancestors 
stared at me from behind these letters on my computer screen. Side by side they stood, 
two black women against the backdrop of an open field, bordered in the distance by the 
tropical Surinamese forest. I clearly saw them in my mind’s eye, and it made my eyes 
tear up, the hairs on my skin stand up. In between the black letters on the white screen I 
saw them, and they saw me. They didn’t smile or move, my forgotten ancestors. The 
thick cloud of silence that had shrouded them for so long slowly filled up my room, full 
of their lives, their untold stories, their dreams alive and dead. I felt so honored, so 
delighted to meet them. And I felt a relief from their side, an exhalation. For finally being 
seen again after so many decades. Even though in this image they did not move, I felt 
them reach out to me, as if to pull me into the screen with them and look at me properly. 
This meeting of spirits, which defied time and space, felt to me like a homecoming. All 
my life the true nature my Caribbean roots had always been a mystery. But this meeting 
reestablished a tie that I now realize had always been there. We were of African descent. 
Like a kinked garden hose my, their, our belonging in this world had been choked. That 
one click of my return button had changed that.  
I suddenly remembered having seen an old photograph of Julia. I found it in the 
box where I keep our old family pictures. The photo is dated 1917, shortly before Julia’s 
death as an old woman, and two years before Sophie’s birth. There she was, an old 
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brown-skinned woman with an anisa79 on, sitting contently amidst three generations of 
her offspring. It was a poor photocopy, of an old black-and white photograph, so could 
not make out her face. But I guesstimate that Julia had a caramel brown skin: on the 
photo she was not a very dark-skinned woman, nor was her offspring. I can only guess at 
what point the “white blood” entered our family lineage. Maybe she indeed had a white 
father, or maybe her mother did. The ledger didn’t say, nor did I expect it to. 
I continued to search for more information on Julia. Another archival entry 
showed me that Julia married the Dutch Carel Constantijn Vervuurt six years after her 
manumission, in 1868. I found their wedding announcement in the newspaper archive of 
the Surinaamse Courant, one of the big newspapers during colonial times. She must have 
left the plantation sometime after being freed, for she spent the rest of her life in 
Paramaribo, as did many Creoles after manumission (Helman 1977:247). But under what 
circumstances she had left, what happened to her family, and how she met Carel, the 
ledger does not say. What constituted their marriage – was it love? I really hope so. The 
ledger only says that Julia and Carel had seven children, including my “white” great 
grandfather Rudolf.  
It is worth noting that mixed-race marriages and marriages between people of 
color had by then only just become allowed in post-abolition Surinam, as they had been 
strictly forbidden during slavery. The Church played a significant role in this state of 
affairs, as was the case in other Caribbean islands. Colonial government allowed 
missionary practices in 1825, which in Surinam were both Evangelical and Catholic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 A headscarf worn by Surinamese women of African descent. 
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(Helman 1977:249). The missionaries tried to teach people to be ‘proper’ Christians. This 
meant abandoning their African-based practices and beliefs and ending promiscuity. This 
included administering “slave marriages” (Helman 1977:249; Allen 2007:95), which 
encouraged people to live monogamously.  
The ‘civilization missions’ had become a powerful tool in the indoctrination of 
the Surinamese and Curaçaoan population during and especially after slavery. The 
Christian faith became a new tool through which dominance was exerted (Allen 
2007:93). Not surprisingly, these Christian civilizing discourses were premised on the 
racist ideology that propagated black inferiority. Black people were labeled as lazy, 
rowdy, and hypersexual, and completely devoid of any civilization (Allen 2007; Hoetink 
1958). The norm remained white purity, and the only salvation available to people of 
color, according to the Church doctrines, was to pursue this as best they could. During 
slavery people of African descent had not been allowed to marry. This had meant that 
children were automatically born in sin. But after 1863 the sanctity of marriage did 
become available to Afrodescendants (Allen 2007; Helman 1977). As a consequence the 
norm of white purity, which had always been the unreachable seat of European 
civilization, status, property and privilege, now became officially attainable (Allen 2007; 
Helman 1977). After slavery, hegemonic white supremacist ideology continued to be 
passed on through intimate relations.  
From Helman’s accounts on Surinam it appears that during slavery, with the 
approval of the slave owner, such unions among slaves were quite common, even though 
they were not recognized by colonial law (Helman 1977:248). But given the lack of white 
marriage partners, such unions had already been common between Europeans and people 
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of color (Helman 1977:243). In Curaçao, during slavery the matrimonia clandestina or 
secret marriage of slaves and freedmen had been common and administered by the 
Catholic Church (Allen 2007:95). Interracial unions and marriages, however, were not 
common the way they were in Surinam. In Curaçao it was concubinage that was 
widespread during and after slavery (Allen 2007; Hoetink 1958). Even though legal 
marriage eventually became available to everyone in post-emancipation Surinam and 
Curaçao, and even though it added considerably to people’s social status and 
respectability, it would take long for it to become the norm among the Afrodescendant 
population. In fact, many people preferred to live in concubinage and other forms of 
unions (Helman 1977; Allen 2007). But Julia had married a Dutch man. Perhaps not only 
the miscegenation but also the status of being wed added to the “whiteness” of their 
offspring.  
Either way, it is evident that the racial label “white” that my family had attributed 
to Rudolph should be understood within the colorist context that has been ruling Surinam 
since colonial times, much like Curaçao’s colorist system, which was previously 
discussed. In many Latin American and Caribbean societies “white” is in fact a far more 
elastic category than in the United States (Loveman 2009; Loveman and Muniz 2007; 
Telles and Flores 2013). But it is also important to notice that this elastic category of 
whiteness surfaces in our family history at a time when there was a significant change in 
marriage laws, which coincided with the onset of a new racial ideology of hybridity. 
In the United States the “one-drop-rule” virtually requires a person to have a 
“pure white bloodline” to be called “white” (Carr, 1997), but as we saw in chapter 1, in 
Latin America and the Caribbean the ideologies of national identity emulating 
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monocultural mestizaje, mulataje, and/or créolité characterized the region from the early 
20th century to the late 1980s (Rahier 2012:1-14). And according to the ideologies of 
national identity that emerged in the region during monocultural mestizaje, national 
populations, which in these nations were largely non-white, were imagined in terms of 
superiority vis-à-vis the white race of European nations (Martínez-Echazabal 1998; 
Rahier 2003, 2012). Latin American and Caribbean intellectuals of the time such as 
Mexican philosopher José Vasconcelos (1925), and Brazilian sociologist and 
anthropologist Gilberto Freyre (1933) proposed that racial hybridity be no longer 
considered a polluting, degenerative influence, as it had been in the colonial past. 
Ultimately these references to miscegenation revolved around the process of whitening, 
thus again upholding colonialism’s infatuation with white supremacy. This was the case 
in the region at large, but also for Curaçao and Surinam. 
What becomes clear from my family narrative is that in the early 20th century 
Surinam and Curaçao of Sophie and her parents, the racial category “white” also included 
light skinned people of mixed racial ancestry. But this label of whiteness became even 
easier to reach when one had a higher socio-economic standing, or at least adopted the 
behaviors, norms and values of the lighter skinned socio-economic elites. Therefore I 
would argue that in these Dutch Caribbean contexts, taking on a white identity is not only 
dependent upon showcasing light skin color. It also results from one’s willingness or 
even eagerness to subscribe to the nation’s hegemonic sociocultural and political order, 
and to demonstrate this through appropriate behavior and allegiance, or a performance of 
‘racial passing.’ The rewards of passing for white are safety, protection, economic but 
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also about “social and political entitlements, and psychological rewards,” argues 
American historian Allyson Hobbs (2014:12). 
 I skyped my mother, and told her about her great grandmother Julia, and Julia’s 
mother, Bruinette Dorothea, and the other Zechiëls. I told her about the plantation, and 
their manumission from slavery. She was as surprised as I had been, she also had not 
known of them. I saw her wipe her eyes, like I had done. She was excited to reconnect to 
our “erased” ancestors, and sad over them having been unknown for so long. She 
repeated how she had always seen her grandfather as white, just as she had always seen 
her mother as white. The deception of her own eyes surprised her – why had she not seen 
that they were not white, but of Afrosurinamese descent?  
Later that week I met with some of my uncles and aunties in Curaçao. They too 
told me that they remembered Rudolf and his siblings as white. The aunt that had cared 
for my grandmother Sophie and lived with her when my grandmother was old, did know 
that Julia was a woman of color, and that she had been born a slave. She had been closest 
to Sophie, and heard many more of her stories than the rest of us. But clearly this was not 
common knowledge amongst her siblings and cousins. It certainly was not part of our 
family’s publically performed racial identity. In fact, I have never heard my uncles or 
aunts identify as Creole, which in Surinam refers to Afro-descendants who live in the city 
and who have some white ancestry. Nor did anyone ever self-identify as Afro-descendant 
or black. Never did I hear anyone call my grandmother Sophie Creole, Afro-descendant 
or black. For all of them, Sophie was white.  
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Laurina – Sophie’s Mother 
Having discovered Rudolph’s proverbial “true colors,” I began to wonder about his wife, 
my great grandmother Laurina van Sprang. My mom told me that her grandmother 
Laurina or “Madje” and her siblings were all light brown people. “All those children 
were very beautiful people,” she said. “That whole part of the family up to today, I never 
thought of them as negroid. I think of my grandmother more as indigenous, native, or 
Javanese. She always wore her brownish hair in long thick braids…” This was another 
story that I had grown up with: my mother describing her grandmother as indigenous, and 
taking pride in an alleged non-black heritage. But I would soon discover that, like her 
husband, Laurina too had a silenced genealogy.  
Laurina’s mother, Maria Jansje Wolfina Murk, had been born in slavery in 1857, 
to Magdalena Adjoeba Murk (born in 1828), who had been a house slave. When their 
names appeared on my screen, again I felt the same thrill and honor that I had felt when 
finding Julia and Bruinetta, mixed with that eerie, cold feeling of never having heard of 
these women who made up half of my blood. But there they were, and the few words that 
the ledger gave me breathed a little bit of life back into them. Adjoeba was manumitted 
with her two young daughters in 1862, a year before slavery ended officially. They had 
lived on the wood plantation La Prosperité. An old newspaper announcement showed that 
my great great grandmother, Adjoeba Murk, married Georgius van Sprang in Paramaribo. 
This is where Adjoeba lived until her death.  
Georgius van Sprang appears to have been born in Amsterdam, but the sources 
vary on that. I wondered if he was a white Dutchman, or if he was a man of color also, 
perhaps mixed with the indigenous Surinamese population, or with one of the many other 
 166 
ethnic groups that started to arrive in the colony at the time. His name alone did not 
reveal enough. The marriage announcement only showed that Adjoeba had two more 
children, two boys, who were born after her manumission but before her marriage. 
Georgius recognized all of the four children, which may all have been his own, and with 
the marriage they all took on his name. Laurina’s mother, Wolfina Murk, thus became 
Wolfina van Sprang, and my family remembers her as a descendent of a well-known 
white family. Wolfina married Johan Jacob Willem Muntz, a man from what appears to 
have been a rather well-off Jewish lineage, who was born and raised in the city of 
Paramaribo. Wolfina and Jacob had five children together, among whom Sophie’s mother 
Laurina.  
Neither my mother, nor my aunts and uncles knew Wolfina’s story. They knew 
that their great grandmother was not white but had a brown skin, but they did not denote 
her as black. But as said, in Surinam the labels of Javanese or indigenous came in handy 
as a way to deflect potential blackness. None of my relatives had heard of Adjoeba or her 
other children.  
This reconnection to my forgotten great great grandmothers was a painful 
reminder of how much of the narratives of my family are premised on silence, 
perpetuated through censorship, omission, denial and avoidance. A deliberate and 
inherited forgetting sustained through six generations. It is also striking – though as said 
not uncommon - that this is becoming more and more a story about the matrilateral side 
of our family. The ledgers identify the mothers, who are the ones who are of African 
descent. However – as is in fact quite common to the colonial tale – they often present 
inconclusive information about the fathers, who form yet another censored part of our 
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past, but in this story they also hold the key to the various processes of whitening that our 
family underwent, be it through rape, a fleeting passionate exchange, concubinage, 
marriage, or other kinds of unions.  
It appears that when my grandmother and her parents were alive, passing for 
white was not exceedingly difficult. Their accounts suggest that clearly, society 
encouraged this type of silencing of one’s black roots to instead subscribe to ideologies 
that emulate mestizaje and non-black racial identities. After all, Surinam was small, so 
people knew each other’s lineages and genealogies very well. To this day Surinamese 
practice this genealogical pursuit, as a fun pass time, and perhaps to make sure that none 
of the youngsters accidentally pair up with an unidentified cousin. For both Rudolf and 
Laurina to respectively pass for white or indigenous (or at least non-black) suggests that 
those around them condoned it, to say the least.  
Charles Hale (1996) states that “mestizaje has been a remarkably effective 
ideological tool in the hands of elites in many parts of Latin America, a unifying myth 
put to the service of state and nation building” (Hale 1996:2). The same can be said of 
other such ideologies of national identity that reify hybridization. National myths have 
had the ability to homogenize, harmonize, indoctrinate, include, exclude, and silence. 
Créolité, Hintzen argues, was devised by white elites in order to obscure racial inequality, 
colonial exploitation and white privilege. In Hintzen’s perspective “the Creole,” then, 
produces a “discursive space” characterized by the hybridization of specific ethnic, racial, 
cultural and national peoples and cultures within the colonial space. Through these 
discourses of hybridity differences were “transformed in a regime of identific solidarity” 
(Hintzen 2002:92).  
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Racial passing doesn’t subvert or reject these discourses of mestizaje, mulataje 
and créolité, which do nothing but confirm white supremacy. The colorist systems of 
Surinam and Curaçao encourage passing: phenotype in these multi-racial societies 
dominated by white and white-mestizo or white-mulatto elites allowed one to trump 
actual genetic heritage. The cases of my great great grandparents illustrate this quite well. 
Being white was the ideal, and hegemony rewards those who subject to it. However, 
Stoler argues, “[s]uch a shifting and arbitrary assignment of social membership makes 
clear that “European” and “colonizer” were not always synonymous categories,” 
(2002:39). The significance of whiteness or European-ness could shift, but that did not 
automatically coincide with membership to white colonial ranks, and with access to the 
privileges of domination and access to property that this particular group had. Mixed race 
people could adopt a “European” lifestyle and adhere to “European” norms. As a 
consequence they would at certain moments enjoy certain possibilities for upward social 
mobility, but many other privileges were still not available to them (Stoler 2002:39, 40). 
The negotiating of racial identity through proposing racial mixedness or even whiteness 
was—and is—a manifestation of hegemony. It brought certain possibilities for upward 
social mobility and improved social status, while supporting rather than dissolving the 
racist ideologies and realities upon which these colonies were premised. 
 
Case Study 2: Dorothy’s Silences  
Sophie, my mother’s mother, was one of the lightest skinned of her siblings. She had grey 
eyes, wavy, auburn hair, and a light café-au-lait skin tone. My aunt and mom have 
always told me that she dyed her blondish hair black to not stand out so much. Sophie 
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was young, beautiful, had a secondary education diploma, a bookkeeping job, and had 
mastered her father’s sewing skills. She was ready to conquer the world. But then, she 
fell in love and got pregnant. In 1940, when Sophie was only 21, Dorothy, my mother, 
was born: an adorable brown skinned baby, with black features and afro-textured hair 
(see photo 2). 
 
Photo 2. Sophie with my mother Dorothy (age 2), in 1942. 
 
My mother says:  
When I was born my family showed me off everywhere. I was a pretty child, so 
they dressed me up in the cutest outfits and paraded me around town. Everyone, 
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except my mother. She was heartbroken: at age 21 she felt too young to be a 
mother (Dorothy, Interview 11 Nov 2013). 
Sophie had dreams and aspirations for a career in the performing arts, with music, 
dancing, and singing. Even though Sophie knew that these dreams did not fit a girl of her 
social standing, she could not help it but feel her burning desire for them. She liked 
children, but maybe she had not necessarily wanted to be a mother, or a wife even. She 
wanted to be free to travel and shine, and be a star. But during her youth that was not a 
choice she could make easily, the way my female cousins and I can—and have—today. 
Sophie had to perform the scripts that society had written for her. When she got pregnant 
her dream world collapsed, especially when her baby turned out to be much darker than 
she was, and had the “wrong” kind of hair.  
A marriage soon followed, and Sophie joined the ranks of “the respectable.” But 
she was not ready for it. I can only assume that she had been marinated in the silences 
that surrounded her parents’ black roots in slavery. Her light skin, which allowed her to 
pass for “white,” had been Sophie’s salvation. Even though her parents were not rich, 
because of her features Sophie was off to a good start in life. But the father of her child 
was not a dark-skinned man. This meant that through the phenotype of Sophie’s brown 
baby the hushed stories of her ancestors had spoken up, and broken a carefully 
constructed silence. And the beautiful, innocent baby Dorothy would forever carry the 
brunt of her mother’s anger and frustration over that.  
Shortly after my mother’s birth Sophie married my grandfather Stanley Spong 
(see photo 3), who belonged to a rather well known Surinamese family of a lineage that 
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contained some Scottish blood, or so it is said, as well as some non-white descent. He 
was a remarkable electrical engineer and entrepreneur, and in 1941 he moved to Curaçao 
with his young wife, to start an electronics business. Like many Surinamese people they 
sought to profit from the booming Curaçaoan economy, which thrived due to the newly 
built Shell refinery. 
 
Photo 3. Family portrait taken in 1951, Dorothy stands on the far right. 
 
Sophie’s parents soon followed, and took on the care of Dorothy until she was 
five. So for the first years of her life my mother was cast out from her parents’ world. 
Sophie had broken the quiet moral code of her society by birthing a baby that was darker 
than her. By not raising her own child she could at least temporarily cloak her failure to 
whiten her lineage.  
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For my mother, this abandonment has always been most traumatic, and it 
impacted her life from its earliest days on. Involuntarily, she repressed parts of these 
traumatic memories that marked her existence. Dorothy remembers her grandparents 
always being around, but it wasn’t until she was in her sixties that her older cousin 
reminded her that it was in fact Laurina and Rudolf who raised her, and not her mother. I 
clearly remember her shock and sadness over rediscovering this lost part of her 
memories. But she remembered plenty of other things. When she does speak about her 
youth, which is not often, it is often with great sadness.  
Sometimes I would be so mad at life that I just froze into a kind of catatonic state. 
I literally could not move anymore. Tears would be running down my face, snot 
was dripping from my chin, but I would not, I could not move. No one could get 
to me but my grandfather. I would be standing frozen like that for hours, until my 
grandfather came home and found me. Then he would say, “Oh Pommetje, is it 
one of those days again? And he would hold me and I would melt, and I would be 
somewhat okay again. But ever since I was a little, little girl I knew that I should 
not have been there, and that my mother didn’t want me (Dorothy, Interview 11 
Nov 2013). 
When my mother was five years old Sophie had another baby. Four more children 
would follow: my matrilateral aunts and uncles. It was now time for Sophie to take on her 
role as wife and mother, and to abandon her dreams of dazzling audiences and creating 
grand things, something that would pain her for the rest of her life. In the new and now 
quickly expanding family, Dorothy was labeled the “ugly” child. Being only slightly 
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darker then her sisters and brothers, if in fact darker at all, her alleged ugliness was 
mostly attributed to her somatic features and her hair. My mother’s siblings, especially 
when little, did have a different phenotype, with smooth, wavy hair, and thin noses and 
lips (see photo 3). This was considered more beautiful than my mother’s thick hair, round 
nose and full lips. What had been true for Laurina, Rudolf and Sophie was true for 
Dorothy also. Racial identity was determined by phenotype rather than genotype. For 
Sophie and her parents it meant a social upgrade. For Dorothy the small differences with 
her siblings meant the reverse. She says: 
I tried to not live consciously, because then there would be the pain of being 
unwanted and ugly. It was my way to survive. My whole life I have hidden away 
my real me, I just was not there. And that was the only way to live, to not be 
there, to be subservient to others and make them happy. So as a small child I 
would always wash the car, do the dishes, weed the garden, even though we had a 
maid. I felt as if I had to pay for myself, for ultimately I had no right to be there. I 
always came home from school straight away, always got straight As because 
imagine I would get lesser grades. I would never do anything that would make 
people angry with me. Had I been a blond haired blue-eyed child though, I would 
have added to my mother’s social standing, and everything would have been 
different (Dorothy, Interview 11 Nov 2013). 
So, for Dorothy, silence became a survival strategy. To omit the heart wrenching trauma 
and the shame of existing, and of being an outcast within her family, something her 
mother and grandmother had not had to do. Her story reveals several forms of silence and 
silencing. The above paragraphs show Dorothy’s traumatic response – the involuntary 
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forgetting, as well as her near-catatonic spells. And we see her presentational rituals 
(Goffman, 1967): her self-censure through behaving properly, never attracting any 
attention to her both interpellated and self-identified Otherness. She did that to protect 
herself from the violence of the racist norm and value system she had been immersed 
into. Her deliberate silences manifest her self-withdrawal and evoke Goffman’s 
avoidance rituals (1967).  
 
Silent Community  
In the communities in which Dorothy lived, in both Surinam and Curaçao, race and skin 
color, the root of her pain, were not mentioned explicitly in everyday exchanges. Neither 
her parents and relatives, nor society at large ever explicitly named the differences in 
phenotype between my mother and her siblings. Dorothy says that in those days race and 
color were embedded in a discourse of shame and therefore best left unmentioned. Plus, 
she said, “they were there for the eye to see, so why would one talk about it?”  
Of course there is that blackness. But I just never identified with it at all. I did not 
get the chance for that either. My relatives would say that I looked like my 
grandmother Madje, like an Indian. Also, no one ever told me to my face that I 
am black or treated me as a black person, or discriminated against me. So I don’t 
think that I am black in the African sense. My family never did say what I am. 
Instead they would talk about others, who looked different than me, and say that 
they were pretty, like my sisters. So I filled in the blanks (Dorothy, Interview 11 
Nov 2013). 
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But also Rudolf, my mother’s grandfather, who was so close to his granddaughter, 
never spoke about it with Dorothy. Perhaps he did understand that his daughter’s 
rejection of Dorothy was at least partially due to the racist norms of early twentieth 
century Surinam, or perhaps he never gave it any thought. He may or may not have been 
aware of the crippling power of race and racialization. With what silences and ideals had 
his mother, who had been born in slavery, raised him? Dorothy said race was never 
discussed, and no one ever offered her words of strength, explanation, or solace.  
Whatever it was that Rudolf believed or knew or saw with regards to race, what he 
offered my mother in her moments of sadness was more silence. Her grandmother 
Laurina had been labeled as native- or indigenous-looking rather than Creole. That label 
was passed on to Dorothy. In labeling her as indigenous looking as well her relatives may 
have attempted to deflect the undesirable label of blackness, both for Dorothy and for the 
family at large.   
 As previously discussed, silence was very much a part of Surinamese and 
Curaçaoan culture in general. “No one really talks,” my mother says. “Especially not my 
mother, but she sure knew how to gossip. That is all people do, gossip.” So Dorothy 
quickly learned never to talk about herself: “you never volunteer information that people 
can gossip about.”  
You never want to give people anything to use against you. It was pretty hard to 
always behave so well, especially when I was little. I could not be a child. I could 
never whine for anything, make trouble, throw a tantrum, run around and act 
crazy. All that was out of the question, especially for me. But because I never said 
anything I never had to worry. People knew nothing about me. Whatever I 
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thought was safe. Everything about me took place inside of me, inside my head. 
My music, all the books and stories I read, my fascination with the Netherlands, 
my dreams and wishes for my future... Also, my mother’s silence was an 
indication that I was doing okay. She never showed any interest in me and in what 
I did. The only times that she paid attention to me was when I had done 
something wrong. So her attention was not a good thing. Silence was better. 
(Dorothy, Interview 11 Nov 2013) 
 
Dorothy’s Escape 
Dorothy used her quietude well. At age 16 she got herself a scholarship, left for the 
Netherlands to study and start a whole new life in a far away place. By this time the 
Dutch empire had begun to unravel. In 1949 the Netherlands had accepted Indonesia’s 
independence, after a long and bloody conflict. In 1954, two years before Dorothy would 
leave Curaçao, the islands of the Netherlands Antilles reached an autonomous status in 
the Dutch Kingdom. Surinam would become independent in 1975, the year of my birth. 
Race relations shifted, as did the expectations empire had of my mother’s intimate 
positioning in the worlds she participated in. Her parents expected her to take care of 
them in their old age. What was more, in the early 1960s it was not yet common for 
young middle class women to move out of their parent’s home and away from their 
protective gaze.  
Still, going to the Netherlands had always been her dream, taken from the many 
Dutch books she had disappeared in as a child. When her parents would not allow her to 
continue her secondary school in Curaçao she prepared her departure in secret, took all 
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required IQ and skills tests, and arranged for her ticket through her school. She didn’t tell 
her parents about her scholarship until two weeks before her departure, just so they could 
not stop her anymore. She was going to Europe. Dorothy’s silence had protected her 
dreams and safeguarded the execution of her plans. Deep inside she had always felt 
European, she always tells me. The library was on her route to school. She loved to read 
so she secretly read every book they had. She knew all the poems and children’s games 
and songs from the Netherlands, and she loved them: they made her feel “at home.” Also 
she would hide in a corner of the garden and listen for hours to the songs that the Dutch 
neighbors played on the radio. She was always geared towards the Netherlands, and when 
she got that scholarship she was gone.  
Her parents did not object to Dorothy’s escape. They had never expected such an 
ambitious and emancipatory action from their quiet and docile daughter. They were 
proud that she obtained her scholarship, as it was a prestigious achievement. But they 
also did not support her in it; she had to fend for herself. Their lack of response 
reinforced Dorothy’s beliefs that they did not care that much about her. This may or may 
not have been true, still their lack of either resistance or praise hurt her. This attitude had 
characterized her childhood, and would continue to do so throughout her studies and 
adulthood in the Netherlands. “My parents never so much as sent me ten guilders while I 
was there” she said.  
Life was so hard, the Netherlands were so cold, and I was hungry so often... I 
would wear pants underneath my dress to get to school in the winter. I was always 
freezing. If my stockings tore I could not afford to buy new ones (Dorothy, 
interview 20 May 2008).  
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Dorothy almost felt that her mother in particular saw her departure as a “good riddance.” 
Sophie’s aloofness confirmed the rejection that had so much hurt Dorothy when growing 
up, but the freedom and positivity Dorothy found in return was well worth it. Her 
parents’ lack of interest did not stop her.  
Since Dorothy was only 16 she had to live with an older lady who served as her 
guardian. In the Netherlands of the early 1960s virginity and chastity also marked a girl’s 
social status and respectability. But my mother was not seeking sexual freedom; she just 
wanted to be free from the racialist judgments of her relatives that had constrained her for 
so long. And the Netherlands of the 1950s and 60s were exactly as she had expected. In 
spite of her hardships she felt liberated, appreciated, not so looked down upon. She could 
just be herself. Finally she had friends, and she loved the climate, because she doesn’t 
like the heat. In the Netherlands my mother felt as if she could start over, distance herself 
from her past and reinvent her life anew. In this country, about which she had read and 
dreamed so much, her silence served as a clean slate. What people did not know did not 
count. From the ugly, unwanted child she grew into a beautiful, well educated woman, 
with long, straightened black hair and a stunning, slender body.  
And the Netherlands welcomed her with great enthusiasm. She belonged to the 
first waves of Caribbean immigrants who came to the Netherlands to study. Back then, 
black people were still rare. The large influx of poor, uneducated immigrants from 
Southern Europe, Northern Africa and the Caribbean would not start until the 1980s. It is 
with this later Caribbean immigration wave that negative stereotypes of Dutch Caribbean 
people intensified. Today those prevail. But the first Caribbean immigrants were 
commonly well educated and successful, and those who did not return to Curaçao, or 
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moved on to other destinations, often merged into the Dutch middle classes and 
intellectual elites, as “exotified,” “rare tropical flowers” amidst the endless tulip fields.  
While racism certainly was not absent in the Netherlands, I have often heard 
people from this first wave of Curaçaoan immigrants describe how they were looked at in 
a positive way. “People always adored me,” my mother tells me. Her fellow students 
always offered to carry her bags, or escort her home, accompany her to events, make sure 
she was safe and content. For the first time people cared for her wellbeing. She never 
experienced any racism or discrimination in the Netherlands, she says. In the stories she 
shared throughout my lifetime she was always unusual, “exotic,” beautiful, and smart. 
People loved the newness she brought, as did she. In Curaçao she had always made 
herself invisible, “but here everyone flocked around to get a whiff of my difference, the 
teachers included” (Dorothy Interview 11 Nov 2013).  
“Exotification”, “erotification” or “hyper-sexualization” of the black body is in 
fact a staple manifestation of racism, argues Rahier (2010, see also Said’s Orientalism 
1978 and Stoler’s Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power 2002) they signify once again 
the Otherness and alleged inferiority and subjectivity of the black subject. I well 
understand how this kind of attention will have been much more pleasant to my mother 
than the rejection she used to feel. Even though I myself also experienced the violent, 
debasing flip side of this kind of sexualized attention, as a teenager and young adult 
woman living in the Netherlands. But still, I do recognize the “positive” feelings my 
mother describes. She may have been objectified, but at least she was objectified as a 
beautiful woman, and attributed positive traits also, not just negative ones. A partially 
complicitous silence this is then, which illustrates how we as individuals have the power 
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to negotiate the identities assigned to us (Jenkins, 1997; Nagel, 1994, 2003; Trouillot, 
1995). We have the power to mute the parts of the picture that we do not like, and 
highlight those that we see as favoring us. In doing so we perpetuate hegemony, because 
we allow for the exotification, which is a manifestation of white supremacy. But in 
drawing strength from this label, in muting the critiquing voice inside that debases us on 
the basis of our race, and in redefining in a positive way what our “otherness” means to 
us, I argue that this adoption of such labels also contains an element of resistance and 
empowerment.   
 
Negotiating Identity   
The Netherlands of the 1960s were diversifying. In that multi-ethnic and -racial 
landscape of the 1960s people also did not always identify my mother as black. Her 
brown hue, straightened hair and mixed race features made people mistake her for an 
Indonesian woman.  
 
 
Photo 4. Dorothy in 1970 
 181 
Indonesia had been another significant part of the Dutch Empire. It had declared its 
independence in 1945, but it was not until 1949 that this was finally acknowledged by the 
Netherlands. This started a large repatriation program in which an estimated 300.000 
people forcibly left the former colony. This group was comprised of the Dutch colonial 
population, and of Indonesian people who had been socialized into Dutch society in 
Indonesia and often were of mixed Dutch and Indonesian descent. By the 1960s, when 
my mother arrived in the Netherlands, Dutch-Indonesians constituted a significant 
population segment in larger Dutch cities and especially in The Hague, where she went to 
live. They often thought she was one of them.  
When she was barely one day in The Netherlands an old Indonesian woman 
grabbed Dorothy’s arm, and asked her to help her cross the street. She had, however, 
asked her question in Malaysian, assuming that my mother was Indonesian too. But 
Dorothy said “I’m sorry but I don’t understand you madam.” The old lady got mad at her 
and said: “You young people, the second you leave home you forget our native tongue!” 
Dorothy did not mind the reprimand: she preferred that newly ascribed identity to being 
black (Dorothy, Interview 11 Nov 2013). Over the years other people would often make 
the same mistake. My mother would not correct them: she did not feel any need to 
volunteer her true ethnic and racial roots. Her story indicates that at least in her eyes a 
Dutch-Indonesian identity label and the associated phenotype with straight hair was more 
positive than so-called “African traits.”  Using the imperial global racial scale, for the 
Dutch Dutch-Indonesians located higher up on the scale of racial respectability than their 
Afro-Caribbean counterparts. But still, it was within the confines of the Dutch Empire 
and its racial oppressive ideologies that Dorothy’s new ethnic identity took shape. 
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When I asked her about what the Black Power movement had meant to her, which 
was so present in the news when she was in her twenties and thirties, she said that it 
didn’t really affect her because she did not feel that it pertained to her. It was too far 
removed from who she was, she said. She liked the black music that came out of the 
United States at the time. She thought that it was great that all this empowerment was 
happening, but never did she realize that it also concerned her. Through her studies, first 
in speech therapy and later in neurology, she had come to live in a “white” world in 
which she felt very comfortable and appreciated. She enjoyed the freedom of being able 
to replace the negative traits that had formed her identity as a child with positive ones. 
She had always known that she was black, but not until now, being in her seventies did 
she truly understand that the injustice and abandonment that she had suffered, to the 
extent of leaving her family and starting anew on the other side of the Atlantic, was in 
fact rooted in race.  
Like her mother and grandmother, Dorothy also used the deliberate forgetting and 
omitting mechanisms that Sheriff mentions (2001). Dorothy did not talk about her 
blackness, or publicly identified as black. She did have Surinamese and Curaçaoan 
friends, and even a few relatives with whom she was close, and she would on occasion 
attend social gatherings and parties. But by and large her life developed predominantly in 
communities that were not associated with blackness. She did not soak herself up in 
Caribbean culture – friendships, music, food, literature, events, clothing – that was 
already so readily available in the Netherlands at the time. This was the life that I would 
grow up in, in which we would enter these Caribbean spaces in the Netherlands only a 
few times a year. She hardly ever spoke Papiamentu, the creole language of her island. 
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Hers was indeed largely a complicitous silence (Bourdieu, 1977). Following the pattern 
Hobbs (2014) identified, Dorothy sacrificed all those cravings, interests and associations 
- often without truly realizing that she did so – in order to adopt a white European 
lifestyle.  
Even if she herself could not be phenotypically white, living a “white” life was 
the next best thing. She married a white man, and raised her children to pass for white. 
She bowed to hegemony as to not get hurt more. And as time passed she distanced herself 
more and more from what she had left behind. She had to, for her departure had also hurt. 
She always kept a hunger for the Caribbean home she had sacrificed and left behind. She 
had wanted to escape the racial oppressiveness of the family and the society in which she 
grew up. But even though from an early age on my mother felt a strong familiarity and 
comfortability with Dutch culture, she has always been a Caribbean woman also. You 
can wake her in the middle of the night for rice and beans, peanut soup, salsa music, and 
the sight of the aquamarine ocean. She found a new pace, a space in which people 
genuinely appreciated her, but she paid a high prize.  
My father was perhaps more aware of the way race and phenotype dictated my 
mother’s life than she herself was. He was born in Amsterdam in 1944, the last year of 
the Second World War, to a Protestant mother and a Jewish father. Most of his father’s 
family never returned from the concentration camps. In part because of his own family 
history he has always been a fiery opponent of any kind of injustice and inequality, 
something that he wove into his academic work as a work and organization psychologist. 
He quickly realized that in one way or another race was the root of my mother’s life. The 
difficult relationship between Sophie and Dorothy had continued, even now Dorothy had 
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moved far away. He provided my mother with some tools of resistance to Sophie’s “reign 
of terror,” as he describes it. The letters Dorothy received from her mother were not kind, 
warm, proud, but full of critique and sneering comments instead. “Sophie was a constant 
disruption,” he said.  
She did not show much appreciation for your mother until she married me, a 
white man, and until she finished her academic degree. It was as if with these two 
achievements Dorothy finally deserved some acknowledgement, as if that girl had 
finally amounted to something. Me, I always tried to neutralize Sophie’s subtle 
yet impactful attacks, to show your mother how irrelevant skin color really is 
(Robert, Interview April 2015). 
And indeed, color should be irrelevant. Perhaps this was why from my father’s side it 
never was a topic that he discussed explicitly with me. But it was a topic that I now 
discovered was part of the conversations between him and my mother. He says that even 
though she herself may not have been aware of it, color was always part of her gaze, part 
of her interpretation of people’s words and actions. From his accounts it turns out that she 
continued to feel discriminated against, inferior even, because she was a brown woman. 
Even though he often tried to debunk such thoughts, it was only fair, he said, that she 
thought them, for the Netherlands responded ambivalently to a brown woman. “Many 
people in our surroundings – educated, intellectual people especially - were very positive 
and appreciative of her, and others were not,” he said. “Negative response could certainly 
be threatening, so she always had to be aware of it to some extent, and anticipate and 
deflect.” But at the same time he describes how in her career as a speech therapist 
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Dorothy found a somewhat ironic way to stand up against the white supremacist 
discourse of the Netherlands, whether she did so consciously or not. He said: 
First, she, a brown immigrant woman from the Dutch Caribbean, was the one who 
taught white Dutch people how to speak their own language properly. She worked 
at every elementary school in our town, which led her to be a widely known and 
appreciated person in the village. And secondly, she showed her intellectual 
superiority to her colleagues, all of whom were white, as she continued to expand 
her knowledge and developed a series of workshops in which she instructed and 
certified her peers to exert new techniques, first locally and soon nationwide 
(Robert, Interview April 2015). 
In spite of the burden of internalized and external oppression that she carried every day, 
my mother had always resisted it, and had in many ways been successful at it. While in 
her silences her oppression continued on, her silences had also given her a place to find 
shelter, regroup, strategize and reinvent herself anew. A few years ago my mother even 
received an impressive Dutch royal decoration for her groundbreaking work as a speech 
therapist. But still, in spite of her achievements, which in many ways challenged the 
racial status quo that she partook in, Dorothy continued her behavior of hiding herself 
away and never really being ‘there,’ even though it was no longer necessary. She 
explained to me that it had become such a habit that she did not know how else to be.  
I was so used to accommodating others, it had become part of my nature. And 
always I pushed away the past – Curaçao, Surinam, my family. But it did not 
bother me, as a matter of fact I was very content with this lifestyle. I lived in the 
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life of my husband and my children, but never did I live my own life. It never 
occurred to me that I could (Dorothy, Interview 11 Nov 2013). 
You win some, you loose some. My mother had made a good life for herself in the 
Netherlands. But her inherited as well as self-made silences and censorships mixed with 
unintentional and “deliberate” forgetting as ways to cope with an ongoing painful reality 
had become a behavioral pattern.  
  
Case Study 3: Angela’s Inheritance  
My grandmother’s life had been marked by her silenced black grandmothers, who 
signified a shameful past, and by her own racial passing. My mother’s life developed in 
the shadow of her struggle with her sense of inferiority, and her search for upward social 
mobility. I was born in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, into my father’s very present white 
Dutch world, and my mothers’ quieted Caribbean world. I am a light skinned woman, 
born with a head full of dark curly hair, dark brown eyes that have some slant to them, 
and an off-white colored skin that tans fast in the summer (see photos 4 and 5). 
   
Photo 5. My mother and I, 1975           Photo 6. My father and I, 1976 
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My features have always revealed that I was of some kind of mixed descent, but I didn’t 
know that, not until I became a teenager. Consciously I only really knew the white Dutch 
mainstream world I was born into. Every now and then we talked about our holocaust 
heritage, a few Curaçaoan and Surinamese nursery rhymes, the occasional roti my father 
brought home from Amsterdam, still warm and almost too spicy to eat, and the Caribbean 
records my parents would once in a blue moon dance to in the living room. Nonetheless, 
ever since I was a toddler I picked up on that hidden Caribbean world that my mother 
carried with her. I wanted it. It stirred inside of me too. I felt it, I connected to it, and I 
wanted to live in it. What my mother kept hidden in silence was what I needed to make 
sense of my self. 
I grew up in Castricum, a small commuter village in the Northwest of the 
Netherlands. In the 1970s and 1980s its immigrant population was tiny in size, barely 
noticeable. My mother was one of the few brown-skinned or black women there. But me, 
I never consciously attributed any meaning to her brown skin, just like I never attributed 
much meaning to my father’s white skin, nor to my own skin or that of anyone else. My 
parents, one brown, one white, were the most solid and unquestioned part of my 
existence. I do remember my mother always saying that she had to dress properly, even 
for a quick grocery store run. Because, as she would always say “I’m the only black 
woman in the village.”  
My father took me to the library on Saturdays. I have loved books ever since I 
could hold them, and with two academically trained parents I was amply encouraged to 
do this. I was as little as two years old when he started this habit, but I clearly remember 
always looking for picture books on far away countries, preferably tropical ones. I clung 
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to the tropes that my naïve mind was being socialized into, so I initially looked for books 
with palm trees, jungle and wild animals. Somehow they did yield small but significant 
clues about who I really was and where I might belong. One of the most memorable 
events of my early childhood was my first visit to the Museum of the Tropics, in 
Amsterdam. A large ethnographic museum developed in 1864, that museum houses a 
vast multitude of artifacts acquired during the colonial endeavors of the Dutch. I was five, 
my baby brother dozed in his stroller, my parents were fussing over the floor map, and 
there I was, walking into the endless colonial hall with the marble stairways. The 
Polynesian statues with their huge ornamented penises looking down on me. All these 
“exotic” worlds rolled over me, and whispered in my ears some strange kind of 
“welcome home.” The spirit canoe of the Trobriand peoples, the old Indonesian gamelan, 
the masks, the African hut and Arabian tea house with the small television set showing a 
colorful program, even the imitation frescos of the Borobudur... Right there and then I 
knew that I would grow up to be an anthropologist, even though back then I didn’t know 
the word yet. Ironically, this strange colonial space, this harvest of artifacts from the 
world over, from the Dutch empire, became my route back to my Caribbean roots, 
unfolding through colonial tropes and lore and representations steeped in white 
supremacy.  
I remember always feeling different from the people around me: they were 
virtually all white. But in addition to my own feelings about this Otherness, every now 
and then people in fact confirmed that I indeed was different. Like when one of the 
neighborhood girls asked me: ”Why do you have a perm?” “I don’t have a perm,” I said. 
“Yes you do, how come your hair is so curly then?” Never before had I thought about my 
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hair. Another clue I got when my 6th grade teacher was talking about the Third World, 
and African people in particular, living primitive nomadic or semi-sedentary life styles in 
huts built from clay and cow dung. My thoughts immediately drifted off to the Museum 
of The Tropics; they had a real hut like that. It was actually made of manure; I loved the 
sweet smell and the soft dry feel of those walls. “African people,” the teacher said, “like 
Angela.” I snapped out of my daydream: “African people like me?” How was this stencil 
in front of me with these two black half-naked men in grass skirts suddenly about me? I 
was raised here, and my skin was white, what did I have to do with Africa? When I told 
my father he got very mad, but I did not understand his reaction either. No one bothered 
to explain to me the Afro-descendant link that indeed was there, or give me some more 
nuanced information about people living in Africa and its diasporas. I was “them,” my 
teacher had said. But what did that mean? I just know that I didn’t like the feeling it gave 
me. And when my teacher said “Why don’t you read Uncle Tom’s Cabin, that will be a 
great book for you,” I didn’t want to, because he didn’t offer it to any of my classmates.  
At home “skin color,” “race” and “racism” were never discussed, partly because it 
had such a raw connection to the holocaust that had decimated my father’s side of the 
family. In fact, in the Netherlands in general “race” is a taboo topic (Essed 1991; Weiner 
2014). To this day race is not part of the Dutch census, in part because such an 
identifiable trait comes with the danger to single out a group and eradicate it, which is 
what had happened in the holocaust. But as scholars like Bonilla-Silva (2010), Carr 
(1997) and Goldberg (1993, 2002) argue, this “invisibilization” of race in fact gives white 
supremacy free play.  
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So growing up I didn’t know the first thing about race; what it was, why it 
mattered, and how it affected people. I grew up in the 1980s, the time of Live Aid, the 
Cold War, recycling, starvation in Ethiopia, and Green Peace spraying baby seal furs. At 
my protestant school we zealously held the starving children in Africa and the baby seals 
in our morning prayers. We learned about the Third World, where the brown people 
lived, and we knew of discrimination and that it was bad to treat people in such a way. 
But rarely did I hear a racial slur, and I never felt the threat of a true racist attack. The 
things that happened to me personally were concealed kinds of infringements, which I 
would not recognize as having been racist until many years later. Like the time when my 
blond, white girlfriend and I went to buy beads in a little toy store. The lady told me that 
surely I did not have the money to buy such beads, and wanted to shoo me out of the 
store. My friend, however, could stay. I had the money, and bought my beads, but I left 
with a strange, blazing fireball in my stomach over the woman’s disgust towards me. I 
knew something bad had happened, but I didn’t understand what for.  
After my trip to the Museum of the Tropics I had a second “homecoming.” In the 
summer I turned six we went to Curaçao on vacation. On that small rock that is my 
mother’s island I felt like a fish in the water. My brown skinned family, the smells of the 
streets and of my grandmother’s kitchen, the iridescent ocean with its pebble beaches, the 
orange colored house, my grandmother Sophie grinding green plantain into tomtom80 in a 
large wooden pestle while my cousin cut up a mango for me, it all felt like pure 
homecoming. My mother said that I walked around the island as if it had always been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Tomtom are small balls of boiled green plantain that are eaten in Surinamese peanut soup. 
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mine, and that I felt more at home there than she ever had. I knew that I belonged with 
these people, for here I did not feel different. But because my mother never extended her 
brownness to me, or named me her Caribbean child, somehow, when the holidays were 
over and I got on the plane my Caribbean world didn’t travel with me. I returned to being 
that same wandering white girl, always looking for where she belonged. 
 
Identity Crisis 
This tug of war between my complete ignorance of my Caribbean roots and my zealous 
search for the “exotic” would characterize my young life until my early thirties. My 
mother had carried her silences initially to protect herself, and later on also my younger 
brother and me, from the negative racist ideology she had been raised into. However, 
these multilayered, intricate silences still harbored racism’s negative messages. They fell 
into step with the white supremacist norm system of the society I grew up in. 
Unbeknownst to us all, I distilled the sense of inferiority my mother had tried to escape 
from and made it my own. After all, I had been born into the same empire my silenced 
great great grandmothers had occupied, even though officially it was no longer called 
“empire” anymore. My brother was less affected by it. Phenotypically he looks fully 
white, and by and large identifies as such. He never felt the pull of the realm of the Other, 
as I did. My mother’s compiled silences catapulted me into a full-fledged identity crisis.  
In the 1990s we moved to Tilburg, an industrial city in the South of the country. 
My parents were doing well in their careers so we moved to a rather fancy part of town. 
Both my neighborhood as the schools I attended were almost fully white, as my 
elementary school had been. However, this time class also featured into it. My school 
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was a middle to upper class school, whereas in Castricum we had been part of a working 
to middle class community. My ignorance continued. I was, for example, only marginally 
aware of the large immigrant communities residing in other parts of the city. During 
summer, at the local swimming pool I got to know the Moroccan and Turkish boys that 
lived in the adjacent neighborhood. They would harass me for wearing a bathing suit, 
assuming I was like them—a Muslim from Morocco or Turkey—because of my skin 
color and dark curly hair. Yet I knew nothing of the large Curaçaoan community, nor of 
the many African immigrants that lived in Tilburg. I never saw them in the shops, cafes, 
clubs and other social settings in the city center that my friends and I frequented. So my 
world remained very white.  
As a child in elementary school I had already begun to feel lesser than my peers. I 
looked different than them, than my Barbie dolls, than the people on TV and in 
magazines. In high school this feeling became more pronounced, as if I had to work 
harder to be equally respectable as my new white classmates, who insisted on donning 
brand clothes and who were all playing field hockey, two things that did not evoke the 
slightest interest in me. This was in part because my father did not care to splurge on 
material things, and rejected ostentatious labels of social status. He would always sneer at 
this “conspicuous consumption.” Inspired by his individualistic stance I too derived my 
sense of self from seeking to be original and true to my real interests rather than 
following the herd. And also I was dreadful at any sports that involved a ball. I could see 
no point in running after a ball with a stick. But what was more was that I did not feel 
welcome in the upscale white world of my classmates and their parents. Somehow I felt 
as if I was tainted, not pure enough for their children to befriend or date me.  
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This was a powerful feeling that quietly assaulted me daily, and that resulted in 
my conscious steering far away from this social segment and their professions, fancy 
neighborhoods, thick bank accounts and high society clubs. This was one of my silences, 
which I in part inherited, and fuelled with the feedback from my every day surroundings. 
It was a silence that was both made up of resistance as compliance. There was shame in 
how I felt about myself, and limiting my interactions with this group shielded me from 
negative feelings. But it was also self-censure. For years I would unknowingly sabotage 
myself by keeping myself from pursuing a well-paying career-path. But at the same time 
I sincerely valued my activist inclinations over becoming rich. I had been like that since 
my early childhood, when I dreamed about working for Greenpeace or Doctors Without 
Borders. My mother, on the other hand, did everything she could to belong to this group. 
She has successfully been living in its heartland for decades now, pulling me along on 
occasion.  
It didn’t help that Curaçao and Surinam were conspicuously absent from every 
course in my high school curriculum. The history book we used did have chapters on the 
Dutch colonies, both in the Caribbean as in the East Indies, but my teacher always told us 
to skip them. And in spite of our occasional trips to the Museum of the Tropics my 
mother rarely spoke of Curaçao. Surinam, where she had only spent the first four years of 
her life, was even less present. The national heroes that she had been taught about in 
school were Peter Stuyvesant, Piet Hein and Michiel de Ruyter81, all of whom played an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Peter Stuyvesant was a commander in the Dutch West India Company. As director-general for the Dutch 
West India Company he governed several Dutch colonies, including Curaçao from 1642 to 1644, and New 
Netherland (now New York) from 1647 to 1664. Piet Hein is also an important commander for the Dutch 
West India Company. He conquered the Spanish silver fleet in 1628, which greatly impacted the 80 year 
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important role in 17th century colonial history. Peter Stuyvesant had even been the 
director of Curaçao on behalf of the Dutch West India Company, leading the colonial 
government in the colony’s early years. She had been taught to be proud to know their 
names. Not once had she doubted or critiqued their colonial contributions. They were the 
same national heroes I grew up with, and it would not be until graduate school that I 
would see them as oppressors instead of heroes. Two small Curaçaoan children’s books 
aside, I knew no Curaçaoan or Surinamese literature. It was never part of our literature 
classes in school, nor of hers. She knew some stories about Anansi - the spider that 
always tricked everyone - which she would sometimes tell my brother and me. And she 
taught us one of the few Papiamentu songs she had learned when she was little: 
Nos ta bai Hulanda, den bapor Franses  
Su master ta di oro, bandera Ulandes   
Bònchi riba bònchi, hende riba hende  
 Sombré ku sinta pretu, Hulanda nos ta bai82 
We are going to the Netherlands, in a French ship 
Its mast is made of gold, the flag is Dutch 
Bundles stacked on top of bundles, people stacked on top of people 
Hat with a black ribbon, we are going to the Netherlands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
war between the Dutch and the Spanish. Michiel de Ruyter was a Dutch admiral who played a crucial part 
in the 17th century Anglo-Dutch wars. 
 
82 The song dates back to 1908, when the Netherlands and Curaçao were at war with Venezuela. During 
those times the South American continent struggled with ample revolutionary wars, seeking freedom from 
colonial rule. Due to its proximity to the Venezuelan mainland Curaçao became a refuge for revolutionary 
leaders in exile, who disseminated their ideas among the island population. This song was a parody on the 
national anthem of Venezuela, and composed to its melody. It was meant as an expression of allegiance to 
the Dutch Kingdom rather than to the Venezuelan Republic (Moen 2010:43). 
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We always giggled about the bònchi, which sounds almost identical to bonchi, which 
means (little) beans instead of bundles. The thought of piles of little dried beans stacked 
in the boat’s hull seemed funny to us then. Little did we know that the song sang praise of 
the glorious Netherlands; when she was little the (white) hats with the black ribbons 
would only be worn by white Dutch colonials, my mother said. The song tells of their 
happy return to the European motherland. And she followed. 
 
Body Politics 
In elementary school I had always been a bit thicker than the other girls, with weird 
unruly curls that contrasted starkly with the straight-haired flowerpot cuts of my peers. 
And I had glasses and buckteeth. However, in my teenage years I got contact lenses, 
braces, and I grew into an athletically built teenager, lean but with more than average 
curves. This was long before women like Beyoncé, Jennifer Lopez, Nicki Minaj and Kim 
Kardashian challenged mainstream ideals of beauty, which at the time centered on 
slender, straight white bodies. So I struggled tremendously with my body image, always 
thinking that I was fat. My mother, on the contrary, had – and has - a forever-slim 
physique that did fit the norms of the mainstream body image. 
Still, she always sang praise of my beauty, whenever she could (and can). She is 
to this day my biggest fan. But I mirrored myself in her beauty, which she herself could 
not see. And there lay another crux. I silently inherited her tendency for self-debasement, 
because as a slender brown skinned woman she still did not conform to society’s white 
supremacist norms, including to those of her mother. My father reassured me that my 
thick thighs were actually much nicer than what he called “camel legs,” by which he 
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referred to the “thigh gap,” something that he absolutely abhorred. It would be many 
years before I could embrace my curvaceous figure, because the thigh gap certainly was a 
standard feature amongst the girls in my world. My friends’ jeans would tear at their 
knees and buttocks, after which they continued to wear them, looking ‘cool.’ Mine 
however, tore on the inside of my thighs. There was no way to fix that. My jeans lasted 
about a year, then it was game over for me.  
My hair was another “seat” of my “otherness.” My mom preferred that I wear it 
up in a neat, tight bun or in a thick braid down my back. She always encouraged me to 
brush it a hundred strokes a day so it would become sleek and lose its frizz. But of course 
this had the complete reverse effect. Combing my long curls resulted in a huge head of 
frizz. Again, today that look is cool again, but in the 1980s and 1990s it really was not. 
One day my hairband snapped in my gym class, so I had to wear my hair down for the 
rest of the day. Initially I was quite excited about it, for now I had an excuse to do so 
whereas normally my mother would discourage me to even think about it. But when I 
entered the classroom all the boys howled at me: “Look, our own little negress!” 
“Negress…” At age 13 I was aware that words like “negro” or “nigger” or “negress” 
were more than derogatory. That was what shocked me first, because my classmates and I 
were usually on good standing, why would they seek to insult me. But also, again I really 
didn’t get the connection between black people and my – at least to my idea - white 
looking self.  
For a long, long time I hated my hair because no one, not on TV, not in my every 
day life, no one had hair like me. I always wished that it were straight. It was not until I 
was seventeen that I discovered that I actually had beautiful curls, as long as I did not 
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comb them out when they were dry. This discovery took place at a hard rock concert. My 
friends and I had gotten soaked by the rain on our way over: Dutch teenagers ride a bike 
everywhere in any kind of weather. I was wearing my hair in a high, braided ponytail, 
which had gotten very heavy due to the rain. Once inside I decided to let my hair down. 
Mind you, I never had never done this. Ever. I looked around the concert hall to see if I 
saw anyone familiar, other than my girls. I might as well have taken my top of... That was 
how awkward I felt about untying my hair in public. But it was dark, everyone watched 
the concert, and I was with my two girlfriends who had seen me in more compromising 
ways than that. We ‘headbanged’ along, as was the favorable hard rock dance style, and I 
loved it, shaking my hair so free and loose. But then, when I went to the bathroom I was 
dumbstruck. Was that me in the mirror? Was that my hair? That cascade of perfect, 
gorgeous ringlets that poured from my scalp? I was beyond myself. Never mind that no 
one had hair like that, I absolutely loved these curls. And I kept them. The rain and the 
headbanging had unlocked the secret of curly hair, something my mother also had not 
known about: air dry curly hair, and never ever brush it unless it is wet, so the curls are 
not unraveled again into frizz.  
The next day was a school day. I had not washed my hair when I came home, not 
yet sure if I would ever get my curls back. So that morning I walked into the kitchen 
smelling like a bar, but with my glorious curls intact. My mother turned around and 
looked at me with alarm on her face. “Are you not going to fix your hair?” she asked. 
“No,” I said. And that was the end of it. Since that day my curls have been my pride, my 
joy, my expression of self, and the seat of my Otherness. It would take another ten years 
before I realized that they were also a proud connection to my Caribbean ancestry. I was 
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overjoyed, and have received mostly praise for them ever since, in addition to the 
occasional worried question how I managed so much hair, is it not a huge amount of 
work? I proudly answered that it is not. All I need is a bit of water to touch up my curls, 
and I’m out the door in five minutes. Some girls in class would tease me by hanging 
paper clips or other things in my hair, being thrilled and disgusted at the same time that 
those objects didn’t fall out, and that I didn’t even notice them. But no one ever said “our 
own little Negress” again.  
In my white world my thick unruly hair, my curves, and my different facial 
features quickly positioned me within “the slot of the exotic” (Wasserman 1994). At my 
high school there was only a meager handful of non-white students: three or four people 
for a total of 1200 white students. Like my mother, people often said I had a kind of 
unusual, “exotic” beauty that my peers did not have. I was also one of the good students, 
and I was headstrong, inquisitive and critical to the point of being annoying. But while 
my mother had always been a bit more timid, I used my intellect, my outspoken nature 
and beauty purposefully to compensate for the ways in which I felt less than my peers. 
These positive characteristics became my shield and my negotiating currency to achieve 
the same thing my mother had always sought to achieve: to belong, and to be the same as 
everyone else. I felt society’s censorship pressing on me, even though I didn’t quite 
understood why, but I tried to push back whenever I could.  
Yet my exotic appearance had a flip side, which I did not like at all: the way in 
which I became over-sensualized by both my peers and my teachers. One day when we 
were discussing the Romance period my history teacher used me as an example of what 
‘romance’ and ‘sensuality’ looked like. “Look,” he said, “Angela is romantic, you can tell 
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that by just looking at her. Look at how she braided her shawl into her hair, and she has 
that natural sensuality…” It was such an awkward moment, why did a grown man 
comment on my fourteen-year old sensuality? But my classmates also thought that I was 
more sensual and therefore more sexual than they were. They always wrongfully 
assumed that I had already done “everything” and knew everything about sex. Those 
assumptions if not accusations were echoed by my Dutch aunties and crushed my 
youthful innocence in a violent83 and racist interpellation. I didn’t know that I could rebut 
it, so I quietly stored it inside of me, and didn’t speak of it with anyone. On one hand I 
was abhorred that I was perceived as less decent, more whorish than everyone else, while 
I tried so hard to be the same. And on the other hand I felt these assumptions presented 
me an outline of the role that I was to play as an adult. “A girl like me” should be a 
sublime mistress. How was I going to fit that expectation?  
From the day I was born the old racist and sexist remnants of empire had 
surrounded and instructed me. Rahier contends that 
Black and brown women’s bodies and sexuality have been construed as directly 
opposed to the way European women’s bodies and sexuality have been imagined 
or reported, idealized and standardized as norms for proper female bodily 
characteristics and behavior (2010:49).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In an earlier version of his article The microphysics of colonial power Rahier (2005, 2010) differentiates 
between two opposing types of power. On the one hand he identifies the "legitimist view," in which 
violence is perceived as "illegitimate use of force," 
(2005:http://cas1.elis.ugent.be/avrug/violence/rahier.htm); a trespassing that is the opposite of legitimized 
force and coercion used by the nation-state. On the other hand he uses the concept of "structural violence” 
(Rahier 2010:47). Following Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung (1969), who coined the term, Rahier 
adopts a notion of violence that includes “a whole range of forms of social injustice and reproduction of 
inequalities imposed by individuals, institutions, or the working of the society at large, which sometimes - 
but not always, and this is the point here - involve the planned infliction of bodily injury, following 
subjection to physical or psychological force.” (Rahier 2010: 47). This is how I, too, use violence 
throughout this study, and particularly in this case.    
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This interpellation was a key part of “the grammar of empire,” as Sandra Ponzanesi calls 
it (Ponzanesi 2005:165), to construct the black body, and specifically the female black 
body, as hot blooded, sexually promiscuous and immoral, inferior (Kempadoo 1999:5-6), 
and available (Ponzanesi 2005:165), as well as unclean (Kempadoo 1999:10) and 
“menacing-and-dangerous” (Ponzanesi 2005:165). This ideological construction of the 
black body justified its inferiority and thus its domination. “The black body became an 
icon for sexuality in general and […] sexuality became a metaphor for domination” 
(Ponzanesi 2005:165). And as I experienced from an early age on, these hegemonic 
constructions of the non-white body are still in effect today (Ponzanesi 2005:165). 
Growing up I clearly felt the contrast with my peers. It felt as if the shape and 
function of my body were never my own private matter, nor inconsequential. The 
ferocious sexual appetite and extreme sexual vigor and sensuality people projected onto 
me from a young age on were so intimidating. I felt as if there never was room to be who 
I really was inside.  
Added to that was the fact that times had changed enormously since my mother’s 
days. In the 1980s and 90s a proper girl was still chaste, virginity still had a value. In 
spite of the fact that the outside world expected great sexual skill and hunger from me, 
my mother had instilled a different norm system in me. With regards to sex and my own 
changing body she had frightened and shamed me enough that I would stay a virgin until 
a week before my 21st birthday. These had been the rules she had grown up with in 
Curaçao. As a woman of color she too had had to balance the discourse of the 
oversexualized black female body with the virginity complex that had for centuries 
determined the worth of white women of elite standing.  
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In the Curaçao of my mother’s youth white women were the ‘guardians’ of 
European culture, morals and beliefs (Römer-Kenepa 1992:35). In order to protect their 
respectability they were confined to the domestic realm (Allen 2007:167). For men, on 
the other hand, it was fully acceptable to be sociable, openly promiscuous even. In post-
slavery Curaçao the State and the Roman Catholic Church sought to further instill such 
norms of ‘civility, seeking to “influence relationships between the sexes and family life 
of Afro-Curaçaoans” (Allen 2007:215). The social norms of conduct that once had been 
reserved for white women now increasingly applied to women of color. Based on the 
racist ideology of the hypersexual black body these norms of virginity, chastity, 
monogamy and the sanctity of marriage continued to instruct people in the rules of white 
supremacy. Respectable young women of color always had to be accompanied by a 
proper person, and could never be seen alone (Allen 2007:166). In my mother’s youth, 
these rules still applied. As a girl from a light skinned family that aspired to live by white 
middle class norms she had to uphold those chastity rules. However, in her experience the 
darker skinned girls with whom she went to school were far more free in their 
interactions with boys and men.  
Someone had once spotted my grandfather when he took my mother to the 
movies. She had been a teenager then. He had put his arm around her shoulder as they 
watched, but the acquaintance had recognized only my mother and not her father. Sophie, 
my grandmother, was notified that Dorothy had been to the movies with a strange man. 
Even though she had been in proper company my mother was still punished severely for 
the possibility of such a trespassing.  
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My life was significantly different. I could become anything I wanted, be 
anything I wanted, go anywhere I wanted. I had a freedom that she had never had. But the 
rules that had applied to her still existed. Thus, in an era and a country in which anti-
conception was readily available, emancipation of women and sexual freedom were the 
norm, peer pressure sky rocketed and chaperones had long gone out of style, instilling 
fear and shame in me was more than a perpetuation of a racist value system. It was the 
best – and only - way my mother knew to protect me.  
I was, however, not aware of her motivations and beliefs. I was dealing with my 
own struggle: how to be that hypersexual woman society expected and feared me to be. 
As always literature was my refuge. In the library I found plenty material, so I vigorously 
and virtuously studied the erotic writings of Anais Nin and the Kama Sutra. I never 
allowed myself to discover my sexuality through the actual interactions with boys. 
Instead, I studied for the role I thought I had to play, and prepared a performance in 
which there was little room for finding out what I might like myself. As the years 
unfolded, this prescribed role caused me much damage, for I bowed to those specific 
oppressive repertoires in the national discourse I was raised in, instead of sailing my own 
course. So unknowingly I embraced my share of “lesserness,” lacking the knowledge to 
recognize and oppose it. 
It would take me many years to discover my true sexuality. It would also take me 
many years to learn that “exotification,” “over-sensualization” and “–sexualization” were 
all discourses that aimed to subdue and appropriate me as a woman of color (see Rahier 
2010; Said 1978; Stoler 2002). At first I bowed to it. But when, during my studies in 
Anthropology and Caribbean Studies I discovered Caribbean literature, I gained access to 
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counter discourses in which women were strong, resourceful powerhouses as well as 
sensual beings who owned their sexuality and reveled in it unabashedly. If I had been 
assigned this slot as an “exotic” woman, over time I would come to flip the script and 
truly own and explore my sexuality. But clearly I was not quite there yet. 
 
The Ethnicity Game 
As an adolescent, ethnicity began to penetrate my self-understanding in terms of 
“otherness.” At age 19, I moved to Amsterdam to study Cultural Anthropology. While 
my world in Castricum and Tilburg had been so white, in this old metropole that 
Amsterdam is I met multitudes of immigrants and travelers passing through. I was happy 
to live in a space with people from all kinds of cultures and backgrounds. But people 
always seemed to wonder where I belonged, what slot I fit in. Time and time again I was 
asked where I really came from, to which I would answer either “from here, the 
Netherlands.” If I was in a good mood I would add: “but my mom is from Curaçao.” 
Many did not believe me, so I would make up fantastic stories about me being from 
Timbuktu, Uzbekistan, or Lake Titicaca, just to throw people off. To my surprise people 
from all over the Levantine region, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, South America and 
virtually every corner of Europe thought that I was from their country. When in Canada 
Native Canadian people even thought I too was Native, or Maori. In a way I found it 
entertaining ‘collecting’ ethnicities. I also felt it unsettling to be so interpellated by 
complete strangers when I myself did not yet know what to call myself. Sometimes this 
ethnic labeling by others turned hostile, for example when the older generations of veiled 
Muslim women in my neighborhood in Amsterdam scoffed at me for wearing the bare 
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belly tops that were so popular in the 1990s, or when a Turkish or Moroccan boy would 
stop on the street to yell in my face for eating during Ramadan, or shoulder block me off 
the curb for walking with a black friend.  
I could not name myself. Until my move to Amsterdam my experiences had 
predominantly been shaped by the meanings and values of the white people around me. 
My black mother subscribed to those meanings so unequivocally that I never even 
realized that she was, or better said is, black. And that I – by extension – am too. She 
never passed that identity on to me, because she herself was so eager to shed it off. She 
did not see reasons to be proud of that part of our heritage. She just knew its limitations, 
and sought to shield me from it. Following the logic of the system in which she had been 
raised she taught me how to be white. Yet I was so longing to define myself as 
Caribbean, as part black, but I could not for the life of me see how I would fit, how I 
would ever be allowed in.  
So in Amsterdam, amidst all of these people from everywhere I remained 
ambiguous, confused and ignorant about my identity. I remained that white girl with her 
mixed heritage bobbing behind her like a little balloon on a string. I attended black poetry 
circles, hip hop, reggae, salsa and zouk parties, I had had both white and black 
boyfriends, got initiated into the Regla de Ocha, visited the Ethnographic Museum of the 
Tropics almost every month, and I had friends from everywhere. I became an “Other.” 
Though still racially and ethnically undefined, I felt better than the white label I had 
grown up in. In my academic work I also found solace and a sense of belonging. From 
my first class in cultural anthropology on I focused on the Caribbean, on Curaçao and 
Surinam. But back then, in the mid 1990s, much to my surprise there was not one 
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department at any of the universities in the country that specialized in the Caribbean. I 
enrolled in three different universities in three different cities, so I could follow every 
class taught on the Caribbean. I studied Caribbean literature, history, politics, economics, 
jumping on one train after the next to make it on time to my next class. My work began to 
zoom in on colonial oppression and its many heritages, including racism. So it was also 
through picking up the sword of knowledge and fighting this “good fight” that I finally 
dared to declare myself a partial insider.  
 
Entering the Field: Curaçao 1999 
Near the end of my Masters’ degree I traveled to Curaçao to visit my family and to “go 
home.” It was the first time I went by myself, without my parents and my brother. By 
now I was already an anthropologist, preparing for a future field study on the island. That 
summer, when I first entered my field as a scholar, I did so as a “white-ish” woman, but 
certainly not as black, or mixed-race even, which is distinctively an American category. I 
was barely even aware that I had been socialized as a white woman. My aim was to 
explore colonial heritage in a post-colonial society, but my personal experience with race 
was mostly characterized by being oblivious to it. In fact, I knew virtually nothing about 
race and its role in this heritage. My knowledge was by and large shaped by my academic 
inquiry, which I had done at white Dutch universities, studying with white Dutch 
professors. Even though their contributions to my training had been rich and invaluable, 
as stated previously, race is a taboo notion and thus left unmentioned in classes. There 
were many such silences in my Dutch education. So I was fully unprepared for what I 
was about to encounter on my first Curaçaoan solo trip. 
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My cousin picked me up from the airport. As we drove towards their house I 
remember thinking “I thought the island was prettier.” In spite of – or perhaps because of 
- having studied Cultural Anthropology for over four years, the Caribbean Paradise 
Paradigm had lodged itself in my mind. Compared to the obsessive neatness of the 
Netherlands Curaçao indeed looks rather run down, with streets full of tears and holes big 
enough to drown a small donkey. The houses of every shape, color and level of 
dilapidation imaginable, faded billboards, and street dogs exploring the trash stuck in 
shrubs and cacti. This was exactly the kind of spontaneity I had always missed “back 
home” in the Netherlands. In spite of the strict moral undertone left behind by 250 years 
of Catholic Missionary work I quickly noticed ample space for people to invent and 
reinvent themselves. I wasn’t used to that. It seemed as if there were less rules, or more 
opportunity to break them. Compared to the monotone and monochrome architecture and 
landscaping of the Netherlands, Curaçao felt like an explosion of some sorts, an 
abundance of things that seemed decrepit but that were in fact not quite broken at all. It 
wouldn’t take long for me to appreciate the perfect imperfection of this place, and to 
reinvent myself anew, in ways that I had never imagined.  
It started that very night, after I had unpacked my bags and settled in at my aunt’s 
house. I was sitting on the porch, putting on my shoes, getting ready to go dance with my 
cousin, when my aunty shared with me the only rule of her household. She said: “You 
can do anything you like, just as long as you do not come home with a black man.”  
“Wait, what?” I did a double take. I honestly wasn’t sure if she meant what she 
said, or if it was a horribly misplaced attempt at a joke. Never in my life had I heard 
someone so dear to me make a comment so racist and blunt.  
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I thought: “But she is my family, and we are not like that!”  
I thought: “But my mom—her sister—is black too, so she cannot be serious…”  
I thought: “Wait, her own skin is brown, can black people say this about each other?” 
My aunt did not elaborate; she had already walked away. But I would soon find 
out that she was not joking. And that condemning racism was not a genetic trait that I 
shared in equal measure with my relatives. I would soon learn that Curaçao’s colorist 
ideology, or color hierarchy (Hoetink 1958) was a living and breathing construct that 
effects everyone, whether they agreed with it or not. I had read about it in Hoetink’s old 
historical description of the island. Now I was engulfed by it. That summer became an 
involuntary crash course in the rules of Curaçao’s pigmentocracy84. “Don’t come home 
with a black man…” These words became my guiding light. Never as a rule to live by, 
but as a moral code to crack, pulverize, reroute. I was now adamant to excavate the roots 
of this horrifying system into which I had just awoken. I thought that it will make for a 
rocky ride. 
I soon discovered that in Curaçao my light skin and curly, but not kinky, hair 
corresponded to an upper-tier position. The sudden privilege I got, startled me. I resisted 
it, finding it incredibly unjust. But no matter how I wanted to self-identify as an 
“average” girl, or even as the slightly “less equal” woman I had always been, I could not 
shake off the labels society placed on me. I scrambled to learn, for I was not at all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Here it is of great importance to remember that in Curaçao a colorist system or pigmentocracy prevails 
(see appendix I), which means that skin color is ranked on a scale of white (top) to black at the bottom. 
This corresponds with the social class system. This correspondence of course is not watertight; over the 
decades and centuries many black people have moved upwards on the socio-economic scale, and there has 
always been a small percentage of white folks that are not part of the middle and upper classes. However, 
the general rule of thumb remains that the upper classes are primarily white, the middle classes are mixed, 
and the lower classes are predominantly black. 
 
 208 
familiar with any of these rules that connected color to status and socioeconomic class. I 
found it difficult to distinguish between different skin tones, features, hair types, to even 
notice somebody’s skin color, let alone attach a value to it on a scale of good to bad, 
socially acceptable to pariah. And I had yet to learn the different markers of socio 
economic class and how people negotiated them on the island. I had to decipher which 
neighborhood or bario is associated with what social status and stereotypes, what brands 
of clothes, cars and drinks were ranked high on the status ladder and which ones were 
not. What beach you go to, what types of music you listen to, what clubs and 
supermarkets you frequent, where you eat, what kind of dog do you have, whether you 
wear your hair natural or not, all of that took me years to learn, with trials and errors. I 
learned, but most and foremost I tried to defy this pigmentocracy. I wanted no part in it. 
Until one night I nearly got raped by a young man I thought I had befriended. This tragic 
event gave me a rude awakening, and made me realize that – especially as an 
anthropologist - I should know better than to impose my Dutch worldview in which racial 
equality seemed so real, while disregarding Curaçao’s social and racial/spatial ordering of 
people and things because they were too “uncivil” and too uncomfortable for me.  
At the salsa dance night class that my cousin and I always went to on Wednesdays 
I once met a handsome dark skinned guy. I had been talking to him for a while. I liked his 
rawness, the way he was taking the world in with some kind of bewilderment. Sure, I had 
noticed that he often wore the same outfit, which none of the other people in the group 
ever did. I knew that he came by bus, while none of the others did. He lived in one of the 
poorer, more dangerous neighborhoods of the island. For me, someone from a lower 
socioeconomic level than mine would make a person less interesting. I had also noticed 
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the dynamics between him and the rest of the group. People would be kind to him but 
they didn’t interact much with him. I asked my cousin about it. She said:  
“He is a good person to know when you’re in trouble. He will always stand up for 
you, people are afraid of him. He is fierce, you don’t want to mess with him.”  
 - “But is he your friend?” 
 “No, you gotta be careful with him, don’t get to close to him.” 
But based on what she had told me I didn’t see why I had to steer clear from him. So I 
didn’t. I enjoyed the chemistry, the dancing, his fiery eyes. I wanted to know him better.  
On the last night of my stay, my cousin and I went to a dance night at a beach 
club. I had told the young man, who I will call Rayquon here, about our plans. I was 
happy to see him there. However, the night didn’t turn out the way we planned. My 
cousin had been feeling under the weather all day and only came out because it was my 
last night. She went home early though, and arranged for me to get a ride from a friend of 
hers, a light skinned young man of Asian descent. Now I finally had a chance to chat 
freely with Rayquon. I didn’t speak much Papiamentu yet, and he didn’t speak Dutch 
very well, but we managed. He seemed a bit shy, a bit uncomfortable even, but eager to 
spend time with me. We sat on a table at the edge of the dance floor and exchanged 
stories, enjoying the music, the breeze, and the setting sun.  
Then a friend of my other cousin approached me. That summer I had spent quite 
some time with him and my cousin, so we spoke for a few minutes. It is worth noticing 
that this young man was light skinned, with a big head of blondish curls. When I turned 
back to Rayquon he was agitated and grabbed my hand, saying that the guy who was 
supposed to give me a ride back had left, and that we had to catch up with him. He 
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dragged me away from the party to the boardwalk that led to the next club, and I 
followed, never giving it a second thought. The boardwalk was quiet, surrounded by 
bushes and palm trees. Suddenly he tripped me, I never saw it coming. I landed on my 
back, and in a reflex I put my foot against his chest, blocking him, so he could not fully 
lay down upon me. But he was trying, and he pinned me to the ground with his arms. I 
knew I was in trouble. I did the only thing that popped into my mind. I looked him deep 
in his eyes and said:  
“If you do this I can never like you again.“  
I do not know where the words came from and what gave them their power, but somehow 
that line snapped him out of his craze and he pulled me back up. He dusted off my skirt, 
grabbed my hand and pulled me back to the party. But I wasn’t ready to be dragged along 
again. My head was reeling, what had just happened! Why on Earth had he attempted to 
rape me, after we had had such a fun night? Just before we got back to the club I stopped 
him. I had to know what had come over him, so I asked him: 
 “Why did you do that… ” 
He turned around, a bit taken aback by my question, and answered: 
 “Because a girl like you would never just be with a guy like me.” 
It took me a few moments to take in his words. I understood him, but the sadness of the 
reality behind his actions hit me like a wrecking ball. He had no reference for an “uppity” 
white girl—a Dutch girl—that acted like me. It didn’t matter that I had been genuinely 
interested in him; he perceived me as too different, too far removed from what he could 
“have.” I also felt his sadness, over what he had attempted to do, while all he wanted to 
do was genuinely get close to me. His belief that such a thing was impossible for him had 
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come between us. That night left me breathless. The earth had moved, but not in a good 
way.  
My sad exchange with Rayquon blasted away another layer of my ignorance. I 
realized that I could seek to break the moral codes of the pigmentocracy to my heart’s 
content, but I still had to be mindful of them, acknowledge their existence, and treat them 
with respect, whether I agreed with them or not. I could self-identify as underprivileged, 
which in the Netherlands made sense maybe. However, in Curaçao I was not on the 
bottom of the social ladder, I was at the top. It outraged me, the disgusting absurdness of 
racial preferences. And I felt as if I suddenly betrayed my mother, my relatives and 
friends who were of color. I raged, yet, I had to come to terms with it. If I wanted to 
acknowledge and comprehend Rayquon’s experiences, his worldview, his understanding 
of me, I had to see him through his eyes as best I could, through the eyes of the 
Curaçaoan society. Even if I really did not want to. But in the end I had to accept that not 
until I understood his way of seeing me, could I find a way to comprehend this society. 
And not until I comprehended this society, could I find a way to comprehend my mother, 
my ancestors, myself, and all of the colonial tug-of-war that still rages on.  
That night took me straight back to the first amendment of contemporary Cultural 
Anthropology; “thou shalt not be Eurocentric.” Because I was so personally connected to 
my research setting I had forgotten this. In my urge to challenge and defy this racist 
system I had in a way been arrogant and ignorant, thinking my knowledge system was 
superior. Even though I meant well, and the premise of equality upon which I had sought 
to overrule Curaçao’s color hierarchy was a legit one, as a social scientist I had to do 
better. If I wanted to indeed challenge this color hierarchy I would first have to 
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understand it, fully accept its existence, and acknowledge it as a powerful system of 
meaning that shapes the lives of hundreds of thousands of people every day. My 
disagreement with its premises was inconsequential here. Thus this night urged me to 
adopt a more professional anthropological stance, the one that allows us to study 
abhorrent things without letting our personal judgment get in the way. I have since come 
to respect Curaçao’s pigmentocracy as an emic system of knowledge, and to use its emic 
notions and rationales to fuel my research and to continue my anti-racist agenda. And I 
realized that from then on I would have to be explicit and transparent about my intentions 
rather than simply acting and expecting people to understand me, and simply embrace my 
value system as if it were the only one in the world. I had to really understand that in 
order to give everyone the respect they deserve.  
 
I Was Never White Until I Came to Curaçao 
This first summer as an adult, visiting Curaçao without my parents, taught me that in 
Curaçao I am white, which is denoted by the words koló blanku (“white” color) or koló 
klá (“clear” color)85. I do not classify as light-skinned (koló habri or “open” color), as I 
would be in the Netherlands. In Curaçao I am considered white. Then I am also a 
Makamba, a somewhat derogatory word for “Dutch person,” which as we already saw 
harbors sentiments of resentment over colonial and postcolonial subjugation. But my 
Dutch-ness also contributed to my high ranking. Curaçaoan resentment goes hand in hand 
with a certain kind of reverence to Dutch people. An old colonial stereotype, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See appendix I.  
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reverence suggests that Dutch people are more skilled, knowledgeable and trustworthy 
than Curaçaoans are. To my shock this summer revealed to me that I enjoyed copious 
privileges based on my whiteness and my high level of education, and that I could 
participate in the realms of the elites in ways that I could never do so in the Netherlands. I 
desperately did not want to be confined to that Dutch slot. I wanted to participate in 
Curaçao’s society, and become an insider. I frantically learned my first words of 
Papiamentu, the social codes, I familiarized myself with the food and the music. And I 
had my relatives, who were proof of my at least partial belonging, and my non-Dutch 
curves, which people often commented on, and I was a good salsa dancer. Little by little I 
was claiming my own bit of Curaçaoan-ness, in spite of also being a Makamba. I was a 
partial insider and outsider. And lucky for me, people much appreciated my zest, which 
they thought was uncommon for a Dutch person, and were happy to teach me how to 
become a Yu’i Kòrsou. 
When after that summer I returned to Amsterdam I had become more comfortable 
in owning my bit of Caribbean-ness. I was half Caribbean, and slowly but surely I began 
to behave accordingly. Society responded. I remember watching a music video of 
Aaliyah with a Curaçaoan friend of mine. In that video, Aaliyah wore her hair braided 
into thick cornrows. I said that I loved her hair, to which my friend commented that I too 
was “allowed” to wear my hair like that. He continued saying that it was okay for me to 
learn Papiamentu, and that my mom’s culture also belonged to me, even if she didn’t 
teach it to me. Never before had anyone said such things to me, given me such an 
outspoken “ok” to become an insider. That was my cue, I plunged right in, and the very 
next day I had my hair braided into my very own cornrows. And I bought a book on 
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Papiamentu and began studying the language, no longer caring about what anyone said. I 
was plotting my return.  
In 2003 I went back. I spent a year on the island, working for the local theater, 
developing a grassroots “open mic” show for local youth. My language skills were 
greatly improving. I danced salsa. I became much more socially and culturally able, and 
people appreciated my desire to belong and my enthusiasm to make positive 
contributions to Curaçao’s overall wellbeing. I stayed for a year, returned to the 
Netherlands, and came back for another year in 2006. By then I claimed my Caribbean-
ness, calling myself half Dutch, half Curaçaoan and Surinamese. But still I was seen as a 
white girl, and dared not define myself otherwise. 
 
I Was Never Black Until I Moved to the USA  
This changed when I moved to Miami in 2007. I had been accepted to FIU’s Ph.D. 
program in Cultural Anthropology. I began to study race while partaking in a society that 
uses a very different understanding of race than what I had been used to. People would 
often mistake me for a Latina, which I rejected. But also, people began to call me black. 
Suddenly I was confronted with the colloquial remnants of the “One Drop Rule,” which 
labeled me black or mixed-race, as a sub-category of blackness. In every day life I 
noticed that the privileged position that I held in Curaçao did not apply. Here I belonged 
to the slot of the “Other,” yet in a different way than in the Netherlands. In the 
Netherlands I had been exotified, and I had often felt lesser than my white peers, which 
resulted in a certain level of discomfort and even underachievement. But I would 
compensate with being smart above and beyond my exotified beauty. I became apt at 
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using the flip side of my exotification to my advantage. That often worked, as both 
markers give access to different sets of privileges. However, in Miami and the other big 
American cities I visited I was just an “Other,” like so many others. Again I had to 
negotiate my identity differently. In a way it was easier to blend in in the US, as "Others" 
can be a citizen and no one will question their eventual citizenship, as people do in 
Europe when asking "Where do you really come from...?" 
 People thought of me as Latina or as black. I rejected the first label because my 
ethnic and cultural roots are too far removed from Latin American culture86. But I did 
embrace the second. What a strange experience it was for me, to have people see me as a 
light skinned black woman. For the first time in my life I could self-identify as mixed-
race or even black without people so much as batting an eye. I felt liberated and 
empowered, and a bit sneaky for I was indulging in the realms my mother and our 
Caribbean relatives had kept locked away from me in their intricate silences. But in this 
new world no one cared about my divergence and convergence. For the first time in my 
academic career I had black professors and black fellow students. I had access to a whole 
new realm of thinking and experiencing. I began to connect to many black scholars. I 
studied their books, studied with them, and befriended them, until I realized that “them” 
had become “us.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Many Curaçaoans do accept the “Latino” label when abroad, as they have been immersed in Latin 
American culture, language, music and history throughout their lives in Curaçao. The island receives 
numerous television and radio stations from the South American main land, so whole generations have 
grown up with the music, telenovelas (soap operas), films, game shows and news from that region. This tie 
with the mainland has been strong since colonial times. There has been a strong Latin American cultural 
presence on the island through the ongoing flows of trade, people and popular culture between the island 
and the mainland (Hoetink 1958). Many Curaçaoans are fluent Spanish speakers, to the point of being well 
versed in recognizing and even speaking different Spanish vernaculars. However, I spent 30 years in the 
Netherlands so I do not have any of this familiarity with “Latin” culture, and therefore did not feel 
comfortable claiming it.  
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In my course work I learned about the intricacies of race, of exclusion and 
inclusion, of privilege and marginalization. In the Netherlands and the Dutch Caribbean 
race had always been a rather taboo topic in academia and everyday conversations, so 
this new degree I was pursuing filled in so many blanks. It started to fulfill a hunger that 
had haunted me for thirty years. My research had always been a very personal journey, 
but now it seriously shifted gears. In my classes I began to discover how these taboos I 
had been educated into, and the silences I had been raised in truly pertained to me, and I 
began to recognize more and more ways in which I had been objectified, marginalized, 
“Otherized” in the Netherlands. My new awareness enabled me to explore and uproot 
important silenced parts of my personal experiences, but also those of my mother and 
grandmother. Finally, I was able to formulate the question that would break these silences 
that we had all lived in. 
 
 “You Are My Caribbean” 
My studies in the US profoundly changed the relationship between my mother and 
myself. For the longest time neither my mother nor I knew that any confusion I might 
have had about me revolved around my ethnic and racial identity. Since my mother had 
reinvented hers, leaving behind the negative parts as best she could while fully 
identifying with the Dutch culture, she naturally remained silent about her Caribbeanness. 
The Caribbean was a painful legacy for her, plus her white Dutch world was physically 
far away, which was quite convenient. Her family lived there, and in our little white town 
Castricum there was no such thing as a Caribbean community. So like her mother, who 
had never spoken about Surinam after she moved to Curaçao, my mother did not speak of 
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Curaçao. Yet it was there. Her silence was what first taught me about the island, for like I 
said silence is not empty space.  
I picked up on certain norms of behavior, which over time I came to recognize as 
norms that fit a light skinned woman who can “marry upwards” in the color line, like 
both my mother and grandmother did. Somehow I knew very well that there was a 
preferred way of being and a preferred type of prospective husband. Perhaps the clearest 
direction I received from my mother was to not wear my hair loose and wild. The hints 
were very subtle, but directive. They showed me that I could be something proper, decent 
and successful, but also that there was something else that I had to be watchful of to 
avoid any downfall.  
It was not until I began my studies in Miami that I was able to have a civil 
conversation about it, without getting mad at her for never sharing her culture with me. 
My newly acquired knowledge and insights gave both my mother and I a vocabulary that 
we had never had, and my questions unlocked understandings that had always laid 
dormant in her, but that she had never been able to access. In one of our talks she 
explained that to her I had never been a white child, nor was I fully Dutch to her. I was 
her child, perpetuating and representing her blood, showing that she never capitulated. 
She might have left the Caribbean, she might have adapted and found refuge and life 
within the Dutch culture, but through my existence she showed the world that she was 
still a Caribbean woman. She said:  
You are the bridge between me and being the European woman that I can never 
be, because of the features that I have. But also with your mixed features, you 
represented the goodness, the beauty of my Caribbean, without the pain of a 
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wounding past, and I have always been proud that I perpetuated my 
Caribbeanness in you (Dorothy, Interview 11 Nov 2013). 
This was the very first time that my mother named me; after thirty years I discovered that 
I was her, by extension. And deep inside she had always been proud of who she was, 
even though her world had not encouraged that. I realized that indeed, I had always been 
a silent and rather helpless witness to my mother’s longing, for Caribbean music, food, 
that familiar space she could no longer inhabit. But it was not until she spoke those words 
that I understood how much she had sacrificed, just to find a place where she would be 
appreciated. Exchanging the joy and the at-homeness of her Caribbean space for the 
Netherlands, and never being able to enjoy her blackness inconsequentially in the locale 
of her birth and youth must have been traumatizing. Silencing her memories and her 
cravings was easier than letting them cry for things she could no longer have. Sometimes 
she travels back though. On her visits to Curaçao my mother will ask me to take her 
dancing, and she will dance all night, every night, for as long as she is on the island. She 
will ask me to take her to local restaurants, to places where they sell roti and pom87, and 
stews, rice, beans, fried plantains. She will stock up, so she can survive, she says, when 
she is back in her white Dutch world. 
My mother’s words revealed that—just like me—she lives betwixt and between 
locales; that she lives by conflicting repertoires that both scold and celebrate whiteness 
and blackness. And so I am my mother’s daughter, just as she is her mother’s daughter, 
her mother who also had to build a bridge between two conflicting worlds inside of her, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Surinamese chicken pie made from mashed tayer roots. 
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and who had to bury her great grandparents in the silence of racial inferiority, and set sail 
as a “white” woman with a brown child in tow. Although our lives are very different, we 
ultimately all share the same pain, the same craving to belong and to be home, and be 
accepted as we are. My mother and grandmother lived in times and spaces that were less 
forgiving with regards to race, phenotype and gender than I do. But—each in our own 
way—we all found harsh oppressors as well as nurturing sanctuaries in our silences, and 
each in our own way we complied, but also always resisted, rebelled, and proved the 
world that we could outdo the expectations it had of us.  
 
Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter was to make visible how hegemony works, how ideologies 
of white supremacy are internalized, and how they shape us, and the most intimate 
dimensions of lives, often without us being consciously aware of it (Gramsci 1971). 
These three stories of our lives highlight the deliberate and unconscious choices we 
made, seeking to improve our lives, satisfy our curiosities, and keep ourselves safe, in the 
face of—often implicit—race-based challenges and restrictions.  
Our transnational and intergenerational stories also illustrate how the colonial 
ideology of white supremacy over the course of centuries shifted from an explicit to a 
more covert form: here we see that, as Gramsci argued (1971), hegemony is never static, 
but always adapts to new contestations by the masses. Each territory has its own 
particular historical trajectory within the Dutch empire, and developed its own culture 
and ideology of national identity. But what surfaces in these accounts is that the tenets of 
white supremacy that perpetuate in these territories have remained fairly stable across 
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time and space (Gilroy 1995). Our stories are testimonies of the racism that is part of the 
national ideologies in Surinam, Curaçao and the Netherlands. They illustrate that white 
supremacy remains the norm, even in more contemporary times, and while it strongly 
shaped and shapes our lives, it is not always easy to identify it. At times we were acutely 
aware of the pain and discomfort that racial exclusion and oppression caused, without 
being able to identify its cause, and at other times we were aware of the discomfort and 
thought it was normal—just the way things are (Bourdieu 1977; Gramsci 1971).  
Furthermore, the chapter shows that hegemony is executed and protected, but also 
challenged by a complex tangle of silences, which entail multiple dimensions of 
oppression and resistance: our stories are full of silences, generated by censorship, 
omission, denial, avoidance and resistance. And it is perpetuated—among others—
through the realm of intimacy, which Stoler (2002) identifies as a micro-dimension of 
imperial power (2002). The nature of intimate relationships, which in colonial and 
postcolonial space is deeply racialized, informs both the elites and the masses of their 
respective place in society, and racial hierarchy.  
But intimacy is one dimension of the gatekeeping mechanisms that were 
discussed in chapter 1; our stories reveal many more. We complied with these 
gatekeeping mechanisms, but we also sought to omit them, and found ways to circumvent 
the marginalizations and exclusions that they composed. Hegemonic silences muted us, 
and shielded the oppression into which we were indoctrinated, but at the same time 
silence was also our space of safety, noncompliance, and active resistance. 
The first main silence is that of our family’s black roots, and thus of the existence 
of Ajoeba, Wolfina, Bruinetta and Julia, and the many others who still remain unnamed. 
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Our enslaved ancestors, Bruinetta and Adjoeba, had lived under the yoke of explicit race-
based dominance and exploitation, which was wrought with violence and danger. The 
possibilities of moving away from this detrimental situation were restricted by various 
gatekeeping mechanisms. 
Intimate relations are one social realm in which gatekeeping mechanisms were 
exerted. Even though I have no details on their lives, the enslaved status of my great great 
grandmothers will have had a significant impact on the nature of the intimate and 
procreative relations they will have had with men—white and non-white. And these 
intimate relations in turn reinforced the social status that was associated with their racial 
identity. The ban on mixed race marriages during slavery, and the unspoken norm of 
white men raping, bedding, or living in concubinage or other kinds of unions with non-
white women had communicated and reinforced the norm of white supremacy. As Stoler 
indicates (2002), these restricted arrangements of intimacy and procreation between 
blacks and whites sent out a powerful message of white superiority88 (Stoler 2002), and 
prevented people of color from joining the ranks of the white colonials, even in the case 
of interracial marriages, or being a child of a white father.  
Mixed race marriages were legalized in Surinam and Curaçao at the end of the 
19th century. It is interesting, to say the least, to note that once people of color were 
officially allowed to wed, Bruinetta and Adjoeba’s daughters Julia and Wolfina both 
married men that were to all likelihood white. This may signal both the power of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  This power balance between black and white was and is always profoundly gendered. Unfortunately it 
falls outside the scope of this study to duly elaborate much on gender. This is, however, an important topic 
for future research, see appendix X. 	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hegemony (complying with the Eurocentric norms of respectability) as a resistance to it. 
These young women had both been born into slavery and had known intimately the 
ramifications of the system. To all likelihood they had been well aware of the fact that 
marriage to a white man would enhance the upward social mobility of their children and 
themselves. It will have been a way to distance themselves from a traumatic past, rife 
with wrongdoings that had been legally justified.   
The ideal of whitening through miscegenation became a theme that to this day 
lives quite strongly in our family. Both my great-grandfather Rudolph and great-
grandmother Laurina were born from a marriage between a black (though possibly partly 
white) and formerly enslaved mother and a white father. Compared to their darker 
skinned mothers, the lighter phenotypes of my great-grandparents and of my 
grandmother, allowed them a higher social status in Surinam and later Curaçao. Whether 
they did so consciously and purposefully or not, over the course of their lifetimes they 
shed their blackness, and their connection to slavery. Or family’s past became silenced, 
whitewashed. This was again a silence that was both hegemonic in its adherence to the 
white-is-better ideal, and a form of resistance: it was a deliberate moving away from 
detrimental influences, and seeking a stronger social position (Sheriff 2000). 
When my grandmother Sophie had a darker skinned child—my mother—she was 
displeased: in spite of her light phenotype her genes had revealed our family’s African 
roots. Sophie temporary abandonment of her darker skinned daughter was also a 
censuring silence, one that temporarily hid her “tainted” progeny, and her failure to 
comply with the rules of the performance of passing that was expected of her. This 
silence was complicitous, but it was also a coping mechanism that temporarily protected 
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Sophie from losing her social standing. Soon after she married a light skinned man of 
European and East Indian descent (or at least so his family narrative goes). Marriage 
complied with the norms of white respectability, but again we must also see this as a 
protective measure and act of agency, as it helped hush the negative impact that having a 
baby out of wedlock, and especially a darker skinned one, could have had on her 
reputation.  
My mother too chose a white husband—my father. Like my grandmother, she 
also closely observed the politics of respectability. Dorothy was always very properly 
dressed and well behaved: she married her first real sweetheart. In doing so she sought to 
limit and avert the white supremacist hegemonic hypersexualization and exotification that 
she was well aware of. The adoption of norms of white respectability gave her a way to 
strengthen her social standing. This did mean that she had to denounce her 
Caribbeanness: another silence that was both hegemonic and empowering. Although it 
hurt her to give up her true identity, it did enable her to create a satisfying life. 
My decision to date a dark skinned man met with significant resistance by at least 
part of my relatives: my aunt’s warning to not come home with a black man was the most 
explicit. And to date, very few of my uncles, aunts and cousins have came home with a 
partner darker than themselves. Also, I have never heard my predominantly brown 
skinned relatives refer to themselves as “black” or “Afrodescendant.” The persistence of 
this silencing, which has become a family tradition, so it seems, suggests that protection 
from racial marginalization is still needed, and that accommodation to ideals of whitening 
still yields rewards, and thus that white supremacy endures.  
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But silence also played a role in the ways we perceived ourselves. The temporary 
concealment of Dorothy’s existence, when Sophie left her with her grandparents, would 
forever echo in the self-censoring silences my mother crafted: as a young child Dorothy 
literally tried to erase herself. She made herself invisible, remained quiet: a coping 
mechanism to shield her from the shame her mother had instilled in her. Her taking on a 
different ethnic and racial identity was a way to mute and escape her blackness. It was 
therefore a hegemonic silence that acknowledged white superiority. It was also a 
complicitous silence: no one had ordered Dorothy to censor herself in these ways, or to 
take on the subservient roles in the household. She was aware of there “being something 
wrong with her,” but she did not comprehend exactly what it was about, and acted upon it 
rather than to question or challenge it. But still, the element of coping and keeping herself 
safe is also part of this silence. It helped her camouflage her pain. Without ever being 
explicitly aware of the gatekeeping mechanisms that instructed her, she navigated them, 
and in doing she replicated and confirmed white supremacy, but later in life she would 
also challenge it.  
Unbeknownst to herself Dorothy extended her muted blackness and 
Caribbeanness to me, raising me away from her part of my cultural heritage and identity. 
Until I was well in my thirties I didn’t know that I was Afrodescendant, or how to speak 
my mother’s language, or cook the Caribbean dishes my grandmother excelled in. But I 
knew, without anyone ever telling me so, that I was different from my white peers—
lesser. In the Netherlands of the 1980s and 1990s, where I grew up, sexuality and 
propriety were defined much more freely than in the Curaçao of her days. The 
emancipation of women and the normalization of birth control, which had been far less 
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avid when my mother was young, allowed me to partially redefine my mother’s 
Caribbean code of respectability. But only to a limited extent. For I still participate in the 
same society as my mother, and live by hegemonic codes that I too am only barely aware 
of. That quiet internal voice of oppression and racism still dictates me, in spite of my 
extensive education on the topic. It took me a decade of thorough education to see how I 
had internalized white supremacist hegemonic ideology, how I too was continuously 
hypersexualized and exotified, and how that had shaped my choices, and still continues to 
do so. Even though I now sometimes catch myself, I still police and censor myself. I 
probably always will.  
The fact that I am a very light skinned and highly educated, middle class woman 
growing up in largely white surroundings for a long time added to the prevalence of these 
hegemonic silence. I rarely had to deal with explicit racist exclusions, and when they did 
occur I didn’t recognize them. I never endured police violence. Because of my light 
phenotype and my white surroundings my ignorance of racism persisted, as does my light 
privilege.  
But my silences also shield the shame that I feel over feeling inferior. I never 
wanted to bring that up and tell people about it. Instead I compensated for it, tried to be 
the smartest, pretty, to define myself in my own way. This was my secret way of 
empowering myself, my coping mechanism. And silence for a long time has had an 
incubating function: I needed to finish my research before I came forward and started 
breaking hegemonic silences. Until now I have not spoken, written, or published much 
about racism. I have not retorted to my aunt. I have been waiting until the time is right, 
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which was first with the release of my documentary Sombra di Koló (“The Shadow of 
Color”) in 2014, and now upon the completion of this dissertation. 
This chapter provided ample illustration of the intimate and intricate 
mechanizations of hegemony and white supremacy across the Dutch imperial spaces of 
Surinam, Curaçao and the Netherlands, and the intricate tangle of silences that protect, 
implement and contest them. In chapter 3, I turn back to Curaçao, and present an 
ethnographic examination of how Curaçaoans experience race and nation today.  
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Chapter III 
Race and Nation as Every-Day Lived Experience: An Ethnographic Study  
 
Bos di buriku no ta yega shelu. 
The donkey’s voice doesn’t reach heaven89. 
— Curaçaoan proverb  
  
Introduction 
The objective of this third chapter is to assess what is the specific work done by 
Curaçao’s Yu’i Kòrsou multicultural ideology of national identity on Curaçao’s 
inhabitants. The chapter examines the discrepancy between the unity and equality that is 
so avidly proclaimed by the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national identity, and the persisting 
racial inequality that was so little addressed and yet so easily observed. How do 
Curaçaoans perceive and experience racial inequality? And how does racism as part of 
multiculturalism operate in ways that people are not always aware of? Do people claim 
that there is equality and unity, as the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national identity suggests? 
Is racism in their perception indeed obsolete? In what ways do people experience racial 
inequality, and do they contest it?  
In this study I conducted largely unstructured interviews with 29 Curaçaoans90 of 
all walks of life. In order to observe how national ideology is experienced in this society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The donkey and the horse star in many Caribbean proverbs, including Curaçaoan ones; the horse (kabai) 
represents the white master, and the donkey (buriku) the black common folk. These horse and donkey 
proverbs provide a rich and critiquing body of folk wisdom on Curaçao’s race relations. This proverb 
means that the voice of people of color is not heard - what they have to say doesn’t matter. Another very 
telling proverb is “Si mi a nase buriku, mi no por muri kabai: if I was born as a donkey, I cannot die as a 
horse,” which suggests that if you are black you will always remain black. Even if you manage to move 
upwards in society, you will never escape the label of inferiority that you were born with.  
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that is highly differentiated by race and class I have conducted five case studies, each one 
in a different socioeconomic neighborhood. These neighborhoods approximate Curaçao’s 
social stratification of race and class. In the pages that follow I describe how I entered 
these five communities, built rapport, selected respondents, participated in everyday life, 
and collected my materials. There are so many stories to tell that this chapter alone could 
have filled my entire dissertation. It presents a content analysis of the stories I collected 
in these communities, to which I’ve added my findings from participant observations.   
Since this is a pioneering study, I had to develop a way to operationalize race, 
which is not one of the criteria used in the census. From my aunt’s inquiry about the dark 
skinned young man I had brought home against her rules it dawned on me that there was 
something about neighborhoods, barios in Papiamentu, that I’d better elucidate. When 
she questioned him as to see what his social status was, she asked him what bario he was 
from. When he answered “Buena Vista,” she had given a disapproving and all-knowing 
look: it was one of the poorest and most troublesome neighborhoods of the island. As 
time went by and I got to know the island better, I too acquired the skill of placing people 
on a social map by the neighborhood they live in. In Curaçao these neighborhoods are 
often quite homogeneous as far as the race and class of its residents, as I would soon 
discover. But more importantly, race and class conflate, Oostindie (2000) argues. Given 
Curaçao’s segmented nature, residentially speaking barios could thus be seen as emic 
units of analysis that each time provide a seat for the multidimensional intersection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The sample was designed for 30 people. I will explain later on in the chapter that I had one non-response. 
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race and class. With the lack of census materials or any other statistical material on race, I 
decided to use the bario or neighborhood as a proxy for race.  
My first task was to choose a number of barios that seemed to provide a good 
cross-cut of Curaçao’s society. To this end they had to differ significantly in their class 
and racial make up, and include rural and urban barios. Further requirements were that 
the neighborhoods would be very well known on the island, so respondents would 
immediately recognize them and association them with racial and class categories. Also 
these neighborhoods should be more or less homogenous in class. If my assumption that 
race and class conflate to a large degree were true, then homogeneity would be necessary 
for the neighborhood to serve as a proxy for race. With the aid of Curaçao’s Central 
Bureau of Statistics I sifted through demographic and statistical data on these different 
barios in order to define the different class levels that coalesced with the racial segments 
of white, lighter brown and dark brown. I looked at numerous possible indicators of 
socioeconomic class such as income levels, education, teenage pregnancies, population 
density, size of the residence, unemployment rates, and modes of transportation. Since 
the census does not use fixed labels of socio-economic class I took the lowest and the 
highest average incomes of all neighborhoods, and divided them up in four brackets. 
These I named “below subsistence level,” “working class,” “middle class” and “upper 
class.” It had been my consistent observation that the below subsistence level and 
working class barios have predominantly dark skinned inhabitants, the inhabitants in the 
middle class are of various phenotypes but mostly lighter skinned, and the upper class 
barios are predominantly white. Next, I made lists of neighborhoods that would both fit 
the class brackets as my requirements. In order to determine whether these 
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neighborhoods would indeed fit the requirement of homogeneity I spent many afternoons 
driving and walking around a large selection of neighborhoods to see who lived there, 
and to ask the neighborhood population to describe who lived there. When I had a 
shortlist of barios I tested it on a general audience, asking them to describe these 
neighborhoods for their socioeconomic ranking, racial composition, and their “character.” 
Table 1 shows the five barios that I selected for this study, in relation to some of the 
indicators that I used to determine their socioeconomic class.  
Table 1 Socioeconomic Markers for the 5 Selected Barios 
 Barber 
(rural) 
 
Seru 
Fortuna 
(Seru 
Papaya)  
Otrobanda Janwé Spaanse 
Water 
Median91 gross monthly 
income 
per household in  
Dutch Antillean Florins and 
US Dollars 
3350 
1872 
1200 
670 
1800 
1006 
4500 
2514 
10.000 
5587 
Teenage mothers % 13.1 14.1 8.0 3.0 * 
School participation  
15-19 % 
81.4 74.7 76.8 90 92.6 
Highly educated per  
100 low educated 
17.9 12.0 22.3 73.3 204.4 
Unemployment % 10.6 32.9 18 6.7 2.5 
Source: census 2011, Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao. 
* means that the value is too small 
 
Map 5 shows where these neighborhoods are. The western part of the island is a rural 
area, with lots of uninhabited land and a few small villages. Willemstad, the only urban 
area, is positioned slightly East of the center. The uninhabited area on the Far East is 
private terrain, belonging to an old family of the former colonial elite. The spatial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 For income levels I chose to use the median rather than the average, because it avoids distortions caused 
by outliers. 
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sequence in the class distribution of my selected barios is not representative for the class 
distribution on the island.  
Map 5. The Five Barios 
 
Source: Sombra di Koló Documentary 2014 
 
Introducing The Five Barios 
Barber is a village in Bandabou, the rural area of the island and the part of Curaçao where 
many of the old plantations were situated. It developed as a church village that emerged 
around a plantation. After slavery ended many of the freedmen continued to work on 
these plantations through the share-cropping system called paga tera, which translates as 
“pay for land” (Allen 2007). Since people here are often times descendants from former 
slaves, and since there were far less white or mixed people here than in the city, the 
population is commonly very dark skinned. Barber is considered to be quiet and peaceful, 
the beating heart of the rural area, where traditions are preserved and where people are 
though to be much more polite and less spoiled by urban life. However, the urban 
population also tends to consider Barber – and Bandabou at large - to be intellectually 
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and economically ‘backwards,’ even though many of its inhabitants go to school and 
work in the city. Its income level lies between working and middle class92. 
Barber has two elementary schools, a police office and a fire station, a doctor’s 
office, a small Chinese-owned store, a snèk (a small cafeteria that also sells alcohol), a 
garage and gas pump, and a small branch of a bank. Two small open air parks – Parke 
Nashonal Tio Selcio and Hòfi Royer - host various festivals, such as the Siman di Kultura 
(Cultural Week), tambú drumming performances, Carnival, and political events – all of 
which draw people from the city. Every Sunday there is a market with local products, 
which attracts many city dwellers, tourists and local inhabitants alike, as does a third 
open-air park, Hòfi Pastor, which is home to the island’s biggest tree.  
Seru Fortuna, which ironically means “Hill of Fortune,” is one of the most 
notorious neighborhoods of the island, where many people live around or below the 
poverty line. Seru Fortuna is a rather secluded bario, built on a hill on the north side of 
Willemstad, right underneath the main approach and departure routes of the airport and 
next to Campo Alegre, a large-scale open-air brothel. One must really be headed to Seru 
Fortuna to end up in it; there are no main road leading through it, nor is it at all visible 
from the main road leading to the airport. All you see is a green hill. As a consequence 
many people don’t know exactly where Seru Fortuna is. Still, due the avid news reports 
on its high crime rate and raging poverty everybody knows of it. I have been chastised 
often by upper- and middle-class people for spending ample time there.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92There is quite a range of income levels in the countryside as there are three gated communities, some of 
which are very elite, and there are also a few very poor neighborhoods, as well as some other middle class 
areas. For my sample I selected one of the oldest and most well known villages of the island, one that has 
always been centrally positioned vis-à-vis the other communities in Bandabou, and one that represents an 
average of the experiences in Bandabou.  
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Seru Fortuna started off as Dutch West India Company plantation Steenen Koraal, 
founded in the early 18th century (Huijgers and Ezechiels 1992:139). It however never 
yielded much. In the early 20th century Shell laborers took up residency here, as did 
immigrants from the Eastern Caribbean. In the mid 1970s the government began 
developing the hill and its surroundings. Government agents leased out parts of the land 
so that people could build their own small houses. They also developed another part of 
the neighborhood into a governmental housing project. On the section of the hill 
officially called Seru Papaya (Papaya Hill) but commonly known as Seru Fortuna, the 
government built a total of 560 houses modeled after European row houses. However, 
when finished the houses did not comply with national building codes and were 
considered too small and poorly built. The houses were then allotted to social housing 
services. Before long, segments of the poorest population of the island were moved here. 
During its first decades the neighborhood quickly made a name as one of the worst 
neighborhoods on the island, characterized by crime, substance addiction, violence93, 
gang activity, ill health, school drop outs, unemployment, and teenage pregnancies. Seru 
Fortuna’s population consists of Afrocuraçaoans of predominantly darker phenotypes. 
Few immigrants live here. The neighborhood has a few tiny stores that are run from 
people’s houses. There is an elementary school, a church, a doctor’s office, a 
neighborhood center, and a large soccer field. Other than that there are no resources. 
Otrobanda, the third bario, is an old working class neighborhood in the heart of 
Willemstad. This is where my grandparents lived, back in the day. Otrobanda was built at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Families brought their old feuds with them when they were relocated. The housing services paid little 
attention to these social dynamics. Sometimes warring families became neighbors, which often led to life 
threatening situations. 
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the end of the 18th century. Until the middle of the 20th century the neighborhood had 
housed affluent white people, the mulatto middle class, the white working class, and 
freedmen and enslaved people (Rupert 2012), who all lived next to one another. I selected 
one clearly heterogeneous residential area to see if the discourse on race and nation 
would be different. Also, being the old city center, Otrobanda is one of the most famous 
neighborhoods on the island. The local architecture bears testimony to this diversity. The 
streets and the intricate networks of alleys show a scattering of mansions, alternated with 
small slave and laborer’s houses and middle class houses. However, since the 1969 
laborers revolt the elites left: many of the businesses in Otrobanda had been burned down 
during the uprising. After that the neighborhood quickly deteriorated. Poor immigrants 
from countries such as Jamaica, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Columbia and Venezuela 
moved into the empty houses, as the rents were low. What was more, during the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s the presence of drugs flared up (Interviews respondents #15 and #16, 
see appendix IX). Since the 1990s however, Otrobanda started to gentrify. The 
prevalence of drugs and violence diminished. The Monument Preservation Foundation 
restored many houses, and slowly the neighborhood improved, attracting more affluent 
people and tourists. Today Otrobanda is a working and lower middle class neighborhood 
with some gentrified bubbles mixed in. It is still home to a racially and ethnically diverse 
population.  
Otrobanda forms half of the city center of Willemstad. As of the 19th century it 
has housed numerous schools, churches, convents, retirement homes, the hospital, the 
population register, restaurants, bars, hotels, theaters, and streets full of stores. It has a 
large police and fireman station. Also the Carnival and Seú processions pass through 
 235 
Otrobanda to end on its main square, Brion Plein, the locale for large national 
celebration. It is a waterfront neighborhood, so the cruise ships dock here. Thus since its 
earliest days the bario has important residential, commercial, educational, health oriented, 
religious, recreational and official functions, and nowadays it draws large streams of 
people from all over the island and abroad on a daily basis. 
Janwé on the contrary, is a very quiet neighborhood, which like Barber, 
developed around a Catholic Church. It is a relatively new neighborhood, developed in 
the 1950s. Janwé is inhabited by a well-educated and well-earning middle class. People 
from Janwé are described in general as considerably lighter than in the lower class 
neighborhoods like Seru Fortuna and Barber. Comfortable houses, lush gardens with the 
occasional pool, and SUVs dominate the street view. It is flanked by the Caracasbaaiweg, 
a main road with lots of shops, but the bario itself has very few amenities. Janwé has no 
stores, recreational facilities, or a police or fire station. It does have several elementary 
schools, which attract a lot of traffic from parents dropping of and picking up children, 
and it has a large Catholic Church. 
The last bario is Spaanse Water, which translates as Spanish Water. Here we find 
a cluster of the richest neighborhoods of the island, populated by the old white and light 
skinned Curaçaoan elite, a small but growing darker skinned Curaçaoan elite, and a group 
of wealthy (mostly light skinned or white) immigrants, commonly referred to as “expats.” 
Spaanse Water is built around a large inland water. In colonial times various plantations 
were situated here, as was an asiento, a disembarking site for the slave ships. Nearby 
were the slave camp and slave market Sorsaka, where captives would be fostered back to 
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health after the horrifying Middle Passage. However, over the course of time this history 
has been thoroughly whitewashed, nowadays one cannot easily find overt mention of it.  
In the 1970s Spaanse Water began to develop as a recreational area, mainly for 
the elites who lived in and around the city center. They built weekend getaways and 
vacation homes, but before long people took up permanent residence there. The 
plantations were parceled up and filled up with luxurious villas and resorts, and the 
asiento became one of the neighborhood’s many marinas, still called “Asiento.” The vast 
majority of the inhabitants of Spaanse Water are wealthy, with the exception of a handful 
of people who bought a parcel in the 1970s or 1980s, when land was still cheap. In 
general Spanish Water residents are stereotyped as white elites: business owners, CEOs, 
lawyers, doctors and politicians. They are also stereotyped negatively as former 
colonizers, people who acquired their wealth exploiting others, and who continue to do so 
today. They are admired, feared even, as well as looked upon with envy and disdain, and 
perceived as a group that “sticks to its own,” with little interest in interacting much with 
the masses. Some inhabitants are indeed descendants from planter families, so their riches 
may indeed correspond to colonial exploits. Others are “expats” from the Netherlands or 
elsewhere, who moved to Curaçao during the heydays of the Shell refinery, or who came 
in more recent times to occupy high ranking positions or as entrepreneurs. A small 
segment of the population is made up of non-white Curaçaoans who climbed up the 
social ladder, or who were born into privilege. Yet the area remains overwhelmingly 
white and light-skinned. Spaanse Water is a residential and recreational area. There are 
no schools, churches, stores, or official institutions, but it has all the more restaurants, 
resorts, marinas and water sports facilities.  
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The Respondents 
The people that I interviewed constitute a good sample of the two main racial groups of 
the island since the colonial era: white Europeans, consisting of Dutch Protestants and 
Portuguese Jews; and Afrocuraçaoans. I argue that Curaçao’s color hierarchy developed 
between these main population segments, which during the more than three centuries of 
slavery became so heavily infused with racial significance. Since Curaçao is a trading 
hub, it has always attracted immigrants, both during the colonial era and especially after 
the Shell refinery opened in 1919. Yet these populations, I argue, found a spot in the 
already existing color hierarchy, adding nuances but not determining its substance. In the 
categories of the color hierarchy they are not represented (see appendix I). 
Focused on this particular population segment, I developed a stratified probability 
sample. My aim was to reflect the characteristics of the Curaçaoan population for the 
variables gender, phenotype, and class. Per bario I selected six respondents, equally 
distributed over gender (M/F) and age (18-29 / 30-55 / 56+), thus amounting to a total of 
thirty respondents for the whole sample (see appendix VI for an overview of the 
anonymized respondents). In every single bario I interviewed three men and three 
women, divided equally over the three above-mentioned different generations. Since this 
study addresses the racial dynamics and the color hierarchy of the “old” Afrocuraçaoan 
and white European descendant population segments, these 30 respondents had to have at 
least one parent that was either of Afrocuraçaoan or white Curaçaoan or white Dutch 
descent; people of an ethnically mixed background were acceptable. Also, the 
respondents had to be immersed in the island culture. Recent Dutch immigrants or 
Curaçaoans that had never lived on the island were not part of the sample. These six 
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respondents also had to reflect the composition of the population in the bario for 
phenotype and class. If a bario of 700 people only contains a handful of light skinned 
inhabitants on a significant dark skinned majority the respondents in the sample would be 
dark skinned. Since there are no statistical data on race or skin color I had to make an 
estimate of the racial composition of the neighborhood, hence my extensive driving and 
walking around and extensively asking the respective barios’ inhabitants to describe the 
racial composition of their bario to me.   
To get the variation in class I used the sample of the five barios. To ensure variety 
within these class levels I selected people of a variety of occupations and educational 
levels. Ideally respondents also belonged to differing social networks. But as they are 
from the same neighborhood it was unavoidable that some of the participants knew one 
another and had some relation of some sort. The matrix below, presented in table 2, 
reflects the sample design. Age and gender are less important in this study, since there is 
already a fair body of academic and policy related literature available on both variables, 
specifically with regards to Afrocuraçaoans. It is the relation between class and race that 
remains obscure, reason why it is at the core of this study. The variables of age and 
gender were taken into consideration mainly to generate a sample that reflects Curaçao’s 
population94. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 A thorough analysis of the relation between race, gender and age is not an explicit focus in this study. 
However, I do acknowledge that the nation is highly diverse and complex, and inherently gendered and 
sexualized (Goldberg 2002, Applebaum et al 2003). Research regarding these dimensions of race and 
nation is much needed (see appendix X). 
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Table 2  Sample Design Interviews  
Age 18 – 29 30 - 55 56+ 
Gender M F M F M F 
Phenotype 
(scale)95 
Black - - - white Black - - - White Black - - - White 
Education High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low 
Income level High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low 
Occupation Various  Various  Various 
Social network Various Various Various 
 
For the selection of the respondents, I started with finding various key players for each 
bario (such as community workers and residents) who knew the neighborhood well and 
who had many social ties in the bario. These I found through the sentro di bario or 
“neighborhood centers” that most barios have, and through asking people in my own 
network for such key players. After explaining my project I asked these key players to 
help me find people according to the matrix I provided, I also asked them to introduce the 
research and myself to the potential respondents. Since the focus of my research is a 
rather delicate topic these intermediaries were most helpful in creating a first bit of 
rapport. I met some of my respondents as I was simply walking down the street. 
However, I found the vast majority of my respondents through the networks of others. 
Initially, people were surprised by the research topic: as mentioned, race is not at 
all a common topic of conversation. Also people were surprised that I, a light skinned 
woman who was not raised on the island, was conducting the research. Especially in 
Barber and Seru Fortuna I encountered this response: people indicated that they were not 
used to see a light-skinned person care about racial inequality. In Seru Fortuna, Barber 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The variable for phenotype is a fluid range, not a binary. 
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and Otrobanda people were very enthusiastic about the research project, and immediately 
began sharing stories. It was much harder to find respondents in the middle class 
neighborhood Janwé and upper class neighborhood Spaanse Water. Especially in Spaanse 
Water it happened continuously that potential male respondent in the 30 – 55 age 
category, who had initially agreed to participate, dropped out at the last minute. Those 
who explained why they withdrew said that they were afraid that they would be 
recognizable somehow, and that they would be portrayed as racists. This shared fear of 
being depicted as racist is remarkable, to put it mildly. It at least suggests that people are 
afraid of their own answers. Due to this consistent non-response, the sample of Spaanse 
Water consists of five instead of six respondents. But the white, upper class, male, 30 to 
55-aged segment aside, people from all barios were eager to share their stories.  
 
Interview Protocol 
Initially I had been worried about how to break the silence around the topics of race and 
racism, and get people to talk. As I explained in chapter II, growing up in a society where 
race was practically a taboo topic I had been apprehensive to address it myself. During 
my earlier fieldwork I had expected my respondents to feel the same gene. However, 
during field research conducted in 2006, 2008 and 2010, I had noticed that people very 
comfortably mentioned racial features in describing one another. One of my female 
cousins, born and raised in Curaçao, would always describe her love interests first in 
terms of the color of his skin and the kind of hair he had before she would tell me 
anything else. “He is tall, white, with straight hair and green eyes…”, she would say. I 
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already knew that people speak in racial terms on a daily basis. They just did not 
voluntarily speak about the things that happened to them as a consequence of race.  
Still, initially I was hesitant to ask directly about people’s experiences with their 
skin color and with race in general. Would they get angry, sad, come apart at the seams? 
In my first research design I planned to ask people about the tambú, the deeply rooted yet 
rather controversial Afrocuraçaoan drumming tradition that I discussed previously. In 
December of 2010 I had already conducted preliminary field research on the tambú, and 
the oral testimonials I had collected then and the participant observation I had engaged in 
had shown that tambú’s past and present were deeply embedded in Curaçao’s racial 
divide. But one day, shortly after I had returned to the island in 2011 I ran into an elderly 
lady who I had known for some years in the supermarket. I was in a hurry, but she 
greeted me enthusiastically and asked me what I was working on. I looked for the 
shortest answer and said “I am studying race in Curaçao.” Much to my surprise this 
catapulted her into a lengthy exposé on her experiences with race in elementary school. 
The nuns had been unkind to her as she was one of the black girls in the school. She had 
to sit at the back of the classroom, while the white girls sat in the front. She often got 
punished, slapped on the fingers with a ruler, and was not allowed to ask questions... I 
barely knew this lady, and yet she shared a most intimate story with me.  
I continued to experiment with my one phrase, “I study race in Curaçao,” and 
discovered quickly that in supermarket alleys, on Sunday afternoon beaches, in 
professional meetings, bars, on birthday parties, complete strangers and friends alike 
spontaneously combusted, pouring out their experiences, not to say grievances with race 
in Curaçao. The censure on race and racism is thus specific rather than all encompassing. 
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People did talk with me about race, but not out of the blue. Yet when prompted slightly 
they spoke easily and in depth. I began to notice that when I did not ask a specific set of 
questions but only provided a bare minimum of information on my research–“I study 
race”–people would volunteer all sorts of stories that actively mattered to them, about 
current situations that bothered them, or about things that had happened long ago but that 
had always continued to hurt. Because these deeply personal and emotional stories came 
out so easily and so fast they had a very genuine quality to them. People were not giving 
me politically correct answers, they were really sharing, some were even unburdening 
themselves. Often stories were shared with such zest that it appeared to me that they had 
been kept in too long, as if my small prompt pushed the lid off an old pressure cooker, 
releasing quite a billow of steam.  
During these informal conversations I also noticed that people responded very 
well emotionally. No one collapsed into a heap of psychological distress, and no one got 
stuck in their rage, which is what I feared would happen after reading Robin Sheriff’s 
account of race and racism in a Brazilian slum (2001). There she argues that one of the 
reasons why her respondents generally avoided talking about racism in order to not fuel 
their frustrations, and relive these painful experiences (Sheriff 2001). In my research, 
however, I consistently found that people expressed relief and excitement, about being 
able to unburden themselves without feeling judged, dismissed or reprimanded. Over the 
years I had observed that a common response to talk of slavery and racism is “You 
should let the past be, not keep pulling open old wounds. Slavery ended 150 years ago, 
are you still going on about that?” Or “Racism is in your own mind, if you experience it 
it’s because you were looking for it.” Those answers are very consistent with Bonilla-
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Silva’s findings about “color-blind racism” (2010). Time and time again I saw that 
exhalation, the release, when people spontaneously shared stories they had not been 
invited to share before. Some people even hugged me afterwards, or told me “I have 
never even told this story to my children.” That’s when I decided to reshape my research, 
to abandon the topic of the tambú and instead focus exclusively and frontally on race, 
race relations, and racism in Curaçao, and to use as few questions as I possibly could.  
Given that this is a pioneer study I wanted to take inventory of people’s 
experiences with and narratives about race and nation. What stories are most at the 
surface in people’s lives? Was their discord and contradiction in their stories? What place 
do race and nation occupy in their lives? But also, what topics never arose? I decided to 
create as open an interview model as possible. I expected that this would invite people to 
share whatever topic came to mind, rather than depart from a list of topics that I would 
have formulated, which would be based on my specific set of experiences and 
observations, and on scholarly literature on the working of race and racism in other 
national contexts. It would be unavoidable that such a list would be biased and limited. I 
used my prompt “I study race in Curaçao” as the basis of my interview model and added 
only one open question: “Tell me something about race and color.” This was the start of 
every interview. Rather than leading the directing of the interviews through using a 
premeditated protocol, I followed the respondents into their stories, and asked for 
clarifications along the way. My follow up questions were completely unstructured and 
spontaneous. The only questions that were part of a protocol of sort were about the 
respondent’s demographic profile and the way they described their own skin color (see 
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appendix VII for the interview protocol). The result was a range of very in-depth stories 
that were far broader than the topics I could have selected myself.  
But I had more reasons to choose this unstructured open model. Firstly, it put 
people at ease. Curaçaoans are often afraid to answer questions because they are afraid to 
say the wrong thing and look stupid (Antonius 1996). I have encountered this many times 
when teaching at the Curaçaoan university: ask a question, no one replies. An interview 
about a sensitive, censured topic could have severely aggravated this reluctance to reply. 
But in this interview model I asked people to tell me something that they wanted to share 
rather than what I wanted to hear. I asked them about them, not simply about a social 
phenomenon. Plus my questions had no possible wrong answers: anything people wanted 
to share was perfectly acceptable. I intended to show a genuine interest and respect for 
the person and their story. I was not directing their stories or imposing my thoughts. This 
is an especially important element in the tension between (Afro-)Curaçaoan and Dutch 
people. Ultimately, even though I am partially Dutch and partially Curaçaoan tend to 
label me as Dutch. But I am very light skinned and highly educated. This combination of 
phenotype and class makes that people label me as “blanku” or white96, which in non-
white neighborhoods gives me an outsider status. Because I was not raised on the island, 
and as a consequence my Papiamentu has a Dutch accent, people also label me as Dutch. 
Dutch people are usually seen as very directive, bossy, overly assertive, and seeking to be 
in charge. I actively wanted to avoid or at least diminish this association. Therefore in 
this interview I made sure that my respondents had the lead, and I followed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See appendix I. 
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Another advantage of this “storytelling” method is that it diminished the socially 
desirable response. Some respondents started out with socially desirable or politically 
correct responses or with a specific narrative, but because they talked extensively on the 
topic their conflicting thoughts, schemas and emotions would also surface. This interview 
format provided ample room to follow the narrator in the meanders of his or her memory 
and motions. Some respondents realized, as they heard themselves talk, that they had 
stuck to some idea that was in fact racially oppressive, without them even realizing it97. 
Those were also very interesting moments, for both the respondent and I. Naturally not 
all respondents descended deeply into their emotional memories, mostly because not 
everyone is equally talkative: some people are long winded; others only shared a brief 
story. But I had also built less rapport with some than with the others: not everyone was 
equally comfortable around me.  
This chapter builds on moderate participant observation and informal 
conversations, in order to thicken the interpretations of my findings. 
 
Raceless Narratives  
Theoretically I needed a framework that would guide me in identifying the presence of 
the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology in people’s stories, as well as the covert racist system that 
operates within it. To achieve this I firstly draw on the theories on hegemony and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Those “aha moments” were an unexpected added value. I also noticed that the interviews made people 
think. Not so much about things I said, but because they heard themselves speak. Quite a few people started 
talking with parents, friends, siblings, or children about the topics we discussed. To many it simply had not 
occurred to do that. And many had not thought that they had so much to say about the topic. People were 
often very excited about this. To my joy, many let me know afterwards what the ripple effect of the 
interviews had been. 
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creation of national ideology (Gramsci 1971; Goldberg 1993; Hobsbawm and Ranger 
1983; Trouillot 1993) and on multiculturalism (Brondo 2010; Hale 2002, 2005; Hooker 
2005; Goldberg 2002; Greene 2007; Rahier 2012), which were discussed in chapter 1.  
I combine these with the theory on silence and its various hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic dimensions, presented in chapter 2 (Bourdieu 1977; Goffman 1967; Scott 
1995; Sheriff 2001; Tannen 1985; Trouillot 1995). In this chapter I add an emphasis on 
racelessness and colorblindness, which I mentioned briefly in chapter 1 is a key 
mechanism in multiculturalism.  
 I have argued that Curaçao’s multicultural rendition of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology 
appears to promote diversity and intercultural equality, specifically with regards to the 
Afrocuraçaoan population and culture. However, pro-black empowerment is deflected at 
the same time. “Racelessness” or “colorblindness” is a common way in which 
multicultural ideology promulgates, but as David Goldberg argues, this so-called 
“racelessness” is in fact a mirage. Through formally rendering race and racial categories 
“unnamable” and “unspeakable” (Goldberg 2002:222), racelessness in its various forms 
facilitates rather than eliminates racial inequality, because it remains embedded in the 
very structure of the state and its bureaucracies. It takes away the vocabulary through 
which racial inequality can be discussed and addressed, it prevents addressing the 
historical and structural roots of racial inequalities, and it explains contemporary racial 
inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics, which places them outside of the realm 
of government intervention. This why I place ample emphasis on identifying it in the 
stories presented by my respondents.  
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 Goldberg takes mostly into consideration South African, U.S. and U.K. contexts, 
but scholars such as Charles Hale (2002, 2005), Shane Greene (2007) and Jean Rahier 
(2012) writing about Latin American contexts, identify these same mechanisms of 
oppression. The effect of racelessness, Goldberg argues, is threefold. Firstly, it erases 
reference to European colonialism, exploitation, and current racial marginalization from 
the public debate, “thus reshaping the narrative of European history and memory” 
(Goldberg 2002:217). Second, it censors direct critique or analysis of racism. And thirdly, 
because of these omissions and censors, the “causal connections between colonial 
legacies and contemporary racial conditions in Europe and settler societies” is placed out 
of sight (Goldberg 2002:218). Goldberg therefore views discourses of racelessness as 
“neoliberal attempts” (Goldberg 2002:221) at moving away from racial equality.  
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, who researches race in an American context, elaborates on 
this. He illustrates how in color-blind discourse the role of race is erased (Bonilla-Silva 
2010). Instead, a number of explanatory frames and storylines describes racial inequality 
as the fault of the victim instead of a larger race-based structure. Society is seen as a 
space of equal opportunities that people may or may not choose to use to their advantage. 
Racial inequality is seen as the outcome of individuals and their choices. Affirmative 
action is therefore not needed. The government should not force social change upon 
people; when people are ready for those changes in well-being and life style, they will 
make them. In this explanatory frame racial phenomena are seen as “natural occurrences” 
(Bonilla-Silva 2010:28). Segregation, for example, is seen as the outcome of racial 
groups preferring to live with people who they like and can relate to. They therefore 
“segregate themselves.” 
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These explanations of racelessness or colorblindness, Bonilla-Silva argues, 
require “ignoring the multiple institutional and state-sponsored practices behind 
segregation and being unconcerned about these practices’ negative consequences for 
minorities” (Bonilla-Silva 2010:28). They perpetuate the status quo of white supremacy 
and the perpetuated minority status of blacks and other non-whites, countering 
affirmative actions and reparations, and providing legitimate outlets to express hostility 
and resentment toward non-whites.  
For an understanding of racial marginalization in Curaçao we must also take into 
account the impact of colorism as a specific form of racial discrimination that is 
interwoven with and operates simultaneous to “traditional” racism. Again I borrow from 
American literature on race. Legal scholar and critical race theorist Angela Harris 
explains the difference and interaction between these two types as follows:  
Racism involves discrimination against persons based on their racial identity, 
which in turn is traditionally designated through a complex mix of self-
identification and other-identification through appearance (including color) and 
ancestry. Colorism involves discrimination against persons based on their 
physiognomy, regardless of their perceived racial identity. The hierarchy 
employed in colorism, however, is usually the same one that governs racism: light 
skin is prized over dark skin, and European facial features and body shapes are 
prized over African features and body shapes (Harris 2008:54, see also Banks 
2000; Burton et al. 2010; Hunter 2007).  
Colorism entails (but is not limited to) black-to-black racism (Hunter 2007:238). 
Racism, though quintessentially premised on white supremacy, also takes place between 
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people of color who have internalized white supremacist values. As we saw in previous 
chapters, these values attribute greater privileges to light-skinned people of color 
compared to dark-skinned ones. Even though racism is first premised on the overall racial 
or ethnic category, in a colorist system the actual skin tone is an additional, and often 
determining, factor (Harris 2008; Hunter 2007). As Hunter explains, processes of racial 
discrimination thus take place on what she calls “at least two levels: race and color” 
(Hunter 2007:238). The first level is the systemic racism referred to by Bonilla-Silva 
(2010) and Feagin (2006), which is exercised through ideology and pertains to a specific 
racial group as a whole, regardless of skin tone nuance. On the second level the nuance of 
the actual skin tone exerts an important influence. “Although all blacks experience 
discrimination as blacks, the intensity of that discrimination, the frequency, and the 
outcomes of that discrimination will differ dramatically by skin tone” (Hunter 2007:238; 
see also Banks 2000; Burton et al. 2010; Harris 2008). “Traditional” racism and colorism 
may manifest as “raceless” or “colorblind” racism.  
While the discussion above refers mainly to racial dynamics in white majority 
nations such as the USA and the Netherlands, the contents of the previous two chapters 
show that raceless ideologies are also at work in Curaçao, which has a majority non-
white population98. In this chapter I continue to identify the different manifestations and 
mechanizations of Curaçao’s multicultural ideology of national identity. I specifically 
focus on racelessness as a means to forge an ideology that propagates racial inequality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 There are various other types of racism that can be defined, such as cordial racism (Owensby 2005), and 
silent racism (Trepagnier 2010), as well as many other kinds of discourses that are operational. 
Consequently this study does not seek to be conclusive, but must rather be seen as a first exploration of this 
field, and an invitation to others to extend this line of analysis (see appendix X).  
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and inclusiveness; forge a whitewashed and glorified historiography of the ruling class; 
and deflect subaltern resistance and omit pro-black reform. 
 
Findings from the Bario Case Studies 
The main question I asked was: “Tell me something about race and color.” This yielded 
all sorts of stories, about family ties; romance; having the “right” color children; hair 
styles and getting jobs; the schools of the friars back in the day, and the school system 
today; riding bicycles; not being seen as a full member of the sports team because you 
don’t have the “right” color. There were stories about white privilege and being 
discriminated against on the work floor, and about a Dutch nurse in the 1960s who tried 
to wash off the brown color of her patient’s skin. Not one story was alike, not one story 
addressed the same topic. Also, in each bario certain narratives surfaced that spoke to the 
particular class- and race-based challenges or privileges of its inhabitants. I will first 
present the findings per bario. This makes visible how people perceive and experience 
racial unity as well as inequality in these separate racial and class segments, and how they 
reproduce and critique these hegemonic ideologies.  
 In the second part of the chapter I provide a deeper analysis of the reproduction 
and critique of hegemonic ideology. I specifically seek to identify the influence of 
Curaçao’s multiculturalism. Even though each story had been so different from the next, 
the interviews and observations also yielded a large body of analogous data that revealed 
how people perceived and experienced race, and also how they perceived and 
experienced the role of the national ideology of unity through diversity. For example, 
while someone may not state directly that “black is negative,” their story might illustrate 
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that this is in fact their experience. In similar fashion, my respondents did not say “I am 
trivializing racism” but their stories illustrated that they did. Therefore, in order to 
subtract this data I composed a series of short statements regarding people’s experiences 
with, perceptions of and attitudes towards race and national identity (see appendix IX), 
and analyzed each interview to see if peoples’ stories corroborated these statements or 
not. This is yet another way in which these non-structured interviews allowed me to 
obtain a broad range of data without having to directly ask respondents for it and risking 
getting socially desired answers.  
 Given my explicit interest in identifying the racist objectives of Curaçao’s 
multiculturalism, in the data I specifically looked for the ways in which people 
reproduced the hegemonic national ideology of unity and equality; referred to racial 
inequality; used narrative strategies of racelessness, deflection, trivialization or white-
washing of racism and racial inequality; and their address (or lack thereof) of black 
agency, empowerment and resistance. 
 
Barber 
In the six stories from the rural village Barber the first narrative that surfaced was one 
about Curaçao’s overt racism. The respondents attribute some of the discrimination they 
have suffered to being from a rural area, which the urban population considers backwards 
and inferior. But mostly the respondents, who are all dark skinned, attributed this 
discrimination to racism. In response to my one question, “Tell me something about race 
and skin color” their stories mostly relayed negative experiences. The topics of unity and 
equality hardly arose. 
 252 
The two older men (#1 and #6), both above 40, elaborated on the Catholic 
education they received as children. Through the white-oriented school materials and the 
teachings of the friars they learned early on that black was lesser than white. The books 
they read in the friars’ elementary school, such as the “Puk en Muk en Moortje” series by 
Franciscus van Ostaden, a friar from the order of Tilburg, were full of “coonish” black 
characters casted in dumb, lazy and delinquent roles. The white characters, on the other 
hand, were always smart, proper, and depicted as actual humans. This ridiculing and 
shaming of blackness affected them and his peers greatly, the older respondent said. They 
would demean one another for being black, but the white kids were never teased. “We 
learned that blackness was bad, and being white was good, so everyone tried to be a bit 
lighter,” he said. His story reveals the power of Curaçao’s color hierarchy. But also, as a 
smart and well-behaved child he identified with the white characters: he simply did not 
recognize himself in the black characters. He didn’t think much of the racial inequality 
reproduced in these books until he attended secondary school and started working, which 
was in the 1950s..Initially those books had taught him that only white people could be 
smart, proper and successful. But as a young adult he began to realize that he was just as 
smart–or even smarter– as his white student colleagues and co-workers. This awareness 
led him to counter at least part of the racist ideas that he had internalized.  
Even though he doesn’t think that the books were purposefully made to oppress 
black people, he does say that the Dutch friars favored white and light skinned kids over 
the darker skinned ones. This was a societal trend, he said, which generated envy and 
resulted in a community that has remained divided by color. As an adult he observed the 
same attitude among his bosses, who pitted their employees against one another. 
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“Therefore people of color are never united,” he said. “There is always jealousy, envy 
and competition. This way we never make progress as a group.” His story challenges the 
unifying tenet of the ideology of national identity: Curaçaoans are too divided to ever 
unify. At the same time it also exemplifies the power of racist indoctrination—it took him 
a while to figure out that these representations of blacks in school materials were 
incorrect and hurtful to him. Also, he partially trivialization of the active role of the friars 
in racist knowledge production. Still, his story also demonstrates his awareness of racial 
inequality, as well as his critique on it. 
The two younger women (#1 and #3) both shared stories about how colorism 
plaid out in their contemporary school settings. The younger respondent (#1) experienced 
discrimination and segmentation in the racially diverse high school she attends, the other 
respondent (#3) described how in the all-black elementary school where she teaches 
children tease and bully each other with racist imagery and insults. This black-to-black 
discrimination illustrates how these young children have already internalized the tenets of 
white supremacy, and use them to strike at their peers, and criticize and curtail 
themselves.  
Except for the young male respondent (#2) everyone said they witnessed and 
experienced racism personally. The two older male and the middle female respondent 
(#3, #4 and #6), however, told me that they were successful at not letting such things hurt 
them, to the extent that for #3 and #4 especially it is hard to even name incidents. This 
indicates a narrative of deflection and trivialization of their experiences with racism. The 
youngest female respondent (#1) was considerably more weighed down by the racism she 
experienced, but respondents #3 and #6 elaborated on their coping mechanisms. The 
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female respondent #3 described to me that she puts negative behaviors or comments in 
the wind and lets them blow away; the senior male respondent (#6) said that he has a 
special drawer in his mind where he stores such occurrences, so they don’t affect him, he 
says. He has always known exactly who he is and where he is headed: racist comments 
and actions have not held him back. But it takes effort. It takes years to dominate these 
coping mechanisms.  
These six respondents talked about these events with emotional distance, as 
observers of these unpleasant moments rather than as emotionally reliving them. Sheriff 
(2001) states that it hurts to remember and talk about such personal experiences, and 
people direct their efforts daily at not feeling this hurt. But when I was at the school to 
conduct the interview with the female respondent in her thirties, some of her pupils 
wanted to talk with me: three young boys of 11 and 12 years old, all dark skinned. She 
had told her students about my study, and they had been waiting for me for weeks, she 
tells me. So we sat down with them on the school’s patio. They told me about the names 
they are called by their peers: “tar,” “dirty motor oil,” “Zulu,” “slave,” etc. When they 
come home from school they often feel sad, listless from these verbal attacks. Sometimes 
it makes them cry. At night they pray to God to give them a lighter skin the next day, 
they say. The spontaneously shared stories of these young boys do reveal how racism 
wounds. The contrast between their emotional rawness and the many stories that would 
follow, which were all told by adults, is an indication of people learning to hide their 
emotions, as Sheriff argues, in order to protect themselves from the pain, and from 
possible repercussions (Sheriff 2001).  
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I had expected the respondents from Barber to be more connected to the past of 
their families. Several of them live on land they inherited from their ancestors, who had 
been born in slavery and bought parts of the land they had been forced to work on. But 
my respondents didn’t seem to have much interest in their family histories, or they 
preferred to not speak of them. No one mentioned slavery, plantation life, the white 
plantation owners, not even when I asked about it. Other pivotal moments in the 
emancipatory history of the island and its black population, such as the revolt of May 30th 
1969 and the positive effects it engendered, only surfaced briefly in the interview with 
the teacher (#3) classes. She draws from this history of black empowerment, and also 
hints at the unifying and egalitarian message that the national ideology promulgates, to 
teach her pupils to stop bullying. She told me: “Black people are not bad, we are 
charismatic people, hard workers; we also have leading positions in society today.” But a 
little while later she says: “Nothing that is black is good,” when indicating how the color 
black has so many negative connotations. She urges her students to not tease each other 
with being black, “because when someone says that to me I will think I’m the blackest.” 
Her tone implies that being the blackest is the worst thing one can be. In her educational 
strategy both the ideology of equality as that of racial inferiority surfaced, which exist 
and operate side by side.  
No one mentioned the notion of the “Yu’i Kòrsou.” The young male respondent 
(#2) did express his appreciation of Curaçao’s diversity, which is central in the Yu’i 
Kòrsou ideology: he stated that we are all the same, and that he likes everyone in equal 
measure. He thus did replicate the tenets of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology. But like the senior 
male respondent he too added that unfortunately there is no unity in Curaçao: people are 
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too focused on nuances in skin tones, and on being envious of each other’s possessions 
and social status. 
 
Seru Fortuna 
In Seru Fortuna people did not talk about unity and equality when I asked them to talk 
about race and color: they did not reproduce the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology. Some of the 
respondents started off saying that they never experienced discrimination, but as their 
stories unfolded everyone addressed the impact of overt racial inequality on their lives, 
and the many challenges they face on a daily basis as dark skinned people living in a 
poor, black neighborhood.  
The dominant narrative in Seru’s stories attests to the extreme marginalization its 
population faces. Two younger female respondents (#7 and #9), respectively dark 
skinned and a bit lighter brown, talked about how difficult it is to get into a good school 
or to get a job. People enroll their children but will be informed that the school is full, 
while lighter skinned children or children with a higher social status are accepted: the 
school was never full to begin with. Respondents brought up this racist, exclusive 
measure in regards to both primary and secondary education. Children from Seru Fortuna 
often have to attend schools outside of their bario. There is an elementary school, but 
there is no secondary education. In those schools Seru Fortuna’s youth is often perceived 
as not performing well, and as being troublemakers by default. The female respondent in 
her forties (#9) has three children in high school. She spoke of the impact of poverty, and 
how the many disadvantages that are related to it may interfere with their school 
performance. Children from barios like Seru Fortuna struggle at home with the 
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challenges that poverty brings, such as malnutrition, parents that have addictions or who 
are never home because they work two or three jobs, having to watch siblings and take 
care of the household’s chores. They may be traumatized by the violent incidences they 
observe at home or elsewhere in the bario, or by being assaulted or abused themselves. A 
social worker working at an elite school once breathed a sigh of relief to me that she did 
not have to work with “those kids.” “They are too much for me,” she said, “the sadness, 
the problems they experience.” She works at one of the white schools, where, as she 
explained, children have less dramatic problems. With regards to opportunities on the job 
market, the two younger women (#7 and #9) and the male respondent in his thirties (#10), 
say that as soon as people hear that you are from Seru Fortuna your chances to get a job 
diminish considerably.  
In interactions with people from outside the bario I often experienced how strong 
Seru’s stigma is. The first time I heard the story about children from Seru Fortuna not 
easily getting into the better ranking schools, I remember having some doubts about 
whether this was an incident, or indeed a structural problem, as the women who told me 
the story indicated. I had just met with my first respondent in Seru Fortuna. It had been a 
nice day, and she had told me some of her stories off the record. They were delicate 
stories, about her trying to make a life in the face of poverty’s challenges and continuous 
societal rejections. A young man I knew had walked with me around the bario. He 
showed me areas that had been particularly bad, with bullet holes in the walls. But also 
the soccer field, the small patches of land at the edge of the bario where people kept goats 
and grew vegetables, and the small square next to the neighborhood center, where after 
school teenagers played domino under a large tree. Evening came and I had another 
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appointment, so I left. I recorded my field notes in the car and drove down the hill, 
headed towards the city, where I would meet up with a friend to dance salsa. As I 
watched the many small, colorful houses of the hill change into big streets with stores I 
was painfully aware of Curaçao’s spatial order. I regretted to have made plans to go 
dancing. I needed more time to digest my experiences.  
I met with my friend and we sat down on the terrace of the fancy club. Two well-
dressed dark skinned men approached us and began to make small talk. “What have you 
lovely ladies been up to tonight?” one asked. I answered him that I had spent my day on 
Seru Fortuna, and I mentioned my research project. Immediately his face cringed, and his 
friend looked horrified. I continued, recounting the story that had touched me most: 
“People there tell me that it is hard to get into a good school, for as soon as the school 
hears they are from Seru they will say they are full.” “But of course!” the man replied. He 
explained that he himself was a high school teacher at one of the white, elite schools. He 
said:99  
They cannot pay the tuition so they cancel themselves out. Which is good, you 
don’t want children like that in your school! We are an A grade school, we want 
to keep that status, not have it ruined by children like that, who cannot perform. 
 I looked at him, speechless. I discovered later that he and his friend came from higher 
middle class backgrounds, as I had suspected. My hesitation to fully believe the extent of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 There are 35 elementary schools in Curaçao. Only five of them have Dutch as the main language of 
instruction, and one of them is an international school taught in English. The remaining 25 schools are 
mainly taught in Papiamentu. But the five Dutch schools are highly popular because early instruction into 
the Dutch language means that children are better prepared for studying in the Netherlands after high 
school. And since Dutch is a language that has a high professional value a good mastery of Dutch increases 
children’s chances for better jobs and overall upward social mobility. Also, education in these Dutch 
schools is of a higher quality compared to most of the Papiamentu speaking schools. These schools cost 
more, so they can afford better materials and they attract teachers. 
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the discrimination in local school my respondent had talked about that afternoon in Seru 
Fortuna waned. These two men confirmed my respondent’s story of marginalization and 
racism. In the following months I got many confirmation of that kind.  
There are 35 elementary schools in Curaçao. Only five of them have Dutch as the 
main language of instruction, and one of them is an international school taught in 
English. The remaining 25 schools are mainly taught in Papiamentu. Between 1935 and 
1987 the language of instruction in all schools was Dutch (Narain 1997:24), and was thus 
taught as a first language, even though the vast majority of the pupils did not speak Dutch 
when starting elementary school. In 1987 this changed. The advantage of Papiamentu 
schools for children who have been raised speaking Papiamentu is that they have an 
easier start in education than if they would get education in Dutch, which at that age often 
is a foreign language to them. However, early instruction into the Dutch language means 
that children—and especially those who already master Dutch when starting school—do 
better at their “state” exams, which are in Dutch100 (see also Farkas 2008), and are better 
prepared for studying in the Netherlands after high school. Also, since Dutch is a 
language that has a high professional value, a good mastery of Dutch increases children’s 
chances for better jobs and overall upward social mobility, both on the island and in the 
Netherlands. But what’s more, education in these Dutch schools is of a higher quality 
compared to most of the Papiamentu speaking schools. Enrollment into Dutch schools 
cost more, so they can afford better materials and attract better teachers. They look for 
parents who are affluent enough to pay these costs. Speaking Dutch is, as discussed in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 State exams taken in secondary level education are the same exams as the ones taken in The 
Netherlands. They are taken on the same day. 
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chapter 1, a gatekeeping mechanism in and of itself. But the selection procedures at these 
schools, which appear to be mostly race- and class-based, are additional gatekeeping 
mechanisms that keep the poor black population out of these schools, and favor the Dutch 
speaking elites and middle classes.  
The stories that my respondents shared about not easily finding a job were also 
corroborated continuously. Time and time again people from outside of the bario would 
make disapproving faces or cringe when the topic of hiring someone from Seru Fortuna 
came up. A CEO of a bank confided in me that one of her employees is from Seru 
Fortuna. She however confessed that she didn’t find out until many years later: the 
employee had listed an address outside of the bario when applying. He had always been 
exemplary, she said, and she felt sad that he had not dared to be honest about where he 
came from. But she also acknowledged that, had she known that he lived in Seru Fortuna, 
he probably would not have gotten a shot at the job. A dark skinned high school student 
told me a similar story. She did not live in Seru Fortuna itself. Instead, she lived with her 
mother at the Seru Fortunaweg, which is the road that circles around the bario. When she 
applied for a job at the McDonalds the manager concluded that she was from Seru 
Fortuna, based on the name of her street. He would not hire her, because in his 
experience the people from that bario could not be trusted. She applied for the job again, 
but listed her father’s home address, which was in the middle class neighborhood 
Jongbloed. She got hired right away.  
The systematic race-based discrimination that inhabitants from Seru experience in 
both education and employment severely limits them in their social upward mobility. 
And it creates a narrative inside the neighborhood that engenders a sense of hopelessness 
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and unworthiness among the inhabitants. Speaking with the teenagers who so often play 
and sit under the huge tree on the square I heard how much they want to work, to be 
taken seriously, to get an education, have a positive prospect for the future, and to help 
provide for their families. But over the months that I conducted research in the bario I 
noticed that they don’t get much of a chance. Instead these teenagers constantly 
stomached rejection. Out of frustration and necessity people look for other—often 
criminal—options, for which they become stigmatized as delinquent and social predators. 
The dark skinned male respondent in his thirties (#10) says: 
No one wants to sell or carry drugs. It is a dangerous, raw lifestyle. It is hurtful, 
not fun. But when your fridge is empty and your family is hungry you have to 
find a solution. 
As previously mentioned, in 2014 I joined a government-led working group that 
was originated to attend to the UN Decade of People of African Descent. The objective 
was to create a policy plan for the government in which it would again—or finally—
address racial inequality. This allowed me to repeatedly bring up these issues in formal 
governmental meetings and in informal conversations outside of Seru Fortuna. But I 
noticed that in this setting some people were eager to refute the correlation between race 
and class. This pervasive trivialization fits into the mold of the raceless and colorblind 
racism that is part of Curaçao’s multiculturalism. “People from Seru Fortuna are lazy, 
they rather get involved in crime than working an honest job,” I heard so very often, or 
“they don’t want to study, they have no ambition, so it’s no wonder that they never get 
anywhere.” In current policy making in Curaçao race and racial inequality are not 
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addressed, which allows race based inequality and discrimination to persist relatively 
unchallenged.  
Instead of considering the linkage between poverty and racial marginalization, 
social policy in Curaçao tends to focus more on dysfunctional families and specific 
cultural patterns and mentalities, often even as a heritage from slavery. However, the 
explanation of racial inequality through an alleged cultural inferiority is part of colorblind 
racism, Essed (1991) and Bonilla-Silva (2010) argue. Minority status is rationalized as “a 
product of their lack of effort, loose family organization, and inappropriate values” 
(Bonilla-Silva 2010:40, see also Essed 1991). A cultural approach to marginalization 
silently rests on the assumption of racial inferiority. The stories from and about Seru 
Fortuna bring these mechanizations of colorblind racism into clear focus.  
The second dominant narrative I heard in Seru Fortuna is a rebuttal of the deep, 
negative stigma directed at the bario. “The neighborhood used to be really bad, but it has 
improved greatly,” respondents said repeatedly. The bad guys died, are in jail, or they 
moved away, so now Seru Fortuna is a very lovely bario.” While the intense crime and 
violence has absolutely lessened over time, and while to me Seru Fortuna also was a 
young, lively and friendly bario, this positive narrative deflects and trivializes the fact 
that Seru Fortuna is still a very poor, secluded neighborhood, with small, run down 
houses, car wrecks, heaps of garbage, and a plague of stray cats. Crime and violence has 
lessened, but not dissolved. Barber is perhaps considered “backwards” due to its rural 
character, but it is considered a “proper” bario, full of hardworking, God-fearing 
Christians. In comparison, Seru’s income level is much lower, its unemployment rate 
considerably higher, its high school participation and level of education is lower, and 
 263 
there still is a considerable amount of crime and violence. There is little to be called 
“lovely” about that. 
 
Otrobanda 
To outsiders Otrobanda is a working class neighborhood, with an ethnically and racially 
very diverse population. This is bario is heterogeneous in ethnicity, as it has a significant 
immigrant population. It is also somewhat mixed in socioeconomic class, with some 
people that have a lower middle-class income, but the vast majority of the bario belongs 
to the working class. From the start the leading narrative amongst my Otrobanda 
respondents was that there was little to no racism in Otrobanda because the bario has 
always been a happy mix of races and ethnic groups that live in harmony and equality. 
This narrative closely resembles the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology, even though none of the 
respondents actually used that term. Some of the six respondents—especially the older 
ones—claim that Otrobanda’s diversity is what Curaçao is truly like: unified and mixed.  
The female respondent in her forties (#15), a brown skinned woman, is a fervent 
advocate of Otrobanda’s unified-in-diversity identity. She took me on walks through Rif, 
one of the old residential sections of this inner city bario. Built in the 18th century, Rif is a 
maze of little streets and alleys. I was amazed. I thought I knew Rif. My grandparents 
used to live here, and I used to work in this part of the city. Yet, I had never really 
noticed the story that this old architecture told. Even though I had walked these streets 
and alleys so many times, I still did not notice that the dilapidated 18th century mansions 
stand shoulder to shoulder with the smaller houses of the middle classes and the tiny 
quarters of freedmen and slaves. I had never realized that the streets were only two or 
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three meters wide, so everyone really lived on top of one another. My respondent argued 
that Otrobanda’s architecture is the brick and mortar proof that this bario had always been 
diverse yet unified with regards to class and race. She emphasized the inclusive 
atmosphere of the bario, and the cordiality and intimacy between the different population 
segments. But when I asked if people of different colors and classes were truly intimate, 
if they were friends who sat on the stoops and shared beers, or married each other, or 
attended each other’s weddings, she responded: “No, things were not exactly like that.” 
Interactions were neighborly, friendly but superficial. Neighbors might borrow a cup of 
salt or sugar, or visit when someone is ill. “It was more of an exchange of things in times 
of need. Today it is still like that,” she said.  
Otrobanda’s respondents vary in phenotype. The senior male respondent (#18), a 
very light skinned man, told with pride that his grandparents were an inter-racial couple, 
and that his white grandfather was very much in favor of marrying a dark skinned 
woman. He went to school with children of all colors and class backgrounds, without 
noticing these differences. Sometimes his mother would send him out to bring food to 
some needy family in another street. He never realized that she sent them food because 
they were poor, and that poverty often correlated with skin tone. He particularly 
remembers the brown boys in his neighborhood for being really good at sports, which he 
also loved. He mentioned that when he grew up these racial divides were not that 
important. The revolt of 1969 was the turning point. Afterwards, he argued, the 
politicians heavily fuelled the racial divide with ideas about Antillianization and 
creolization. He clearly was not enthusiastic about the revolt and the reform it brought. It 
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changed Otrobanda forever, he said. The white elites left, and the bario dilapidated. The 
revolt did not bring much good.  
What stands out most in his account is his appreciation of the Church, and his 
challenge of the anti-colonial narrative that depicts Europeans as harmful individuals. He 
says: 
What you hear a lot in Curaçao is that the Dutch have come with their slaves, and 
there are people who keep stressing that to this very day, how that influence 
continues to this day. It hurts, it bothers, it oppresses. The assumption is that it has 
a negative influence on a group of people. So people bring this to the front, people 
believe this, still. What I wish to say is that it is true, historically, that Europeans 
brought slaves here. But what I would also like to say is that the same Europeans, 
and in this case the Dutch, brought a lot of clergy […] who have done great great 
work in Curaçao. Especially with regards to education and providing care for 
people.  
Contrary to the respondents in Barber, he is most appreciative of the efforts of the 
Catholic Church. He described some racist practices of the clergy, who clearly favor 
white over black. This he condemned. However, to him the good work they did with 
regards to providing the black population with education and health care was paramount. 
He perceived the Church as instrumental in black empowerment, not as an instrument of 
colonial oppression.  
Over the years I have often encountered this depiction of European people as 
benevolent and praise worthy, especially with regards to the Dutch missionaries and the 
Church, and as I discussed in Chapter I, with regards to the monumentalized architecture. 
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Indeed, the majority of the schools on the island have been set up by the Catholic Church, 
as are all the big hospitals. They have been incredibly instrumental in developing 
Curaçao’s education and healthcare, and in stimulating cultural life and the use of the 
Papiamentu language. Both black and white people feel strongly about this. So the 
pluralization of Europeans that this senior male respondent introduces certainly is 
justified. However, in his particular wording he trivializes and deflects the scale and 
impact of Curaçao’s slavery, and the systemized race-based inequality that results from 
this. The wrongs done by colonialism were balanced out by the good done by the Church, 
he reasoned. His story is thus a hegemonic one, and fits in with what I call the discourse 
of “gratitude” that I have often encountered in both the white and the black community. 
The tenet of this discourse is that:  
Black people should be grateful that they were colonized and shipped here, 
otherwise they would still walk around like the savages they were, naked or in 
grass skirts, living in huts made of straw and clay. Now they are civilized, now 
they can read and write! 
But I argue that this narrative of gratitude again places the complexity of the role 
that the Catholic Church played and continues to play in Curaçaoan society out of sight. 
It deflects past and present Church-led indoctrination of the masses in white supremacist 
ideology (Allen 2007), and instead presents the white elites as benevolent, and as 
successful heroes that built a phenomenal nation (Goldberg 2002). 
Still, in Otrobanda, the signs of racial inequality were also abundant. The lighter 
skinned participants (#15, #17 and #18) claim to not have had any personal experience 
with racism, even though they all mention witnessing it at work, in school, in the street, 
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even in Church (in the past the pews in the front were reserved for white people, and 
black nuns ranked lower to white nuns). Their stories also described racism among 
people of color, like the story about a black mother who instructed her black daughter to 
only sit next to white children in class. When the girl had to sit next to a black classmate 
she cried and cried, afraid of her mother’s reprimands. The two younger men (#14 and 
#16) both of a darker phenotype, shared various personal experiences with racism, 
especially with regards to work. The youngest male respondent was particularly irritated, 
time and time again seeing the jobs he applied for go to white people, while he never got 
a call back. The male respondent in his thirties, a dark skinned Rastafarian, talked about 
his dread locks, which in Curaçao are stigmatized as the hairdo of rebels, delinquents and 
criminals. “If you have locks you can only get a job in construction,” he said. There they 
don’t care what you look like, as long as you do the work. Everywhere else people will 
tell you to cut and shave your hair and beard.” For many years he covered his locks 
because they were so negatively stigmatized, until he realized that he was in fact bowing 
to the system of white supremacy that he sought to defy with his hairstyle. The youngest 
man also mentions this respectability politics regarding to hair (Allen 2009, see also 
Besson 1993; Stoler 2002; Thomas 2004; White 2010; Wilson 1969). The norms 
regarding to what is “proper” are based on the somatic norms image of the white elites 
(Hoetink 1958). When he wanted to grow out his afro-textured hair the school 
management told him to cut it. “One has to look proper when wearing the school 
uniform,” the school explained to him, and dreadlocks or too long an afro simply are not 
proper. Over the years I noticed time and time again that this code regarding hair is 
indeed very strong in Curaçao. As I illustrated in chapter 2, I grew up not even knowing I 
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had such big curls. The recent change in fashion on the global stage eases the shame on 
naturally worn afro-textured or big, curly hair. Particularly girls are increasingly wearing 
their hair natural, but locks continue to be perceived as distasteful.  
 
Janwé 
Janwé is a well-off bario, with a mainly well-educated and lighter skinned population: 
this perspective is shared by outsiders and insiders alike. Their houses, lifestyles and 
occupations demonstrated their higher socio-economic status and social upward mobility. 
However, the respondents of Janwé did not share a clear narrative about their bario, like 
the people of Seru Fortuna and Otrobanda did. The respondents also did not refer to the 
larger ideology of national identity of unity and equality, but the younger female 
respondents (#19) and (#21), who are respectively very light skinned and “red101,” did 
refer to the racial mixedness of their own families, and stated that this mixedness is 
normal for Curaçao. Their stories suggest that hybridity is a national symbol of Curaçao, 
and in spite of an explicit reference to it, obviously adhere to the national narrative or 
Yu’i Kòrsou and its praise of diversity and hybridity, including its proclamation of the 
insignificance of race and skin color.  
The respondents of Janwé varied in skin color. Both the youngest (#19) and the 
senior female respondents (#23) are very light skinned. Especially the senior female 
respondent’s story attests to the power of light privilege as part of Curaçao’s colorist 
system. In the 1940s she was one of the first young light skinned black woman to work as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 See Appendix I. 
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a shop employee at a prestigious white store. Beforehand those positions were only open 
to white girls: people of color worked in the back of the store. In the 1940s the 
government however made it mandatory to employ non-white local people, so these jobs 
opened up mainly to light skinned people. She got the job and worked there until her 
retirement. In her story the gratitude discourse also surfaces, both to her kind and caring 
employers and to her Church. But her story also indicates that as a young, unmarried, 
light skinned black woman she was economically vulnerable. The virginity complex 
(Stoler 2002), which I elaborated on in chapter 2, had in pre-emancipation Curaçao 
applied to white women. But after emancipation it became part of the Catholic Church’s 
civilization mission (Allen 2007:215). These Eurocentric social standards of conduct 
demanded that “proper” women of color lived by the norms of virginity, chastity, 
monogamy and the sanctity of marriage, and ideally did not venture out of the house and 
work (Allen 2007:166, see also Stoler 2002; Thomas 2004). For many women of color 
this bida drechi (proper life) was not an option, given the fact that with or without a male 
partner, they lived in poverty and had to sustain their families. Furthermore, a marriage 
ceremony was costly. Women who did not live by these norms were much more free in 
their comings and goings, but they paid a price for it (Allen 2007). My respondent 
described how children born out of wedlock, called yu di piká or “child born in sin” 
would not be accepted into the good schools, could not get the better jobs, and did not 
easily receive the sacraments in Church102 (see also Allen 2007:161). Her parents had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Allen writes that children born out of wedlock would be shamed with names such as: “yu di skuridat’ 
(child of the dark), “yu di puta” (child of a whore), “yu di porko” (child of a pig), or “yu di diabel” (child of 
the devil) (2007: 158, 161). To this day people that are sexually active but that are not married are not 
allowed to receive the Eucharist sacrament (take the wine and bread), nor can they play any role in 
organizing Church’s activities. 
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been married, which was crucial in her getting this particular job. But she had to work 
since her family needed the extra income after her father passed away. Women of color 
that aspired to live a bida drechi could not work just anywhere, but this job at a fancy 
white store was appropriate. She was very lucky, she said, to have gotten the position. 
Her story not only illustrates the advantages light people received in Curaçao’s colorist 
system, but also of the way in which the white supremacist norms instilled by the Church 
could both enhance and limit the social upward mobility of people of color, especially in 
the time period she refers to—the first half of the 20th century. 
All Janwé’s respondents brought up overt racism, whether they witnessed it, or 
experienced it. Their stories illustrate that racism does not disappear as one gets higher up 
the social ladder. Like in Otrobanda, in Janwé the most troubling stories about racism 
were told by men. The older male respondent (#24), a dark skinned bank manager with 
an international career, initially stated that nowadays people of color have moved upward 
considerably. After May 30th 1969 the boundaries between the racial tiers became more 
permeable for blacks, with the result that many Afrocuraçaoans today head large 
multinational companies and work jobs their parents never could have dreamed of. These 
are indeed imperative and long standing victories. But he also spoke about constantly 
being undervalued and underestimated as a person of color, whether it was in a casual 
setting, like people not serving him at a bar or a restaurant, or on the work floor. In this 
account we clearly identify Essed’s everyday racism (1991). She uses this notion to refer 
to (white) people’s surprise about the accomplishments of black people, whom they still 
assumed to be inferior. “As a person of color you must learn to suppress your emotions,” 
he said. It is dangerous to challenge racist actions: you may loose your job, customers, 
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business partners or investors. Because of this fear people of color not only acknowledge 
white supremacy but are often forced to bow to it, making this self censure a 
complicitous silence (Bourdieu 1977), which perpetuates the racial status quo.  
The male respondent in his thirties (#22), who has a brown skin color, 
emphasized that it is difficult for a person of color to start your own business. White 
people, whether Dutch or island elites, have their networks that give them easy access to 
real estate, investors, loans even, he argued. A “good” family name can already make all 
the difference. But what is more is that Curaçaoans themselves prefer to do business with 
white people instead of with their own people. White people are considered to be more 
reliable, professional, better educated, and more capable, he said. He observes a clear 
color line in the commercial world: black Curaçaoans usually run small businesses, 
whereas large and higher end establishments are white-owned. There are however no 
qualitative or quantitative data on loans, property ownership, and commercial activity, 
which points out a gaping hiatus in the knowledge available on racial status quo of 
Curaçao’s economic sector. Nonetheless it is common knowledge that the majority of 
Curaçao’s hotels, restaurants, resorts, clubs, large stores, banks, law firms, and all sorts of 
larger retail businesses are white owned103. Chinese and East Indian people also own a lot 
of businesses and properties, especially in retail, but they fall outside of the color 
hierarchy104.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Especially the hospitality sector is known to be largely foreign –and white– owned, to cater to whites, 
and to have lots of white, foreign interns and employees. In 2015 the management of Mambo Beach, one of 
the large hospitality areas of Curaçao, informed the owners of the recently opened bars and clubs on their 
strip that they want less black people there. It expressed a strong preference to substitute nights with local 
bands with house and lounge music; music that appeals to white people. 
 104	  See appendix I. 
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The youngest male respondent (#20) is a light skinned man in his twenties. He 
talked about the laziness of the Curaçaoan, something that he himself suffers from also, 
he complained. It is so hard to get motivated sometimes, to get off the couch and do the 
work that we know helps us advance in life. He wondered, could it be self-sabotage? Yet 
he did not consider the possible racial dimension of this self-sabotage, as part of 
internalized racism. But when he spoke about racism he said: “I have never felt 
discriminated against, because I don’t go looking for it.” This expression clearly belongs 
to color blind or raceless discourse, and suggests that racism is self-induced and results 
from “inappropriate” behavior, and that it can be easily ignored (Essed 1991; Bonilla-
Silva 2003).  
What Janwé’s stories illustrate is the greater opportunities for upward social 
mobility that the respondents experience. Some came from a poor background and 
worked their way up, others were born into this social-economic class. Their economic 
and educational position, reinforced by the good reputation of their bario, is stronger 
compared to that of the respondents in the previous barios. Especially the darker 
respondents still experience racist exclusions, but their higher social standing helps them 
to continue to move upwards, which for their lower class counterparts is more difficult. 
Also, some of the respondents in this sample are considerably lighter than those in the 
other neighborhoods, so in Janwé’s stories the impact of Curaçao’s colorist system also 
show. Some of the respondents, especially the lighter skinned ones, make reference of 
these advantages.  
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Spaanse Water 
To outsiders the neighborhood Spaanse Water is both fancy and uppity: the inhabitants 
are perceived as mostly white people who stick to their own, who do not easily socialize 
with those who are less affluent and less white. In fact, Spaanse Water’s residents are 
thought of as having gained their wealth through the exploitation of non-whites. From the 
stories of the respondents themselves there does not arise one clear narrative. The two 
senior respondents (#28 and 29), are both born to affluent white Dutch parents who 
worked and lived on the island at the beginning of the Shell era. Growing up during the 
1930s, 40s and 50s they both experienced Curaçao as a very segregated island. They were 
not allowed to interact with people of color, nor did they easily get into contact with 
them. Often even the servants were white, the older lady says: they were recently 
immigrated, poor Portuguese workers. Both describe that it felt as if they lived in a 
bubble of whiteness. Especially the senior male respondent experienced that as a lack; 
nowadays he deliberately looks for more interaction with black people. The three 
younger respondents (#25, #26 and #27) grew up in different times. The two younger 
female respondents both have black partners, and the young male respondent talks about 
having many friends of color and from different classes, and playing in a mixed base-ball 
team. Their stories allude to Curaçao’s ideology of diversity and unity. 
Inequality, segregation and racism are themes that all respondents from Spaanse 
Water address, and the three younger respondents argue that they continue to exist. The 
female respondent in her forties spoke about her white, Jewish family owning slaves in 
the past. She showed me an authentic bill of purchase that she had recently discovered in 
the family archives, and points out that on it six slaves are listed together with livestock 
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and furniture, as if they were not humans but property. It had shocked her to see this 
because it had been a silenced part of her heritage. She argued that enslaved people do 
not get credit for building the island; it was their forced labor that made Curaçao into 
such a rich and important colony. But even though she rejects slavery and all the horror it 
entailed, she also views it as an unfortunate but necessary condition in Curaçao’s 
development into the prominent “nation” it is today.  
The stories convey that the respondents speak of inequality, segregation and 
racism from an “outsider’s” point of view; their stories indicate that they themselves are 
not adversely affected by racism. Spaanse Water’s residents benefit from the privileges 
brought about by their whiteness, whether they actively pursue or protect these privileges, 
or critique them, like the young female respondent does (#25). She herself is light 
skinned from a mixed race background, and has experienced how this privilege operates 
in her personal context. 
Interestingly, in this bario respondents finally actively refer to the Yu’i Kòrsou 
ideology and identity. The two older respondents, both born to Dutch parents, referred to 
the unifying and egalitarian Yu’i Kòrsou ideology, and made reference to the 
“multiculturalism” of contemporary unified Curaçaoan society to explain why there is no 
more racism today. They both celebrate Curaçao’s diversity and feel that racism belongs 
to the past. Afrocuraçaoans focus too much on their history of slavery, the senior female 
respondent explained, which traps them in a negative mentality of inferiority. Only they 
can set themselves free. She perceived racism as personal and self-induced, which is an 
expression of raceless racism (Bonilla-Silva 2010). 
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However, the female respondent in her forties (#27) and the young male 
respondent (#26), both white Curaçaoans, refer to their Yu’i Kòrsou identity with regards 
to being discriminated against by Afrocuraçaoans. These two respondents, who self-
identify as Yu’i Kòrsou because they were born and raised on the island, indicate that as 
rich white or light skinned individuals they often feel discriminated against by people of 
color, and have to defend the fact that they too are Yu’i Kòrsou. Among the non-white 
population there is a noticeable disdain for the white and light skinned elites, which is 
comprised of resentments about past and present white privilege and black 
marginalization. This resentment is not commonly expressed in strong counter-
hegemonic discourse. Some of the previous respondents explained that non-white people 
often choose to remain silent instead out of fear for repercussions. But silence does not 
automatically signal complicity and hegemony, Robin Sheriff argues (2001). In her 
Brazilian case study she has often found it to be a form of resistance to white supremacy, 
as well as protection from repercussions following from overt critique on it. Furthermore, 
Scott argues that discontentment and resistance can take on a multitude of non-overt 
forms (1992). Seeking to exclude whites from the in-group labeling the in-group non-
white, I argue, is one of them.  
The respondents from Spaanse Water indicate that they experience such 
exclusions, exerted through disdain, distrust, or disinterest, as painful and unpleasant. 
They feel that they do qualify as a Yu’i Kòrsou105. What’s more, they take the brunt for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 As her defense the middle female respondent refers explicitly to the unifying discourse, which states that 
everyone born on the island and who seeks to contribute positively to it is a real Yu’i Kòrsou. Her family 
has lived on the island for multiple generations, she loves the island and contributes duly, she speaks 
Papiamentu fluently, and therefore more than qualifies as a Yu’i Kòrsou. 
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an injustice they did not cause personally and that they condemn, they argue. Their 
exclusion is unfair, they argue. But while negative attitudes from the rest of the 
population are unpleasant, these do not limit whites in their access to networks, jobs, 
education, material assets, and other privileges the way they do with people of color and 
with immigrants.  
Furthermore, the white population, which given Curaçao’s color hierarchy 
automatically has an elite status, does not have to merge with the masses and adopt the 
same national identity in order to be part of the nation. The Yu’i Kòrsou ideology dictates 
white supremacy, which means that whites are a quintessential part of the nation, 
regardless of if others consider them “real” Yu’i Kòrsou or not. Furthermore, in chapter 1 
we saw how after the revolt ruling elites and those allegiant to them deliberately placed 
Afrocuraçaoan people and culture at the core of multicultural ideology of national 
identity, with the aim to deflect black resistance. Therefore, a rendition of the Yu’i 
Kòrsou as being solely black, which these white respondents refer to, cannot simply be 
seen as counter-hegemonic.  
Also, the Yu’i Kòrsou-being-black discourse is not a the full version of the 
national ideology, as some of these white elite respondents claim, for it does not in any 
way inform the nation of structurally embedded black superiority. If one layer advances 
blackness as central to the nation, another layer harbors the old sentiments colonial and 
post-emancipation era, in which Afrodescendants were referred to as childlike and 
culturally inferior compared to whites (see Allen 2014). In this version, which is still very 
active today, black people are imagined as lower class, crude, and even coonish. I argue 
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that this alleged exclusion of whites in fact confirms their separate—and superior—status 
within the nation.  
 
Additional Analytical Comments about the Stories Collected 
This journey through these five barios reveals some important patterns. While people 
may start off by reproducing fragments of the colorblind discourse, and with the ideology 
of national identity that is supposed to incorporate everyone, the respondents all in one 
way or another indicated that race-based discrimination is prevalent. In their stories the 
positive values attributed to whiteness and the negative values attributed to blackness 
surface. The majority of the respondents is deeply aware of the harmful consequences 
this has for people of color with regards to their upward social mobility and overall 
wellbeing. The effects of colorism in Curaçao also become clear. In the stories collected 
colorism most acutely affects dark skinned people of all class layers. The highly educated 
and well-earning dark skinned respondent of the middle class bario addresses similar 
exclusion processes as the dark skinned respondents from the poorer neighborhood do. 
Even though the light(er) skinned respondents in the different barios are well aware of 
Curaçao’s racial inequality, their stories indicate that they themselves suffer considerably 
less from racist marginalization. In order to tease out these patterns, I developed a series 
of tables106 that show the distribution of these narratives, attitudes, beliefs and 
experiences in the stories in my sample. I discuss them in the remainder of this chapter. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  See appendix IX for the overview of these tables per bario. 	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Racelessness 
All twenty-nine respondents observed and/or experienced racism. However, twenty-two 
people (76% of the total respondents from all barios) started off their stories by revealing 
an attachment to raceless ideology (Goldberg 2002).  
Table 3. Raceless Ideology 
 Bario Barber 
(n=6) 
SeruF 
(n=6) 
OtroB 
(n=6) 
Janwé 
(n=6) 
SpW 
(n=5) 
Tot % 
 Phenotype respondents dark dark varies varies white   
1 I don’t see color 2 1 0 3 4 10 36 
2 I’m not discriminated against /  
Discrimination is passé 
1 2 3 3 2 11 38 
3 There is unity 1 1 3 2 4 11 38 
Tot  4 4 6 8 10   
 
Ten of the twenty-nine respondents (36%) said that color does not matter anymore, 
eleven said in one way or another that they themselves have never been discriminated 
against or that discrimination is a thing from the past (38%), and eleven talked of unity 
within the diverse Curaçaoan population (38%). Table 3 shows that this raceless stance is 
somewhat stronger among the respondents of the white upper class neighborhood 
Spaanse Water, and in the middle class neighborhood Janwé, where respondents of all 
colors make these statements. Working class neighborhood Otrobanda stands out with its 
elaborate narrative that this bario is a happy mix of races and ethnic groups that live in 
harmony and equality. This narrative closely resembles the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of 
unity and equality, although none of Otrobanda’s respondents actually used the notion of  
the Yu’i Kòrsou. 
Across the island, racelessness is a popular discourse. In December of 2015 I had 
the privilege to show my documentary on race and racism in Curaçao to the Parliament of 
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Curaçao and the Court of Justice. The viewing was followed by an informal conversation 
with the President of Parliament, a man of color from a well-off background. He had 
watched with great interest, but argued that racism is something that people bring onto 
themselves through what they believe, racism is not a structural problem. Over the years 
of doing this research I have dozens and dozens of conversations with ministers, 
educators, people from all ranks of society, all phenotypes, and all walks of life. Time 
and time again they made the same claim: “racism doesn’t exist anymore in Curaçao, 
racism is in people’s minds!” Yet when I say “I study race” people combust into sharing 
personal stories about racial inequality. In these stories the topic of national unity may 
surface briefly at first, before quickly shifting to acknowledging and illustrating the 
impact of racism. Hegemonic ideology constructs a diversity-embracing national unity 
that attempts to cover over overt racial inequality. 
I already mentioned that among my respondents, I found that reference to 
narratives that adhere to racelessness is something that is much more prevalent among 
people who themselves suffer less from the consequences of racism, whether they are 
white, light skinned black, or of a higher socioeconomic class. But in poor neighborhoods 
the discourse of racelessness also exists. As we saw in the section on the barios, quite a 
few of the respondents initially started of saying that they did not experience racism or 
that color no longer mattered, before a few seconds later sharing stories about how racism 
has affected them intimately. However, here racelessness appears to be considerably less 
profound: none of the respondents interviewed suggested that they brought the 
discrimination they suffered onto themselves through not being proper enough (see 
Bonilla-Silva 2010 and Essed 1991).  
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Talking about Blackness, Talking about Whiteness 
In the way the twenty-nine respondents talk about whiteness and blackness, the 
prevalence of white supremacy quickly becomes evident. In table 4 I listed seven 
attitudes towards whiteness and blackness.  
 
Table 4. Attitudes Towards Whiteness and Blackness 
 Bario Barber 
(n=6) 
SeruF 
(n=6) 
OtroB 
(n=6) 
Janwé 
(n=6) 
SpW 
(n=5) 
Tot % 
 Phenotype respondents dark dark varies varies white   
5 Black is negative 5 4 4 6 3 22 76 
6 Black is positive 1 1 2 2 3 9 31 
7 White is negative 2 2 3 2 1 10 36 
8 White is positive 3 1 2 1 1 9 31 
9 White is better than black 5 5 3 4 4 21 72 
10 White and black are equal 5 4 4 4 5 22 76 
11 Black is better than white 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
In twenty-two of the stories (76%) “black” is presented as negative or of lesser 
value. People tell about personal experiences with discrimination or racial inequality, or 
they share stories of how black is generally perceived as inferior to white. This does not 
necessarily mean that they agree with this assessment, rather it might simply mean that 
they are aware of this dominant societal hierarchy, which is the source of a great deal of 
hurt and frustrations in their lives. People describe how they experience the devaluation 
of blackness at work, in family, education, socioeconomic position, privilege, access to 
opportunities, and social standing in general. No one mentioned negative traits of black 
people on the record. Off the record, however, I have heard such stories in great 
abundance, specifically—but not certainly only—in white circles, about blacks being 
criminals, dangerous, violent, lazy, incompetent, ugly, vulgar, and so on. These are 
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virtually identical to the stereotypical negative traits ascribed to blacks during colonial 
times. 
Yet, only nine people describe black in a positive sense. In this table this “positive 
sense” refers to people talking about blackness as: “we can also achieve lots of things,” or 
“I made it in spite of the adversity,” or “I am also a good person.” Remarkably, there 
were no stories that addressed situations in which black people might excel compared to 
white people. Nor were there many stories that relayed opinions such as “black is 
beautiful,” “I love my black skin,” “I love my black hair,” or “I love our Afrodescendant 
culture, beliefs, traditions or art.” Only one respondent specifically spoke about going 
natural, because she wanted her natural Afrotextured hair back, and about people’s 
positive responses to that.  
In the stories I collected there was however no sign of a unique cultural or racial 
pride. In the first chapter I mentioned that this pride does exist within the Afrocuraçaoan 
population, mostly among the small, specifically pro-black NGO’s and community 
initiatives on the island. But none of my respondents addressed this, nor did these groups 
and their perspectives or achievements arise in the stories. The interviews aside I often 
observed people becoming quite uncomfortable in the face of this black pride. “Curaçao 
is not a black nation, it is a multicultural nation” is a rebuttal I hear very often. Too strong 
a focus on Curaçao’s Afrodescendant heritage quickly evokes a reverse response, arguing 
that non-black traditions and lore are also part of the canon, and deserve a lot more 
visibility and acknowledgement.  
One of the respondents that spoke positively about blackness is an older white 
Dutch respondent (#29), who was raised on the island, and spent most of his life here. He 
 282 
describes that in the pre-revolt era blacks and whites did not easily socialize. The system 
of race relations forced him to remain an outsider to the Afrocuraçaoan community, 
which is something he regrets. Nowadays he makes some deliberate efforts to expand his 
interaction with black people and black culture.  
The [Freemasons] loge that I am part of, most of the people there are dark 
skinned. That is also one of the reasons that I picked that loge out of the four [on 
the island] to become part of. I found it interesting because in my personal life I 
didn’t have dark skinned people as friends because in the past that was not really 
possible. So now I have chance to interact with them and that is extraordinary in 
this period of time. So that is the reason why I am part of that loge.  
Yet his efforts have not amounted to an expansion of his actual social circle. When I 
asked him if he now he does have black friends, it turns out that he does not. He remains 
an outsider, by choice. 
His story is not uncommon, though it’s not a usual one either. On one side of the 
scale we find a very small number of Dutch people who participate very actively in 
Afrocuraçaoan circles, have Afrocuraçaoan partners, live in middle- or lower class 
neighborhoods that are predominantly non-white, dominate the Papiamentu language and 
become fluent in Afrocuraçaoan tradition, history and every day culture. If they are truly 
proficient, Curaçaoans may perceive these Dutch people as white Curaçaoans1 rather than 
as Dutch or Makamba. On the other side are the people that live in predominantly white 
(often gated) middle- and upper class neighborhoods, have a primarily white social circle, 
and work in white or foreign owned companies. They commonly do not dominate 
Papiamentu and never or only very occasionally participate in Afrocuraçaoan culture and 
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tradition107. In my observation this is clearly the most common pattern among the white 
Dutch population. It appears that, in spite of his efforts to change this, the 
abovementioned respondent still belongs to this section.  
In nine of the stories (31%) a positive attitude towards whites surface. Three 
lower class black respondents and one brown skinned middle class respondent mention 
positive personal relationships that they have or had with white superiors at work and 
school. Two lower class dark skinned respondents mention their friendship with whites. 
The other two people, which are very light skinned (koló klá), express their appreciation 
for the nation building and the acculturating work that white colonizers and friars 
instigated during the colonial era. While these two light skinned respondents are both 
critical of white oppression and exploitation, they also value whites as the directing force 
behind Curaçao’s success as a colony and as a nation today. One lower class dark skinned 
respondent described wanting a white baby because she thought that was beautiful, and 
successfully seeking out a white partner to make this happen. Even though in these 
stories people are not necessarily elated about whites, it becomes evident that whiteness 
is perceived as a marker of social higher ranking, more privileged, more aesthetically 
pleasing, and socially more desirable than black. 
Ten respondents (36%) shared negative stories about white people. In Barber, 
Seru Fortuna, Otrobanda and Spanish Water people spoke about colonial oppression and 
exploitation in the past, by colonials and by the Catholic orders. In Barber, Seru Fortuna, 
Janwé and Spaanse Water respondents addressed contemporary discrimination by whites, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Because of their segregation, and because of the perpetuated privilege that this group enjoys the 
Curaçaoan population—black and white alike—commonly looks at this group with considerable disdain.	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racial profiling of blacks by whites, white financial elites and their exclusive white 
networks, and the import of expensive, foreign white personnel instead of giving the 
position to a local person. The young respondents of Seru Fortuna and Otrobanda 
complained about white privilege in work and education, which diminished their 
opportunities. Only one respondent, in Barber, spoke of racist name-calling by white 
peers. 
These stories do not mention contemporary race-based physical violence from 
whites to blacks. These are indeed stories that I have never heard in Curaçao. In fact, 
physical white violence in contemporary Curaçao is almost inconceivable. In 
contemporary society black people, especially those of the lower classes, are perceived as 
potentially violent and dangerous. The threat of the unruly, violent, angry, physically 
strong and hypersexual black man is the stuff of ordinary racist representations. This is 
the reason why so many people expressed concern for me going to Seru Fortuna. 
White people on the other hand are a numeric minority. They may even be 
perceived as physically more vulnerable than blacks. I have not heard of the existence of 
white hate or extremist groups in contemporary Curaçao. This comes in stark contrast 
with settler colonial societies with a majority white population such as the United States, 
where white physical violence towards blacks is more present and is one of the major 
characteristics of anti-black racism. In Curaçao it is an unwritten and unspoken code that 
white people must act non-violently towards black folks. White people may have 
financial power, but the black population far outnumbers the white population, 
demographically. There is a silenced anger and resentment among the black population 
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towards whites for past and present racial oppression, which could potentially erupt again 
as it did for the revolt of 1969. Curaçao’s elites still fear that.  
A conversation I had in 2015 with a white civil servant from Curaçao’s 
Department of External Affairs about race and racism on the island illustrates this fear. I 
asked him what holds the government back to actually implement anti-discrimination 
measures in Curaçao. He gave a response that I have heard many times: 
The government is just not interested. We don’t want to re-open those old 
wounds. If we start talking about discrimination, and people begin to realize they 
are being discriminated against, then they will become angry. There is so much 
pain still, if you open those wounds before you know it we will have flaming, 
violent conflicts erupting all over the island. It will become a disaster that we 
cannot maintain. Our people are not yet mature enough to talk about race. It is too 
dangerous. We best leave this topic alone. (Conversation on July 13th 2015) 
Curaçao’s elites are well aware of the many generations of pent up anger, pain, and 
frustration among the non-white masses. They fear both for their personal livelihood as 
for the destruction of white hegemony.  
What also stands out in the stories that I collected is that there is very little 
mention of Dutch people or of white elites in particular. Yet in informal conversations 
Curaçaoans of all walks of life complain that Dutch people are arrogant, have a 
misplaced sense of superiority, and do not integrate into Curaçaoan society. The old 
white Protestant and Jewish elites shield their exclusive networks through which they 
continue to dominate the island, and they too often prefer to live separated away in their 
fancy neighborhoods. But people are careful who they share their complaints with. As the 
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senior male respondent in Janwé said, openly accusing someone in a superior status from 
racism may cost you dearly (see also Sheriff 2001). Thus both elites and Afrocuraçaoans 
silence critique on racism. Silencing is, as we saw repeatedly, an important part of 
multiculturalism, which deflects subaltern critique and demands to a reformulation of the 
power balance (Hale 2002, 2005; Greene 2007; Rahier 2012). Since there are as of yet no 
organizations sanctioned by the state to address racism and other forms of discrimination, 
this silencing perpetuates, in spite of the ample legal reform regarding anti-
discrimination.   
 Twenty-one people (72%), from all class segments, age groups and phenotypes, 
describe that white people are better off, have more privileges and opportunities, and are 
considered to be more beautiful. The respondents do not necessarily agree with this–
various respondents avidly criticize this representation–but they mention and illustrate 
that this is a dominant value in society.  
Twenty-two respondents (76%) talk about the ideology of whites and blacks 
being equal. Here again the potent raceless, national narrative of unity and equality 
surfaces. Respondents do not necessarily state that white and black people are indeed 
currently valued equally, although many do, but in their stories people argue that black 
and white should be equal.  
Yet, none of the respondents shared a story about black being better than white. I 
already pointed at this absence when discussing how people talk positively about 
blackness. No one says that blacks surpass whites, or have superior qualities, as happens 
to whites when compared to blacks. Only three respondents mention Tula in passing, the 
leader of the 1795 slave revolt. None of the respondents describes any story of black 
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pride, or refers to a rich black Curaçaoan heritage, or to the international successes of 
contemporary Afrocuraçaoan artists such as sculptor Yubi Kirindongo, grammy winning 
percussionist Pernell Saturnino, performance artists Doble RR and Izaline Calister, and 
writer Frank Martinus Arion, to only name a few. Nor does anyone mention the 
numerous international achievements of famous Afrocuraçaoan athletes such as sprinters 
Churendy Martina and Liemarvin Bonivacia, both Olympic participants, world champion 
Muaythai boxing Jemyma Betrian108, or even the long standing, above-average 
representation of Afrocuraçaoans in major league baseball, by men like Hensely 
Meulens, Andrew Jones, Wladimir “Coco” Balentien, Kenly Jansen, Jurickson Profar, 
and the list goes on and on. This demonstrates that underneath the ideology of unity and 
equality there is limited, if any, appreciation of blackness. This is again consistent with 
how multiculturalism operates: the ideology of diversity and inclusion is only a 
superficial varnish that enhances the foundation of white supremacy (Hale 2002, 2005; 
Greene 2007; Rahier 2012).  
Thus, the way people talk positively and negatively about blackness forms a great 
contrast with how people talk positively and negatively about whiteness. When the 
respondents share negative accounts about whites the superior position and privilege of 
whites surfaces immediately. The negative things people share about blacks, on the other 
hand, illustrate the inferior ranking of blackness. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 She is multiple times world champion in the bantamweight class. 
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Empowerment and Silencing 
Trouillot (1997) argues that harmful but also empowering parts of the subaltern past and 
present are omitted or trivialized in order to convenience hegemonic historiography (see 
also Andermann 2007; Aronson & Elgenius 2011; Brooms 2011; Butler 2001; Buzinde 
and Santos 2008; Cummings 2004; Eichsted and Small 2002; Goldberg 2002; Hall 1999; 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Poria and Ashworth 2009; Rahier 2003; Timothy and Boyd 
2006). In table 5, I examine if and how people talk about important historic people and 
events that significantly impacted the Afrocuraçaoan population in a positive or negative 
sense.  
Table 5. Talk of Important Historic Afrocuraçaoan People and/or Events 
 Bario Barber 
(n=6) 
SeruF 
(n=6) 
OtroB 
(n=6) 
Janwé 
(n=6) 
SpW 
(n=5) 
Tot % 
 Phenotype respondents dark dark varies varies white   
12 Tula (leader of 1795 slave revolt) 0 1 1 0 1 3 10 
13 Emancipation and Afrocuraçaoan 
empowerment (including revolt of 1969) 
1 1 4 1 2 9 31 
14 Slavery 3 1 4 1 3 12 41 
 
In Otrobanda and Spaanse Water the senior respondents speak of the 1969 revolt 
because they lived it (#17, #18, #29, #30). They do not so much speak of the revolt as a 
celebratory event for blacks, rather they talk about the destruction, the fear and the chaos 
at the hands of “an angry black mob.” They blame the revolt for intensifying racial 
tensions for many years afterward. They do however acknowledge that the empowerment 
that resulted from it was much needed for the black population. The male respondent 
from Otrobanda in his thirties (#16), a dark skinned man, explicitly describes the revolt as 
a turning point in pro-black empowerment. In contrast, the female respondent in her 
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forties (#15), who is lighter brown, mainly speaks of Otrobanda’s demise, due to the 
elites leaving the bario soon after the revolt.  
In the other three barios, Barber, Seru Fortuna and Janwé, it is also the 
respondents in the 30-55 or the 55+ age brackets that bring up the revolt and its aftermath 
(#3, #9 and #24). In these three barios the respondents that mention this are darker 
skinned. They explain that pro-black empowerment considerably changed life for 
Afrocuraçaoans, and opened up job possibilities that had not been there before. But in 
their stories, and in the narrative that I have found to be prevalent in every day 
conversation and narrative, because of the empowerment and Antillianization that 
resulted from the revolt racial discrimination has waned. This line of reasoning reveals 
several tenets of multicultural ideology (see Hale 2002, 2005; Goldberg 2002; Greene 
2007; Rahier 2012). 
The topic of slavery surfaces slightly more often in the stories than does the 1969 
revolt, but not much. Conform the findings in chapter 1, both in the interviews and in 
larger society slavery is a sensitive and omitted topic. This silencing, I argue, is 
hegemonic, in order to whitewash inconvenient parts of the past (Trouillot 1997, see also 
Brooms 2011; Butler 2001; Eichsted and Small 2002; Goldberg 1993; Gramsci 1971; 
Hall 1999; Rahier 2003;Timothy and Boyd 2006). Again the rationale is that the anger of 
the black masses regarding oppression should not be kindled. Slavery is trivialized in 
museum collections, erased by the monumentalization and repurposing of colonial 
European-based architecture, and in the positioning of statues on the island: Tula’s 
sizeable statue is hidden from plain view. In the tourism-hospitality sector colonialism is 
thoroughly romanticized, and slavery placed out of focus. “Slavery belongs to a past long 
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gone,” the mainstream colorblind narrative dictates. “We have got to move on.” This 
silence is reflected in the respondents’ stories. Those who spoke of slavery only 
mentioned it briefly. Two white respondents (#18 and #27) spoke apologetically about 
slavery. One argued that the wrongs of slavery were balanced out by the work of the 
missionaries, while the other said slavery was a horrid but necessary evil. In the account 
if the female respondent from Otrobanda in her forties (#15) the trivialization of slavery 
becomes apparent. She stressed the cordial interactions in the bario between slaves, 
freedmen, mulattos and whites in colonial times. Three dark skinned respondents (#5, 
#14 and #24) mentioned to be relieved that slavery is over and belongs to a past long 
gone. 
But the female respondent in her thirties from Seru Fortuna (#9) brings up a more 
emotional connection to slavery. She says that she still feels like a slave, always working 
for a white person, and never being able to move up in life. The young female respondent 
from Barber (#1) mentions that “slave” is one of the words used to tease and bully blacks, 
which indicates that it is still a shameful notion. And the young female respondent from 
Otrobanda (#13), a dark skinned eighteen-year-old girl, didn’t know what slavery was, 
even though she described in great detail the racial inequality she observed in Otrobanda. 
When I asked her why she thought this racial inequality existed, she answered: “ I don’t 
know. I don’t think anyone knows.” When I asked her what she knew about slavery she 
was not exactly sure what slavery was, again. “Is that where black people have to work 
very hard and get very little money?” she asked. The colonial past and slavery are topics 
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that are taught in elementary and high school, but not in great detail109. Her lack of 
knowledge signals the strength of this silenced discourse. Three male respondents from 
respectively Barber, Otrobanda and Spaanse Water, two dark skinned and one white (#6, 
#16, and #26), briefly refer to slavery as the root of racism today. People’s knowledge of 
slavery thus varies greatly. It stands out that in my research especially the respondents 
from Spaanse Water people bring up this topic in considerable detail, and are quite 
knowledgeable about slavery, colonialism and their aftermath.  
The representations of slavery brought up in the interviews however lacked any 
positive representations of enslaved people as being resourceful, strong, creative, and as 
having agency: a slave is a pitiful being. Scholars and cultural workers such as Rose 
Mary Allen, Rene Rosalia, Linda Rupert, Richenel Ansano, Jeanne Henriquez, Gilbert 
Bacilio and Ieteke Witteveen have for years been generating knowledge on 
Afrocuraçaoan agency, resilience, and resistance during slavery. They complain about the 
fact that the larger population, both black and white, knows so very little about the rich 
material and immaterial culture enslaved people produced. This knowledge is not a 
standardized component of school curriculum, of museum collections, nor of radio and 
television programs. 
The limited availability and circulation of empowering knowledge on slavery and 
pro-black reform contrasts starkly with the abundant literature on white achievement. As 
discussed in chapter 1, white heroes and their successes are featured extensively in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 I have attempted to examine narratives of slavery in past and present educational materials and 
curriculum. However, this study proved to be too elaborate for this research project. Current school 
materials are not standardized and may vary per school and even per teacher. Schoolbooks and other 
educational materials used in the past have been poorly documented. Collecting these past and present 
materials is an arduous task. The systematic analysis of school materials is yet another important topic for 
future research (see appendix X). 
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museums, statues, and especially in the monumentalized colonial architecture, Curaçao’s 
pride and joy. This again is a characteristic of multiculturalism, which as Goldberg 
argues features “the indomitable superiority of whites –in prestige, achievements, 
education, wealth and power—not as a natural phenomenon but as historical outcome” 
(2002:212).   
 
Internalized Racism  
Hegemony entails that oppression is internalized and naturalized: the state does not have 
to use violence or other explicit forms of authority to exert its dominance (Gramsci 
1971). Therefore, the internalization of racism, facilitated by the ideology-based denial 
that racism exists and by the omission and trivialization of black achievement and 
empowerment, is crucial to the functioning of multiculturalism (Goldberg 2002). This 
relative invisibilization of race and the internalization of a racial hierarchy translate into 
the ways my respondents see and appreciate themselves, and how they perceive and treat 
others. In table 6, I looked for ways in which these attitudes manifested in people’s 
stories.  
 
Table 6. Internalized Racism 
 Bario Barber 
(n=6) 
SeruF 
(n=6) 
OtroB 
(n=6) 
Janwé 
(n=6) 
SpW 
(n=5) 
Tot % 
 Phenotype respondents dark dark varies varies white   
15 Black on black discrimination  5 2 2 3 3 15 52 
16 Teasing / bullying with black features 3 2 1 1 0 7 24 
17 Color hierarchy 2 0 0 0 0 1 7 
18 “Drecha rasa” or “fixing the race” 0 1 1 1 0 3 10 
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Fifteen of the respondents (52%) describe how people of color discriminate each other. 
Many of these stories describe how Afrocuraçaoans criticize each other by making fun of 
one another’s black features (skin tone, hair texture, nose shape, etc.), or for behavioral 
traits that are stereotypically associated with blacks, such as laziness, not being reliable 
business partners, or being disreputable. This parallels the “respectability politics” that 
exist in other parts of the African Diaspora (Besson 1993; Stoler 2002; Thomas 2004; 
White 2010; Wilson 1969), and which I already referred to briefly, earlier in this chapter. 
Shaming by applying, rather brutally, the racist scale of physical beauty and desirable 
features is key here.  
Teasing and bullying are a dimension of this shaming. The two younger female 
respondents from Barber (#1 and #3) and the young male respondent from Otrobanda 
(#14), all dark skinned, talk about hard and hurtful bullying. As we saw in Barber’s 
stories, people really use derogatory names for each other. Some (#6, #9, and #21) 
mention more “playful” racist teasing, which they describe as behaviors that—in part—
serve to correct “improper,” or “too black” behavior without chastising the beholder. In 
these stories there is also some mention of shame or shaming with regards to blackness or 
being discriminated against.  
The older male respondent in Barber (#6) describes how people are assigned 
racial nicknames, which initially may be intended to be hurtful, but which “stick,” 
sometimes for life, and become neutralized. This is the case of Moortje, an old Dutch 
word that refers to the Moors, the inhabitants of Northern Africa who occupied Medieval 
Europe between 711 and 1492 (Lemm 2007). In the Netherlands, Moortje is used to call 
the stereotypical blackface characters that still perform at specific occasions. In Curaçao 
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the nickname Moortje indicates a dark-skinned person. I already discussed how white 
supremacy surfaced in the old school materials used by the friars to evangelize.  
The social instruction about the racial/spatial order and the preoccupation or 
anxiety to always perform the proper behavior in the right environment is a very 
important part of Curaçoan society. It also denotes internalized racism. Yet I have only 
heard it mentioned in colloquial conversations on occasion. Of course I myself was 
amply instructed into Curaçao’s moral codes and into the behavior befitting my racial 
positioning as a light skinned woman. In chapter 2 I elaborated amply on that. There is a 
very intricate racist system of propriety that is upheld among Curaçaoans. It becomes 
particularly evident in the rules regarding hair and attire, and in the shaming and abasing 
that take place between Curaçaoans, and particularly between people of color.  
Dutch people commonly find black hair interesting, exotic, or pretty. They send 
their mixed race children to school with dread locks, big afros or wide cascades of curls, 
possibly without even being aware of there being such a code of aesthetics, or 
deliberately ignoring it. In Curaçao’s color hierarchy being white Dutch means one is 
racially and thus aesthetically intrinsically superior: “proper” attire and hair is not as 
necessary for them as it is for people of color110.  But as I have mentioned time and time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 On the other hand, I find that Curaçaoans commonly agree that Dutch people have little style. They do 
not pay much attention to nails, hair, outfits, but they don’t have to. When I first moved to Curaçao people 
immediately instructed me into the Curaçaoan dress code. “One has three wardrobes,” a friend told me: 
“One is for formal and business attire. This means that your sleeves are not too short, your skirt reaches 
your knees, and for God’s sake no ‘open toes.’ No sandals, slippers or flip-flops! The second is informal 
but decent attire, which you wear when going out, when you visit family and friends, or when you run 
errands. The third wardrobe is for the clothes worn in the home or perhaps on the beach. Those three 
wardrobes do not mix!” The instructions were not lost on me. I had walked into a first meeting with a 
potential employer, who has become a good friend, on slippers and in a casual t-shirt. To this day, 15 years 
later, this friend ridicules me for it. It did mean that I had to build up my three wardrobes. It also means that 
one can always easily spot the newly arrived Dutch interns, who have not yet been instructed into these 
codes of propriety.  
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again, among Curaçaoans hairdo, dress style, interests, or modes of behavior that are 
considered too “black” are quickly submitted to teasing and shaming. A strong, 
reprimanding and condescending expression used by Curaçaoans of all colors and 
backgrounds is No hasi kos di bo koló, which literally translates as “Don’t do things of 
your color.” It means “don’t act too black.” This warning replicates a white norm of 
“propriety,” much like the civilization discourse of the Catholic Church proposes. Such 
improper, “black” behaviors are: talking and laughing loudly; over-acting; bragging 
about money or new purchases; brawling, fighting or yelling in public; cat calling or 
“hollering;” or even getting involved in criminal or corrupt activities. Although these 
behaviors are not at all the exclusivity of black people, I noticed that in society at large 
they are perceived as crude, “ghetto-ish” behaviors that are associated with lower class 
Afrocuraçaoans. Such “too black” behaviors “lower” a person in the eyes of others, and 
might make someone more vulnerable to discrimination. This expression fits colorblind 
discourse, which suggests that discrimination is something one brings onto oneself 
through improper behavior. If one acts appropriately, one should be able to steer clear 
from discrimination. As one lighter skinned middle class respondent says: “I never 
experienced discrimination because I didn’t go look for it.”   
The notions of bida drechi, hende nechi, hende drechi, and hende drechá are 
directly related to this code of ethics, which can be stood as “respectability politics” 
(Wilson 1969). Respectability politics entail a set of rules for the subjugated masses 
through which they can achieve social upward mobility, through adhering to white, 
Eurocentric cultural standards (Besson 1993; Stoler 2002; Thomas 2004; White 2010; 
Wilson 1969). Thomas, writing about 20th century Jamaica, describes respectability as  
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[…] a value complex emphasizing the cultivation of education, thrift, industry, 
self-sufficiency via land-ownership, moderate Christian living, community uplift, 
the constitution of family through legal marriage and gender related experiences, 
and leadership by the educated middle classes. (Thomas 2004:5,6).  
Speech, appearance (dress, hairstyle and make up), and control over one’s 
emotions are also part of these politics of respectability.  
Because respectability politics subscribes to white norms, and shames those who 
do not adhere to them, it has a strong hegemonic component. However, Deborah Thomas 
(2004), Jean Besson (1993) and Francis White (2010) also identify the emancipatory 
elements of this politics, in which it becomes a seat of resistance and counter-hegemony. 
Adopting these standards does not automatically equate hegemony: it can be a strategy in 
order to achieve greater social upward mobility and strengthen pro-black reform. 
With regard to Curaçao’s context, we already encountered the notion of bida 
drechi or “respectable life,” which was one of the pillars of the Church’s post-
emancipation civilizing mission (Allen 2007). This is what surfaced in the story of the 
senior female respondent in Janwé, but also throughout the stories of my mother and my 
grandmother, in the previous chapter. Hende nechi, then, translates as “virtuous or 
righteous people,” and even as “beautiful people.” These are commonly perceived as 
lighter skinned people of a higher socioeconomic class who were born into the bida 
drechi, and who are respectful of the social norms and thus preserve their good social 
standing. As the senior female respondent from Janwé illustrated, here the emphasis lies 
on appearance, such as one’s skin color, dress and hair style, and adhering to Christian 
the sanctimony of marriage, and on entering religious life and abiding to the moral codes 
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of the Church, which include matrimonial life. Having a nice and tidy house in a 
neighborhood of good standing, a respectable job that makes a good living, and having or 
obtaining secondary education further increase ones respectability. 
As of yet there is no literature on how these codes of respectability play out in 
society today. Also it was not the key focus of my research. Therefore, I used on Allen’s 
work (2007) on respectability politics in the pre-industrial era (1863-1917) as a point of 
departure, and corroborated my observations and experiences on this topic with 
Curaçaoan anthropologist Louis Philip Römer, who is currently finishing his dissertation 
on this topic. I reached the following preliminary insights111. 
 Since bida drechi is commonly perceived as part of middle class lifestyle, 
respectability politics are mostly directed at the darker skinned people from the lower 
class (Allen 2007). They can “convert” to a respectable lifestyle, and become hende 
drechi, “correct or suitable people112.” In order to achieve this status they have to distance 
themselves sufficiently from a lower class or “ghettoish” or “vulgar” lifestyle, and/or 
from practices that are associated with subversive “African” culture, such as the tambú, 
Afrocaribbean religion and wearing black hair styles such as afros and dreadlocks. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Due to time constraints this inquiry on respectability politics needs further theoretical and empirical 
substantiation, as well as more elaboration on my positionality as a light skinned middle class woman who 
was educated in Europa and the US. 	  
112 Allen writes elaborately on bida drechi during the late 19th and early 20th century, and how this was 
shaped by the ways in which whites perceived Afrocuraçaons as inferior and second rate citizens. Suffrage 
for Afrocuraçaoans was initially denied because they were considered to not be “suitable” for it, she argues. 
In 1895 J. Hamelberg, a civil servant, argued that the Papiamentu language and the many children born out 
of wedlock was proof of this black inferiority, and argued that suffrage should continue to be denied (Allen 
2014:5). In 1948 general suffrage was introduced in Curaçao. “Before that time, voting remained restricted 
on the basis of literacy, income level and property ownership.” (Allen 2014:5). Over a century later, these 
qualifications of marital life, having children within wedlock, good education, and a fairly high social 
standing remain in effect in the notion of the “hende drechi,” and continue to marginalize lower class 
blacks.  
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addition to the abovementioned requirements regarding education, work, religion, and 
matrimonial life, driving an above average  car and paying ample attention to one’s 
appearance aid, as do moving to a more upscale neighborhood, and marrying a person of 
a higher class, and preferably of a lighter skin tone. Drecha rasa or “improving the race” 
through generating lighter skinned offspring remains a goal that many Afrocuraçaons 
desire. It must, however, be noted that nowadays religion plays a far lesser role than it did 
in the past: one does not necessarily have to be an avid Churchgoer or have a relationship 
under the sanctimony of marriage to be hende nechi or drechi. And since only 6% of the 
population is agnostic or atheist113, it is commonly assumed that one is religious. Also, 
membership in white elite religions such as Judaism and Protestantism add to one’s 
status.  
Römer argues that in Curaçao the hende drechi is restricted by class (personal 
conversation Römer May 13, 2016; see also Thomas 2004). People of low income levels 
may live very proper lives (bida drechi) and adhere to the morals dictated by the Church, 
but that does not mean that they will be recognized as hende drechi. Poverty tends to be 
associated with hende bruá and hende shouru: disparaging notions that translate as 
“disreputable people.” This links to a third notion, which conflates with hende drechi: 
“hende drechá,” which translates literally as “improved or repaired people.” Hende 
drechá is another rather derogatory term used by the white elites (hende nechi) or by the 
darker skinned middle and upper classes (hende drechi). It signals someone who is 
attempting to climb up on the social ladder, but whose low socioeconomic class remains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  See appendix V for the statistical distribution of religion in Curaçao. 	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evident in spite of his or her best efforts to live a bida drechi (personal conversation 
Römer May 13, 2016). When people talk about hende drechá it is usually accompanied 
by lots of giggles and laughter, joking and ridiculing at the expense of the people they 
debase. Time and time again I noticed that people from the white middle class have a lot 
of contempt for the lower classes, for anything too black, and ridicule what is referred to 
as “ghetto-ish behavior.” In fact, Curaçaoan stand up comedians and actors in folk theater 
heavily capitalize on these stereotypes.  
Römer contends that it is important that these appropriate behavioral norms and 
codes are maintained continuously. “Only the highest elites are safe from social 
degradation” (personal conversation Römer May 13, 2016), but everyone else is expected 
to upkeep social standing through ongoing proper moral behavior. Especially middle 
class people of color (hende drechi) have to strive continuously to obtain recognition of 
the elites (personal conversation Römer May 13, 2016). This allows people better 
opportunities in jobs, commerce, children’s admission in better schools, and so on .  
These categories of bida drechi and hende nechi, drechi and drechá are heavily 
racially charged, and carry deep-seated message of white supremacy, which has been, 
and continues to be, protected by the Catholic Church. Allen illustrates this specifically 
for the bida drechi (2007, 2014). These categories indicate the conversion from bad to 
good, from black to white, from savage to evolved, ugly to beautiful, disreputable to 
proper and suitable. The lower class is excluded from social upward mobility, from 
access to social networks, access to better (white) schools, and access to good jobs. It 
reflects that the unifying and egalitarian message of the ideology of national identity 
doesn’t mirror everyday reality.  
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However, Curaçao’s respectability politics also has a counter-hegemonic side (see 
also Besson 1993, White 2010; Thomas 2004). As previously mentioned, there is the 
population segment that consciously resists white supremacy by explicitly upholding 
their black consciousness, allegiance and interests. The work of Curaçaoan scholars such 
as Rosalia (1997), Allen (2007, 2014), and Rupert (2012) avidly shows black agency and 
resistance to white supremacy. I was able to observe that this population segment forms a 
small but strong black-oriented social network that in substantial parts overlaps with the 
mainstream networks (people attend the same schools, frequent the same stores, and may 
work in mainstream organizations and companies etcetera), but that also forms its own 
social segment. Its members are strongly represented in the arts, culture and heritage 
sector, and in education. The institutions in focus here are the Kas di Kultura (House of 
Culture), a government organization that focuses on Curaçaoan culture and heritage; folk 
museum Kas di Pal’i Maishi (House of Cornstalks), where Afrocuraçaoan history is 
presented; and the National Archeological Anthropological Memory Management, an 
institute that also focuses on Curaçao’s heritage. There are many more such 
organizations, including musical and dance groups, NGOs, and community initiatives 
where “black culture” is preserved and celebrated. Some of these institutions engage in a 
critique of white supremacy. But many participants still adhere to a bida drechi. In my 
discussion of Afrocuraçaoan folklore it already became clear that black cultural 
expressions do not automatically evoke resistance and counter-hegemony: the tambú and 
seú are also played in Church.  
The color hierarchy, the third prompt in table 6, is only mentioned by the junior 
and the senior male respondents in Barber (#2 and #6), both of whom are dark skinned. 
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Since race is related to socioeconomic class this color hierarchy has a significant 
influence on people’s potential for social upward mobility. I had expected that in their 
stories people would address this particular systemic racial inequality, and possibly even 
challenge it. Yet, the fact that only two of the twenty-nine respondents brought it up 
indicates that this might not be at the forefront of people’s thoughts the way I had 
expected. In larger society too I found that color hierarchy goes mostly unmentioned, 
when talking about race. It appears to be a given, a normal part of society, rather than an 
issue that needs addressing. This strongly signals hegemonic ideology: Gramsci (1971) 
argued that hegemonic norms and values are so natural and self-evident that they are 
unquestioned. People use the different labels that indicate the color hierarchy’s various 
phenotypes on a daily basis, but I have yet to hear critique on this labeling system. I also 
have never heard people address the way the color hierarchy operates unless they are 
explicitly asked about it, for instance when explaining it to a foreigner, or to me. 
The already mentioned ideal of whitening through miscegenation, or drecha rasa 
(“fixing” or “correcting race”), is a manifestation of the color hierarchy and its 
underlying premise of white supremacy. The story of the senior female respondent in 
Seru Fortuna (#11) demonstrated her very deliberate actions to have a light skinned child, 
in which she succeeded. She herself is the darkest child in her family, with lighter 
skinned siblings. It had always been her desire to have a white child with a handsome 
(nechi) white man. Her siblings loved and spoiled her son, but after he died, seven years 
ago, they no longer came up to Seru Fortuna to visit her, as if she had lost her social 
status when she lost her light skinned child. She herself does not recognize her actions as 
drecha rasa, a deliberate act to upgrade the social standing of her child, herself, and her 
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family. Yet the story she told when I asked her to tell me something about color indicates 
that she is acutely aware of the unequal values attributed to white and black, which only 
corroborates the power of hegemonic white supremacy and its invisibilized socialization: 
people act on it whether they know it or not.  
 Many respondents chose lighter skinned partners, and many others chose partners 
who were darker skinned than them. The hende nechi and hende drechi norms suggest 
that lighter skinned people are overall considered to be more attractive with regards to 
esthetics, social standing, “refinement” and “overall development.” This is a norm that is 
unambiguously mirrored in the representations of people on billboards and other 
commercial announcements that adorn public space and the media. When it becomes 
obvious that someone shows an attraction for a darker skinned person, it is often mocked 
by comments that hyper-sexualize people of color. As if a “penis the size of a cathedral” 
(Hall 1997) would be the only reason one would be interested in a dark skinned man. The 
color hierarchy remains in effect through shaming blackness and praising whiteness.  
 
Consequences of Racial Marginalization  
Many studies show how race is closely connected to vulnerability to poverty and other 
manifestations of marginalization and exclusion (Lin and Harris 2008; see also 
Alexander, Entwisle and Horsey 1997; Farkas 2008; Massey 1990). Throughout this 
chapter, I have shown how these vulnerabilities pertain to ideology, social norms of 
respectability, somatic norm image, culture, historiography, education, jobs, socio 
economic class, religion, access to social networks, and to residential location114. As table 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 A topic that is not at all mentioned is the race-based disparity in health and health care.  
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7 indicates, the racist disparities people complained about the most are those that affect 
employment (69%) and education (55%).  
Table 7. Consequences of Racial Marginalization 
 Bario Barber 
(n=6) 
SeruF 
(n=6) 
OtroB 
(n=6) 
Janwé 
(n=6) 
SpW 
(n=5) 
Tot % 
 Phenotype respondents dark dark varies varies white   
19 Work 4 4 4 4 4 20 69 
20 School 4 4 4 2 2 16 55 
21 Poverty 1 3 1 1 3 9 31 
22 Crime 0 5 2 0 1 8 30 
 
I explained earlier that the darker skinned respondents from all the neighborhoods 
indicate that they have fewer opportunities to get good jobs because of the negative 
stereotypes about blacks that circulate on the island. Over the years I have often spoken 
with highly educated, successful people of color in the middle and upper classes at 
business meetings, happy hours and all sorts of other events. When hearing about my 
research many people shared the same reaction: it is very possible to get ahead, but you 
have to put up a considerable fight. A dark skinned man who is now the owner of a 
multimillion guilder company told me how difficult it was to get a loan with a bank, or to 
be taken seriously by investors. To this day people still don’t easily believe that a darker 
skinned black person is the owner or CEO of a business. I also hear many stories told by 
affluent people of color about not being served properly in bars, restaurants, and stores, 
being mistaken for the gardener or the cleaning lady when working in one’s yard or when 
opening one’s front door, or being sabotaged and counteracted by co-workers and 
supervisors. These stories from the middle-and upper classes indicate that abiding by the 
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codes of respectability politics do not erase racial discrimination and the impact of 
colorism: skin color continues to matter.  
Furthermore, various respondents addressed the racist exclusions in the school 
system, which surfaced so clearly in Seru Fortuna’s stories. In informal conversations this 
was one of the top complaints I heard, from people from the lowest to the highest classes. 
People of color encounter numerous difficulties to register their child in the higher-
ranking and better-funded Dutch speaking schools, while allegedly white parents register 
their children effortlessly. The most striking story I was told by a young girl described 
how her dark skinned mother went to enroll her daughter, addressing the administrators 
in Papiamentu. She was rejected, “classes are full,” the school said. But when her mother 
called the school afterwards and sought to enroll the child via telephone, speaking fluent 
and accent-less Dutch, the child was accepted on the spot and the enrollment was 
finalized right there and then over the phone. When the mother walked back into the 
school to sign the enrollment form the administrators got a tremendous freight: clearly 
their racist practice had been exposed. One story indicated that a black parent went to 
enroll his child but was refused. The white parent of the same child went to enroll the 
child, and the enrollment took place immediately. Dark skinned people from the upper 
classes have told me that they had to show a salary slip as to prove that they were 
suitable. And always the same schools are mentioned. These stories are common 
knowledge, and date back multiple generations. 
Informal conversations that I have had with teachers from various schools as well 
as a testimony given by an official of with the Education Inspectorate, who insisted on 
remaining anonymous, indicate that they too are well aware of these racist practices. Yet 
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no one objects, files a complaint, or initiates an investigation. People do complain about 
this, but just not formally to the “state” (see also UN 2015). Following Scott (1992), such 
informal complains could be seen as a way to resist without taking overt action. At least 
it is a way to unburden oneself and share with others.  
There are many other ways in which Afrocuraçaoans contest racism in more 
hidden and less overt ways115. Still, the lack of is official complaints and reports of cases 
of racial discrimination is significant and problematic, as the report of the UN Working 
Group also indicates (UN 2015). When I ask people why they don’t protest many of them 
profess that they don’t know how to. Again, many people are not aware of the actual 
criminalization of racism. Many others express apprehension. They don’t want to critique 
or accuse anyone, out of fear of losing social standing, and out of fear for repercussions. 
One mother, a brown skinned middle class woman, told me in an informal conversation: 
Curaçao is a small island, everyone knows everyone. When I complain about my 
child not getting into that school I could end up losing my job, because some 
person on the school board happens to be friends with my boss, or something like 
that.  
Respectability politics surface again: “respectable people do not make a fuss in 
public.” People fear that becoming known as a “troublemaker” might only further 
complicate the enrollment of their child in a “good” school, if not impossible, and cut 
them off from other networks and opportunities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  This dimension of resistance falls outside of the scope of this study but deserves much more research 
and documentation, see appendix X.	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Even though the stories I heard indicate that these discriminatory practices have 
been part and parcel of Curaçaoan society for many generations—they are common 
knowledge, a public secret—the government does little to address this. The Educational 
Inspectorate appears to be aware of these practices, but does not investigate or properly 
address them. The fact that it has not yet happened again signals the impact of 
multiculturalism, where such subaltern contestation is omitted and deflected. 
Poverty and crime were mentioned considerably less often in peoples’ stories. In 
Seru Fortuna the two younger female respondents (#7 and #9) and the middle male 
respondent (#11) spoke of the difficulties of poverty, of living in dilapidated houses, of 
having a hard time finding a job, not having enough food. Nearly all respondents in Seru 
Fortuna spoke about the high crime rate in their neighborhood. In other barios poverty 
was not a topic people discussed in depth. In Otrobanda the two middle respondents (#15 
and #16) mentioned the rise of crime in the bario after the departure of the elites, 
following the 1969 revolt.  
Crime is certainly a serious problem in Curaçao. The census’ Victim Survey 
indicates that in 2014 21.7% of the population had been the victim of some sort of crime 
(www.cbs.cw, visited April 19th 2016, see appendix VIII). There are, however, no census 
data about who the victims or the perpetrators are, nor does the website of Curaçao’s 
Central Buro of Statistics present information on crime rates, arrests or incarcerations per 
bario116. Yet a detective of the Police Corps informed me that the most common types of 
crime in Curaçao are burglary into houses and companies, small theft, and violent theft, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Conversations with two detectives reveal that data on perpetrators are not collected per bario. Only data 
on victims are listed. 
 
 307 
including armed robberies (see appendix VIII). These offenses are mainly committed by 
dark skinned Curaçaoan youth from poor barios, who often have had very little 
education, and tend to come from families with a number of “problems” 117. As the table 
in appendix VIII indicates, the type of crime most common in Curaçao suggest a link to 
poverty alleviation, and to people marginalized to the extent that they have insufficient 
chances to advance in life by any other mean.  
One respondent from Spaanse Water indirectly expressed her fear of criminals, 
and indicated that her bario—a gated community—was safe. I often see and hear this fear 
for burglary, robbery and assault expressed among people of all class layers. Most houses 
have iron bars on windows and doors. Most people, of all class layers, have watchdogs in 
the yard, and high fences. This is a trend common to all neighborhoods, regardless of 
race. Restaurants, movie theaters, shopping areas and other venues and beaches 
frequented by tourists and middle and upper class people have guards to secure parking 
lots and entrances. Many offices have guards at night.  
The fear, I argue, is particularly directed at poor black men. People do not easily 
verbalize this, but both the middle male respondents from Otrobanda (#16) and Janwé 
(#22), both black, mentioned it. People clutch their purse tighter, cross the street, or lock 
the doors of their car when they see them. As previously discussed, the fear of the 
dangerous black male is part of racist stereotyping that has existed from colonial times 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 What is remarkable about these Curaçaoan criminals, this detective says, is that they tend to be very 
violent, which results in a high incidence of robberies with extreme violence, murders and liquidations. 
Even though the CBS does not specify the incidence of drug related crime, these same youth often engage 
in it, including local drug trade and drug runs to Europe. Import and large scale trade is mainly dominated 
by South Americans and an occasional Curaçaoan. Higher end crime, such as whitewashing, which is not 
listed in the victims’ table of the CBS, is mainly executed by highly educated white criminals from the 
middle and especially the upper class. 
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until today. But the constant representation of poor black people as criminals in the media 
further feeds this fear. Curaçao doesn’t have poor white barios. There is no significant 
white poor population: poor whites are outliers. Even though public policy and scholarly 
research do not link race to poverty, people certainly do.  
The media, and newspapers in particular, also unambiguously establish that link. 
Every day the newspapers, and especially those directed at working class audiences118, 
display large photographs of poor black men as criminal aggressors who have been 
arrested for all sorts of misconduct. Black men in handcuffs, black men bent over the 
hoods of police cars, black men on the ground, black men killed by other black men, 
black men in accidents. It is mostly men, on those newspaper pages; women are not 
nearly as often presented as criminal. And in these representations of delinquency we see 
mostly black bodies, often half naked, in surrendered or even mangled positions, which 
had engaged in crimes because of desperation and poverty, as explained by the press. 
Sometimes there is no description, and the photographs tell their own stories, always 
casting poor black people in situations of misery, “disgrace” and “savagery.”  
This criminalizing representation casts poor black people in the role of criminal 
offenders, but leaves out of focus the multiple dimensions of how crime affects poor 
black people. A broad body of literature on the United States addresses how inhabitants 
of poor barios are also victims of robberies and assaults, and of people getting caught in a 
cross fire between quarreling groups, and getting hit by a stray bullet. But what is 
specifically important with regards to the structural side of poverty and crime is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 These are the newspapers Nobo, Ekstra, Vigilante, and Bala. 
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young black males with low levels of education are much more at risk at being 
incarcerated. A criminal record further diminishes chances at social upward mobility, as 
does the victimization they experience while incarcerated (Wheelock and Uggen 
2008:263). Furthermore, they run a great risk at becoming the victim of robbery and 
homicide (Wheelock and Uggen 2008:262). The fact that the link between poverty and 
race is at once so explicit in the media, and so unrecognized and unaddressed in research 
and policy points to the mechanization and normalization or naturalization of white 
supremacy through multicultural, raceless ideology.  
 
 Resistance and Complicity 
This chapter has revealed that Curaçao’s system of white supremacy is largely 
normalized and unchallenged (see UN 2015; Gramsci 1971). A myriad of gatekeeping 
mechanisms reproduces racial discrimination in work, education, poverty and crime. But 
does that mean that people indeed do not challenge racist behavior? And we observed 
that people reproduce the principles of racelessness, equality and unity through diversity 
as suggested by the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national identity, but do people actually 
bring up the label of “Yu’i Kòrsou” when talking about race? In table 8, I explored these 
remaining questions.  
 
Table 8. Resistance and Compliance 
 Bario Barber 
(n=6) 
SeruF 
(n=6) 
OtroB 
(n=6) 
Janwé 
(n=6) 
SpW 
(n=5) 
Tot % 
 Phenotype respondents dark dark varies varies white   
23 Response to racist behavior 3 2 3 2 2 12 41 
24 Respondent mentions Yu’i Kòrsou 0 0 0 0 4 4 14 
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Allen indicates that in the past in Curaçao, rebellion and defiance were labeled as 
uncivilized behaviors inherent to disreputable black people, hende bruá, which had to be 
improved (Allen 2007). In some cases, Allen illustrates, these oppressive ideas were 
worked into tambú songs. We saw previously that the tradition of the tambú was—and 
still is—perceived as the seat of Afrocuraçaoan resistance. But still, such hegemonic 
tambú songs were not uncommon. In 1986 Allen collected such a tambú song from the 
post-emancipation era, from a respondent who himself was born in 1898, and who had 
learned the song from his mother. The song used to be sung by house slaves, and 
illustrate indoctrination of hegemonic values (Allen 2007:74,75).  
Papa Sewe,    Papa Sewe, 
Ata Negru tribí   Look at that insolent Negro 
k’a lanta ku Blanku   who stood up against the Whites 
Papa Sewe,    Papa Sewe, 
Ata Negru tribí   Look at that insolent Negro 
k’a lanta ku Blanku   who stood up against the Whites 
Hork’é     Hang him 
Mat’é     Kill him 
This song refers to Tula and the slave revolt of 1795. In it, Tula—a powerful symbol of 
black resistance—is purposefully presented as an enemy of the nation, not a national 
hero. Allen and others such as Ellis Juliana and Paul Brenneker have recorded more 
songs like this, which reflect the old value of resistance was linked to insolence and 
improper behavior, a value that persists. Shaming and silencing of resistance was done by 
whites and blacks alike.  
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We saw in Barber’s stories that when confronted with racism most people remain 
silent and shrug it off. In Janwé the older, dark skinned male respondent (#24), who is 
highly educated and has a vey prominent job, said that it was difficult, but absolutely 
necessary, to keep your emotions under control when facing racism. It is hazardous to 
display anger publically, because you could damage your career, which you worked so 
hard for, and risk your job, the opportunities for your children, and so on. He described 
situations in which people assumed he was the gardener, or where he was not served in a 
bar while around him white people were served. It is profoundly denigrating, painful, and 
frustrating, to be discriminated against; to be “constantly devaluated because you are a 
person of color.” But, he argues, the repercussions of your speaking up or acting out 
might be even more painful. He too mentions the role that Curaçao’s small-scale plays in 
this: a complaint or accusation regarding something that takes place in the social sphere, 
such as in sports or among friends, may create a ramification on the work floor. The 
silence engendered by this fear clearly has an oppressive dimension: it preserves the 
principles of white supremacy. However, it is also a deliberate act of self-protection (see 
Sheriff 2000), and thus attests to Afrocuraçaoan agency. Even though people do not 
speak up, navigating and restricting the damage caused by racial discrimination is an 
important action.  
In other barios I witnessed the same attitudes. At home, among friends and loved 
ones, I witnessed the same thing. I have seen grown men and woman cry hot tears about 
racist humiliations, but they never said a word in public, mostly out of fear for 
repercussions. But also, time and time again I heard people say: “What can you do?” In a 
conversation a brown skinned male in his thirties said:  
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Curaçaoans often don’t know how to calmly, verbally put people in their place. 
There are some people who do have that razor sharp tongue, but if you don’t 
know how to do that then it’s safer to remain silent. You don’t want drama, but in 
that instant all the pain surfaces, so you might start yelling or hitting people. That 
would hurt your reputation. Discrimination often happens at work, when an 
employer or some other higher placed person says something ignorant. Then it is 
really difficult to respond: you don’t want to lose your job. They will complain to 
others about what happened, but the boss will never know, and the abuse can go 
on forever. But also, Makambas often don’t know better. They always want to 
continue making racist jokes, so at some point you say “let them be.” You gotta 
pick your battles, otherwise you are fighting all day, and then you are seen as that 
negative person. Also, some black people don’t really get that all people are 
equal. If they think Makambas are better than they are they will stay quiet and 
take the abuse. As if it is the Makamba’s right to abuse them. But people that are 
more conscious will set you straight.  
One young Afrocuraçaoan man of about fifteen years of age said “it’s not as if racism is 
illegal.” But as we saw in chapter 1, it is119.   
The two young dark skinned men in Otrobanda (#14 and #16) and the younger 
male respondent in Barber (#4), all dark skinned men, are the only ones in the sample 
who I have seen resist explicitly, not through direct retort but through their hair- and 
lifestyles. After many years the man with dreadlocks (#16) finally uncovered his hair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See appendix II for an overview of Curaçao’s anti-discrimination legislation. 
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instead of hiding it under hats. The youngest male respondent (#14) refused to cut his 
hair: he was raised in the Netherlands and grew up without Curaçao’s strong censure on 
African hairstyles. But most others remain quiet. The teacher from Barber (#3) teaches 
her pupils not to bully and to stand up against discrimination, even though her own way 
of dealing with discrimination was to turn a blind eye on it. What seems to add further to 
this silence is—again—people’s unawareness of the various legal instruments against 
racism. 
Throughout this chapter we saw repeatedly that critique on racial inequality is 
referred to only marginally in the interviews, and not part of mainstream society’s culture 
and knowledge production. But the discussion of the port-revolt era in chapter 1 revealed 
that it certainly has a significant presence in Curaçao’s past and present. As Scott 
indicates, there are numerous avenues for overt and hidden forms of critique. Scholars 
such as Allen (2007) and Rosalia (1997) have highlighted Afrocuraçaoan resistance 
through music, and tambú in particular. But as it is, this counter-hegemonic discourse is 
severely under-documented. It deserves far more elaboration, exploration, and 
documentation. As of yet there is no comprehensive body of work that has recorded and 
analyzed these different movements, the key-players, and their achievements. This 
invisibilization of the achievements of black empowerment is part of multiculturalism: it 
deflects and trivializes the importance of counter-hegemonic progress (Hale 2002, 2005; 
Goldberg 2002; Greene 2007; Rahier 2012). 
But in spite of its relative invisibility, and there is ample critique on and resistance 
to against white supremacy. There is critique and resistance in music, such as in the 
recent rap songs “Koi Makambanan” (Dutch Things) by Mosta Man (2009), on persisting 
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white Dutch dominance, and in “Nelson Mandela” by Dongo (2015), which addresses 
police violence directed at poor black youth120. There is critique and resistance in art, 
literature, story telling, film, poetry, folk theater, the multitude of proverbs that address 
inequality, the natural black hairstyles that are becoming increasingly popular, and 
through a revival of locally developed fashion using African prints and clothing styles. 
There is critique and resistance in delinquency and school drop out: why partake in a 
system that does not have your interests at heart, and why attend a school that praises 
white Dutch achievements over Afrocuraçaoan ones? There is resistance in engaging in 
Afrodescendant medicinal and religious practices such as the old herbal remedies 
preserved by people such as herbal specialist Dinah Veeris, and in the worship of the 
Santos and engaging in Afrocuraçaoan spirituality, which is often done secretly, or at 
least away from the public eye. There is critique and resistance in the unfriendly behavior 
of (darker skinned) working class shop clerks towards white tourists and other clients, 
and in the attitudes of aloofness and disinterest towards job supervisors (Antonius 1996).  
There is critique and resistance in the broad range of institutions that have 
developed since the 1970s, and that focus on the preservation and stimulation of 
Afrocuraçaoan culture and heritage. And as discussed in chapter 1, in the political arena 
politicians such as Amador Nita, Stanley Brown, Don Martina, Maria Liberia-Pieters and 
the late Hermin Wiels openly critiqued and resisted white supremacy. They were not 
many, but they made important changes. However, Wiels was assassinated shortly into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  These rappers reside respectively in the Netherlands and Colombia, but their songs pertain to both the 
Netherlands and Curaçao, and are consumed by the Curaçaoan community that inhabits a transnational 
space. There are 250.000 people living on the island, but another 140.000 people from Curaçao and the 
other Dutch Caribbean islands live in the Netherlands (http://www.zorgatlas.nl/beinvloedende-
factoren/demografie/etniciteit/nederlandse-antillianen-en-arubanen/). See appendix XII for their lyrics. 	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his first term, one day before he had announced to reveal data regarding the corrupted 
practices by wealthy white families. He was shot on a Sunday afternoon, when he went to 
drink a beer on the beach. He had sent his bodyguards home. To this day his murder has 
been unresolved. Nita, one of the leaders of the 1969 revolt, died only a few months into 
his first term as minister in the government. The people close to him claimed that he was 
poisoned, but this has never been proven (Anderson and Dynes 1975:102). The 
possibility of there being a correlation between their political orientation and their 
untimely deaths is whispered, not spoken. But it certainly does not diminish the 
sensitivity surrounding the critique on white supremacy, which is fuelled by fear of 
repercussions (see also Sheriff 2001).    
But in spite of all this critique and resistance, overt and systematic contestation of 
white supremacy and the racial status quo in Curaçao is minimal. And the critique and 
resistance is directed to certain parts of white supremacist oppression, while other 
dimensions people are far less aware of. I argue that, while there is critique and 
resistance, it is silenced to such an extent that white supremacy is hegemonic. Again, 
hegemony does not mean that people are unaware of their subjugation, or that they agree 
with it. Hegemony means that, in spite of their discontentment, the masses consent to 
their subjugation, and perceive the status quo as natural and self-evident (Gramsci 1971). 
In the iceberg metaphor, which I presented in the introduction, I argued that this 
silencing—and with that, hegemony—results from a large part of the mechanizations of 
hegemony not being clearly understood. The top of the iceberg, we see. In the metaphor 
this refers to the ideology that propagates unity and equality. We are likely to be aware 
that the iceberg has a bottom, but do not know its shape or size. Consequently, people are 
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aware that racism, racial discrimination exist, but they do not know how extensive these 
oppressive and excluding measures are, and how—exactly—they operate. But it is 
difficult to dismantle that which we cannot see or hear or comprehend. But as I also 
explained in the introduction, hegemony is never absolute, nor static, but always in flux 
as it is forever adapting to new contestations by the masses. 
The Yu’i Kòrsou was very rarely mentioned in the stories collected. None of the 
respondents from the non-white neighborhoods ever mentioned the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology 
by name, unlike the white respondents in Spaanse Water, who brought it up to reason 
away racism, and to claim their place in Curaçao’s “multicultural” society. Their defense 
of national unity in diversity is most certainly in accordance with their interests of not 
being ostracized as an ethnic and racial demographic minority that genuinely dominates 
all domains of Curaçaoan societal structure. Their attachment to the Yu’i Kòrsou identity 
gives them ideological means and tools to attenuate—if not completely erased from 
view—their obvious positioning at the apex of the Curaçao’s racial/spatial order.  
I have also found that people refer to the Yu’i Kòrsou at the “borders” of the 
nation, when interacting with foreigners. And it arises when people want to explain the 
nation’s core “nature,” and when talking about political reform, national culture and 
heritage. Curaçao is a relatively young nation. It has only reached its current status as a 
“constituent country” within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 2010. Therefore topics of 
nation building are often on the table in political and governmental meetings and 
speeches. But in my case study, the respondents, with the exception perhaps of the white 
Curaçaoan respondents, have not felt the need to refer to the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology to 
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explain or understand their circumstances, to organize their lives, or to formulate their 
hopes and worldviews. 
However, in reverse, when I ask people to define both the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology 
and the Yu’i Kòrsou identity (which I did not do in the interview but which I often did in 
informal conversations), respondents connect it to race and racism quite immediately. 
People say: “all are equal,” but the elaboration on racial disparity immediately follows. 
The structurally defining influence of race on the shape of the nation is an influence that 
is largely invisible. Instead the nation is perceived as defining race. 
Race     à   Nation invisible relation 
Nation  à   Race visible relation 
 
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this third chapter was to assess how Curaçaoans today perceive and 
experience race in their every day lives, and to examine the discrepancy between the 
unity and equality that is so avidly proclaimed by the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national 
identity, and the persisting racial inequality that is so little addressed and yet so easily 
observed. The chapter also examines the impact of multiculturalism on the imagination 
and representation of race. The bario is a crude measure that cannot replace census or 
other statistic data on race. Nonetheless, using the bario as a proxy for race proved to be a 
worthwhile approach to gain some valuable insights.   
Firstly, the twenty-nine stories showed a significant discrepancy between the 
unity and equality that is propagated by the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national identity, 
and people’s everyday experiences with racism. The ideology of inclusion and equality, 
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the top of the proverbial iceberg, was the very first thing that surfaced when I asked 
people to “tell me something about race and color,” like a knee-jerk response. Many 
respondents initially argued that there no longer is racial inequality. Even when racism 
was part of their every day life experiences, this national ideology was very much at the 
forefront, and surfaces throughout in their stories as a base-line for racelessness 
(Goldberg 2002; see also Bonilla-Silva 2010; Hale 2002, 2005; Greene 2007).  
But as people continued to talk their stories dismissed this unity and equality. The 
respondents mostly spoke about racial inequality: their overt critique on racial 
discrimination in for example education and on the job market fills most of the stories. 
The vast majority of the stories did not celebrate unity through diversity but were largely 
testaments of racism’s obvious persistence. In informal conversations I observed the 
same trend: people talk much more about racism than about unity and equality.  
In these twenty-nine stories the previously mentioned gatekeeping mechanisms 
again became apparent. People spoke of how racial discrimination in for example the 
field of education and on the job market restrict social upward mobility of 
Afrocuraçaoans. These marginalizations especially affected the lower classes. Everyone 
acknowledged the impact of the color hierarchy, and the current racial/spatial order of the 
island. The upper classes have remained predominantly white, the middle classes are 
mixed, and the lower classes are primarily dark skinned. The different religions are still 
largely racially segregated. The Catholic Church still plays a strong, directive role in the 
lives of the Afrocuraçaoan population, and still upholds numerous tenets of its 
civilization mission. Education has become one of the main routes to social upward 
mobility for people of color, but it is a double-edged sword. Education in Papiamentu 
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gives mainly Afrocuraçaoan children—many of whom speak Papiamentu at home—a 
better start and more positive appreciation of self. Nevertheless, mastery of the Dutch 
language remains a key asset on the job market, especially with regards to higher skilled 
jobs, and to pursuing higher education in the Netherlands. The neighborhoods are still 
largely segmented by race and class. Poor—black—neighborhoods, where the large 
social housing projects are located, are stigmatized, which adds to inhabitants’ 
marginalization when applying for a jobs or when seeking to enroll in certain schools. 
The black-is-beautiful ideals from the 70s and 80s have waned, and colorism is again in 
full effect. It was clear that race was not a topic that people commonly spoke about, but it 
surely is a topic about which people spoke eagerly, and had plenty to say, and most of it 
was far from positive. 
But the full extent of racism, especially its structural, institutionalized dimension, 
did not appear to be very clear to people. People mostly described incidences, not larger 
patterns. This corroborates with the iceberg metaphor: we know that the bottom is there, 
but we have no real idea of its size or shape. I repeatedly observed that people trivialized 
the horrors of the colonial past, and how these are related to persisting racial inequality 
today. The obfuscation of this correlation signals the impact of multiculturalism, which as 
we saw places especially the structural and institutionalized dimensions of racial 
inequality out of sight and promotes racelessness. 
The second part of the chapter zooms in on this. It offers a deeper analysis of the 
twenty-nine stories, through which I specifically looked at multiculturalism and how this 
is implemented through the principles of racelessness (Goldberg 2002). This section 
makes visible the hegemonic narratives of white supremacy that people reproduce 
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without being fully aware of this: the bottom of the iceberg. After all, hegemony demands 
that one has internalized the subjugating norms and values to the extent that they appear 
normal and natural, and often difficult to even define. But because these norms are so 
normal and natural people do replicate them continuously.  
This deep reading of the stories indicates that many respondents argued that there 
should be equality, but that in Curaçao’s society white is generally still seen as superior 
to black, and that black continues to have strong negative connotations. Many of the 
stories contained narratives that normalize and naturalize black inferiority and racial 
inequality compared to white superiority. At the same time, the glorification of white 
achievement and history—another principle of multiculturalism—was obvious. 
Whiteness continues to be associated with superiority and respectability, even though the 
respondents overtly expressed their dissatisfaction with this. Dark skinned, but also many 
of the white and light skinned respondents, critiqued white privilege and called it unfair. 
But some of them also reproduced mainstream renditions of national history, such as the 
salvation that the Catholic Church brought Afrocuraçaoans through education, health 
care, and religion, and the importance of slavery in making Curaçao a prominent 
Caribbean nation.  
This glorification goes hand in hand with a consistent trivialization of the horrors 
of slavery and colonial oppression, which were absent from the majority of stories. When 
respondents did refer to slavery, they portrayed enslaved people as victims, not as potent 
agents. Their mention of Tula as leader of the 1795 slave revolt was an exception to this. 
But Tula also turned out to be one of the antagonizing names used by kids, when they 
tease and bully one another. In this use, children referred to Tula’s slave status and not 
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his powerful agency, and shamed their playmates or rivals for their alleged inferiority due 
to their dark skin. Nonetheless, this narration of slavery echoed the white mainstream 
rendition of Curaçao’s colonial past, and reinforced black submission rather than 
empowerment. 
 The stories did not indicate that people were irritated about this whitewashing of 
the colonial past, and of the glorification of elite achievements. This signals hegemony: 
many perceive this particular narration of past and present as normal, and reproduce it 
without much contestation, and often even with great pride. Over the years of living and 
working on the island I have repeatedly noticed that Curaçaoans are very proud of their 
beautiful old city, and particularly on the colonial mansions and haciendas 
(“landhuizen”). When the Curaçao Tourism Board posts yet another video on Facebook 
that celebrates this colonial European-based architectural heritage, thousands of people—
black and white alike—like it and post enthusiastic comments. Generally, I have found 
signs of critique to be few and far between. 
In these narrations colonial exploitation as the root case for contemporary racial 
inequality also became trivialized, or even obfuscated. The respondents, and especially 
those in Seru Fortuna, did perceive race to be a key factor in their restricted access to 
employment and education, and in the high poverty and crime rate they experience. 
However, as previously mentioned, in larger society this correlation between race and 
poverty and other kinds of detrimental effects of racism is denied and made invisible. 
Consequently race has not been a variable that has been incorporated in governmental 
policies or academic research. The stories that did refer to this correlation do not mention 
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the lack of this address on behalf of government and academia. People appear to perceive 
the lack of attention for race as normal, which makes this particular silence hegemonic. 
What’s more, these hegemonic narratives in these stories revealed a constant 
trivialization of Afrocuraçaoan reform, resistance, and achievement, which deflects 
possible black contestation of white supremacy. In the stories there was a minimal 
presence of black heroes, achievements and knowledge. When respondents did talk about 
the revolt, pro-black empowerment and Antilleanization, they mostly reproduced the 
negative hegemonic narratives that trivialized and even scorned these events and 
achievements: the revolt and the pro-black emphasis of Antilleanization were depicted by 
some as harmful to society. The overall valuation of blackness that arose from these 
interviews was decidedly negative compared to whiteness. This again signals the 
persistence of white supremacy, perpetuated through the mechanizations of 
multiculturalism. 
Respectability politics play a central role in this deflection: articulating critique is 
labeled as disreputable, and disreputableness can amount to repercussions that diminish 
one’s social upward mobility. This pertains both to the way people perceive pro-black 
reform, which as we saw in hegemonic narratives is presented as an act of disobedience 
and antagonism rather than as empowerment, and to the individual’s responses to the 
racism they encounter in every day life.  
However, to only see these silences in response to every day life confrontations 
with racism as hegemonic would be a mistake. Various respondents talked about the 
coping mechanisms they developed to deal with racism. Their accounts illustrate that 
they do not easily contest the racism directed at them. Many remain silent, or ignore it 
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and shrug it off. They perceive it as unpleasant but normal. As said, it is the norm of 
Curaçao’s respectability politics to not direct explicit critique at anyone, and especially 
not through legal instruments, nor is it the norm to adhere to pro-black emancipatory 
reform. Some respondents indicate that they are afraid of repercussions, and that they fear 
the intensity of their own emotions, once they allow them to surface. As discussed in 
chapter 2, here too it becomes apparent that these silences are in part hegemonic, but also 
deliberate actions to navigate the dangers of racial discrimination (see also Sheriff 2001). 
The silence keeps people safe, as it secure one’s social standing and possibilities for 
improvement. In part it’s a complicit silence (Bourdieu 1977), but it is also full of 
agency.  
A last core element of multiculturalism that becomes visible in this deep reading 
of the stories is the prevalence of a discourse of racelessness. Throughout this dissertation 
we saw that racelessness engenders numerous deflections, of black empowerment and 
reform, subaltern critique, white exploitation, and the causal relation between past 
transgressions against Afrocuraçaoans and their contemporary marginalization (see 
Goldberg 2002). All of these deflections, though not actively addressed by the 
respondents, surfaced throughout these twenty-nine stories. They undercut true black 
reform and safeguard the persistence of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2010; Goldberg 2002; Hale 
2002, 2005; Greene 2007; Rahier 2012).  
This final chapter showed that the unifying part of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of 
national identity is very pervasive and well known by all respondents, but it does not 
have a strong enough impact to genuinely invisibilize the impact of Curaçao’s deeply 
rooted racial inequality. Curaçaoans clearly witness and experience the impacts of this 
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racial inequality—in fact, they always have. But this is a quintessential part of hegemony: 
it does not necessarily render oppression invisible. People may in fact be acutely aware of 
it. It however naturalizes and normalizes oppression to the extent that people do not seek 
to overthrow it: it informs the natural order of things. This, the chapter illustrates, is what 
the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology indeed does. For while the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology may not 
succeed in fully convincing the population that unity and interracial equality are real, 
through the largely invisible mechanizations of multiculturalism it is still successful in 
disguising the various ways in which racial marginalization, exclusion, deflection and 
trivialization are implemented, repelling counter-hegemonic critique and contestation, 
and thus in safeguarding and perpetuating white supremacy.  
On a closing note, this third case study focused on ideology and what parts of it 
people internalize and perpetuate, and considerably less on the myriad of ways in which 
people have been resisting to it for centuries, and continue to challenge it successfully 
today. In the introduction I warned the reader for the one-sidedness of my approach. This 
chapter was not designed to unveil the “super powers” of the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of 
national identity, and to forecast ever-lasting subjugation of Curaçaoans of African 
descent. Instead, the chapter’s ultimate objective is making visible at least some parts of 
the way hegemonic ideology works, which hopefully contributes to the breaking of at 
least some of its silences, as to enhance social change.  
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Conclusion: The Sound of Silence 
The Intricacies of Race and National Ideology in Curaçao 
 
 
Mundu yama Sinta Mira.  
The name of the world is Sit and See.121   
–Curaçaoan proverb 
 
This dissertation is titled The Sound of Silence, Ideology of National Identity and Racial 
Inequality in Contemporary Curaçao. Throughout its chapters I have sought to unveil 
that contemporary racism in Curaçao is a partially hidden constituent of the Yu’i Kòrsou 
ideology of national identity, which advocates unity and equality through 
multiculturalism. The main objective of this research was to show how race and racism 
have been entangled with Curaçao’s hegemonic ideology of national identity, and to 
demonstrate that racism has not become obsolete, as many Curaçaoans today often claim. 
Via three different case studies I have sought to critically analyze and theorize how this 
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  This proverb is also the title of a collection of poems and scholarly articles on womanhood in Curaçao. 
In the introduction of the collection, editor Joceline Clemencia explains what the proverb means and how 
she uses it to challenge the long standing silencing of Afrocuraçaoan and especially Afrocuraçaoan 
women’s voices (Clemencia 1992:ix). She writes:  
In Curaçao it means that reality is complex and dynamic, and that when you take time to study it, 
you will be able to discern this complexity. Mundu yama sinta mira speaks of survival based on 
strength and the wisdom of timing. Only the shrewd ones, who can perceive the difference 
between a noisy and apparently strong opponent and their own presumable silence and weakness 
know that in the end they will win, because today’s things can change into their opposite 
tomorrow (Clemencia 1992:ix). 
The proverb’s meaning, as explained by Clemencia, is an important testament of the empowering 
dimension of silence. As we saw throughout this thesis, and especially in Dorothy’s story, silence is not 
only about obedience and subjection, but also about resistance and empowerment: about healing and 
waiting until the time is right to make a move. Clemencia states that “the women of Curaçao were not 
silent, they awaited the right moment to speak out in the past, and continue to do so now” (Clemencia 
1992:x). 
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ideology of national identity facilitates the perpetuation of racial inequality, through 
hegemonic representations, deflections, and silences.   
In Chapter 1, I examined how an ideology of white supremacy has over the course 
of 380 years become deeply embedded in the societal make-up of the island. It informs its 
racial/spatial order, and legitimizes, safeguards and perpetuates the dominance of the 
ruling class (Bonilla-Silva 2010). During the colonial era racial hierarchy became 
increasingly implanted in legislation, education, politics, demography, language, religion, 
culture production, and intimacy, thus structurally segregating white and black through a 
myriad of gatekeeping mechanisms (see Bonilla-Silva 2010).  
Although the appearance of the ideology of white supremacy changed over time, 
this dissertation showed that its tenets fundamentally remained the same. After 
manumission, industrialization brought ample change to the island. A new ideology of 
national identity, which emulated hybridity and creoleness, grouped the old black and 
white populations of the island together under the label of the Yu’i Kòrsou, the child of 
Curaçao. It professed a more inclusive stand towards the Afrocuraçaoan masses, which 
had been marginalized for so long. But this ideology mostly served the elites. 
Afrocuraçaoan culture became a figurehead of Curaçao’s cultural uniqueness, which 
strengthened the elites in their claims for autonomy from the Netherlands. It also—at 
least temporarily—excluded the large stream of immigrants from true participation in the 
nation. This alleged unity and equality did however not decrease the marginalized 
position of the Afrodescendant population. Instead, gatekeeping practices remained in 
effect and white supremacy persisted. 
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The 1969 revolt brought about another clear shift in the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of 
national identity, by adopting multiculturalism and racelessness, which celebrated 
diversity and intercultural equality (Hale 2002, 2005). Even though for many 
Afrocuraçaoans this multicultural reform was initially seen as a victory that would finally 
diminish—if not end—racism, following scholars like Goldberg (2002), Hale 
(2002,2005), Greene (2007) and Rahier (2012) I explained this shift as an elite strategy to 
deflect Afrocuraçaoan demands for additional reforms. Part of this deflection was 
intensification in the appreciation of Afrocuraçaoan culture: Afrocuraçaoan people and 
culture were now perceived as the core of Curaçao’s national identity. The government 
initiated legal reform, and through numerous initiatives from both the government and 
civil society people of color got much more opportunities in education and on the job 
market. But still, numerous gatekeeping mechanisms, tied to the institutions that had their 
roots in colonial society, remained intact.  
A discussion of how multiculturalism developed on the island, in chapter 1, 
showed that in spite of its unifying and egalitarian message, the multicultural rendition of 
the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of national identity still facilitates the perpetuation of racial 
inequality and white supremacy. Racelessness plays an essential role in this. Because of 
the alleged unity and equality “race no longer matters,” the narrative goes. Consequently, 
the structural and institutionalized ways in which the racial hierarchy continues to shape 
the nation remain in effect (Goldberg 2002; see also Bonilla-Silva 2010).  
In the second chapter I explored how the ideology of white supremacy impacts 
the most intimate dimensions of one’s life. Following Ann Stoler I analyzed how racial 
dominance shaped the lives of three generations of transnational Caribbean women: my 
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mother, my grandmother and myself. I explored how Dutch imperial racial ordering of 
people and places affected our perceptions of self, of our bodies, our intimate 
relationships, family patterns, behaviors, the way we kept our hair and the dress we 
chose, the moral codes of respectability that informed our decisions, and so on. Colorism, 
and whitening though miscegenation as a means of upward social mobility is another 
theme. This chapter illustrates the concrete impacts that hegemonic ideologies of national 
identity can have on our lives. Racial ideology seeps into everything: into our thoughts, 
our feelings, our bodies, our psyches, into the dreams we dare to dream, the choices we 
make. And because it is naturalized it is pervasive, illusive, and ungraspable. Also, the 
chapter revealed that hegemony entails an intricate tangle of silences, some of which 
serve hegemonic indoctrination, while others are instrumental in counter hegemony, 
resistance, and our agency. 
Chapter 3 zoomed in on the impact of multiculturalism on the Curaçaoan 
population. It reverts back to the mechanizations of multiculturalism, as described in both 
the theory and the historical analysis in chapter 1. There we saw that multiculturalism is 
yet another ideology of white supremacy, which promulgates diversity, intercultural 
equality, and state-recognized inclusion of subaltern people, particularly through tools, 
such as legal reform, which allow marginalized peoples to increase their upward social 
mobility (Hale 2002, 2005; Greene 2007). However, in reality this reform and 
inclusiveness is just a mirage: it deflects subaltern claims on increased power (Goldberg 
2002).  
 The ethnography conducted in chapter 3 generates more insight in how racism 
persists, and especially to what extend people seem to be aware of its existence. 
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Interviews conducted among 29 respondents from different racial and socio-economic 
backgrounds examined how Curaçaoans experience and respond to both the unity that the 
Yu’i Kòrsou ideology proclaim exists, and the impact of racial inequality in people’s 
everyday lives. What initially became clear was that there is a strong discord between the 
ideology of unity and equality that is promulgated by the Yu’i Kòrsou ideology of 
national identity, and Afrodescendant people’s lived experiences with racism. Also the 
gatekeeping mechanisms regarding education, language, the job market, and rules 
regarding propriety resurfaced: they continue to restrict social upward mobility of 
Afrocuraçaoans. In contemporary society this marginalization remains visible in the 
distribution of race by class. Today the upper classes are still predominantly white, the 
middle classes are mixed, and the lower classes are mainly dark skinned. 
In the second part of the chapter, I provided a deeper analysis of the twenty-nine 
stories in order to decipher in particular the hegemonic narratives that people reproduce 
unknowingly, and how these instruct people in the naturalized and uncontested racial 
order that is dictated by white supremacy. This analysis centered on racelessness as a key 
component of multiculturalism (Goldberg 2002). It revealed that in these hegemonic 
narratives of the nation Afrocuraçaoan reform, resistance, and achievement is 
consistently trivialized, colonial exploitation as the root case for contemporary racial 
inequality is whitewashed and obfuscated, white achievement and history is glorified, and 
critique on white supremacy is deflected. Blackness is presented as the core of the nation, 
but white norms prevail. The findings in this chapter show the persistent silence that 
keeps race out of every day conversation, as well as academia and national policy. 
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This thesis has attempted to make visible the multiple layers of discourse in 
Curaçao’s ideology of national identity. Under the discourses of hybridity and 
multiculturality, which advocate unity, equality and the praise of diversity, white 
supremacist ideology prevails. Especially in the ways in which people talk about 
whiteness and blackness the contradictory nature of this ideology becomes evident. And 
in spite of the censure surrounding race and racism, people know that the myth of racial 
equality simply doesn’t hold up. Over time people have contested racist ideology, among 
others through the discourses of pro-black empowerment and Antillianization, which 
every now and then flare up, but wane again. Antillianization and pro-black reform 
engenders mostly an ideological shift, but it had less impact on the institutional 
dimension of society. I argue that this is because both the racializedness of Curaçao’s 
institutions, and its gatekeeping mechanisms, are relatively invisible. This does not mean 
that racism is actually invisible, but that it is difficult to get a good idea of how extensive 
the structural part of racism is, and what its precise mechanizations are. This thesis shows 
that this relative invisibility causes an omission of a deliberate address of racism, and 
thus preserves white supremacy.  
Chapter 1 explored how over the course of 380 years an ideology of national 
identity developed in Curaçao, premised on white supremacy, which persists today. 
Chapter 2 showed how this hegemonic ideology permeates our lives in such intricate and 
unseen, normalized manners. This makes it so hard to identify this ideology, and contest 
it. Chapter 3 further elaborated on the relatively unseen influence of this ideology, which 
I argued, is much more extensive than the parts that we do see. This is so by design. My 
analysis of the tenets of multiculturalism in the stories told by twenty-nine respondents 
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demonstrated this deep reach of hegemonic ideology. Turning back to the theoretical 
frame and the data presented in chapter 1, which made visible the goals of Curaçao’s 
multiculturalism (perpetuation of white supremacy), and its means (racelessness, 
deflection, invisibilization and naturalization of oppression and of supremacy), in chapter 
3 I show its ideological mechanizations. 
The stories I presented elucidate that Curaçao’s silence is never empty space, and 
never still. The many voices that fill it form a complicated concoction that produces a 
harmony, though a dissonant and uncomfortable one. The ideology of national identity is 
a system that reproduces itself, and that protects its objectives, in spite of constant 
subaltern challenges. The subjugated, the counter hegemonic, the ruling classes all 
convene here, filling silence’s space with their own purposes, wants, needs, fears and 
cross-sectional allegiances (Gramsci 1971). Oppression, invisibility, deflection, 
protection, trauma, resistance, empowerment—it all belongs here. But not until we make 
the full scope of oppression visible, and see what we are really up against, not until we 
breach the silence, can we make a veritable change. My work seeks to contribute to that. 
It is a drop in the ocean. But every bit helps.   
 
Recommendations for Research and Policy Innovation 
For decades the address of racism has been silenced by the official narration of the 
nation, and as a consequence been left largely unaddressed in academia, policymaking, 
and mainstream media. Because of the way hegemonic ideology reasons away the effects 
of race and racial discrimination, people are largely unaware of how precisely they 
operate, and these topics are perceived as “taboo” (see also UN 2015). Remedying racial 
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inequality and discrimination will require the identification and breaking of hegemonic 
silences. Since hegemony is so pervasive, I strongly believe that the address of hegemony 
should be approached from a great many different angles. 
  
Increase of Funding 
My first recommendation is directed at the government, to make available an adequate 
budget for the thorough address of racial inequality and discrimination, to fund projects 
from GO’s, NGO’s, and civil society. When discussing current initiatives regarding 
reform, at the end of chapter 1, I pointed out that one of the current obstructions to anti-
discrimination reform is the dire lack of available funding. Many of the organizations that 
are invested in knowledge production and pro-black reform struggle to make ends meat, 
which impedes the work they seek to do. This shortage in funds is not surprising given 
the disinterest and lack of active involvement of the government regarding race and 
racism. It is therefore adamant that the government will acknowledge that people of 
African descent, which comprise the vast majority of Curaçao’s population, are 
structurally disadvantaged in comparison to the rest of the population, and that as a 
consequence racism is a genuine threat to the well being of the nation.  
The UN Decade for People of African Descent (UNDPAD) however appears to 
have changed the game, and broken an important hegemonic silence. The Bill for the 
Curaçaoan Fulfillment of the United Nations Decade for People of African Descent 
(2015), created by a multidisciplinary working group initiated by the Directorate of 
Foreign Relations, has been accepted by the Council of Ministers. Nonetheless, currently 
there is no government funding available yet for the UNDPAD. Therefore I recommend 
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that the government takes an actively interested stance, and makes available at least part 
of the funding needed within a reasonable period of time. This will include reaching out 
to the Netherlands for additional funding to fight racism. For funding will be an essential 
baseline for the many recommendations made by the UN Working Group of Experts on 
People of African Descent (2015), and by the Bill for the Curaçaoan Fulfillment of the 
United Nations Decade for People of African Descent (2015), and by myself and many 
others. I advise that NGO’s and civil society monitor closely if this funding is indeed 
allocated.  
 
Knowledge Production 
My second recommendation regarding the breaking of hegemonic silence is to drastically 
increase knowledge production on the many dimensions of racial inequality and 
discrimination, and on the culture, history and achievements of Afrodescendants. We 
cannot hope to make effective policies without thoroughly corroborated qualitative and 
quantitative knowledge. In fact, I strongly warn against creating policies and projects that 
are not founded on in-depth inquiries in which race, racism, and racial discrimination are 
well researched, and validated by the population segments and communities they will 
apply to. 
The first research project that I believe to be crucial to successfully target racial 
inequality is generating reliable statistical data on race. Currently race is not part of the 
census. This has contributed greatly to the invisibilization of the impact of race on 
multiple dimensions of society. I therefore strongly recommend to collect statistical data 
using a population sample, and through operationalizing race through the use of a well-
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researched and tested lexicon that concurs with people’s self-identification. This data will 
provide us with essential insights in how race interrelates with socioeconomic class, 
education, work, language, poverty, education, crime, residence, and so on. Based on 
these data we can work towards the development of effective, targeted policies. 
 But overall there is very little qualitative and quantitative information available on 
race, racism, racial inequality, and racial discrimination: a dangerous silence. In appendix 
X I proposed a rather lengthy though preliminary list of research topics that to my 
opinion deserve considerable attention. The interrelatedness of race and socioeconomic 
class, in my opinion, is a crucial topic: how does racism negatively affect individuals, and 
what are the specific vulnerabilities per class layer that aggravate the impact of race, such 
as poverty. What kinds of racial discrimination do people experience? How do such 
vulnerabilities impact people’s access to and/or performance in for example health care, 
education, housing, and finding work? And how do such vulnerabilities make people 
more susceptible to delinquency and/or becoming the victim of crime and police 
violence? Race intersects with many other variables, such as gender, age, sexual 
orientation, and migration status or country of origin: these may increase or diminish 
these vulnerabilities. I believe that it is crucial to map all this out in order to successfully 
tackle racial discrimination and institutionalized inequality. 
Another important area of inquiry is race and the economic sector. What is the 
current racial and class composition of the economic sector, regarding business 
ownership, management and overall employment? What are the obstructions that people 
of color might experience in the economic sector as entrepreneurs and employees, and 
that contribute to the perpetuation of the island’s current racial/spatial order? 
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Furthermore, I mentioned throughout the dissertation that it deserves 
recommendation to thoroughly document the past and present of Antillianization and pro-
black empowerment, and the key players. I consider this to be especially important in the 
formulation of a strong counter-hegemonic discourse. I believe that it is of key 
importance to consider gender in such a study: currently the heroes of the nation are 
virtually all men. I also recommend the documentation and analysis of representation of 
race in the Curaçaoan arts in past and present—in popular culture, traditional culture, 
folklore, and the arts at large, including but not limited to representations of racial 
oppression and exploitation, resistance, and black empowerment. I belief that the study of 
contemporary Curaçaoan African Diasporic identity formation in relation to broader, 
transnational diasporic contexts that the island and its populations partake in through 
flows of people, commodities, capital, information, through popular culture and 
expressive culture would also be of great value. 
Then, I belief that additional in-depth ethnographic work be done on past and 
present Afrocuraçaoan dimensions of resistance to white supremacy, in both hidden and 
overt form. Important historical work has already been done by scholars such as Rose 
Mary Allen and René Rosalia, but in my opinion especially contemporary forms of 
resistance and agency deserve more attention. In the light of acknowledging the atrocities 
of the colonial past, I advice to make visible the intricacies of interracial relations, 
including but not limited to sexual violence, and to break the stereotypical romantization 
of such interactions, as well as the classic gender dyad of white male and black female to 
also include relations between same sex individuals, and black men and white women. 
And in order to further problematize the glorification of white colonial heritage I propose 
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to analyze race and contemporary representations of national identity, and particularly the 
prevalence of multiculturalism. This I argue should include but not be limited to race and 
policies of heritage preservation and monumentalization, urban symbolism, urban 
planning, and demography, the representation of race in mainstream media, the 
reproduction of narratives on race and national history in school materials of past and 
present and in tourism. It is evident that this list of recommendations for future research 
cannot in any way be exhaustive, but it presents the urgent hiatuses that I came across in 
my current thesis. 
I would recommend that institutions such as the University of Curaçao (UoC) and 
the Foundation National Archeological and Anthropological Memory Management 
(NAAM), but also the numerous research platforms in the Netherlands, direct part of 
their attention to such research, and that funding is specifically made available for this. 
Furthermore, as a former colony, Curaçao’s struggle with race did not develop in a 
vacuum: the island is part of the African Diaspora. Solutions should therefore not be 
sought in the vacuum of our national borders, but in dialogue with this intra-national, 
transatlantic space that formed and informed our past and present. I advise that relations 
with universities in the region and the larger international arena are augmented, with the 
aim to increase the flow of knowledge and people engaged with race and racism, and to 
encourage exchange.  
I however wish to emphasize that knowledge production should never be a 
unidirectional process that is directed from a governmental, academic or other kind of 
“state” institution to civil society. It is this one-sidedness, in which one platform of 
knowledge making is labeled “official” and esteemed over other platforms, that makes 
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hegemony both successful and detrimental to the masses. Instead, I encourage that 
knowledge be produced in a close dialogue between the state and its inhabitants, so the 
perspectives and needs of the ruling elites do not trump those of the masses, but instead 
the perspectives and needs of the wide variety of inhabitants inform the state. It is high 
time that the masses are duly respected as knowledgeable and active agents.  
 
Human Rights Institute 
In tandem with my emphasis on knowledge production I recommend, as do the UN 
Working Group and the working group of the Directorate of Foreign Affairs, the 
origination of a Human Rights Institute. I suggest that such an institution should be 
intimately linked to the University of Curaçao (UoC), which is currently the prime 
institution for knowledge production on the island. Human Rights Institutes commonly 
generate information for—and in collaboration with—a broad range of institutions and 
organizations in civil society and the government, regarding the awareness of human 
rights, and the strengthening of marginalized population segments, among others. 
Therefore I belief that such an institute requires a multidisciplinary environment that has 
a long standing and broad infrastructure for the production of dependable knowledge and 
for community outreach and service. Such an institute could work closely with the UoC’s 
Departments of Law, Social Sciences and Economics, Social and Behavioral Sciences, 
Engineering, and the General Faculty, and the newly developed trajectory of Cultural 
Studies, as well as with a myriad of organizations from civil society and the government, 
as to become a booming center of activism, community service, policy making and 
academic accomplishment. 
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Ideological Decolonization 
In this light, I belief that a successful address of racism should include a reformulation of 
the ideology of national identity, and the excavation of the relatively unseen element of 
white supremacy that is so pervasive. I refer to this process as “ideological 
decolonization,” and identify four phases, which may overlap122. Firstly, it will require a 
nation-wide dissemination of knowledge that makes visible and officially acknowledges 
the extent of historical and contemporary oppression and marginalization of people of 
African descent, the mechanizations through which this oppression and marginalization is 
executed, and the values of white supremacy that have been communicated consistently. 
It also involves reinstating Afrocuraçaoan beliefs, stories, practices and traditions that 
have been shamed, stigmatized, invisibilized, and even outlawed, as well as new beliefs, 
stories, practices and traditions that augment a positive representation of people of 
African descent. This relates directly to the abovementioned knowledge production.  
This phase really started after the revolt of 1969. During this time it was carried 
mostly by NGO’s and initiatives of civil society, and at some points by political parties 
such as MAN and Pueblo Soberano, and their leaders. However, as discussed in chapter 
1, these processes of coming to awareness and of an increased acknowledgement of 
Afrocuraçaoans and Afrodescendants at large as full participants in the nation were 
hindered by for example a lack of funding and media attention, and especially by the 
widespread perpetuation of white supremacist values in many dimensions of society. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 I base this recommendation regarding decolonization, and my discussion of the decolonization process, 
on the research presented in my Master’s thesis Aboriginality and Indianuity: Decolonization in the Urban 
Native Community of Vancouver (Roe, 2003).  
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order to diminish the influence of multiculturalism I recommend that NGO’s and civil 
society in particular keep a close watch on how this reform develops. 
Secondly, decolonization equals healing. Once people reach a thorough awareness 
that their marginalization was not caused by their own “inadequacies,” as hegemonic 
narrations of the nation propose, but by a deliberately constructed and institutionalized 
ideology that has been kept active for centuries, people are likely to experience a range of 
emotions, such as anger, sadness, frustration, and distrust. These emotions will have to be 
addressed through a variety of projects and events that are aimed at a constructive and 
emotionally safe exchange123 of people’s experiences and ideas, and based in or relevant 
to Afrocuraçaoan or Afrodescendant knowledge and tradition. Healing entails the sifting 
out of harmful societal norms, values and practices and all their manifestations, both in 
our communities and other settings, and in our own minds. Decolonization in this sense is 
both a communal and an intimate and ever-ongoing project: we have to create a new, 
positive and empowering “internal voice” that informs our sense of self in a beneficial 
and kind manner, and that will overlay the inner voice of subjugation, through which we 
oppress ourselves, often unknowingly but ever so harshly (see Fanon 1952/1967).  
This process of identifying the oppressive elements of the national ideology in our 
own minds and in society at large, and deliberately replacing them with positive ones will 
ultimately result in a new, “cleaned up” discourse. Initially this will be shared by some, 
but in order to dissolve white supremacy as a hegemonic force, ultimately this new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 The documentary Sombra di Koló  (“The Shadow of Color”), which I made in 2014, together with 
filmmakers Selwyn de Wind and Hester Jonkhout, is an example of a tool that raises awareness. The 
documentary addresses race and racial inequality in contemporary Curaçao. It has been shown over 70 
times on the island and in the Netherlands, always followed by a lengthy discussion with the audience. 
During these exchanges, which were always emotional but safe and constructive, people exchanged their 
stories and let off steam. 
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narration has to become spread nation-wide, which happens in the third stage, and 
become implemented in the nation’s institutions, which is the fourth stage. 
 
Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
It is crucial in the fight against racism and the breaking of hegemonic silences that people 
report cases of racism and racial discrimination, and that this results in adequate 
sanctioning. As appendix II shows, Curaçao has an elaborate body of legal instruments, 
existing of articles in the Constitution and Criminal Code, and several international 
treaties, which is designed to combat racism and other kinds of discrimination. Currently 
these instruments are severely underused: the national population is insufficiently 
unaware of their existence, and of how precisely they can make use of these instruments, 
and people are afraid that their complains will result in negative repercussions and 
retaliations. Therefore, like the UN Working Group and the working group of the 
Directorate of Foreign Affairs, I call for the initiation of an Anti-Discrimination Agency, 
which operates in collaboration with the Court of Justice, the police, lawyers, the 
Ombudsman, but also with organizations and agents from civil society, such as 
neighborhood centers, youth organizations, social workers, and churches. It is important 
that the various institutions that partake in the judicial process are well geared to one 
another, so the reporting of discrimination and the subsequent judicial process are easily 
accessible, transparent, and safe for victims.  
Such an institution would take inventory of people’s problems with racial 
discrimination, provide information and help as to how to respond, and the steps to take 
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to file a formal complaint. This institution would thus also gather valuable data that 
further adds insight in how racism impacts individuals and communities.  
In order to make the national population aware of this agency and their rights, I 
recommend the development of a national awareness campaign, to be presented in the 
mainstream media. This campaign should inform people of what racism is exactly, what 
people’s rights are, best practices in responding to discrimination, how to report such 
cases to the authorities, and why this is important.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I Categories in Curaçao’s Color Hierarchy 
 
Papiamentu 
name 
English translation Contemporary use 
 
Makamba 
 
No exact translation. The original 
word “Makamba” refers to a 
specific tribe in Africa, from 
which a fairly large group of 
slaves was brought to Curaçao 
(Hoetink 1958). Over time the 
name began to signify “stranger” 
or “outsider.” 
This label refers to white Dutch people. 
“Makamba” commonly refers to the outsider 
status of a white Dutch person living on or dealing 
with Curaçao. Said person does not integrate 
(sufficiently) in Curaçao’s culture and society, and 
instead shows a strong allegiance to the 
Netherlands and to Dutch culture and identity. 
Although commonly signifying a white person, 
Makamba can be used to denote a person of any 
phenotype, as long as they strongly adhere to 
Dutch culture. Speaking Dutch fluently is a key 
part of this category. 
 
Makamba can be used as a matter of fact 
descriptor of a white Dutch person, or jokingly or 
critically, to indicate that a Dutch person has not 
integrated enough in Curaçaoan culture. In this 
sense it can also signify a Curaçaoan of color who 
has integrated too much into Dutch culture.  
 
The label also has a very strong negative and 
derogatory meaning when it is used to express the 
resentment Curaçaoans feel regarding white Dutch 
superiority today, especially with regards to the 
island. 
 
White Dutch people often use the label in a 
neutral or positive way. 
 
Blanku “White.” Derived from the Dutch 
word “blank” which literally 
translates as “colorless,” “clear,” 
“clean,” and “immaculate.” In 
Dutch blank is commonly used to 
refer to white people. 
 
 
The label refers to white people in general, or a 
very light skinned person of racially mixed origins 
whose skin is white or nearly white, and who has 
predominantly white features.  
 
This label does not indicate an outsider status in 
the way that Makamba does. The person can be a 
Yu’i Kòrsou and thus have a full or partial insider 
status. In Curaçao “blanku” is not a negative 
term124, as it literally translates as the color white.  
 
Hair texture is a centrally important marker of this 
label. It cannot be afro-textured but it has to be 
curly, wavy or sleek.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 In the Netherlands the racial label “blank” however is getting more and more critique over its 
significance of purity. It is slowly becoming replaced by “wit” (white). 
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Koló kla “Clear color” or “light color.”  A person who has an overall white (what in the 
US is referred to as Caucasian) phenotype but 
who has a slightly darker complexion, like people 
in the Mediterranean area. Or a person with a 
white skin tone but with some black facial 
features or hair texture. The person may be of 
racially mixed origin, but this is not necessarily, 
nor does he or she have to be Afrodescendant. 
 
People with a fully white phenotype may still be 
referred to as koló kla as a way to express that 
they are considered to have insider status.  
 
This is the case when one is locally oriented, 
immersed in Curaçaoan culture, and particularly 
in the nuances of every day life, norms and values, 
street culture and humor. This includes speaking 
fluent and accent-free Papiamentu. One must 
furthermore have a strong knowledge of and 
allegiance to Curaçao’s Afrocuraçaoan heritage as 
being the center of national culture, and not only 
participate in the island’s white elite culture, be it 
of the Dutch-born or the Curaçaoan-born white 
population. This is especially important for those 
people that were not born on Curaçao but that 
integrated later on. 
 
Koló habrí “Open color” 
 
 
 
This label refers to light-skinned black people. 
This category is similar to koló kla though here 
one’s black features – body and behavior – tend to 
be more pronounced. The hair is commonly afro-
textured or a smaller curl.  
 
The label’s fluid boundaries allow both white 
people who are not Afrodescendant as well as 
darker skinned black people to fall into the 
category. People that look largely white may still 
be labeled koló habrí if they are very locally 
oriented and knowledgeable – and preferably 
participants in - Afrocuraçaoan culture. This does 
not mean that they may not at the same time also 
belong to white elite circles, and spend the vast 
majority of his or her time there. The main 
characteristic is that the person is fully proficient 
in, and appreciative of, Afrocuraçaoan culture. 
 
On the other hand, darker skinned people who are 
labeled as or self identify as koló habrí are 
considered to have a more elite and/or white 
allegiance, be this to the Netherlands, the local 
elites, or another white culture. They may also be 
seen as of a higher socioeconomic status. 
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Korá “Red”  
 
This category refers to people with red hair, or to 
light skinned black people with blond or light 
brown hair as opposed to dark hair. The skin tone 
can be white or a light brown, possibly with 
freckles, a skin that burns in the sun, or that has a 
reddish brown hue.  
 
This category refers to an insider status. This can 
be through being born on the island, or for 
foreign-born people through black allegiance, 
and/or proficiency with Curaçaoan culture. 
 
Mispel  “Sapodilla,” the shade of brown 
of the fruit’s peel 
 
This label is only used for women. This is a 
medium light brown skin tone. The person has 
undeniably black physical features, most often 
including afro-textured hair or strongly curled 
hair. Mispel refers to the beauty ideal of the 
lighter skin tone, which in Curaçao is more 
imperative for women then for men.  
 
Again the label is fluid, and is also used for darker 
skinned women if they have very pretty features, 
or when they have a higher socio-economic status. 
It is also used when women have features that are 
associated with white bodies, such as curly or 
sleek hair, or non-curvy physiques.  
 
Koló Bruin “Brown” This label covers a range of skin tones, including 
mispel, but it is commonly perceived as slightly 
darker than mispel. This skin tone is also 
perceived as the most common skin tone for 
Curaçaoans, or as “the norm,” and is therefore not 
necessarily mentioned as a descriptor: it is the 
default. Those who deviate from this color, be it 
darker or lighter, are described in the above and 
below mentioned color terms.  
 
Again allegiance and cultural immergence play a 
significant role. People with a somewhat lighter 
brown skin tone can self-identify as brown, while 
they could also choose to identify with a lighter 
skin tone. 
 
It can also be used to signify darker-skinned 
people who are of a higher socio-economic class 
and/or who are strongly immersed in or allegiant 
to white culture.  
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Koló bruin skur / 
koló skur 
“Dark brown” / “Dark color” 
 
This label refers to people with a dark brown skin 
tone and clear black features. 
 
Allegiance still matters, as people with this skin 
tone may still be perceived as lighter brown when 
they are thought to have less immergence in black 
Curaçaoan culture, or have a strong allegiance to 
white culture.  
 
Pretu “Black” This label refers to people with a very dark brown 
skin tone. It is also the umbrella notion for all 
Afrodescendant people. 
 
Here allegiance matters less: people with this 
phenotype can be called koló bruin skur or koló 
bruin, but their explicitly black features imply 
their allegiance.  
 
Pretu sera 
 
“Closed black” This is the darkest shade of brown skin tone. This 
is a rare shade and a rarely used label.  
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Appendix II Anti-discrimination Legislation in Curaçao 
 
 Constitution125 of Curaçao 
Article 3 
 In 1865, two years after abolition, the anti discrimination clause became part of the 
Government Regulations (Regeringsreglement) of the Dutch colonies (van Rijn 
1999:138). This clause became article 3 in the Constitution of the Netherlands 
Antilles, which was accepted in 1955. In 2010 Curaçao issued its own Constitution 
when it reached autonomous status in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Article 3, now 
much more specified with regards to race and all other forms of discrimination, 
remains in effect. 
 
 Criminal Code of Curaçao 
Article 1:221 read together with the articles 2:60, 2:61, 2:62, 2:63 en 3:12 
 In the pre 10-10-2010 version of the Criminal Code of Curaçao these articles, 
which were then articles 143a, 143b and 143c, were signed on Christmas Day, 
December 25, 1971, and became operational retroactively as of December 9, 1971. 
Two weeks later, on 9-1-1972 the CERD treaty was signed by the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The two events appear related.  
 
 
 
International Treaties against Racial Discrimination 
 
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Nov 4, 1950 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification  
Aug 31, 1954 Signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and ratified by the Netherlands  
Dec 31, 1955 Ratified by the Netherlands Antilles 
  
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) 
Dec 21, 1965 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 
2106 (XX)  
Jan 9, 1972 Signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and ratified by the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands Antilles 
  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Statuut van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden) pertains to 
all constituents of the Kingdom, which since 10-10-2010 include the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and St. 
Martin. Bonaire, Statia and Saba are since then municipalities of the Netherlands. Since 1955 the 
Netherlands Antilles, then comprised of Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, Statia, Saba and St. Martin, had their 
own Constitution, which was called “Staatsregeling,” in which the islands specified a number of laws as 
one country. Since 2010 Curaçao has become an autonomous constituent of the Dutch Kingdom and thus 
specified its own Staatsregeling. 
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (IVBPR) 
Dec 16, 1966 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification 
March 11, 1979 Signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and ratified by the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands Antilles 
  
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IVESCR) 
Dec 16, 1966 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification 
March 11, 1979 Signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and ratified by the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands Antilles 
  
 Convention against Discrimination in Education 
Dec 14, 1960 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification 
March 25, 1966 Signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
June 25,1966 Ratified by the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles 
  
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Dec 18, 1979 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification 
July 17, 1980 Signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Aug 22, 1991 Ratified by the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles 
 
This list of treaties is not exhaustive. However, in 2015 the United Nations Report of the 
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its sixteenth session: Mission to 
the Netherlands (2015), the Working Group makes a specific recommendation to the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands to include the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, so it can better protect the 
rights and needs of all Afrodescendants (UN 2015:19). In the case of Curaçao this would be 
an important measure to address ethnic discrimination of Afrodescendant immigrants, as well 
as vulnerabilities that immigrants experience when they are undocumented or have temporary 
visas. The Report writes: 
While the Netherlands has ratified most of the core human rights instruments and its 
national legal framework covers a broad range of offences related to racial 
discrimination, the protection offered by the law is not always sufficient to 
overcome persistent and structural disparities specifically affecting people of 
African descent. The Netherlands should consider ratifying the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, and adopting legislation to address the specific needs of people of 
African descent (UN 2015:19).  
 
 
  
 365 
Appendix III Overview of Interviewees and Interview Protocol for the Case Study on 
Curaçao’s Color Hierarchy  
 
These data were obtained through semi-structured interviews I conducted with a group of 12 respondents. I 
asked them the following two questions: 
1. Name the different classifications of skin color and phenotype in Curaçao. 
2. Describe the different classifications of skin color and phenotype in Curaçao. 
3. Give examples of local or international people that fit these categories.  
I used the below stratified probability sample to recruit my respondents. It is diverse for the variables skin 
color or phenotype, age, gender and socioeconomic background, see the sample design shown in the table. 
The variable for phenotype is a fluid range, not a binary.  
 
Variables of the respondents 
Age 18 – 29 30 - 55 56+ 
Gender M F M F M F 
Phenotype 
(scale) 
Black - - - white Black - - - White Black - - - White 
Education High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low 
Income level High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low 
Occupation Various  Various  Various 
Social 
network 
Various Various Various 
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Appendix IV Curaçao’s Museums 
 
 Open Collection Era Building / site 
General Society     
Money Museum Yotín 
Kortá 
1993 The development of Curaçao’s 
national currency past to present. 
16th – 21st c. Colonial mansion 
Postal Stamp Museum 1985 Collection of Curaçao’s stamps 
past to present 
17th – 21st c. Oldest house in 
Punda 1693 
Carnival Museum 2010 Collection of costumes 20th – 21st c. Colonial mansion 
Children’s Museum 
Curaçao 
2015 Children in Curaçao’s Society  Modern building 
European Elite Heritage     
Curaçao Museum 1948 Furniture and artifacts of Dutch 
colonial elite 17,18,19th century, 
Dutch and regional art. 
17th -21st c. Military hospital, 
1853 
Maritime Museum 
 
1998 Maritime developments and 
achievements of the Dutch, the 
Dutch West India Company, and 
the harbor of Willemstad. 
15th - 21st c. Colonial mansion 
1729 
Fort Church & Protestant 
Historical Cultural 
Museum 
1992 Religious artifacts of prominent 
Dutch Protestant families.  
17th -21st c. Colonial era church 
1769 
Rif Fort Museum 2014 History of the Dutch military fort 
during colonial rule. 
19th-21st c. Military Fort 
Jewish Museum 1970 Religious artifacts of prominent 
Portuguese Jewish families. 
15th - 21st c. Part of the 
synagogue complex 
Octagon 1980 Life of Venezuelan freedom 
fighter and general Simon Bolivar, 
and his years of exile in Curaçao. 
19th c. Colonial building 
Mongui Maduro Library 2010 Furniture, artifacts and archives of 
Jewish community in Curaçao. 
19th - 20th c. Plantation house 
Rooi Catootje 
The Liqueur Factory 1896 Traditional and contemporary 
artifacts for liqueur production 
19th - 21st c. Plantation house 
Chobolobo 
Plantation Savonet 2010 The history of plantation Savonet 
and nature / island in general. 
4000 years, focus 
on 17th-21st c. 
Plantation house 
from1662 
Afrocuraçaoan Heritage     
Museo Tula 2006 Traditional Afro-Curaçaoan 
lifestyles and slavery 
18th - 20th c. Plantation house 
Knip 
Kas di Pal’i Maishi 2000 19th century traditional Afro-
Curaçaoan lifestyle and lore  
17th – 20th c. Slave house, 1880 
Den Paradera Herbal 
Garden 
1981 Traditional Afro-Curaçaoan 
herbal garden 
19th - 20th    c.  
Museo di Tambú Shon 
Cola  
2015 Historical development of Afro-
Curaçaoan drumming tradition 
and accompanying cultural 
practices.  
17th-21st c. Colonial mansion 
Slavery     
Kura Hulanda Museum 2003 Cultures of the peoples of the 
Caribbean basin, including slavery 
4000 years, focus 
on 17th-21st c. 
Mansion and slave 
market courtyard  
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Appendix V Statistical Distribution of Religion in Curaçao 
 
 
Table Population by religion and sex  
 
    
Religion Total 
  Male Female Total % 
Christianity         
     Roman Catholic 50346 59192 109538 72.7 
     Methodist 285 460 745 0.5 
     Protestant 2301 2590 4891 3.2 
     Pentecostal 3866 6104 9970 6.6 
     Adventist 1905 2549 4454 3.0 
     Hinduism 1152 1906 3058 2.0 
     Anglican 118 218 336 0.2 
     Evangelical 1155 1644 2799 1.9 
     Mormonism 28 58 86 0.1 
     Baptism 18 5 23 ** 
     Christian* 547 833 1380 0.9 
Subtotal 61721 75559 137280 91.0 
          
Jehova's Witness 658 564 1222 0.8 
Islam 426 325 751 0.5 
Judaism 141 155 296 0.2 
Other religion 553 632 1185 0.8 
No religion 4894 4083 8977 6.0 
Not reported 455 397 852 0.6 
Total 68848 81715 150563   
Census 2011, Central Bureau Statistics 
 
*This group consist of persons which answered the question about belonging to a 
Christin-based religion, without further specification. 
** The number is too small. 
The column with percentages was added by me. 
 
         
 
Original table: Table D-5. Population by religion, age group and sex, Census 2011. www.cbs.cw, visited 
April 4th 2016. 
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Appendix VI Overview of Respondents in the Bario Case Study  
 
 
Respond
ent  
Age F/M Skin color Level of Education 
(Dutch system**) 
Occupation 
Respondents Barber 
1.  18 F Dark brown Pre-University Ed. Student 
2.  24 M Dark brown Vocational Training Mechanic 
3.  30 F Dark brown Higher Professional Ed. Elementary school teacher 
4.  55 M Dark brown Senior Secondary 
Vocational Ed. 
Mechanic, planter  
5.  80 F Dark Brown Primary Ed. Retired cleaning lady 
6.  69 M Dark brown Higher Professional Ed. Retired social cultural worker 
Respondents Seru Fortuna Bieuw / Seru Papaya 
7.  21 F Brown Pre-Vocational 
Secondary Ed. 
Cook, waitress 
8.  19 M Dark brown Pre-Vocational 
Secondary Ed. 
Student  
9.  39 F Mispel Senior Secondary 
Vocational Ed.  
Cook 
10.  35 M Brown Lower Secondary Ed. Baggage handler airport 
11.  55 F Dark brown Lower Secondary Ed. Seamstress 
12.  65 M Dark brown Lower Secondary Ed. Roadside worker 
Respondents Otrobanda 
13.  18 F Brown Pre-Vocational 
Secondary Ed. 
Student 
14.  18 M Brown Pre-Vocational 
Secondary Ed. 
Student 
15.  40s V Brown Senior Secondary 
Vocational Ed. 
Bookkeeper 
16.  33 M Dark brown Senior General 
Secondary Ed 
Painter, construction worker 
17.  70s F Light brown Higher Professional Ed. Retired elementary school 
teacher 
 70s F Dark brown Primary Education Road sweeper for waste 
management company  
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18.  70s M Very light-
skinned 
Higher Professional Ed Retired P.E. Teacher 
Respondents Janwé 
19. 18 F Light-skinned Pre-University Ed. School 
20.  26 M Light brown University Pilot 
21.  36 F Brown University Bank manager 
22.  36 M Brown Higher Professional Ed. Entrepreneur and sales 
representative 
23.  80s F Light brown Lower Secondary Ed. Shop assistant 
24.  56 M Dark brown University Bank manager 
Respondents Jan Sofat 
25.  18 F Light skinned University Student 
26.  26 M Very light-
skinned 
University Student 
27. 45 V White University Director of a Foundation  
28. non-
response 
x M x x x 
29.  75 F White, Dutch Higher Professional Ed. Retired teacher, spiritual 
worker 
30.  70s M White, Dutch University / Higher 
Professional Ed. 
Civil engineer 
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** Overview of the Dutch educational system, which also pertains to Curaçao and other 
parts of the Dutch Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Du Bois-Reymond (2009) 
 
Du Bois-Reymond, Manuela (2009) The Integration of Formal and Non-Formal Education: The Dutch 
“brede school.” In: Social Work and Society International Online Journal, Vol 7(2). 
http://www.socwork.net/sws/article/view/72/331, site visited April 12th 2016. 
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Appendix VII  Interview Protocol Bario Case Study 
 
 
1. Tell me something about race or color / Kontami algu over di rasa of koló. 
 
This question would lead to a number of follow-up questions that were specific to the topics the respondent 
introduced. I made an effort to not lead, but at the same time to be critical of the narratives they presented. I 
would let people tell their stories, and afterwards dig deeper into the contradictions in their stories. 
 
2. How do you describe your own color? Kiko ta bo koló? 
 
3. What is your age? / Kuantu anjo bo tin? 
 
4. What was the last school you attended / what is your level of education? Kual ta e delaster skol b’a bai / 
Ki ta bo nivel di edukashon? 
 
5. Who did you come home with, partner-wise? / Ken b’a bin kas kun’e komo partner? 
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Appendix VIII    Victims of Crime in 1 Year (1981- 2008), in Percentages 
 
  1980/81 1991/92 1994/95 2007/08 2013/14 
car theft 1,2 1,4 1,2 1,5 0,9 
theft from car 9,1 8,0 9,0 7,1 7,9 
car vandalism     3,9 3,7 3,8 
burglary (break-in) 7,3 9,0 8,9 5.7 5.2 
intent of burglary (break-in)     5,4 4,0 2,8 
theft from yard, garden, porch   8,8 10,0 6,7 5,5 
robbery/theft of personal properties 4,4 2,6 4,4 3,4 2,1 
vandalism 3,1 3,4 2,6 2,4 1,8 
assault/threat     3,3 1,9 1,8 
hit and run 0,8 1,0 1,9 1,6 1,9 
other crime 2,1 0,6 0.4 0,9 0,6 
total 18,8 27,5 39,0 26,3 21,7 
CBS: Victim Survey           
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Appendix IX  Interview Results per Bario 
  Barber 
(n=6) 
SeruF 
(n=6) 
OtroB 
(n=6) 
Janwé 
(n=6) 
SpW 
(n=5) 
Tot % 
 Phenotype respondents dark dark varies varies white   
1 I don’t see color 2 1 0 3 4 10 36 
2 I’m not discriminated against /  
Discrimination is passé 
1 2 3 3 2 11 38 
3 There is unity 1 1 3 2 4 11 38 
4 There is discrimination 6 6 6 6 5 29 100 
5 Black is negative 5 4 4 6 3 22 76 
6 Black is positive 1 1 2 2 3 9 31 
7 White is negative 2 2 3 2 1 10 36 
8 White is positive 3 1 2 1 1 9 31 
9 White is better than black 5 5 3 4 4 21 72 
10 White and black are equal 5 4 4 4 5 22 76 
11 Black is better than white 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Tula 0 1 1 0 1 3 10 
13 Emancipation and Afrocuraçaoan 
empowerment 
1 1 4 1 2 9 31 
14 Slavery 3 1 4 1 3 12 41 
15 Black to black discrimination  5 2 2 3 3 15 52 
16 Teasing / bullying with black features 3 2 1 1 0 7 24 
17 Color hierarchy 2 0 0 0 0 1 7 
18 “Drecha rasa” or “fixing the race” 0 1 1 1 0 3 10 
19 Work 4 4 4 4 4 20 69 
20 School 4 4 4 2 2 16 55 
21 Poverty 1 3 1 1 3 9 31 
22 Crime 0 5 2 0 1 8 30 
23 Response to racist behavior 3 2 3 2 2 12 41 
24 Respondent mentions Yu’i Kòrsou 0 0 0 0 4 4 14 
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Appendix X Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have often remarked on topics that are not included in this thesis 
but that are in much need of thorough address. I here list some of the research that I consider to 
be the most urgent.  
 
1. Interrelatedness of race and socioeconomic class: how does racism negatively affect 
individuals, and what are the specific vulnerabilities per class layer that aggravate the 
impact of race, such as poverty. What kinds of racial discrimination do people 
experience? How do such vulnerabilities impact people’s access to and performance in 
for example health care, education, housing, finding work? And how do such 
vulnerabilities make people more susceptible to delinquency and/or becoming the victim 
of crime and police violence? Race intersects with many other variables, such as gender, 
age, sexual orientation, and migration status or country of origin: these may increase or 
diminish these vulnerabilities. This must all be mapped out. 
 
a. The interrelatedness between race and poverty. 
 
b. The interrelatedness between race, poverty, crime, delinquency and violence 
(including but not limited to domestic violence), and the juridical elements of 
criminal punishment. 
 
c. The interrelatedness between race and health. 
 
d. The racial dimensions of education, including but not limited to the selection 
procedures of the educational system, on the gate keeping mechanisms regarding 
language politics and funding of schools, and on the racialized content of class 
materials.  
 
e. Race and the housing market, including but not limited to race based policies of 
the social housing projects and urban planning. 
 
f. Race and gender: in what ways does race impact males and females differently, 
and how does this play out per socioeconomic class section.  
 
g. Race and sexual orientation: in what ways does race impact LBGTQ people 
differently compared to heterosexuals, and how does this play out per 
socioeconomic class section. 
 
h. Race and age: how does race impact people of different age categories (child, 
adolescent, adult, elderly). 
 
i. Race and migration status or country of origin: how does race impact 
immigrants? What role do the various ethnic backgrounds play, as well as 
whether people are documented or not? 
 
  
 375 
2. Race and the economic sector.  
 
a. The racial and class composition of the economic sector, regarding business 
ownership, management and employees 
 
b. Benefits of and challenges to black entrepreneurship, compared to white and 
other non-white entrepreneurship 
 
c. Racism in bank, loan and insurance policies. 
 
d. Racism in HRM selection procedures and diversity management. 
 
e. How does race in these abovementioned topics intersect with socioeconomic 
class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic background and immigrant status?  
 
3. Historical exploration and documentation.  
 
a. Documentation of the past and present of the development of Antillianization and 
pro-black empowerment, and their key players.  
 
b. Past and present Afrocuraçaoan dimensions of resistance to white supremacy, 
hidden and overt. 
 
c. The intricacies of interracial relations, including but not limited to sexual 
violence. 
 
d. Representation of race in the Curaçaoan arts in past and present. Documentation 
of representations of race in popular culture, traditional culture, folklore, and the 
arts at large, including but not limited to representations of racial oppression and 
exploitation, resistance, black empowerment. 
 
4. Race and contemporary representations of national identity: prevalence of 
multiculturalism. 
 
a. Race and policies of heritage preservation and monumentalization. 
 
b. Race and urban symbolism, urban planning, and demography. 
 
c. Representation of race in mainstream media.  
 
d. Reproduction of narratives on race and national history in school materials of 
past and present, including but not limited to slavery, resistance, and 
empowerment.  
 
e. Race and tourism, including an exploration of the possibilities of pro-poor 
tourism. 
 
f. Contemporary Curaçaoan African Diasporic identity formation in relation to 
broader, transnational diasporic contexts that the island and its populations 
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partake in through flows of people, commodities, capital, information, through 
popular culture and expressive culture. 
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Appendix XI Bill for the Curaçaoan Fulfillment of the United Nations Decade for 
People of African Descent  
 
Published by the Directorate of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of General Affairs, on 30 
November 2015. The original title is Nota voor Curaçaose invulling van United Nations Decade 
for People of African Descent. 
 
I. Recognizing that the position of people of African descent is oftentimes disadvantaged 
compared to that of the rest of society, and that discrimination on the basis of race/skin 
color is therefore a problem in Curaçao’s society. 
  
II. For the duration of the decennium the government will dedicate itself to improve the 
societal, social and economic position of people of African descent.  
 
III. Making a choice of one of three proposed definitions of ‘people of African descent.’ 
  
IV. Agreeing to the coordination of the International Decade for People of African Descent 
(UNDPAD) by the Foundation National Archaeological - Anthropological Memory 
Management (NAAM). 
 
V. Launching a governmental website regarding the UNDPAD and human rights. 
 
VI. Initiation of a Human Rights Institute by the Ombudsman. 
 
VII. Initiating an Anti Discrimination Agency. 
 
VIII. Adapting educational curriculums to the history as experienced by people of African 
descent, and dissemination of information regarding discrimination, respect, equality 
and (self)acceptance. 
 
IX. Deciding upon immigration policy and the laws that illegal immigrants have, and 
upholding these. 
 
X. Directorate of Foreign Relations and NGO’s are to inform ministries on human rights 
and racial discrimination as to generate awareness within the government on this, and 
on the UNDPAD.  
 
XI. NGO’s that organize activities within the context of the UNDPAD can apply for 
additional reimbursement/subsidy. 
 
XII. The multidisciplinary group (MDG) that has dedicated itself to the fulfillment of the 
UNDPAD will launch the UNDPAD on the international day of human rights, 10 
December 2015, for involved organizations and citizens. An extensive launch for the 
national population will take place at a later time.  
 
XIII. Appointment of one or more ambassadors that will raise attention for racial 
discrimination and breaking the taboo within the context of the UNDPAD. 
 
(Directorate of Foreign Relations 2015:2,3) 
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Appendix XII   Lyrics 
 
Nelson Mandela – Dongo (2014) 
 
Niun koño,  
Djis un badge ku un tiki power! 
Bo ke bati nos den grupo, 
Pa sirbi i proteha, 
Pero hopi ta korupto. 
Hopi partí wanta, 
Grita mí den mi kara, 
Wak mi kar’i sanka, 
Min por hasi nada! 
Mal uso di poder, 
Paso pòrnada bo ke dal mí, 
Bo kièr sa ku mi tin miedu, 
Ta más rabia bo ta n’ami! 
Paso mi ta pretu? 
Bo ta kla pa kue mi sera? 
Voorbeeld grandi mi por nabu, 
Nelson Mandela! 
 
Ba drenta den mi kas, 
Ba haña kos eiden? 
Bo konfiská un kilo, 
B’a entrega 800. 
Kiko pasa ku e sobra anto? 
Dikon bo no deklará un kilo? 
Bo mama no a siñabu? 
P’a kue kos ku no ta di bo? 
Free mi nigga Gino, 
Free mi nigga Sandy, 
M’a bisa nan “trankilo”, 
Nan lo tei un 'beki! 
Korda hasi bo trabou bon, 
Rònt mundu mi ta papia. 
Min ta papia di Kòrsou so, 
Paso rònt mundu e ko’i ta pasa. 
 
Bo ta klap mi den mi lomba,  
Si mi sali kore, 
Si mi ta keda para tambe,  
Tantu sla m’a kome. 
Bo ke baha grita,  
Ni kuminda mi promé, 
Bisa mi keda rustig,  
Bo por lag’e hode! 
Kla pa boei mí, kla pa stot mí, 
Kibra repchi, mandá mi poli, 
[You’re] fucking nothing,  
Just a badge with a bit of power! 
You want to beat us in groups,  
To serve and protect, 
But many are corrupt. 
Many beat you,  
Yell in my face, 
Look down on me, 
I can’t do anything! 
Abuse of power, 
Because you want to beat me for no reason, 
You think I am scared, 
But you only piss me off more! 
Because I am black? 
You want to throw me in jail? 
I can give you a grand example, 
Nelson Mandela! 
 
You entered my house, 
You found something there? 
You confiscated a kilo, 
But handed in 800. 
What happened with the rest, eh? 
Why did you not hand in a kilo? 
Did your mama not teach you? 
You can’t take things that are not yours? 
Free my nigga Gino, 
Free my nigga Sandy,  
I told them to “take it easy,” 
They will be out in a bit! 
Remember, do your job well, 
I am talking about around the world. 
I’m not talking just about Curaçao, 
Cuz this happens around the world… 
 
You shoot me in my back,  
If I run away, 
If I stay put,  
I also get beaten up. 
You start yelling as you get out of the car, 
Without greeting me first, 
Tell me to keep my cool,  
Fuck you!  
Ready to cuff me, ready to beat me, 
Break my ribs, send me to the ER, 
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6 luna riba krùk. 
M’a pèrdè kaso, si mi bai dilanti, 
Si mi hasi algu tambe, bo ke arestá mí? 
Pa tantu tempu, 
Nan ke karsela mí, 
Bo ke menasá mí,  
Pa bo n’ami miedu, 
Bo ta dal mi wanta sin m’a hasi fresku, 
Si mi no hasi nada, sua laga mi ketu! 
Hasi bo trabou p’abo por bai laga mí, 
Bisa mi kon Kòrsou por bai dilanti, 
Bin ku prueba mustra tantu mati, 
Ku a pèrdè bida na Hulanda akí! 
 
Niun koño,  
Djis un badge ku un tiki power! 
Bo ke bati'e nos den grupo, 
Pa sirbi i proteha, 
Pero hopi ta korupto. 
Hopi partí wanta, 
Grita mí den mi kara, 
Wak mi kar’i sanka, 
Min por hasi nada! 
Mal uso di poder, 
Paso pòrnada bo ke dal mí, 
Bo kièr sa ku mi tin miedu, 
Ta más rabia bo ta n’ami! 
Paso mi ta pretu? 
Bo ta kla pa kue mi sera? 
Voorbeeld grandi mi por nabu 
Nelson Mandela! 
 
6 months on crutches. 
I already lost if I take it to court,  
If I move on you, you gonna arrest me? 
This has been going on for so long, 
They want to incarcerate me  
You want to threaten me,  
So you can scare me, 
You beat me without a reason, 
When I don’t do anything, man, fuck off! 
Do what you gotta do and leave me alone, 
Tell me how can Curaçao get ahead, 
I got proof that so many of my friends, 
Have died here in the Netherlands! 
 
[You’re] fucking nothing,  
Just a badge with a bit of power! 
You want to beat us in groups,  
To serve and protect, 
But many are corrupt. 
Many beat you,  
Yell in my face, 
Look down on me, 
I can’t do anything! 
Abuse of power, 
Because you want to beat me for no reason, 
You think I am scared, 
But you only piss me off more! 
Because I am black? 
You want to throw me in jail? 
I can give you a grand example, 
Nelson Mandela! 
https://soundcloud.com/shaiconq/dongo-nelson-mandela 
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Koi Makambanan / This is for the Dutch – Mosta Man (2009 
 
Bob Marley di “emancipate yourself  
From mental slavery,” 
Michael Jackson a hasi su mes blanku, 
Ba wak si. 
Nos no por sigui asinaki. 
 
Ai esaki ta pa e Makambanan, 
No mi lubida riba mi pasado naw, naw, naw 
 
1795 Tula e katibu a disidi di libera su tribu, 
E tabata tin rabia riba e Makamba,  
Pero ku su motibu. 
La reina mes,  
Ta riba nos rasanan ta riku, 
Su rasa a dal Mandela,  
Binti piku anja kastigu, 
Mi no sa presis, pero mas ku 25. 
El a sali bira presidente,  
Tur hende blanku ke ta amigo. 
 
Ai esaki ta koi Makambanan, 
No mi lubida riba mi pasado naw naw naw,  
Ai esaki ta koi Makambanan, 
No mi lubida riba Afrika naw naw naw,  
 
Hiba mi for di Afrika,  
i hiba mi Amerika 
Batimi hasimi slaaf,  
Kier sa mi tin ku keda braaf 
Ai ai, bo kemen esei tin mag 
Try to push mi down mi rasa elke dag 
Kon mi por hasi feest Koninginnedag 
Beatrice duna bling bling na su paleis  
Na Den Haag, 
Ik op de straat met mn lege maag, 
E progreso, e koi a bin muchu traag. 
 
Ai esaki ta e Makambanan, 
Ai no mi lubida riba mi pasado, 
Ai esaki e Makambanan, 
Ai no mi lubida riba Afrika naw naw naw, 
 
Ai Afrika, su naturalesa,  
Su bellesa, su rikesa, 
Bosnan ta ladron, bosnan ta maton, 
Bosnan a separami foi mi nashon, 
Bob Marley said “emancipate yourself  
From mental slavery,” 
Michael Jackson made himself white,  
You saw it. 
We can’t go on like this. 
 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget my past, no, no, no, 
 
1795 Tula the slave decided to free his tribe, 
He was mad at the Dutch,  
But for a reason. 
The queen herself,  
Became rich from exploiting our race, 
Her race punished Mandela,  
For more than 20 years,  
I don’t know precisely but more than 25. 
He came out of jail became president, 
All white people wanted to be his friend. 
 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget my past, no, no, no, 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget Africa, no no no,  
 
Took me from Africa,  
brought me to America, 
Beat me, enslaved me 
They thought I had to be obedient. 
Ai ai, you mean that was allowed, 
Try to push me down, my race, every day, 
How can I celebrate Queensday 
Beatrix puts on the bling bling in her palace in 
the Hague, 
Me in the street with my stomach empty, 
Progess, that came too slow. 
  
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget my past, no, no, no, 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget Africa, no no no, 
 
Africa’s nature, 
Her beauty, her abundance, 
You are thieves, you are killers, 
You separated me from my nation, 
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Bo kemen, 
Mi no tin mag di bula den KLM,  
Pesei Afrika mi a bin represent. 
E stem, Goddamn,  
Bosnan kier sa ku nos ta kens? 
 
Ai esaki ta e Makambanan 
Ai no mi lubida, riba Afrika naw naw naw  
Ai esaki ta e Makambanan 
No mi lubida, riba mi pasado naw naw naw 
 
Tula e katibu libera su tribu, 
Rasista ku su motibu, 
Nigger for real, man, 
E Makambanan kier sa ku nos ta bobo, 
Nan kier sa ku nos ta mahoso,  
Paso nos tin kabei duru, 
Nanishi grandi, lip diki, 
Pero nos ta hendenan bunita,  
Hendenan fuerte, 
Afrikano nos ta, ketubai!  
 
Wanta nos abou, 
Awor nan ta kita nos paspoort, 
Nos no tin mag di bai Ulanda. 
Danki Dios nan a mata Pim Fortuyn,  
For real nigger! 
Mi’n tin miedu di niun hende, no, 
E berdat, mi ta bisanan den nan kara brother, 
For real…  
 
Ai esaki ta pa e Makambanan, 
Pa mi lubida, riba mi pasado naw naw naw,  
Ai esaki ta pa e Makambanan, 
Pa mi lubida, riba Afrika naw naw naw,  
 
Gobierdo di Korsou ta chupa chupa Makamba,  
Nan ta skop bosnan despues den bosnan 
atras… 
 
You mean, 
I am not allowed to fly with KLM,  
That’s why I came to represent Africa. 
The voice, Goddamn, 
You think we are stupid? 
 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget Africa, no no no, 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget my past, no, no, no, 
 
Tula liberated his tribe, 
He was racist for a reason, 
Nigger for real, man. 
The Dutch think we’re stupid, 
They think we are ugly, 
Because we have frizzy hair, 
Big noses, thick lips, 
But we are beautiful people, 
Strong people, 
Africans we are, still! 
 
Beat us down, 
Now they take our passports, 
We are not allowed to go to the Netherlands. 
Thank God they killed Pim Fortuyn 
For real nigger! 
I ain’t afraid of anyone, no, 
The truth, I tell it to their face brother, 
For real… 
 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget my past, no, no, no, 
This is for the Dutch, 
Don’t let me forget Africa, no no no, 
 
The Curaçaoan government sucks up to the 
Dutch, 
And then they kick you in the ass…. 
 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYlwkJJXUD8 
 
  
 382 
VITA 
 
ANGELA E. ROE 
 
Born, Amsterdam, Netherlands 
  
1994-1996    B.A., Cultural Anthropology 
University of Amsterdam  
Amsterdam, the Netherlands  
 
1997-2003    M.A., Cultural Anthropology 
    Free University of Amsterdam 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
 
2007-2009    M.A., Global & Sociocultural Studies 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
Teaching Assistant 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2009-2016    Doctoral Candidate 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS  
 
Roe, A. E. (May, 2016). “Curaçao Seen Through the Lens of Race.” Lecture presented at 
the General Faculty of the University of Curaçao lecture cycle in preparation of the 
Bachelor degree in Culture Studies. 
 
Roe, A. E. (September, 2015). Sombra di Koló / The Shadow of Color: Race Relations in 
Curaçao Today. Screening presented at the Royal University of Leiden, Netherlands, at 
the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies.  
 
Roe, A. E. (May, 2015) Sombra di Koló / The Shadow of Color: Race Relations in 
Curaçao Today. Screening presented at the Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies 
Association, New Orleans, USA. 
 
Roe, A. E. (March, 2015). Sombra di Koló / The Shadow of Color: Race Relations in 
Curaçao Today. Screening presented at Bridgewater State University.  
 
Roe, A. E. (March, 2015.) “Colorism and Pigmentocracy in the Dutch Caribbean.” 
Lecture presented at the English Department ENGL 318 at Bridgewater State University. 
 383 
 
Roe, A. E. (January, 2015). “Curaçao’s Slave Codes and their Contemporary Legacy.” 
Lecture presented at the Annual Program in Comparative and International Law in 
Curaçao, co-sponsored by the University of Baltimore School of Law and the Maurice A. 
Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, offered in cooperation with the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam Faculty of Law, and hosted by the University of Curaçao.  
 
Roe, A. E. (October, 2014). “Contemporary Race Relations in Curaçao and their Roots in 
Colonial Slave Codes.” Lecture presented at the School of Law at the University of 
Curaçao.  
Roe, A. E. Sombra di Koló / The Shadow of Color: Race Relations in Curaçao Today. 
Documentary Film. 2014. 71 min. Willemstad, Curaçao: Warwarú Productions. 
 
Roe, A. E. (June, 2013). “Racism and Racial Representation in Curaçao Today.” Lecture 
presented at the interdisciplinary lecture series “150 Years of Abolition of Slavery” of the 
University of Curaçao.  
 
Roe, A. E. (November, 2014) Sombra di Koló / The Shadow of Color: Race Relations in 
Curaçao Today. Screening presented at the Caribbean Regional Conference of 
Psychology, hosted by the Caribbean Alliance of National Psychological Associations 
(CANPA), Paramaribo, Surinam.  
 
Roe, A. E. (November, 2010). “In the Belly of the Tambú: Curaçao’s African Heritage 
and the Re-Imagination of a Nation.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the 
American Anthropological Association, New Orleans.  
 
Roe, A. E. (May, 2010) “No Tur Sinku Dede Ta Pareu” (“Not All Five Fingers Are The 
Same”): Inclusion, Exclusion and the Imagining of Nationhood in Curaçao.” Paper 
presented at the Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Barbados.  
 
Roe, A. E. (December, 2009). “Disjunction Between National Identity Formation and the 
Lived Experience of Racism in the Postcolonial Dutch Caribbean.” Paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of the American Anthropological Association, Philadelphia.  
 
Roe, A. E. (June, 2009). “Curaçao’s Myth of Racial Democracy.” Paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Kingston, Jamaica.  
 
Roe, A. E. (May, 2008).“The Sound of Silence: A Personal Narrative about Three 
Generations of Dutch-Caribbean Women.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of 
the Caribbean Studies Association, San Andres Island, Colombia. 
 
Roe, A. E. “Review of “The Politics of Passion: Women’s Sexual Culture in the Afro-
Surinamese Diaspora.” The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, 
12(1), February 2007: 285-287.  
